Server-prefixed tool names are not unique across servers: server 'a'
exposing 'b_x' and server 'a_b' exposing 'x' both bind as 'a_b_x'. The
flatten step forwarded both declarations to the model, where the provider
silently keeps only one and the other server's tool becomes unreachable
with no diagnostic.
Deduplicate by bound name in enabled-server declaration order and drop
later duplicates with a warning.
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(mcp): keep rotating OAuth refresh tokens across restarts and Gateway instances
MCP servers on the OAuth refresh_token grant lost their rotated refresh
token whenever a new process or manager started (restart, tool-cache
reset for non-task servers, every personal-connection run, a second
Gateway instance) and re-seeded with the consumed configured token,
getting invalid_grant for good.
- New table mcp_oauth_tokens (migration 0047_mcp_oauth_tokens), one row
per refresh_token connection keyed (scope, owner_user_id, server_key):
('deployment', '', name) or ('personal', owner, personal runtime
name). Access and refresh tokens are DEER_FLOW_CREDENTIALS_KEY
ciphertext; a config fingerprint (token_url, client_id, grant, scope,
audience, seed) makes a changed seed win.
- OAuthTokenManager re-reads the row under its process lock, adopts a
peer's valid token, and otherwise claims the refresh with a lease plus
a version compare-and-set (database clock), fetches outside any
transaction, writes under the lease and releases it on failure.
- The Gateway installs the store (sync engine via to_thread) around the
LangGraph runtime for sqlite/postgres; personal managers pass their
owner. client_credentials stays in process; an unloadable key falls
back to process memory; database errors fail the refresh.
- credentials_key_consumers lists refresh_token MCP OAuth servers, so a
declared multi-instance deployment needs the shared key.
Docs: MCP_SERVER.md, CONFIGURATION.md, Helm README, README, mcp and
migrations AGENTS.md, CHANGELOG (en/zh).
* docs(changelog): link the MCP OAuth token store entry to #7207
* fix(mcp): prune removed connections' OAuth token rows and ask owners to re-authorize on invalid_grant
Review follow-up (willem-bd):
- Both MCP config writers drop mcp_oauth_tokens rows of connections a
save removes (deployment: _commit_mcp_config_write; personal:
_mutate, keeping each connection's enabled/disabled runtime-name
variants so a toggle keeps its chain). Best effort; no startup sweep,
since a missing config file would look like every server removed.
- invalid_grant on a refresh_token request raises
McpOAuthReauthorizationRequired: the tool error names the server and
asks for a new refresh token, plus the shared-key hint when this
instance could not decrypt the stored chain.
- Annotate the gateway helpers' config as AppConfig.
* fix(mcp): renew the OAuth refresh lease, keep unstored rotations, and key access tokens by request parameters
Review follow-up (willem-bd, second round):
- HTTPX timeouts bound each I/O wait, not a whole response: the refresh
holder now renews its lease every third of REFRESH_LEASE_SECONDS while
the token request runs and abandons it after REFRESH_MAX_SECONDS (120 s);
waiters outlast a live holder. Regression uses a real loopback endpoint
that streams its body for three lease lengths.
- A refresh whose tokens could not be stored keeps them pending
(unsaved_base_version): they are written back before an older stored
token is adopted or refreshed with, retried every few seconds while the
access token is still valid, and dropped once a peer stored a newer
chain. A failed save releases the lease.
- New token_request_fingerprint (extra_token_params and response fields):
a stored access token is reused only under the same request parameters;
otherwise the stored refresh-token chain is refreshed.
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(mcp): keep resolved credentials out of discovery failure logs
A failed per-server MCP discovery logged the raw exception message and traceback. ExtensionsConfig resolves $VAR values before validation, so a discovery error can embed a resolved-credential request URL (for example an httpx error carrying a URL with userinfo). Log only the server name and the exception type instead, at both the per-server and whole-phase handlers, and pin it with a caplog regression test using a simulated credential.
* test(mcp): assert the exact retained server name when redacting logs
The redaction regression test asserted a bare "A" in the captured log, which any unrelated A would satisfy. Assert the full "server 'A'" fragment so the test actually proves the offending server name is preserved while the credential is not.
* test(mcp): assert structured discovery warning arguments
The redaction change made the per-server discovery warning a parameterized log call, so asserting the server name inside the raw format string no longer matches. Assert the structured arguments instead: the server name, the exception type, the fully formatted message, and the absence of exc_info.