* feat(e2b-sandbox): make mount upload deadline configurable
Replace the hardcoded 120-second mount upload deadline with a
configurable `mount_upload_deadline_seconds` key read from
SandboxConfig (extra=allow). The value is validated: zero and
negative inputs are clamped to 1 second. Omitting the key
preserves the existing 120-second default.
This addresses the follow-up from PR #4842 review: operators
with large mounts or slow networks can now size the deadline to
their deployment without changing code.
* fix(e2b-sandbox): address review feedback on configurable deadline
- Remove import-time default capture from _mount_deadline_reason()
and _MountUploadBudget.deadline_seconds to prevent silent drift.
- Add warning log when mount_upload_deadline_seconds is clamped to 1
(was silent before).
- Update AGENTS.md E2B Mount Uploads section: deadline is now
configurable, not fixed 120.
- Add mount_upload_deadline_seconds to YAML examples in provider
docstring and __init__.py.
- Add config-path test that exercises SandboxConfig -> _load_config ->
_apply_mounts end-to-end.
* fix(e2b-sandbox-provider): handle non-numeric mount_upload_deadline_seconds
Guard _resolve_mount_upload_deadline against None, non-numeric strings,
and other invalid values. None returns the default; non-numeric strings
like '120s' or 'abc' log a warning and fall back to the 120-second
default instead of crashing provider init with TypeError/ValueError.
Extend the parametrized clamp test with None, suffix, and alpha cases,
and add a warning assertion. Update CONFIGURATION.md with the new
mount_upload_deadline_seconds key and its behavior.
* fix(sandbox): handle infinite mount deadline
Add deerflow.community.serply.tools:web_search_tool, a Google SERP
provider for the web_search slot that also covers Google News and Google
Scholar through an optional `vertical` config option. Reads the key from
api_key in config.yaml or SERPLY_API_KEY, clamps max_results to Serply's
1-100 range, and returns the same structured JSON errors as the Serper
and Brave tools.
Register the provider in config.example.yaml, scripts/doctor.py,
scripts/wizard/providers.py, .env.example, backend/docs/CONFIGURATION.md,
the en/zh tools.mdx provider tabs, and tools/AGENTS.md. Tests mock httpx.
* fix(sandbox): harden local Docker sandbox containers and port binding
Root causes (security audit SBX-1/SBX-2) in the local container backend:
- _resolve_docker_bind_host published sandbox ports on 0.0.0.0 whenever
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_HOST was non-loopback (docker-compose defaults to
host.docker.internal), exposing the unauthenticated /v1/shell/* exec
API on every host interface.
- _start_container ran every sandbox with seccomp=unconfined and no
capability, privilege-escalation, or resource limits, so untrusted
model-authored code could exhaust the host, escalate privileges, and
reach internal networks / cloud metadata endpoints directly.
Hardening changes and defaults:
- Port binding: non-loopback sandbox hosts now bind the Docker default
bridge gateway instead of 0.0.0.0, discovered dynamically via
`docker network inspect bridge` with a static 172.17.0.1 fallback.
host.docker.internal resolves to that gateway through host-gateway,
so DooD gateways and the Docker host still reach the sandbox while
external interfaces no longer see the port.
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_BIND_HOST=0.0.0.0 restores the legacy broad bind.
- seccomp=unconfined is no longer unconditional: sandboxes run with
Docker's default seccomp profile; opt back in with
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_SECCOMP_UNCONFINED=1, only when the sandbox image
is verified to require syscalls the default profile blocks.
- Add --cap-drop=ALL and --security-opt no-new-privileges (Docker only;
the Apple Container CLI does not support these flags).
- Bounded resources with env overrides: --memory 2g
(DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_MEMORY), --cpus 2 (DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_CPUS),
--pids-limit 512 (DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_PIDS_LIMIT); each also accepts
"0"/"none" to disable the limit.
- No --user is forced by default (the default AIO sandbox image's user
is upstream-controlled and unverified), but
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_CONTAINER_USER passes one through for deployments
that know their image.
- DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_NETWORK passes --network so sandboxes can be
attached to a dedicated egress-controlled network; default networking
is unchanged.
backend/docs/CONFIGURATION.md documents the new bind behavior and every
override; tests cover each default and escape hatch.
* fix(sandbox): follow host-gateway mapping for binds; keep image-required seccomp default
Review follow-ups on the hardening change:
- Bind: resolve the sandbox host itself and bind that address, instead of
assuming the default bridge IPv4. host.docker.internal follows the
daemon host-gateway-ip mapping (customizable, possibly IPv6), so the
resolved address is exactly where the gateway connects — the published
port and advertised URL always match. IPv6 is bracketed for docker -p,
zone ids stripped, wildcard resolutions ignored; unresolved hosts fall
back to the bridge gateway with a warning pointing at
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_BIND_HOST.
- seccomp: the shipped AIO image needs seccomp=unconfined for its
Chromium browser (upstream quick-start always passes it; the upstream
FAQ documents the browser failing under Docker default profile), so
that option returns as the default. Tightening stays possible via
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_SECCOMP_PROFILE=<path to a restricted,
Chromium-compatible profile> or DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_SECCOMP_UNCONFINED=0
for images verified to work with Docker's default profile.
- cap-drop/no-new-privileges and the resource limits are unchanged.
- Tests updated for both behaviors; 37 pass.
* fix(sandbox): bracket bare IPv6 bind overrides; state seccomp default accurately
DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_BIND_HOST was returned verbatim, so a bare IPv6 literal
like fd00::1 produced an invalid publish spec (fd00::1:port:8080); Docker
requires the bracketed form. Normalize raw and already-bracketed IPv6
literals (IPv4/hostnames untouched), with resolver-level and argv-level
tests covering the explicit IPv6 override.
The CONFIGURATION.md overview claimed Docker's default seccomp profile
stays active, contradicting the seccomp=unconfined default the table (and
the code) actually ship for the Chromium-based image; spell out the relaxed
default and where to change it.
* style(sandbox): apply ruff format to local_backend
* fix(sandbox): reject host networking, force builtin seccomp opt-out, resolve hostname binds
Review follow-up on #4986 (willem-bd):
- P1: DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_NETWORK=host (and container:<name>) now raise a
RuntimeError at start instead of silently voiding the hardened port
bind — Docker discards -p/--publish in host mode and shares the
network namespace for container:<name>, which would re-expose the
unauthenticated exec API on the host's interfaces. Two regression
tests cover both rejections.
- P2: the seccomp opt-out now passes seccomp=builtin explicitly instead
of omitting the option, so a daemon configured with an unconfined or
custom default cannot weaken the documented opt-out; the test asserts
the flag.
- P2: hostname values in DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_BIND_HOST resolve to an
address before use (Docker publish specs require an IP literal as the
host part, so host.docker.internal previously produced an invalid
spec that prevented every sandbox from starting); unresolvable names
raise a clear configuration error. Tests cover resolution and
rejection; CONFIGURATION.md updated for all three behaviors.
43/43 pass in tests/test_aio_sandbox_local_backend.py; ruff check +
format clean.
* fix(sandbox): reject DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_NETWORK=none (loopback-only, breaks published API port)
* fix(sandbox): validate the effective Docker network target; normalize IPv6 sandbox hosts once
name=host / name=none dodge raw-string checks but attach like the bare
words; strip name= prefixes and validate the effective target (network IDs
keep passing). Bracketed IPv6 sandbox hosts now resolve for the bind and
bare IPv6 hosts produce bracketed URL authorities — both input forms give
identical bind and URL addresses.
* fix(sandbox): parse the full Docker network long syntax before validating
Docker accepts comma-separated key=value fields in any order (name=, gw-priority=,
alias=, ...); a name=host field hides the host network behind surrounding fields.
Parse the CSV and validate the parsed name= target (last occurrence wins, fields
lowercased, mirroring opts/network.go); no-name values fall through like Docker's
own rejection.
* fix(sandbox): keep CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID through cap-drop=ALL for the default image
The shipped image's entrypoint starts as root, creates the gem user,
chowns /opt/jupyter and drops to that user via su; without those three
capabilities the set -e script dies before the readiness endpoint exists.
no-new-privileges stays (it blocks gaining privileges via exec, not using
the added caps). Adds a docker-gated real-image startup smoke test.
* fix(sandbox): let pre-initialized non-root images drop the startup capabilities
The CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID re-add only exists for the shipped image's root
entrypoint handoff. A custom image that never runs as root gets an explicit
opt-out (DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_IMAGE_STARTUP_CAPS=0) so those capabilities are
not left available to sandboxed code (chown on bind mounts, UID/GID
impersonation).
* test(sandbox): gate the real-image smoke test behind the live marker
The default offline suite (make test = -m 'not live') must not depend on a
third-party registry: mark the smoke test live, probe the daemon inside the
test body (never at collection time), and allow pinning the image reference
via DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_SMOKE_IMAGE for a dedicated integration job.
* test/docs: isolate DEER_FLOW_SANDBOX_IMAGE_STARTUP_CAPS in tests; add table row; split custom-image guidance
_clear_hardening_env now clears the new knob so a developer shell or .env
preset cannot flip the default-path tests. CONFIGURATION.md gains the table
row, and the custom-image guidance becomes its own paragraph with the
no-new-privileges scope stated correctly (it does not mitigate the retained
CAP_SETUID/SETGID risk).
* test(sandbox): make the live smoke test diagnosable
300s readiness budget (cold pull + cold start must not be conflated with
broken capabilities) and dump the container's last 40 log lines on failure
so the next live run tells us whether the capability set is incomplete
(chown/useradd/su errors) or the services are merely slow.
* test(ci): align the smoke test with the 60s provider deadline; add a dedicated live smoke workflow
Single-source the readiness deadline as SANDBOX_LOCAL_PROVIDER_READY_TIMEOUT
(used by both provider paths and the smoke test) so the validation cannot
drift from the production contract again. New sandbox-image-smoke.yml runs
the live test on a dedicated job, with the image reference pinnable via the
SANDBOX_SMOKE_IMAGE repository variable (digest resolved and recorded in the
job summary when falling back to :latest).
* test(sandbox): pull the failing program's own logs on smoke failure
supervisord only surfaces exit codes in docker logs; nginx's stderr lands in
files inside the container. Dump supervisor program logs, nginx -t, and the
nginx error log on failure so the next run names the exact broken line.
* ci(sandbox): export an immutable repo@digest reference for the smoke run
docker pull once on the runner platform, resolve RepoDigests[0], and pass
that immutable reference to the test via GITHUB_ENV — the recorded and
executed images can no longer diverge when the tag moves, and platform
selection is left to the daemon instead of jq over the manifest index.
* fix(sandbox): add DAC_OVERRIDE — the root nginx master writes gem-owned logs
The image's root nginx master opens /var/log/nginx/{access,error}.log,
which belong to the gem user, for the container's lifetime; without
CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE it dies with 'open() failed (13: Permission denied)' on
every start (FATAL under supervisord) and readiness never arrives. Four
capabilities now: CHOWN/SETUID/SETGID for the entrypoint handoff plus this
runtime log-write need.
Adds scheduler.recursion_limit to config.yaml (default 1000, clamped by
max_recursion_limit) so scheduled background runs can use a different
recursion limit than the web UI. The value is read at dispatch time, so
a YAML edit applies to the next scheduled run without a Gateway restart.
Also logs a warning when the resolver falls back to the default or
clamps the configured value.
* feat: integrate MiniMax Code as an ACP agent
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(agents): database-backed storage for custom agent definitions
Add an agent_storage.backend switch (default file, behaviour-unchanged) with a
db backend that stores each custom agent as a row in the shared SQL persistence
layer, so a multi-instance deployment sees the same agents on every node
(#4331, #4357). Introduces an AgentStore interface routing all read/write
surfaces, an agents table + migration 0006, startup validation, and a file->db
importer. Follows the thread_meta store / run_events backend-switch /
0003_scheduled_tasks migration patterns; no new dependency.
* fix(agents): make db storage path production-ready (review round 1)
Addresses review feedback on the db/sync agent-storage path:
- sql.py: mirror the async engine's per-connection SQLite PRAGMAs on the sync
engine (busy_timeout=30000, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON, WAL) so both
engines behave identically against the shared DB; guard the engine cache with
a lock (double-checked) so concurrent first-touch cannot build duplicate
engines or register the connect listener twice.
- routers/agents.py + routers/assistants_compat.py: offload the sync-store reads
that ran on the event loop (list/get/check, update's pre-read + legacy guard +
refresh, and assistants_compat's four list routes) via asyncio.to_thread — on
db+postgres each was a network round trip stalling the loop. Writes were
already offloaded.
- file.py: translate the create() mkdir(exist_ok=False) race FileExistsError
into AgentExistsError (router 409, matching SqlAgentStore's IntegrityError
path); correct the _write docstring — per-file atomic replace, two commits
sequential not transactional.
Tests: sync-engine PRAGMA + engine-cache reuse assertions; file create-race ->
AgentExistsError; strict Blockbuster anchor over the read endpoints so a
regression back onto the loop fails CI.
* fix(agents): address round-2 review on the db store path
- update_agent tool: align the docstring/inline comment with FileAgentStore._write.
Cross-field write atomicity is db-only; the file backend commits config then
soul via two sequential os.replace (a crash between them can leave a fresh
config.yaml beside a stale SOUL.md). The dropped partial-write *reporting* is
an intentional tradeoff — the stage-then-replace safety is preserved
(test_update_agent_soul_failure_does_not_replace_config still holds).
- SqlAgentStore.update(): true upsert. Catch IntegrityError on the
insert-on-missing branch, re-fetch and apply, so two concurrent first-time
writes (e.g. two setup_agent handshakes) converge instead of surfacing a raw
UNIQUE(user_id, name) violation as a 500. Symmetric with create().
- get_agent_store(): document the graph-subprocess config-resolution invariant
(the except->file fallback is a genuine no-config path, not a mask for a
misconfigured graph process) and pin it with two tests driving the real
get_app_config() file resolution: db resolves from an on-disk config.yaml,
file fallback when config is unresolvable.
* test(agents): cover SqlAgentStore.update() write-race upsert recovery
Mandatory-TDD test for the round-2 fix in 0680340a: two concurrent first-time
update()s where the loser's insert hits UNIQUE(user_id, name). Deterministically
forces the IntegrityError recovery path by making the first _row probe miss the
committed winner, and asserts last-writer-wins instead of a surfaced 500.
* feat(browser): add agentic browser control
* fix(frontend): format browser view changes
* fix(browser): keep browser optional and isolate sidecar layout
* fix(browser): address PR review security and IME findings
- Nginx: add a browser-stream WebSocket location before the generic
/api/threads regex so Live upgrades instead of downgrading to HTTP
(both nginx.conf and nginx.local.conf).
- Ownership: require an existing owned thread for the WS stream and REST
navigate, and tear down the browser session on thread deletion so a
later caller cannot reuse a retained page/cookies by guessing the id.
- SSRF: enforce the URL policy at the browser request boundary via a
context-level route guard covering redirects, popups, iframes, and
subresources (skipped for CDP-attached Chrome).
- IME: skip key forwarding while a composition is active so confirming a
CJK candidate with Enter no longer submits the remote page form.
Adds regression tests for the request guard, session teardown on delete,
and the composing-Enter key decision.
* fix(frontend): smooth streaming in long tool threads
* Revert "fix(frontend): smooth streaming in long tool threads"
This reverts commit f0462516eabe77f138d4027ea1c714fb226683cf.
* fix(browser): address review security and lifecycle findings
- Reject cross-origin WebSocket upgrades on the live browser stream
(Origin allow-list reuse of CORS/same-origin helpers) to close a
WS-CSRF hole, and fail closed when the ownership store is absent.
- Warn when a CDP-attached session runs with the SSRF request guard
off, and drop the unreachable CDP screencast teardown dead code.
- Read browser session launch config from a single canonical source
(browser_navigate) so it is deterministic regardless of call order.
- Bound per-thread Chromium accumulation with idle-timeout eviction
and an LRU max-sessions cap.
- Reset the Live reconnect counter on a successful open so the stream
can't permanently stall after the cumulative attempt cap.
* fix(frontend): reduce long tool thread render stalls
Reuse stable historical message groups during streaming, defer heavy Markdown and browser previews, and lazy-decode message images.
* fix(browser): keep live control responsive during continuous input
Why: Manual browser control felt laggy — a physical click ran the remote
Playwright click three times and each non-move input synchronously awaited a
JPEG screenshot, so events queued behind capture (queue wait up to ~237ms).
The first async attempt used a trailing-edge debounce, which froze the visible
page until a wheel/keyboard gesture stopped ("scroll finishes, then it jumps").
What:
- Frontend forwards one `click` per physical click instead of also emitting
`down`/`up`, so the remote page is not clicked twice per gesture.
- Backend detaches live-frame capture from input dispatch: non-move actions
start a rate-limited background refresh loop (leading frame + bounded cadence)
that keeps emitting frames while input continues and never blocks dispatch.
- Add regression tests: input dispatch no longer awaits the screenshot, rapid
inputs coalesce, and continuous input keeps refreshing before it stops.
Scenarios: Verified in the live Browser panel — a single click completes in
~57ms (was blocked behind a 171ms capture), and a 1.14s sustained wheel gesture
renders ~7 frames throughout the scroll instead of one frame after it ends.
* fix(browser): harden worker and session lifecycle
* fix(browser): address latest review feedback
* fix(frontend): preserve optimistic new-chat message
* test(e2e): preserve mocked message run ids
* fix(browser): address capability review feedback
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* Add phase 1 skill static scanning
* Rework SkillScan phase 1 as native scanner
* refactor(skillscan): align phase 1 with trimmed RFC contract
- SecurityFinding: 7 fields (rule_id, severity, file, line, message,
remediation, evidence); category/analyzer derive from the rule_id
prefix, confidence/column/fingerprint/metadata removed
- scan_archive_preflight()/scan_skill_dir() are pure functions: no
ScanContext, no policy schema; CRITICAL-blocks is a code constant and
skill_scan.enabled is applied by enforce_static_scan()/callers
- secret-* evidence is redacted before findings leave the scanner
- de-dup keys on (rule_id, file, line) so repeated occurrences keep
distinct locations for agent self-correction
- cloud-metadata detection consolidated into network-cloud-metadata
- nested zip members get a one-level stdlib magic-byte peek; an
executable member escalates package-nested-archive to CRITICAL
- install metadata sidecar removed (Phase 7 decides if it is needed)
- rule specs moved next to their analyzers; skillscan/rules/ removed
- tests updated + new anchors: redaction, dedup lines, nested-zip
escalation, single cloud-metadata rule, bundled-skill zero-CRITICAL
* fix(skillscan): tighten reverse-shell/secret/archive scan rules from review
Address PR #3033 review feedback on the native SkillScan analyzers:
- Reverse-shell false positives: split shell detection by signal strength
(/dev/tcp/, nc -e stay CRITICAL; bash -i, mkfifo -> new HIGH
shell-reverse-shell-heuristic, warn->LLM). The Python check is now
AST-anchored on real socket.socket/os.dup2/subprocess call sites instead
of raw-text substring matching, so prose/docstrings no longer hard-block.
- Secret evidence: _redact_secret_evidence returns [redacted] with no secret
bytes (was value[:6], which leaked 2 real token bytes past the prefix).
- Archive DoS: cap outer archive member count (_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS=4096);
scan_archive_preflight early-aborts with a package-too-many-members CRITICAL
finding (routes through the existing blocked->400 fail-closed path).
- shell-destructive-command: broaden the rm -rf matcher to sensitive system
roots (/home, /usr, /*, --no-preserve-root /) while leaving safe subpaths
unflagged.
- Dead code: collapse _decode_text_for_analysis to a single decode path and
drop the unused _TEXT_SUFFIXES set and _has_text_shebang helper.
- local_skill_storage: document why the host_path branch keeps app_config
possibly-None (lazy kill-switch resolution; avoids eager get_app_config in
config-free environments such as CI).
Tests: new negative/positive coverage in test_skillscan_native.py. Full
backend suite 6616 passed, 26 skipped.
ModelConfig is `extra="allow"`, so a config key like `api_base` (which
config.example.yaml uses for other model classes, e.g. PatchedChatDeepSeek and
Moonshot) gets copied onto a `langchain_openai:ChatOpenAI` model by users.
LangChain's OpenAI client does not reject the unknown kwarg — it transfers it
into `model_kwargs` (with a UserWarning), which is then spread into every
`Completions.create()` call and rejected by the OpenAI SDK at REQUEST time with
an opaque `unexpected keyword argument 'api_base'` error. The endpoint override
is also silently dropped, so the model targets the wrong base URL.
Changes in factory.py, mirroring the existing OpenAI-compatible helpers:
- `_normalize_openai_base_url`: renames `api_base` -> `base_url` for the
OpenAI-compatible family (ChatOpenAI + PatchedChatOpenAI); when an endpoint
key is already present, drops the alias with a warning. Runs before the
stream_usage/stream_chunk_timeout heuristics so they see the canonical key.
- `_warn_unknown_model_settings`: scoped to the same OpenAI-compatible family
(where the model_kwargs divert-and-crash actually happens and the field/alias
set is accurate), logs an actionable warning for unrecognized config keys.
- The three OpenAI-compatible helpers now share `_OPENAI_COMPAT_USE_PATHS`
instead of disagreeing on the literal class string.
Adds a note to docs/CONFIGURATION.md and 9 tests covering normalization
(ChatOpenAI + PatchedChatOpenAI, both-set precedence for base_url and
openai_api_base, non-OpenAI class untouched, no-op when unset) and the
unknown-key warning (fires on a typo, silent on a clean config and on
non-OpenAI providers like ChatAnthropic).
* feat: add scheduled tasks MVP
* fix: harden scheduled task execution semantics
* feat(scheduled-tasks): preset-driven schedule form with timezone and live preview
Replace the raw cron input with a preset Select (hourly/daily/weekly/monthly/custom)
plus structured inputs (time picker, weekday toggles, day-of-month), datetime-local
for one-time tasks, a timezone selector defaulting to the browser timezone, and a
live human-readable preview. Reuses one ScheduledTaskScheduleInput for create and
edit; backend contract unchanged; zero new deps (pure Intl + DST-safe offset helpers).
* feat(scheduled-tasks): full-page i18n + recipe templates + E2E locale pin
Localize the rest of the scheduled-tasks page (filters, detail pane, actions,
edit form, run list, enum values) via t.scheduledTasks.* in en/zh. Add four
built-in recipe templates (GitHub Trending, news digest, issue triage, weekly
report) exposed as a chip row that pre-fills title + prompt + schedule. Pin
Playwright locale to en-US so E2E selectors stay stable against i18n. No backend
change, no new deps.
* fix(scheduled-tasks): idempotent 0003 migration, update head constants, future-date once test
Merge with main surfaced three CI failures:
- 0003_scheduled_tasks create_table collided with legacy test seeds that
build from full metadata; guard with inspector.has_table so the revision
no-ops when the table already exists (0004/0005 are already idempotent via
_helpers.py).
- persistence bootstrap concurrency/regression tests pinned HEAD to main's
0002_runs_token_usage; bump to the new head 0005_scheduled_task_thread_nullable.
- once-task router test used a fixed past run_at and tripped the
must-be-in-the-future validation; use a future date.
* address review: ok-check, 502 for trigger failure, mock fields, migration filename, doc fences
- fetchThreadScheduledTasks now checks response.ok like the other fetchers.
- trigger endpoint returns 502 (not 409) when dispatch fails outright, so
clients can distinguish a real conflict from a server-side failure.
- E2E mock normalizes scheduled-task objects with context_mode/last_thread_id
and nullable thread_id, matching the backend contract the UI renders against.
- Rename 0002_scheduled_tasks.py -> 0003_scheduled_tasks.py to match its
revision id (file was renamed in spirit already; filename now follows).
- CONFIGURATION.md: close the Tool Groups yaml fence and drop the stray fence
after the Scheduler notes so the sections render correctly.
* fix(scheduled-tasks): harden lease, poller, config, and frontend UX after review
* fix(scheduled-tasks): harden run lifecycle, overlap skip, non_interactive gating, and DST conversion after review
- defer a once task's terminal status to the run-completion hook; the task
stays running until the real outcome, and a startup sweep cancels once
tasks orphaned by a crash (launch-time 'completed' could stick forever)
- record interrupted runs as a distinct 'interrupted' run status with a
readable message; an interrupted once task ends 'cancelled', not 'failed'
- enforce overlap_policy=skip for fresh_thread_per_run via an active-run
pre-check (same-thread ConflictError can never fire across fresh threads)
- protect terminal run statuses from the late launch-path 'running' write
- honor context.non_interactive only for internally-authenticated callers;
arbitrary clients can no longer strip ask_clarification
- fix DST-stale timezone offset in zonedLocalToUtcIso by re-deriving the
offset at the resolved instant (once tasks fired an hour late around
spring-forward and the create->edit round-trip diverged)
- drop dead ScheduledTaskRunRepository.update_by_run_id; share one Gateway
API error helper between channels and scheduled-tasks frontends
* fix(scheduled-tasks): close review round-3 gaps in guards, concurrency, and API ergonomics
- scrub internal-only context keys (non_interactive) from the assembled run
config for non-internal callers: gating body.context alone left the same
key smuggle-able through the free-form body.config copied verbatim by
build_run_config
- guard update_after_launch with protect_terminal so the launch bookkeeping
write cannot clobber a once task already finalized by a fast-failing run's
completion hook (parent-row sibling of the run-row guard)
- reject a manual trigger while the task has an active run (409) instead of
launching a duplicate concurrent run on fresh_thread_per_run
- re-arm a terminal once task to enabled when PATCH pushes run_at into the
future; previously the endpoint returned 200 with a next_run_at that could
never be claimed
- make max_concurrent_runs a real global cap: each poll claims only into the
remaining budget of active (queued/running) scheduled runs
- paginate GET /scheduled-tasks/{id}/runs (limit<=200, offset) and push the
thread filter of /threads/{id}/scheduled-tasks into SQL
- stamp context.user_id on scheduler-launched runs, matching IM channels, so
user-scoped guardrail providers see the owning user
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Images older than all-in-one-sandbox 1.9.x have no /v1/bash/* routes, so
every env-bearing command (skills declaring required-secrets) surfaced a
raw nginx 404 that the model kept retrying. Detect the 404, remember the
capability gap per sandbox instance, and return an actionable error that
names the minimum image version and the sandbox.image remediation.
No fallback through the legacy shell path on purpose: /v1/shell/exec has
no env parameter, and every workaround puts the secret values back into
the command string or on disk — the exact leak surfaces the
request-scoped secrets design closed.
Closes#3921
* feat(community): add Crawl4AI web_fetch provider
Crawl4AI is a self-hosted, no-API-key web fetcher: it runs headless
Chromium and returns server-cleaned "fit" markdown directly via its
POST /md endpoint, so no client-side readability extraction is needed.
It sits alongside the existing self-hosted Browserless provider.
- deerflow.community.crawl4ai: async Crawl4AiClient + web_fetch_tool
(reads base_url/timeout_s/token/filter from config; "Error:" string
convention; 4096-char cap), mirroring the browserless provider
- tests: 17 unit cases (success, HTTP error, success:false, empty,
timeout, request error, token header, truncation, config reads)
- config.example.yaml: commented web_fetch example
- doctor: register as a no-key (free) web_fetch provider
- setup wizard: add to WEB_FETCH_PROVIDERS (no API key)
- docs: README, CONTRIBUTING, CONFIGURATION, AGENTS provider lists
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(community): address Crawl4AI provider review feedback
- timeout: robust _coerce_timeout (bool / non-numeric -> default) mirroring
jina, so 'timeout: off' no longer becomes 0.0 and times out every request
- read web_fetch config once per invocation and pass values into the client,
so a concurrent hot-reload can't split base_url from filter
- rename config key timeout_s -> timeout to match jina/infoquest (the
default providers); update config.example.yaml + setup wizard
- validate + normalize the markdown filter against {fit,raw,bm25,llm};
unknown values fall back to fit with a warning instead of an opaque HTTP 400
- client: a non-JSON 200 body (reverse proxy / auth wall) now reports the
content-type + snippet instead of a generic JSONDecodeError
- tests: 22 cases (added non-JSON-200, _coerce_timeout, _coerce_filter,
invalid-filter fallback, read-config-once)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: DanielWalnut <45447813+hetaoBackend@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* Add Brave image search community tool
* fix(community): length-cap Brave web_search queries
Apply _clean_query in web_search_tool so over-long queries are trimmed
to Brave's 400-char limit before the API call, matching image_search_tool
and avoiding HTTP 422 from the Brave Search API.
* fix(community): harden Brave image search SSRF guard and dimension mapping
Address PR review findings:
- Catch ValueError from urlparse so a malformed bracketed-IPv6 URL skips
one item instead of crashing the whole image_search call
- Reject IPv6 literals embedding a non-global IPv4 (IPv4-mapped, 6to4,
NAT64, IPv4-compatible), closing the loopback/private SSRF bypass
- Report width/height from the dict of the URL actually returned, so a
surviving thumbnail no longer reports the dropped original's dimensions
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(community): add Browserless web_capture screenshot tool
Add a web_capture tool that renders a page via Browserless /screenshot and
presents it through the artifact system, alongside the existing Browserless
web_fetch provider.
Hardening:
- SSRF guard: reject URLs resolving to private/loopback/link-local (incl. the
169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint)/reserved/multicast/unspecified
addresses; opt out via allow_private_addresses for internal targets.
- Surface a warning when Browserless renders a target page that itself
responded with a non-2xx/3xx status (X-Response-Code), so an error/anti-bot
page is not mistaken for valid visual evidence.
- Dedupe colliding output filenames instead of silently overwriting prior
captures.
Docs: comment out token: $BROWSERLESS_TOKEN in tool examples (an unset $VAR
fails AppConfig startup) and document allow_private_addresses.
* fix(community): format web_capture guard + document local Browserless startup
Address PR #3881 review: fix the lint-backend failure (ruff format on
browserless/tools.py) and add local Browserless startup instructions to
CONFIGURATION.md so reviewers can run the service to try web_fetch/web_capture.
Adds ``deerflow.community.e2b_sandbox.E2BSandboxProvider`` with parity
to AioSandboxProvider: metadata-keyed per-thread persistence, server-
side idle timeout, warm-pool reclaim with liveness checks, /mnt/user-data
bootstrap symlinks, dead-sandbox auto-rebuild, and release-time mirror
of agent outputs back to the host artifact directory.
Signed-off-by: joey <zchengjoey@gmail.com>
* feat(groundroute): add GroundRoute community web_search + web_fetch tools
GroundRoute is a meta search layer over six engines (Serper, Brave, Exa,
Tavily, Firecrawl, Perplexity) with price-based routing and failover. This
adds a self-contained community engine module (httpx only, no new required
deps) mirroring community/brave + community/tavily:
- web_search: POST /v1/search, normalize to {title,url,snippet,source_engine}.
- web_fetch: fetch a URL via mode=page.
- unit tests covering normalization, auth, clamping, and graceful errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(groundroute): register GroundRoute search + fetch in wizard and config
Add GroundRoute to the setup wizard provider lists (SEARCH_PROVIDERS +
WEB_FETCH_PROVIDERS) and as commented web_search + web_fetch examples in
config.example.yaml, mirroring tavily/serper/brave so SEARCH_API can select it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(groundroute): apply repo ruff format (line-length 240)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(groundroute): add GroundRoute to tools docs and config reference
Adds GroundRoute as a web_search and web_fetch option in the en + zh
tools.mdx pages (new tab alongside Tavily/Brave/Exa/etc.) and documents
GROUNDROUTE_API_KEY in CONFIGURATION.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(groundroute): define empty groundroute extra for clean install
The docs install line 'uv add deerflow-harness[groundroute]' (mirroring the
tavily/exa/firecrawl pattern) referenced an undefined extra, which uv accepts
but warns about. GroundRoute needs no extra packages (httpx is a core dep), so
declare an empty 'groundroute' extra in deerflow-harness optional-dependencies
so the documented command resolves without a warning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(groundroute): per-tool api key + honor caller max_results (review)
Address maintainer review on PR #3675:
- _get_api_key(tool_name): web_fetch now reads the web_fetch config block's key
instead of always web_search, so a flow that pairs GroundRoute fetch with a
different search engine authenticates correctly. Mirrors serper/exa/firecrawl.
- web_search honors a caller-supplied max_results (sentinel default None),
falling back to the configured value only when omitted, so the documented
parameter is no longer silently discarded.
- warn-once is now keyed per tool. Tests cover both fixes (web_fetch key,
agent max_results honored).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(community): add Serper Google Images provider for image_search
Add a Serper-backed `image_search` tool alongside the existing Serper
`web_search` provider, so users with a SERPER_API_KEY can pull Google
Images results as reference images for downstream image generation.
- Share request/response handling between web_search and image_search
via `_serper_post` / `_response_items`, with bounded `max_results`
(capped at 10) and query normalization.
- Add a best-effort SSRF guard (`_safe_public_url`) that rejects
non-http(s), localhost and private/non-global IP image URLs; filtered
entries are dropped and never consume the result limit.
- doctor: flag literal `api_key` values in config as a warning and steer
users toward `.env` + `$SERPER_API_KEY`.
- Docs/config: document the Serper image_search provider and SERPER_API_KEY,
and discourage committing literal keys to config.yaml.
- Tests: cover the provider end-to-end (100% line coverage on tools.py)
and the doctor literal-key warning path.
* fix(community): block obfuscated IPv4 literals in Serper image SSRF guard
The image_search SSRF guard only rejected dotted-decimal IP literals; encoded
forms such as decimal (http://2130706433/), hex (0x7f000001) and octal
(0177.0.0.1) raised ValueError in ip_address() and were allowed through, even
though many HTTP clients resolve them to private addresses like 127.0.0.1.
Add _decode_ipv4() to permissively decode these inet_aton-style encodings and
apply the same is_global check; hostnames that do not decode to an IP (e.g.
cafe.com) are still treated as hosts and left to fetch-time re-validation.
Addresses PR review feedback. Tests cover decimal/hex/octal loopback and
private encodings plus non-IP edge cases; tools.py stays at 100% line coverage.
* test(community): cover IPv4-mapped IPv6 URL filtering
* fix(community): address Serper image search review feedback
- Block trailing-dot hostname SSRF bypass (localhost./127.0.0.1.) in
_safe_public_url by stripping the FQDN root label before checks.
- Keep a filtered image/thumbnail URL empty instead of collapsing onto
its counterpart, preserving the high-res/preview contract.
- Evaluate the SSRF guard once per field rather than twice.
- Treat a null-typed organic/images field as "no results" rather than a
malformed payload.
- doctor.py: when a config $VAR is unset, fall through to the default env
var before reporting it as not set.
* feat(community): add Brave Search web search tool
Add a community web_search provider backed by the official Brave Search
API (https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search). API key is read
from the tool config (inline api_key) or the BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY env
var. Output schema (title/url/content) matches existing search tools.
No new dependencies (uses the existing httpx). Also wires up the setup
wizard, doctor health check, config example, and EN/ZH docs.
* refactor(community): drop redundant [:count] slice in Brave search
The Brave API already caps results via the `count` request param, so
client-side slicing was redundant. Tests now simulate the API honoring
`count` instead of relying on the slice. Addresses PR review nit.
* style(tests): apply ruff format to test_doctor.py
Collapse multiline write_text calls onto single lines to satisfy the
CI ruff formatter (lint-backend was failing on format --check).
* docs(spec): MiniMax integration for generation skills + new music skill
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(plan): MiniMax generation providers implementation plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(skills): add importlib loader + FakeResp for skill tests
* test(skills): register loaded module in sys.modules; raise requests.HTTPError in FakeResp
* feat(image-generation): add MiniMax provider with env auto-detect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(image-generation): guard unknown provider, derive ref MIME, strengthen tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(video-generation): add MiniMax provider with async poll/download
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(video-generation): surface base_resp errors while polling; add timeout test
* feat(podcast-generation): add MiniMax t2a_v2 provider with env auto-detect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(podcast-generation): restore TTS credential guard; add volcengine + voice tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(music-generation): new MiniMax music skill via skill-creator
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(music-generation): treat empty lyrics as absent; test no-audio-data path
* refactor(skills): add request timeouts to MiniMax network calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding 'Explicit returns mixed with implicit (fall through) returns'
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(models): strip inconsistent user-message names for MiniMax chat
DeerFlow middlewares tag user messages with provenance names (user-input, summary, loop_warning); langchain serializes them into the OpenAI-compatible payload and MiniMax rejects mismatched user-message names with "user name must be consistent (2013)". PatchedChatMiniMax now drops the per-message name from user-role messages. Point the config.example MiniMax models at PatchedChatMiniMax so they also get reasoning_content mapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(image-generation): MiniMax sends JSON prompt field, guard 1500-char limit
MiniMax image-01 takes one text string capped at 1500 chars, but the skill was sending the whole structured JSON. The MiniMax provider now extracts the JSON `prompt` field (relying on prompt_optimizer to expand it) and fails fast with a clear error before calling the API when that field exceeds 1500 chars. Authoring stays provider-agnostic; Gemini still receives the full JSON.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(podcast-generation): per-provider TTS concurrency and retry/backoff
Each TTS provider owns its concurrency internally — MiniMax runs single-threaded to reduce rate-limit failures, Volcengine keeps 4 workers — with automatic retry and backoff on transient HTTP and base_resp errors. No caller-facing concurrency knob.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(skills): address Copilot review comments on generation skills
- video: add raise_for_status + timeout to the Gemini download/POST/poll calls so non-2xx responses surface as clear HTTP errors instead of JSON/KeyError or hangs
- video: check the task Fail status before the generic base_resp check so the failure keeps its task_id context
- video/image: create the output file parent directory before writing (matching music-generation) so nested output paths do not raise FileNotFoundError
- music: require a non-empty prompt and fail fast with ValueError instead of sending an empty prompt to the API
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(scripts): reclaim dev ports across worktrees in make stop/dev
All deer-flow worktrees (main checkout + linked worktrees) hardcode the same dev ports (8001/3000/2026), so a service started from any worktree must be reclaimable from another. stop_all now resolves the set of worktree roots (DEERFLOW_ROOTS) and treats a process as deer-flow-owned when its open files live under any of them. It also force-kills survivors on 2026 alongside 8001/3000, fixing `make dev` aborting on the nginx port preflight when a prior nginx lingered on 2026.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(view-image): hide the injected image-context message from the UI
ViewImageMiddleware injects a HumanMessage (text + base64 images) so the vision model can see viewed images, but it was the only internal injector that set neither hide_from_ui nor a hidden name, so it leaked into the chat UI (and IM channels) as a user bubble reading "Here are the images you've viewed:". Mark it with additional_kwargs={"hide_from_ui": True}, matching todo/dynamic_context injections, which the frontend isHiddenFromUIMessage and the channel sender already honor. The model still receives the full content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(minimax): mark M2.7 models as text-only (no vision)
MiniMax M2.7 / M2.7-highspeed do not support vision; only M3 does. The
provider config asserted vision support for M2.7 in four places.
- config.example.yaml: 4 M2.7 entries -> supports_vision: false
- backend/docs/CONFIGURATION.md: M2.7 + highspeed -> supports_vision: false
- wizard: add LLMProvider.model_vision_overrides + extra_config_for() so
selecting an M2.7 model writes supports_vision: false while M3 (default)
keeps vision; wire it through setup_wizard.py
- tests: M2.7-highspeed fixture -> supports_vision=False; add
test_minimax_vision_is_per_model
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
- Add MiniMax-M3 to model list and set as default
- Keep MiniMax-M2.7 and MiniMax-M2.7-highspeed
- Remove older models (M2.5)
- Update related tests
Co-authored-by: octo-patch <octo-patch@github.com>
* fix(harness): resolve runtime paths from project root
* docs(config): update
* fix(config): address runtime path review feedback
* test(config): fix skills path e2e root
* test(config): cover legacy config fallback when project root lacks config files
Verifies that when DEER_FLOW_PROJECT_ROOT is unset and cwd has no
config.yaml/extensions_config.json, AppConfig and ExtensionsConfig fall back
to the legacy backend/repo-root candidates — the backward-compat path
requested in PR #2642 review.
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(security): allow disabling API docs in production via GATEWAY_ENABLE_DOCS
Expose /docs, /redoc, and /openapi.json only when GATEWAY_ENABLE_DOCS=true
(default). Setting GATEWAY_ENABLE_DOCS=false disables all three endpoints,
preventing unauthorized API surface discovery in production deployments.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(security): add unit tests and docs for GATEWAY_ENABLE_DOCS
Add 7 tests covering default behavior, env var parsing (case-insensitive,
fail-closed), endpoint visibility, and health endpoint independence.
Update CONFIGURATION.md and CLAUDE.md with the new toggle.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(security): apply ruff formatting to gateway app.py
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(agent): 为AgentConfig添加skills字段并更新lead_agent系统提示
在AgentConfig中添加skills字段以支持配置agent可用技能
更新lead_agent的系统提示模板以包含可用技能信息
* fix: resolve agent skill configuration edge cases and add tests
* Update backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/lead_agent/prompt.py
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* refactor(agent): address PR review comments for skills configuration
- Add detailed docstring to `skills` field in `AgentConfig` to clarify the semantics of `None` vs `[]`.
- Add unit tests in `test_custom_agent.py` to verify `load_agent_config()` correctly parses omitted skills and explicit empty lists.
- Fix `test_make_lead_agent_empty_skills_passed_correctly` to include `agent_name` in the runtime config, ensuring it exercises the real code path.
* docs: 添加关于按代理过滤技能的配置说明
在配置示例文件和文档中添加说明，解释如何通过代理的config.yaml文件限制加载的技能
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix path for TitleMiddleware implementation
* Fix link to Provisioner Setup Guide in CONFIGURATION.md
* Update file path for TitleMiddleware implementation
* Update image paths in Leica photography article
* fix(security): disable host bash by default in local sandbox
* fix(security): address review feedback for local bash hardening
* fix(ci): sort live test imports for lint
* style: apply backend formatter
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat: Add github PAT configs, allowing larger github API rates.
* Update comment to English for better clarity
* fix: Remove unused config lines in config.example.yaml and unreferenced declarations in app_config. Fix lint issues and update documentation.
* fix: Remove unused imports, and passed the ruff check.
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(LLM): fixing Gemini thinking + tool calls via OpenAI gateway (#1180)
When using Gemini with thinking enabled through an OpenAI-compatible gateway,
the API requires that fields on thinking content blocks are
preserved and echoed back verbatim in subsequent requests. Standard
silently drops these signatures when serializing
messages, causing HTTP 400 errors:
Changes:
- Add PatchedChatOpenAI adapter that re-injects signed thinking blocks into
request payloads, preserving the signature chain across multi-turn
conversations with tool calls.
- Support two LangChain storage patterns: additional_kwargs.thinking_blocks
and content list.
- Add 11 unit tests covering signed/unsigned blocks, storage patterns, edge
cases, and precedence rules.
- Update config.example.yaml with Gemini + thinking gateway example.
- Update CONFIGURATION.md with detailed guidance and error explanation.
Fixes: #1180
* Updated the patched_openai.py with thought_signature of function call
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* docs: fix inaccurate thought_signature description in CONFIGURATION.md (#1220)
* Initial plan
* docs: fix CONFIGURATION.md wording for thought_signature - tool-call objects, not thinking blocks
Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com>
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow/sessions/360f5226-4631-48a7-a050-189094af8ffe
---------
Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
