369 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Otavio Rodrigues Santana	27cb73659d	fix(auth): correct OAuth conflict error message + validate multi-worker Postgres claim with real concurrency benchmark (#5026) ... * fix(auth): correct OAuth uniqueness error and index parity on Postgres create_user() caught any IntegrityError on commit and always reported it as a duplicate email. The email pre-check already rules out a real email collision in the common case, so any IntegrityError reaching that handler is actually idx_users_oauth_identity firing instead -- confirmed against both backends: SQLite reports "UNIQUE constraint failed: users.oauth_provider, users.oauth_id", Postgres reports a UniqueViolationError naming the same index. The caller saw "Email already registered" for an OAuth account conflict, which is wrong and would send API consumers debugging the wrong field. Distinguish the two cases via a substring check on the driver error text (both backends name the oauth columns) and raise an accurate message for each. Also add postgresql_where to the same index, alongside the existing sqlite_where. This is not a correctness fix -- verified empirically that Postgres already enforces the same practical uniqueness without it (NULL is never equal to NULL in either backends unique index, so real duplicate (provider, id) pairs are already rejected and NULL/NULL rows are already unconstrained). postgresql_where makes the index genuinely partial on Postgres too, matching the stated intent in the surrounding comment and keeping the index smaller as the common case (plain-password accounts, both columns NULL) accumulates. * test(bench): add multi-process SQLite vs Postgres concurrency benchmark CONFIGURATION.md documents that multi-worker deployments must use Postgres because "SQLite silently ignores row-level locks", but nothing in the repo exercised that claim against real separate worker processes -- the existing checkpoint benchmarks (scripts/benchmark/checkpoint/) measure single-process read/write latency, and the existing Postgres tests (test_pg_schema_integration.py, test_multi_worker_postgres_gate.py) cover schema placement and config validation, not throughput or lock behavior under concurrent load. run_concurrency_bench.py spawns N real OS processes (subprocess.Popen, not asyncio tasks or threads within one process) against the shared users table, mixing reads (get_user_by_email) and writes (create_user) at a configurable ratio, and reports throughput, error counts by exception type, and p50/p95/p99/max latency per run. Measured locally (2/4/8/16 workers, 100 ops/worker, 70/30 read/write): SQLite completed all operations with zero errors at every worker count (busy_timeout absorbs contention rather than raising), but total throughput stayed flat around 28-34 ops/s regardless of worker count, and p99 latency grew from ~400ms at 2 workers to ~5.9s at 16, with a 22s max. Postgres throughput scaled with worker count (41 to 66 ops/s) and p99 stayed under 500ms at every worker count tested. Raw JSON output from both runs is available on request; exact numbers will vary by machine and are not asserted in the test suite. test_bench_concurrency.py unit-tests the pure aggregation logic (percentile math, error grouping, crashed-worker handling) the same way test_bench_checkpoint_channels.py does for the existing benchmarks -- fast, no DB required, not the full multi-process sweep in CI. * fix(auth): inspect the driver exception for OAuth conflict detection str(exc) embeds the full failed INSERT statement, whose column list always names oauth_provider/oauth_id, so a substring check on it misclassified every commit-time IntegrityError on the users table as an OAuth conflict (reproduced on SQLite: a duplicate primary key with a different email raised "OAuth account already linked: None/None"). _is_oauth_identity_violation now inspects exc.orig instead: constraint_name on Postgres, both violated column names present (not a bare "oauth" substring) on SQLite. Also ships the alembic revision idx_users_oauth_identity's postgresql_where predicate needed: 0001_baseline created it as a full index on Postgres, and ORM metadata changes only affect fresh create_all databases, never an already-versioned deployment. Addresses review feedback from willem-bd. * fix(bench): run the concurrency benchmark in an isolated schema and derive paths from the checkout --pg-url accepted an arbitrary database URL while the code pinned postgres_schema="public" and unconditionally ran DELETE FROM users -- against any non-disposable database that permanently destroyed every auth account. Each run now generates a unique throwaway schema (bench_<uuid>), points both the seeder and every worker subprocess at it via postgres_schema, and drops only that schema (DROP SCHEMA ... CASCADE) once the full worker-count sweep finishes. Also stopped hard-coding /opt/deer-flow/backend as the checkout path and .venv/bin/python3 as the interpreter: BACKEND_DIR is now derived from Path(__file__), and workers are spawned with sys.executable (the orchestrator's own interpreter) instead, so the documented uv run python scripts/benchmark/concurrency/run_concurrency_bench.py command works from any checkout. Addresses review feedback from willem-bd. * fix: shorten oauth-index revision id, repin migration-head assertions, fix bench read/write mix - 0017_users_oauth_identity_partial_pg (36 chars) exceeded alembic_version.version_num's VARCHAR(32) limit, which would fail stamping/upgrading on both fresh and existing Postgres deployments. Renamed to 0017_oauth_identity_pg_partial (30 chars). - Repinned every test asserting 0016_subagent_batches as the migration head (test_persistence_bootstrap[.py|_concurrency.py|_regression.py], test_migration_0004/0007/0015) to the new 0017 revision id. - worker.py's `(i % 100) < int(read_ratio * 100)` assumed n_ops >= 100; at the documented default (50 ops/worker, 0.7 read ratio) it produced either all-reads or all-writes, never the claimed mixed workload. Replaced with read_count()/is_read_op(), which distribute an exact round(n_ops * read_ratio) reads evenly across the sequence via modular spacing, and added test_bench_worker.py covering the default values plus small op counts. * fix(bench): establish a real physical connection before timing ops async with sf(): pass entered an empty AsyncSession without checking out a physical connection -- SQLAlchemy stays lazy until the first statement executes. That pushed connection-establishment cost onto each worker's first timed operation instead of conn_time_s, and at 16 workers those 16 cold first-ops (1% of a 1600-op sample) could skew the reported p99. Execute a real `SELECT 1` before starting the timer instead. Verified with a real end-to-end run (uv sync + sqlite backend, 2 workers/10 ops, 0 errors) plus the full auth/bench/migration-bootstrap suites (135 tests) and ruff check/format, all clean. * fix(bench): synchronize workers before timing, fix percentile off-by-one Two remaining measurement issues from review: - run_workers() started the wall clock before spawning any worker, so throughput/wall_time absorbed N processes' staggered Python-startup and connection-establishment cost, and early workers could run ahead of ones still starting. Workers now print READY right before their timed loop and block on stdin for a GO signal; the orchestrator waits for every READY, then starts the timer and releases all workers together. - summarize()'s pct() used int(len(latencies) * p) directly as a zero-based index -- a one-based-rank-as-index bug that put p95 and p99 at the same slot (the max) for any 20-or-fewer-sample run, and for the documented 100-sample default. Now delegates to checkpoint_bench_common.percentile(), the already-correct nearest-rank implementation used elsewhere in the same benchmark family, instead of a second, broken one. Verified: 14/14 unit tests pass (2 new pinned-value regression tests for the percentile bug, using the reviewer's own 20-sample repro), ruff clean, and a real 2/4-worker SQLite multi-process smoke run completes with distinct p95/p99/max latencies and no hang. * fix(bench): absolute SQLite bench path, surface crash diagnostics, exit nonzero on failure; share OAuth index constant + cover Postgres branch Three more findings from review at 5fd25a7: - seed_baseline() cleaned an absolute .deer-flow/bench_data path but handed DatabaseConfig a relative one, which resolves against the CALLER's CWD -- not BACKEND_DIR. Invoking the documented command from anywhere other than backend/ silently pointed the seeder and the (cwd=BACKEND_DIR) workers at two different directories: workers crashed with 'unable to open database file' while the run still printed a well-formed summary and exited 0. Both seed_baseline() and worker.py's make_session_factory() now use the same absolute path. - Crashed workers' stderr was captured then discarded, and main() always exited 0 -- an all-crashed sweep was indistinguishable from a real (uneventful) measurement to anything checking the exit code or --out. run_workers() now prints each crash immediately and tags it with the real worker_id (previously always None); summarize() exposes crashed_worker_errors alongside the existing crashed_workers count; main() exits 1 via the new summary_indicates_failure() whenever any sweep crashed or fell short of expected_total_ops. - idx_users_oauth_identity was hardcoded separately in the ORM Index and in _is_oauth_identity_violation's Postgres branch, with no test to catch drift, and that branch had zero non-skipped coverage (its only guard needs a live Postgres CI never configures). Exported OAUTH_IDENTITY_INDEX_NAME from user/model.py as the shared source of truth (migrations intentionally keep their own frozen literal, matching every other revision in that package) and added stub-exception unit tests pinning both the asyncpg constraint_name path and the sqlite message-substring path, positive and negative. Verified: 107 passed locally (auth + bench-unit suites), ruff clean, and two real reproductions -- invoking run_concurrency_bench.py from a scratch directory outside backend/ (the reviewer's exact repro) now completes 8/8 ops with crashed_workers: 0 instead of crashing, and the new crashed_worker_errors/exit-code logic is exercised directly by the new unit tests against the real summarize()/summary_indicates_failure(). * fix(auth): attribute create_user IntegrityErrors to the right constraint Two coupled review findings on the classification helpers: P3 (fall-through) -- after ruling out the OAuth-identity index, create_user raised "Email already registered: {email}" for every remaining IntegrityError, including the duplicate-primary-key case the new regression test exercises, whose address is not registered. Added _is_email_violation() so the email message is used only for an actual users.email collision that raced past the pre-check; anything else (in practice a duplicate id) now raises a neutral "User already exists (constraint: <name>)". P2 (unreachable asyncpg branch) -- exc.orig is not the asyncpg error. SQLAlchemy's asyncpg dialect re-raises its own DBAPI IntegrityError (pgcode/sqlstate only) 'from' the real asyncpg error, so constraint_name lives on exc.orig.__cause__. getattr(exc.orig, "constraint_name", None) was always None on Postgres; the helpers only worked there by accident, matching asyncpg's DETAIL line in the message fallback. Added _driver_constraint_name() which walks orig then orig.__cause__, and the stub tests now model that real shape (orig wrapper + __cause__) instead of a constraint_name that no driver puts on orig directly. Tests: 76 passed. New coverage for the email-race path, both new helpers on each backend, the neutral fallback message, and the cause-chain walk. * fix(bench): match app SQLite PRAGMAs in workers; fail a sweep on any op error Two review follow-ups: - worker.py opened its SQLite engine with only connect_args timeout=30. synchronous and foreign_keys are per-connection PRAGMAs, so workers ran at SQLite's synchronous=FULL / foreign_keys=OFF while a real Gateway worker runs synchronous=NORMAL (persistence/engine.py::_enable_sqlite_wal) -- an extra fsync per commit on the measured 30%-write path, overstating SQLite's cost in the direction that flatters the "use Postgres" conclusion. Added a connect listener applying the same four PRAGMAs, with a test asserting synchronous/foreign_keys/journal_mode on a real worker connection. - summary_indicates_failure() only looked at crashes and the completed vs expected op counts, so a sweep where every op completed but raised (e.g. writes hitting OperationalError) passed as a clean measurement: completed_ops == expected, 0 crashes. Added an "errors > 0" clause; the error breakdown stays in the JSON, only the exit code changes. Test added. test_bench_concurrency.py + test_bench_worker.py green (20), plus a real 2-worker sqlite smoke run (6/6 ops, 0 errors, exit 0). * fix(auth): match the real email index name; only claim "exists" for uniqueness Review follow-ups on the classification helpers: - email is mapped_column(unique=True, index=True), which SQLAlchemy and 0001_baseline realise as a single UNIQUE INDEX (ix_users_email), not a named UNIQUE constraint. _is_email_violation compared the driver constraint name against "users_email_key", which Postgres never emits, so that arm was dead on Postgres (SQLite matched via the message). Fixed to ix_users_email. - the residual IntegrityError fallback raised "User already exists" for every remaining IntegrityError -- a NOT NULL / CHECK / foreign-key violation is not a "user already exists" condition and is not part of create_user's ValueError contract. Added _is_uniqueness_violation (sqlstate 23505, or the SQLite "UNIQUE/PRIMARY KEY constraint failed" message); only that raises the "already exists" ValueError, everything else propagates unchanged. - documented scripts/benchmark/concurrency/ in backend/AGENTS.md alongside the other benchmark family. Tests: 78 auth + 20 bench-unit pass, ruff clean. New coverage for _is_uniqueness_violation on both backends and for a non-uniqueness IntegrityError propagating out of create_user. * fix(bench): don't pre-close worker stdin (breaks communicate); require --pg-url for postgres * fix(bench): ruff format; time throughput on the op phase, not teardown - lint-backend: ruff format the files touched in this PR. - Throughput window (P2): the orchestrator sampled its wall clock after every worker's communicate() returned, so it also covered each worker's engine.dispose(), result serialization and stdout transfer. Each worker now times just its operation phase (GO -> last op) and reports ops_elapsed_s; summarize() uses max(ops_elapsed_s) over the workers -- all released by the same GO -- as the throughput window (ops_window_s). - Exercise migration 0018 (P2): test_user_oauth_partial_index.py goes through bootstrap create_all(), which builds the partial index from ORM metadata and never runs 0018.upgrade(). New Postgres-gated test_migration_0018_oauth_identity_pg_partial.py alembic-upgrades to 0017 (full index), then 0018 (asserts the predicate appears), then downgrades (asserts the full index is restored) and re-upgrades. * docs(middlewares): tighten SandboxAudit and Clarification entries in AGENTS.md PR #5134 grew agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md ~1.8 KB, pushing the effective AGENTS.md chain for that directory over the 96 KiB hard limit once this branch also documents scripts/benchmark/concurrency/ in backend/AGENTS.md. Condense the two longest middleware entries (SandboxAuditMiddleware, ClarificationMiddleware) without dropping any identifier, example, issue reference, ordering constraint, or documented gap; chain back to ~96.8 KiB. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-09-03 08:17:26 +08:00
SPEC	822c7bca4b	fix(memory): cancel buffered extraction when agent is deleted or cleared (#5123) ... * fix(memory): cancel buffered extraction when agent is deleted or cleared * fix(memory): cancel buffered work before agent delete Address review: cancel before/after delete to close the rmtree race, scope user_id=None cancels to the legacy root only, and import memory helpers at module scope. Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> * fix(memory): close remaining cancel races from review Post-clear cancel, legacy-only all_agents scope, always cancel even when memory is disabled, and fold cancel+delete into one offloaded thread. Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> * docs(memory): align cancel_by_agent None-scope with legacy root Document that user_id=None cancels only the legacy no-user bucket, matching clear/storage semantics, not the whole process-local queue. Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> * test(memory): fix cancel_by_agent docstring regression assertion Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> * fix(memory): address final cancel review nits Type the delete helper with AgentStore, replace docstring pinning with a kwargs mapping test, and document scoped cancel + residual window in AGENTS.md. Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> * fix(memory): resolve agent store inside delete worker thread get_agent_store() does blocking config/FS work; keep it off the event loop so test_delete_agent_does_not_block_event_loop and backend-blocking-io CI pass. Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk> --------- Signed-off-by: SPEC <zt1y17@soton.ac.uk>	2026-09-03 08:00:25 +08:00
Aari	9e0fbd60fa	fix(sandbox): isolate concurrent subagent shell sessions (#5134) ... * fix(sandbox): isolate concurrent subagent shell sessions * fix(sandbox): make execution acquire idempotent * fix(sandbox): close execution lifecycle gaps * fix(sandbox): serialize retained client lifecycle * fix(sandbox): close remaining client lifecycle gaps * fix(sandbox): unwind failed client lookup * fix(sandbox): protect internal lease identities * fix(sandbox): make cancellation reconciliation durable * fix(sandbox): fence cancelled workers and IM uploads	2026-09-02 21:05:23 +08:00
hataa	08b27aef73	feat(auth): make login rate-limit parameters configurable, fixes #5108 (#5110) ... * feat(auth): make login rate-limit parameters configurable, fixes #5108 Add auth.local.max_login_attempts (default 5) and auth.local.lockout_seconds (default 300) so operators can tune the per-IP login throttle: raise the ceiling for shared-egress-IP offices behind proxies/NAT, or tighten it for stricter posture. Policy is live-read per call (matching the _local_registration_enabled precedent), so a config reload applies without a Gateway restart; raising the threshold mid-lockout immediately unblocks affected IPs. Review feedback addressed (willem-bd): - Only FileNotFoundError falls back to the hardcoded defaults; a malformed config propagates, mirroring _local_registration_enabled, so an operator who tightened the policy never silently gets the more permissive defaults. - _check_rate_limit looks up the record before resolving the policy, so a clean IP pays zero config reads (get_app_config re-hashes config.yaml per call and login_local is an unauthenticated async endpoint). Bumps config_version to 39 in config.example.yaml and the Helm chart (values.yaml + README example) so the chart drift check stays green. * fix(auth): reject max_login_attempts=1 and honor live lockout_seconds for active lockouts * fix(auth): close live-policy state gaps in login throttle (resurrection, count reset, broken-config verification) * fix(auth): commit evaluated lockout duration on decreases too, preventing raise-resurrection * test(auth): pin broken-config fail-closed sequence through the login route * fix(auth): sweep expired locks by stored sentence and keep policy reads off the event loop * fix(auth): re-read throttle record after the policy-resolution yield point --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-09-02 19:16:56 +08:00
wutongyuonce	fb722770e4	fix(agents): do not hide invalid config with file fallback (#4952) ... * fix(agents): do not hide invalid config with file fallback * test(agents): cover invalid on-disk config fallback * fix(agents): resolve stores off the event loop * fix(agents): distinguish missing nested config from main config * fix(agents): reject missing explicit config path * test(agents): isolate config fallback test * test(agents): isolate router blocking IO coverage * test(agents): pin malformed config.yaml parse-error propagation An unparseable config.yaml used to be swallowed by the broad except Exception and silently downgrade to FileAgentStore. The narrowed except FileNotFoundError already propagates yaml.ParserError/ScannerError; pin that contract with a real on-disk config instead of monkeypatched get_app_config.	2026-09-02 12:34:09 +08:00
Aari	340bff1107	feat(mcp): manage servers from Settings (#5022) ... * feat(mcp): manage servers from settings * fix(mcp): make settings updates targeted * fix(mcp): reject ambiguous masked array edits * fix(mcp): honor targeted server field deletions * fix(mcp): preserve OAuth extension secrets * fix(mcp): validate config before persistence * fix(mcp): preserve environment placeholders * fix(mcp): harden targeted configuration routes * docs: keep gateway guidance within budget * fix(mcp): protect per-tool override secrets * fix(mcp): keep disabled edits structurally safe	2026-09-01 23:24:49 +08:00
rayhpeng	cd35363a05	fix(history): early user messages vanish or jump mid-run when pagination and context compaction overlap (#4696) ... * fix(history): stop dropping user messages that fall outside the loaded page window Two independent paths made a user's own message disappear from a long thread (#4666, #4508, #4363). Both are reproduced by a real two-round run: once the thread passes the 50-row `/messages/page` window AND context compaction fires, the two sources of truth stop overlapping at the head. 1. Middleware-answered tool results never reached the event store. A middleware that short-circuits a tool call (e.g. ReadBeforeWriteMiddleware's blocked write) returns a user-visible ToolMessage, but LangChain never emits `on_tool_end`, so RunJournal never persisted it — the user saw it during the run and it vanished on reload. RunJournal already reconciles final-output tool messages, but only for an `ask_clarification` allowlist. The allowlist is removed; scope stays bounded by the three conditions that actually matter (visible, this run's lead agent, not already persisted), so subagent results still stay in their own step feed. 2. mergeMessages discarded the checkpoint prefix before the first shared anchor. #4065 correctly established that a summarization-rescued early message must not be appended to the tail, and suppressed it instead. That suppression is what deletes the message when the first history page no longer reaches back to it. It is now woven in before the first shared anchor — the one position both the checkpoint and seq-sorted history agree on — so #4065's invariant (never the tail) still holds. A collapsed unloaded gap is recoverable by paging; a dropped message is not. Verified against real captured payloads from the reproducing run: the first user message returns to the transcript. Its exact position is still approximate — after compaction the live window carries too few anchors to place it precisely, which only seq-based ordering can close. Backend: 10809 passed (baseline 10808; same 15 pre-existing failures in browser/crawler community tools). Frontend: 986 passed, typecheck + eslint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(events): look up a persisted message's seq by identity Groundwork for placing checkpoint messages in the seq-ordered thread feed (#4666). A checkpoint carries no seq of its own and loses messages to summarization, so once the feed's 50-row page window no longer reaches back to a surviving old message, a client has nothing to place it by. The seq already exists in run_events keyed by the message id — this exposes it without paging the whole feed. `message_identity` is the backend half of the identity rule the frontend applies in `hooks.ts::messageIdentity`: a ToolMessage is keyed by `tool_call_id`, and DynamicContextMiddleware's `X` / `X__user` human copies collapse to one identity. The two halves must stay in sync — a mismatch is silent, degrading placement rather than raising. `get_message_seqs` is implemented for all three stores. Misses are absent from the result rather than an error, so callers degrade to their own placement rule; the earliest seq wins when one identity resolves to several rows, so a re-persisted message keeps the position it first occupied. The DB store decodes rows in Python because `content` is a TEXT column holding a JSON string, not a JSON column — the identity fields cannot be projected in SQL. Nothing consumes this yet; no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(runtime): carry each persisted message's feed seq on values frames Attaches `additional_kwargs.deerflow_seq` to messages in a root `values` frame that the thread feed already holds, so a client can place a message the checkpoint kept but its loaded history page window no longer reaches (#4666). Nothing is written back to the checkpoint: the seq is added when the frame is serialized and belongs to that frame only. Cost is bounded to frames introducing identities the run has not resolved yet. Messages this run produces are not in the feed while streaming, so they are looked up once, recorded as misses, and never retried — in a real run the only frame that pays for a query is the one where compaction brings older messages back into view. Measured on a reproducing two-round run: 1 lookup across 25 values frames. The stamper is built once per run rather than per `_stream_once`, or a goal continuation would discard the resolved seqs. Subgraph frames are not stamped: a subagent's snapshot is not part of this thread's feed ordering. A lookup failure logs and leaves the frame unstamped rather than failing it — placement is an enhancement and clients fall back to their own ordering rule. Frontend does not read the field yet; no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gateway): strip the server-owned message seq from untrusted input `deerflow_seq` is display metadata the Gateway attaches when it serializes a values frame. A client replaying messages (regenerate / edit-and-rerun) would otherwise write it into the checkpoint, where it becomes wrong the moment the thread is forked — a branch re-seeds its feed and reassigns seq (#4380). Joins the existing server-owned key set, so it follows the same trusted-internal rule as the dynamic-context and view-image markers. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): place a checkpoint message by its feed seq, not its nearest anchor Completes #4666. Weaving a compaction-rescued message before the first shared anchor keeps it in the transcript, but not in the right place: after compaction the live window carries too few anchors, and the nearest one can sit deep inside the loaded page window — measured at row 25 of 50 on a reproducing run, which is why the first user turn rendered mid-transcript instead of at the head. Both sides now carry the backend's thread-global seq. `buildVisibleHistoryMessages` copies each row's `seq` onto the message (same shape as the existing `run_id`), and the Gateway stamps it onto `values` frame messages it has already persisted. A live message whose seq is below the loaded window's lower bound is placed ahead of everything on screen rather than before the nearest anchor. A message with no seq — still streaming, so not in the feed yet — keeps the weaving path, since the tail is already its correct position. Verified against the captured payloads of the reproducing run: the first user message goes from absent, to #13 (behind the second question), to #0. Frontend: 988 passed, typecheck + eslint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(frontend): place a pre-window checkpoint message even when no anchor is shared Also #4666. Placing a compaction-rescued message by its feed seq was gated on reaching a shared anchor, because the split ran inside the anchor walk. When the loaded page and the live checkpoint share no identity at all, that walk never runs and the message fell through to `[...canonical, ...live]` — appended after the entire window, the one arrangement #4065 proved wrong, with its seq known the whole time. That is not a corner case. Open an old, already-summarized conversation and send a message: the page on screen is the newest rows from before that turn, while the checkpoint holds the rescued first user turn plus steps of the new run that are not in the feed yet. On a reproducing run the two sides shared zero anchors and the user's own first question rendered at row 50 of 50 — the reported "first message jumps to the bottom". Split `beforeWindow` out of `live` before walking anchors, walk `liveInWindow`, and use it for the no-anchor branch as well, so a message routed ahead of the window is not re-appended at the tail by dedup. Measured on captured payloads of a reproducing run (real gateway, real compaction), first user message position: no shared anchor: row 50 -> row 0, seq order monotonic again shared anchors: row 0 -> row 0 (unchanged) paged to the top: row 0 -> row 0 (unchanged) Regression test verified red-green: reverting the fix fails it with the message rendered after the window. Frontend: 989 passed, eslint + tsc clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(gateway): stamp the message feed seq on checkpoint reads, not only on stream frames Completes #4666. `_MessageSeqStamper` sits on the streaming publish path, so a client that joins a live run learns where a summarization-rescued turn belongs while a client that merely opens the conversation does not — and opening is the common case. `GET /threads/{id}/state` and `POST /threads/{id}/history` returned the checkpoint with no seq at all, so the merge fell back to the nearest shared anchor, which after summarization sits deep inside the loaded page. Reproduced in a browser against a real gateway, on a thread that had already compacted: the user's first question rendered at row 320 of 389, behind the newest question instead of at the head. Both reads showed 0 of 13 messages carrying a seq. That is the reported symptom, still present after the streaming fix. Add `stamp_messages_with_seq`, the request-scoped counterpart of the stamper: everything a checkpoint still holds is already persisted, so one batched lookup resolves the whole list and there is nothing to retry later. Resolve the store through `_optional_run_event_store` rather than `get_run_event_store`, because seq is placement metadata — a deployment without a feed must still be able to read a thread. After the fix, on the same thread in the same browser: 13 of 13 messages carry a seq and the first question renders at the head, ahead of the newest one. Backend: ruff clean, 326 passed across the touched suites. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(harness): move the injected-user-id suffix helpers to utils.messages to break an import cycle message_identity imported strip_injected_user_message_id_suffix from the dynamic-context middleware, closing a cycle (middleware -> deerflow.runtime -> worker -> events -> middleware) that only stayed hidden while an earlier import happened to break it. Define INJECTED_USER_MESSAGE_ID_SUFFIX and the strip helper in deerflow.utils.messages and re-export them from the middleware so existing importers keep working. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(docs): improve formatting and clarity in AGENTS.md and message-merge.test.ts * perf(events): stop the seq scan once every wanted identity is resolved Rows past the last wanted seq can only be re-persisted copies that already lose the earliest-seq-wins tiebreak, so all three stores now break out of the scan (and the db store out of its per-row JSON decoding) once found covers wanted. Matters most for /state and /history reads of long threads, where this lookup runs with no run cache and a typically tiny wanted set. Raised by review on #4696. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(events): share the seq-stamping expression between the two stampers The walrus-plus-merge expression was duplicated verbatim between stamp_messages_with_seq and _MessageSeqStamper.stamp — two counterparts of one rule where silent divergence is the likely failure mode if only one side is edited. Both now call attach_message_seq next to MESSAGE_SEQ_KEY in message_identity.py. The trailing isinstance(message, Mapping) guard was unreachable (a non-Mapping entry already got identity = None) and is gone with the extraction. Raised by review on #4696. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(events): seq stamping survives launch paths without user context The db store's get_message_seqs defaults to user_id=AUTO, which raises when no user is in the contextvar — the first strict-AUTO read ever called from the worker context. On a launch path that never inherits the auth context (e.g. a null-owner scheduled task), stamp()'s except clause swallowed that into a per-frame warning and silently disabled seq stamping for exactly the background runs that need it. The stamper now soft-resolves the user id once at build time — the same rule as the worker's write paths beside it (unset -> no filter) — and passes it explicitly. jsonl/memory stores gain the same user_id kwarg the base list_messages contract already carries. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * perf(events): SQL-prefilter the message seq lookup's candidate rows get_message_seqs scanned and JSON-decoded every message row of the thread: the early exit never fires when a wanted identity is absent from the feed (a message still streaming, or checkpoint-only), and /state / /history reads want the newest messages, so the ascending scan traversed essentially the whole feed — with the content column carrying full tool outputs, that is heavy I/O plus N JSON parses on exactly the long threads this lookup exists for. A LIKE prefilter now keeps that cost in SQL: only rows containing a wanted raw id as a substring are fetched and decoded. False positives are re-checked by message_identity; LIKE wildcards are escaped; an id json.dumps would escape (breaking the verbatim-substring guarantee) falls the whole set back to the full scan rather than silently missing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): sink runtime mechanism docs below the gateway guidance budget Merging main pushed backend/app/gateway/AGENTS.md past its 40KB soft budget (main had left 81 bytes of headroom). Per the nearest-file rule, move the mechanism detail of the message-seq stamping and run-delivery receipt sections — both owned by runtime/ code — into packages/harness/deerflow/runtime/AGENTS.md, leaving the gateway file the REST-surface summary and a pointer. The seq section also documents the stamper's build-time soft user-id resolution and the db store's SQL prefilter from the review follow-ups. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(agents): sink durable-MCP task detail below the backend guidance budget Merging main pushed backend/AGENTS.md past its 24KB module soft budget (main itself is at 24762 after #4848 — this branch adds zero net bytes to the file). Per the nearest-file rule, move the two durable-MCP task runtime bullets' mechanism detail into packages/harness/deerflow/mcp/AGENTS.md, leaving summaries and pointers; this also restores ~2KB of headroom so the next merge does not trip the same wire. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(events): re-ask a message-seq miss once the feed advances The run-scoped stamper cached lookup misses for the whole run. A message this run produces reaches a values frame before RunJournal flushes it, so its first lookup legitimately misses — and the journal persists it moments later, giving it a feed seq the stamper never asks for again. A long run that afterwards rolls past the history page and compacts then carries that message unstamped, back to the approximate anchor placement this stamper exists to replace (#4666). A transient store error had the same permanent effect, since the except clause degrades to an empty result. A miss is now provisional while a hit stays final: RunJournal counts its successful event-store writes as `feed_generation`, and the stamper re-asks a missed identity only once that counter moves. Retrying is therefore bounded by feed writes rather than by frames — the per-frame query the run-scoped cache was built to avoid — and a failed lookup costs one generation instead of the run. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-01 22:04:17 +08:00
Ryker_Feng	8d8ca506ba	feat(artifacts): download run files as zip (#5117) ... * feat(artifacts): download run files as zip * fix(artifacts): address archive review feedback * fix(artifacts): gate unavailable archive downloads * fix(artifacts): verify archive availability * fix(artifacts): harden archive consistency * fix(artifacts): reject archive path aliases	2026-09-01 22:01:21 +08:00
Hyeonsang Cho	9146bfa03d	feature(gateway): issue request trace ids unconditionally (#5119) ... * refactor(gateway): issue request trace ids unconditionally The request trace id was gated behind logging.enhance.enabled at every entry point, so downstream code had to keep asking whether one existed: a header-provenance flag in its own ContextVar, a precedence resolver, and three-level carrier fallbacks at each consumer. Bind one unconditionally instead. TraceMiddleware covers Gateway HTTP; ensure_trace_context covers the entry points that never touch ASGI -- scheduled occurrences, MCP task notification runs, IM channel messages, and the embedded client -- each scoped to one unit of work so a long-lived worker task cannot leak one occurrence's id into the next. The ContextVar becomes the only source; the response header, runtime context, run metadata and log records are derived outputs. Consumers now use ensure_trace_id() or resolve_trace_id(*carriers) and drop their presence guards. Removed: resolve_deerflow_trace_id, the header-provenance flag and its three helpers, set/reset_current_trace_id, is_trace_correlation_enabled and its gateway alias. BREAKING CHANGE: every Gateway HTTP response now carries X-Trace-Id and it cannot be turned off; logging.enhance.enabled controls log output only. Installations on the default enabled: false will start seeing the header. No config keys were added or removed. * fix(gateway): stop persisting a caller-supplied trace id on the run record body.metadata forks two ways: through build_run_config into the live run config, which the run worker restamps, and through create_or_reject into the run record that the runs API echoes verbatim. Only the first was covered, so a client sending metadata.deerflow_trace_id made the most durable and most visible surface of a run disagree with the X-Trace-Id and the log lines the same request produced -- a correlation id that does not match the logs is worse than none. Stamp the server-issued id once at the trust boundary so both forks receive it, preserving the caller's own metadata keys. Close the same gap on config.context, which reaches the runtime context by a separate path: _build_runtime_context no longer merges server-owned keys from the caller, and _install_runtime_context assigns rather than setdefaults. A thread's metadata is no longer seeded with the run-scoped id of whichever run created it -- one thread spans many runs and as many trace ids. Found by driving a real run through the Gateway and reading the run back from the runs API; every unit test built its metadata by hand and so could not see it. * fix(gateway): expose X-Trace-Id to split-origin browser clients X-Trace-Id is not on the CORS safelist, so a browser client served from a separate origin could not read it -- and those are exactly the clients that cannot read the Gateway's logs either, leaving them with nothing to quote in a bug report. Same-origin nginx deployments were unaffected, which is why this stayed hidden. Add it to CORS_EXPOSED_HEADERS beside Content-Location, referencing TRACE_ID_HEADER rather than repeating the literal. * fix(gateway): keep X-Trace-Id on unhandled-exception 500s Starlette's ServerErrorMiddleware sits outside every user middleware and emits unhandled-exception 500s through the raw send, so those responses never pass TraceMiddleware's header-writing wrapper. The 500 for a server bug is exactly the response a user most needs to correlate with a log line, and it was the one response that shipped without the id. TraceMiddleware now tracks whether http.response.start has been sent. On an exception with no response started it emits its own plain 500 carrying the header, then re-raises: the outer ServerErrorMiddleware sees the response already started and only re-raises too, so the server's exception logging is untouched. An exception mid-stream keeps propagating unchanged — a second response start cannot be sent, and the already-written header stands. The trace id is printable ASCII by construction (normalize_trace_id / generate_trace_id), which is what makes the raw latin-1 header encoding safe. * fix(gateway): strip the forged trace id from the persisted request echo The run-record fix stopped a forged metadata.deerflow_trace_id on the authoritative metadata surface, but the raw request echo still carried one: create_or_reject persists body.config verbatim as runs.kwargs_json, which the runs API serves back. A client posting config.context.deerflow_trace_id therefore still got its forged value stored and echoed on one API surface while the header, logs, run metadata, and checkpoint all carried the real id — the id is ignored as input there, so echoing it back only manufactures disagreement. Two changes close it. redact_config_secrets — already the shared scrub for that echo, applied at admission and again at serve time, so historical records are covered too — now also drops deerflow_trace_id from config.metadata and config.context. And build_run_config now merges run metadata onto a copy of the caller's config["metadata"] instead of updating it in place: the nested values of the request config are reference copies, so the in-place merge was writing the server-stamped key through into body.config, contaminating the "what the client sent" record before it was persisted (and incidentally masking the forged-value echo on the metadata container). The regression test posts a forged id through body.metadata, config.metadata, and config.context at once and reads the kwargs echo back off the run record, failing if either leak returns. * docs(harness): record the trace-echo scrub, 500 fallback, and accepted retry divergence The trace section of the harness AGENTS.md now covers the two fixes that close the derived-output rule (the kwargs-echo scrub in redact_config_secrets plus build_run_config's copy merge, and TraceMiddleware's own 500 for unhandled exceptions), and CHANGELOG gains their Fixed entries. It also writes down the one accepted divergence: a crash-recovered scheduled launch reuses the durable run through its idempotency key, and start_run returns early on idempotency_reused without restamping — so the run record keeps the first attempt's deerflow_trace_id while the retry's own log lines carry the freshly minted id of its ensure_trace_context binding. The divergence is confined to the crash-recovery window and is accepted rather than fixed: restamping on reuse would rewrite a persisted record for a run that already exists, which is worse than two ids that each correlate their own attempt's logs. Written down so the next reader of the scheduler recovery path does not diagnose it as a bug. * docs(config): align the logging.enhance schema note with the unconditional trace id The config-module AGENTS.md still described logging.enhance as the gate for the Gateway X-Trace-Id header and Langfuse deerflow_trace_id. That model is gone: ids are issued unconditionally and this block decides log output only. Left as-is, the stale wording invites an agent to "restore" a header gate it believes was lost. Reworded to match the sibling AGENTS.md files and config.example.yaml, with a pointer to the Request Trace Context section that owns the full model. * docs(changelog): link the trace entries to #5119 The five new entries pointed at the ([#XXXX]) placeholder with no reference definition, rendering as literal text instead of a link — and RELEASING.md step 2 relies on those references when the section becomes release notes. All five now point at #5119, with the definition appended to the reference block. * refactor(harness): rename _stream_without_trace_context to _stream_turn The name asserted the opposite of what the method now does. It was accurate while logging.enhance.enabled could route stream() around the trace scope; with the gate gone it is the only stream implementation left, and it binds the id itself via ensure_trace_id(). Private, so the rename touches only the definition and the one stream() call site. * docs(harness): fit the trace-context guidance inside the AGENTS.md chain budget The expanded Request Trace Context section pushed the effective AGENTS.md chain for agents/middlewares to 99,815 bytes, past the 98,304 hard limit scripts/check_agent_guidance.py enforces in CI (AG002). Compressed the section from 7,359 to 4592 bytes with no facts removed: the entry-point table, the derived-output rule and its enforcement points, the accepted scheduled-retry divergence, the two resolution helpers, the stream() binding rationale, the log-output-only gate, the CORS listing, the 500 fallback, and the test map all remain. Sized against the merge, not just the branch: current main grew the same chain by ~724 bytes, so the check was verified on the merged tree as well (97,772 bytes; branch tree 97,048). * fix(gateway): declare content-length on the fallback 500 The pre-response 500 declared content-type but no content-length, leaving the framing to the ASGI server: chunked on HTTP/1.1, close-delimited on HTTP/1.0 — the one wire difference from the ServerErrorMiddleware response it replaces, which sends content-length: 21. The explicit header keeps the fallback byte-identical to what clients saw before. * docs(readme): drop the trace-correlation condition from the translations The zh/ja/fr/ru Langfuse sections still said metadata.deerflow_trace_id matches X-Trace-Id "when request trace correlation is enabled". The id now always matches and that condition no longer exists, so each bullet states the unconditional match and that logging.enhance.enabled only controls whether the id is printed into logs — the one piece of the feature a user can still configure. * test(gateway): pin TraceMiddleware wiring through create_app() Every X-Trace-Id test exercised a hand-built four-route app, so the real stack's add_middleware(TraceMiddleware) line was pinned by nothing: deleting it — or short-circuiting above it — passed CI while silently dropping both the response header and the ambient id the run-record stamp and enhanced log records derive from. One case now drives /health through create_app() and asserts the inbound id round-trips; mutation-checked by removing the wiring line, which fails exactly this test. * docs(gateway): note the fallback 500 is CORS-opaque The pre-response 500 is emitted outside CORSMiddleware — the exception has already unwound past it — so it carries no Access-Control-Allow-Origin and a split-origin browser client cannot read the id on this one response, unchanged from the ServerErrorMiddleware 500 it replaces. Documented on the class and in the CHANGELOG entry rather than fixed: replicating the origin allowlist outside CORSMiddleware would let the two policies drift. * fix(harness): keep abandoned-stream cleanup inside the trace binding stream() binds the turn's id around each next(inner) and resets it before yielding, but the finally's inner.close() ran after that binding was gone. Abandoning the stream therefore drove the inner LangGraph generator's GeneratorExit/finally path with no trace id — or an unrelated ambient one from whichever context ran the close — so cancellation and finalization logs and callbacks did not correlate with the turn they belong to. inner.close() is now wrapped in a local bind/reset of the same turn id. The token is set and reset in the same frame, never across a yield, so the per-step cross-context safety is preserved even when GC closes the generator from another Context — pinned by the existing copy_context close test, which now exercises this path. The regression test records the id from the inner generator's finally and fails without the binding. * test(harness): teach the worker-trace fake about RunManager.cleanup Upstream #5112 (bound gateway memory after terminal runs) added a run_manager.cleanup(run_id) call to run_agent's finalization, so the merge-commit CI run failed all five worker-trace-binding tests with AttributeError on this PR's _FakeRunManager. The fake gains the same no-op shape as its other methods. * docs(gateway): bring the gateway AGENTS.md back under its soft budget Upstream #5092 grew backend/app/gateway/AGENTS.md to 40,966 bytes, 6 over the 40,960 soft budget that test_agent_guidance_check.py::test_repository_guidance_stays_below_soft_budgets_and_avoids_doc_indexes enforces — its Unit Tests run on main was cancelled by push concurrency, so main is currently red on that test and every PR merge-run inherits the failure. Two whitespace/wording trims in the row #5092 touched (a doubled space, and "its configured `context_window`" → "its `context_window`") bring the file to 40,953 with no content change. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-09-01 16:49:39 +08:00
Willem Jiang	56a7185f30	fix(ci): fix the ci check of gateway AGENTS.md (#5130) ... * fix(ci): fix the ci check of gateway AGENTS.md * fix(ci): fix the ci check of gateway AGENTS.md	2026-09-01 16:34:45 +08:00
Zeren Wang	a06a6fed7e	feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2) (#5109) ... * feat(harness): deterministic acceptance checklist for subagent delegations (RFC #4651, layer 2) PR4 of RFC #4651: check lead-supplied acceptance_criteria in code when a subagent completes, so objectively checkable requirements can never be silently passed by a self-report. - subagents/acceptance_checks.py: deterministic leaf families — file:<path> exists|non-empty and file_written:<path> read through read_current_file_content scoped to the shared thread workspace; the read uses the sandbox-native virtual path form (the local read validator and provider mount tables resolve /mnt/user-data/... paths, not host paths); the scope decision canonicalizes with realpath on the local sandbox so workspace symlinks cannot escape into uploads; a remote provider's "Error: ..." return string is normalized to a failed check (provider-typed via is_local_sandbox); a UnicodeDecodeError marks a binary deliverable as existing and non-empty; out-of-scope paths degrade to UNVERIFIED. tests_passed:<command> anchors to a matching recorded bash execution with status=success and a test-summary shape; matching is shell-structure aware with control-flow attribution (span must end at the last segment with provable execution), negating-option values are ineligible evidence and a target negated anywhere in the command degrades the match, extra flags must be selection-preserving, extra positionals widen only after a path-scoped criterion, truncated commands degrade via command_truncated, the summary shape is read only from output attributable to the matched segment (preceding segments provably silent by invocation form), and pass shapes require a nonzero passed count. Criterion text is neutralized with neutralize_untrusted_tags before storage/rendering. Anything else renders UNVERIFIED, never silently passed. - executor: accumulate bounded bash command/output evidence per streamed chunk (merged by tool_call_id, newest-capped) so subagent summarization compacting earlier messages cannot erase a recorded execution; the recorded status is the actual shell exit status parsed from the output's exit marker (signed codes included; the remote Command exited with code N form is accepted only as the whole trimmed output), falling back to deerflow_tool_meta only when no marker exists. - sandbox providers: e2b/opensandbox/tenki/boxlite append the LocalSandbox-style "Exit Code: N" marker on nonzero exit even with non-empty output; aio propagates the SDK's structured exit_code on both exec paths the same way; local timeouts append Exit Code: 124; and _truncate_bash_output always preserves a trailing exit marker (signed included) inside its budget, with a 32-char floor raising any smaller configured limit, so the actual shell outcome always survives in the output text. - task_tool: run the checklist offloaded (asyncio.to_thread) on the completed branch, failure-isolated; stamp the verdict into result metadata and render the per-criterion section into the model-visible result text. - status contract: additive subagent_acceptance_verdict transport with read-side structural validation. - delegation ledger: entry carries the verdict and renders a compact acceptance segment; gateway strips caller-forged verdicts from both ledger entries and message metadata, like the citation verdict. - blocking-IO anchor pins the offload (teeth proven red->green); leaf read errors catch only OSError/SandboxError so unexpected errors reach the task-tool-level isolation instead of being mislabeled. * fix(harness): close acceptance evidence gaps from review (RFC #4651 PR4) - negating options: overlap with a matched criterion target is now checked by path/nodeid prefix, not exact token equality — excluding a sub-path of the criterion's selection (pytest tests --deselect tests/unit/test_auth.py) degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of holds - output attribution: any redirection token in the matched final segment makes the recorded tail non-attributable (> / >> / 2> are word characters to the parser, so redirection was invisible to the matcher) - silent-source allowlist narrowed from any *activate suffix to the */bin/activate shape - status_contract docstring: restore the shared-fixture sentence and note subagent_acceptance_verdict is deliberately outside the fixture - executor: update_bash_executions publishes [] (stream carried no bash-family calls) instead of collapsing it into None, mirroring update_tool_receipts * fix(harness): close acceptance residual gaps from re-review (RFC #4651 PR4) - tests_passed: add error outcomes to the fail shapes — "4 passed, 1 error" and pytest's "ERROR <nodeid>" short summary no longer satisfy the pass shape when the exit status is swallowed (|| true) or absent; zero-error counts stay clean. - file leaves: bound the deliverable read — a "wc -c" shell size probe answers files above 50k bytes without loading ~2x their size, honoring the host-bash kill switch and falling back to the full read on any non-integer rendering, so verdicts never get less sound. - executor: record the exit marker text as status_marker on harvested bash evidence; the leaf detail now reports the marker actually seen instead of asserting a failure indistinguishable from the command's own trailing text. - extend the blocking-IO anchor to drive the probe branch inside the offload; teeth re-verified red->green. * fix(harness): close acceptance forgery and bound gaps from P2 re-review (RFC #4651 PR4) - file leaves: never read unbounded — size is established first (os.stat on the validated local host path, so the host-bash-disabled configuration needs no shell; a guarded wc -c on remote providers that renders missing/unreadable in its own words). Above the 50k cap the leaf answers from the size alone, at/below it the full read runs, and an unestablishable size degrades to UNVERIFIED instead of an unlimited fallback read. - output attribution: source/. prefixes are never provably silent — a crafted */bin/activate path shape says nothing about what the script prints, so sourced segments can no longer lend a passing summary. - executable identity: an explicitly path-spelled criterion now requires the same normalized executable path; the basename rule stays only for deliberately bare criterion commands. * fix(harness): run acceptance size probe outside subagent-controlled state (RFC #4651 PR4) - remote probe no longer runs in the sandbox's persistent shell: a fresh env -i /bin/sh with absolute-path stat/realpath (poisoned functions, aliases, PATH, exported functions, IFS, locale cannot steer it), plus a marker env routing AIO onto a fresh per-call bash.exec session. - metadata-only: stat never opens content, so a FIFO deliverable cannot block the parent for the provider's idle timeout; non-regular files (fifo/dir/symlink) degrade to UNVERIFIED. - containment canonicalized against the literal mount root: a final-component symlink or a swapped parent directory (root included) cannot redirect the check outside shared storage; unprovable layouts degrade to UNVERIFIED. * fix(harness): canonicalize probe containment against the canonical mount root (RFC #4651 PR4) Literal-root equality made every remote file leaf permanently UNVERIFIED on e2b and Tenki, which realize /mnt/user-data as a symlink to the home dir by default (e2b bootstrap 'sudo ln -sfn', Tenki best-effort symlink). Containment now compares the file's realpath against the mount root's realpath — exactly what the provider's own read path resolves, so probe and read-back stay consistent; final-component symlinks stay rejected by the non-dereferencing stat, and an intermediate dir-link escape under a sane root still lands ESCAPED. The inner script is a module constant and the suite now executes the composed probe for real against on-disk layouts (real dir, symlinked prefix, final symlink, fifo, missing, dir-link escape), which the canned-output stub could not see. * fix(harness): close bare-criterion negation and CDPATH summary channels (RFC #4651 PR4) - matching: a criterion with no positional selection target (bare pytest, make test) stands for the runner's default selection, so ANY negating option (--ignore/--deselect/...) makes the recorded run a different selection — unprovable. The overlap guard only sees consumed criterion tokens, which a bare criterion does not have; scoped criteria keep the unrelated-exclusion behavior. - attribution: cd is no longer blanket-silent — CDPATH makes cd print the resolved (subagent-chosen) destination and the pass shapes match as substrings, so one mkdir 'all tests passed' plus an export minted a pass for any quiet command. A cd argument or CDPATH= value (export or leading assignment) carrying any summary shape makes the segment non-silent; shape-free cd dir wrappers keep matching. - docs: _truncate_bash_output states the effective 32-char floor (the guarantee previously read as an unconditional max_chars bound). * fix(harness): close env-assignment and expansion channels in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) Self-audit in the shape of the last review rounds — channels the matcher classified as accounted-for that can change what runs, narrow the selection, or lend the summary text: - env assignments are no longer blanket-stripped: only an allowlist of inert display/CI knobs (CI, NO_COLOR, PY_COLORS, ...) may prefix a matched span, and a non-allowlisted assignment in any preceding segment (pure-assignment or export NAME=) is state pollution — PATH redirects the executable, LD_PRELOAD/PYTHONPATH/NODE_OPTIONS inject code, PYTEST_ADDOPTS/GOFLAGS/MAKEFILES inject selection-changing inputs, BASH_ENV runs arbitrary shell startup. All degrade to unprovable. - runtime expansions: any span token carrying /$( )/backticks, any negating-option value carrying an expansion or glob (unknown excluded set), and any extra executed token carrying glob metacharacters (crafted option-looking filenames narrow invisibly) are unprovable. Criterion-side globs stay self-consistent (literal match). - cd: an argument carrying a runtime expansion or glob is non-silent (unknown destination, unknown print); CDPATH= assignments are now handled as state pollution at the match layer, subsuming the value-shape special case. * fix(harness): persistent-shell evidence, exact env sets, option-arity scoping (RFC #4651 PR4) - tests_passed: on a persistent-shell provider (new Sandbox.persistent_shell_sessions capability, set by AioSandbox) every leaf degrades to UNVERIFIED — any earlier call in the shared session could have mutated the state the clean-looking run executed in, and only a fresh controlled session (RFC section 6 verifier) can prove otherwise. The flag is read from the provider registry without acquiring a sandbox. - env assignments: the allowlist is gone — no variable is provably inert across repositories (CI/DEBUG are routinely read by tests). The span's assignment prefix must equal the criterion's exactly (values included, order-insensitive); any assignment or export NAME= in a preceding segment is state pollution. - scoping: positional targets are now read by option arity, so a path embedded in an option (--basetemp=/tmp/p, --junitxml=/tmp/r.xml) never counts as a selection target and an extra positional after such a criterion narrows the default selection it denotes. * fix(harness): stamp shell provenance at harvest, close export/unset and arity gaps (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): split physical newlines as shell separators in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): scope cd wrappers to thread data roots, pin accepted boundaries (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): preserve criterion connectors, prove file_written readable, fail-closed shell capability (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): compare only the connector prefix, tolerate trailing criterion semicolons (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): preserve continuation-line operators, keep ./-spelled executable identity (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): render criteria single-line so a multiline criterion cannot inject a forged checklist line (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): reject parent-traversal executable tokens in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4) * fix(harness): reject parent-traversal negated values in acceptance matching (RFC #4651 PR4)	2026-09-01 16:13:41 +08:00
Sunshine	a956bbc030	fix(runs): reject cancel actions on GET stream joins (#5092) ... * fix(runs): reject cancel actions on GET stream joins stream_existing_run is registered for both GET and POST, and its ?action=interrupt|rollback branch cancels the run. The CSRF middleware exempts GET, so a session-authenticated browser could be forced cross-site (img/script/top-level navigation) into GET /api/threads/{id}/runs/{run_id}/stream?action=interrupt|rollback — a state-changing GET that bypasses the CSRF protection guarding the POST variant. Introduced with the dual registration in #1403. The handler's docstring already documents cancel-then-stream as POST-only (the LangGraph SDK's joinStream/useStream stop button uses POST); enforce it: GET with an action answers 405, action-less GET joins and POST cancel-then-stream are unchanged. Regression drives the real router: GET+action is 405 with the run left running, plain GET join still streams, POST+action still cancels. * fix(runs): scope the 405 detail to the action requirement "GET is a read-only stream join" overstates the current main: on a locally-owned run with the default on_disconnect=cancel, a GET join's disconnect can still trigger cancellation. That observer-disconnect vector is closed by #5041; the detail here should only claim what this guard enforces. * fix(runs): harden GET stream action rejection * fix(runs): align stream schema with method contract * test(runs): pin GET stream action 405 through the production stack Review follow-up (defence-in-depth): the GET-action suite drove bare FastAPI() apps, so nothing pinned that a session-authenticated cross-site GET reaches the route gate at all once CSRF exempts the safe method. test_pat_auth.py already assembles the production middleware order (AuthMiddleware inner, CSRFMiddleware outer), so its mirror app now registers the real _reject_get_stream_action dependency on a GET join route. The new case pins the end-to-end premise: an authenticated GET ?action=interrupt is answered 405 + Allow: POST by the production route dependency, while the same unauthenticated GET dies at AuthMiddleware's 401 before any route logic runs. Validation: focused suites (test_pat_auth, test_stream_get_action, test_csrf_middleware) — 62 passed; ruff check + format clean; the new case errors on the pre-fix baseline (guard absent), confirming the pin.	2026-09-01 15:51:37 +08:00
早上肚子疼	3b601922ff	fix(buzz): move seen-event persistence off event loop (#5103) ... * fix(buzz): move seen-event persistence off event loop * fix(buzz): address seen-event persistence review * fix(buzz): replace stale scheduled flush tasks * fix(buzz): harden final seen-event flush * fix(buzz): make seen-event shutdown retryable * fix(buzz): quiesce persistence after channel stop * fix(buzz): drain late events on repeated stop --------- Co-authored-by: zaoshangduziteng <309590849+zaoshangduziteng@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-31 23:18:34 +08:00
PeaceMaker-best	72ba661b84	feat(skills): install local skill archives (#5039) ... * feat(skills): install local skill archives Signed-off-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(skills): enforce upload limits before parsing * fix(nginx): scope skill upload limit to upload route * fix(nginx): harden skill upload proxy handling * fix(skills): improve archive upload feedback * fix(skills): address upload review polish --------- Signed-off-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: PeaceMaker-best <221849497+PeaceMaker-best@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-31 15:22:45 +08:00
Sunshine	bf740ffa90	feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#5041) ... * feat(auth): add personal access tokens for programmatic API access (#4849) Backend-first implementation of the PAT contract from #4849: show-once dfp_ tokens bound to their owning user (AUTH_SOURCE_PAT, is_internal=false), digest-only storage (migration 0017), strict credential precedence (invalid Bearer is a 401, never cookie fallback), CSRF double-submit skipped only for Bearer requests while auth-endpoint origin checks still run, scopes intersecting the authz route permissions, session-auth-only PAT management and password changes, and throttled best-effort last_used_at stamps. * fix(auth): harden PAT scope boundary and schema parity from adversarial review Independent review of the initial draft found: (1) scopes only constrained the threads/runs permission axis while admin routes treated a PAT as its (possibly admin) owner — is_admin_user now rejects PAT callers outright since no scope grants admin capability; (2) the model declared a column UNIQUE constraint while migration 0017 created a named unique index, so downgrade failed on create_all-bootstrapped DBs — both now use the named unique index; (3) auth-disabled mode is an operator override and now stays ahead of the Bearer check so a stray Authorization header cannot 401 an E2E sandbox; plus wiring the previously-unused constants, bounding the last_used_at stamp cache, and four new tests (middleware-level expiry, expires_in_days, admin-capability rejection with session control, and the auth-disabled precedence). * docs(api): document personal access tokens for programmatic API access * fix(auth): close PAT security boundaries from review (default-deny routes, extension admin suppression) P1-1: scope intersection only constrains @require_permission routes, so undecorated mutation routes (DELETE /api/memory, POST /api/agents, Lark credential switching, channel config) accepted a PAT holding a single read scope. AuthMiddleware now enforces a default-deny route policy in auth/pat.py: PAT requests are admitted only to the thread/run lifecycle routes the v1 scopes govern; everything else answers 403 regardless of scopes. Session-cookie callers are unaffected. P1-2: the extension principal resolver projected is_admin/roles from the raw system_role, so an admin-owned PAT passed deerflow_extension_api.require_admin on contributed routes despite the documented no-admin guarantee. The projection is now PAT-aware and suppresses every admin signal for PAT callers, mirroring deps.is_admin_user. Both fixes carry regression tests (route outside policy 403 + session control; production resolver admin suppression), and API.md documents the default-deny boundary. * fix(auth): enforce PAT scopes on stateless run entry and harden decorator Follow-up hardening from an independent audit of the P1 fixes: - POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait were the only allowlisted run entrypoints without @require_permission, so a threads:read-only PAT could still start runs (same bug class as P1-1, now closed): both now carry @require_permission("runs", "create"). POST /api/threads and POST /api/threads/search gain threads:write / threads:read for the same reason. Authorization-disabled deployments see no change (the permission set resolves to all permissions). - require_permission now binds the wrapped signature to locate a positionally-passed request before injecting the test stub, fixing 'got multiple values for argument' on direct positional unit-test calls. - API.md: the intro PAT example used GET /api/models, which the new default-deny policy 403s — replaced with GET /api/threads; the default-deny route list now spells out method sets. Regression test: threads:read-only PAT is 403 on the decorated stateless entry while a runs:create PAT passes. * fix(auth): address review P2s (empty Authorization header, PAT name trimming, API example) - CSRFMiddleware treats an explicitly empty Authorization header as present (is None), so an invalid credential always reaches AuthMiddleware's uniform 401 instead of a CSRF 403 that varies by method/CSRF state. Regression: empty-header request dies at auth. - PATCreateRequest strips the name and rejects whitespace-only values before token generation; created names are stored trimmed. - API.md intro PAT example now uses the implemented POST /api/threads/search endpoint (GET /api/threads does not exist). - AGENTS.md trimmed back under the guidance soft budget after the upstream merge. * fix(auth): tighten PAT route policy to implemented methods only The allowlist admitted GET /api/threads, a method no router implements. Pre-authorizing a dead method weakens the default-deny boundary: a future GET collection route added without a permission decorator would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. Restrict the rule to POST, fix the stale GET description in API.md's PAT constraints, and document the default-deny boundary accurately in the gateway AGENTS.md guidance (only the threads/runs allowlist is PAT-reachable; every other authenticated route 403s PAT callers). Audited every remaining rule against the mounted routers: all other method+path entries map to real routes. Regression: test_pat_policy_does_not_pre_authorize_unimplemented_methods. * test(auth): guarantee the negative digest test mutates the token token[:-1] + "X" is identical to the original whenever the generated token already ends in X (1/62), making the negative digest assertion fail intermittently. Choose the replacement character based on the existing tail so the mutated token always differs. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for cancel-then-stream requests stream_existing_run is gated at runs:read so action-less stream joins work with read-only credentials, but its ?action=interrupt|rollback branch cancels the run — a separate permission. A runs:read-only PAT passed both the PAT route policy and the route decorator and could interrupt or roll back an active run, bypassing the runs:cancel scope. Decorators cannot express query-parameter-conditional permissions, so the check lives in require_cancel_permission_when_action(), applied at the top of the handler. Regression drives the real helper through the production middleware: runs:read-only PAT + action is 403, the same token joins action-less, runs:read+cancel passes, session control unaffected. * docs(changelog): add the PAT feature entry * docs(readme): add personal access tokens section Repo documentation-update policy requires user-facing features to update README.md in the same changeset; the PAT feature previously touched only backend/docs/API.md and the gateway AGENTS.md. * fix(auth): require runs:cancel for mutating multitask strategies All five run-creation entrypoints were gated only by runs:create, but RunCreateRequest.multitask_strategy accepts interrupt/rollback and start_run forwards it to create_or_reject, which terminates an already-active run. A runs:create-only PAT could therefore kill an existing run through a create request, bypassing runs:cancel. Decorators cannot express body-parameter-conditional permissions, and per-route checks leave the same hole for the next entrypoint, so the gate lives in start_run itself — the single choke point every run-creation path (HTTP routes and internal launchers) flows through. Regenerate launches pass multitask_strategy="reject" and are unaffected; requests without a stamped auth context (internal/test compositions) skip the gate. The check is the shared authz.require_cancel_permission_if primitive; require_cancel_permission_when_action now delegates to it, so every request dimension that carries cancel capability (query action, body strategy) flows through one gate. Regression drives the real middleware stack: runs:create-only PAT + interrupt/rollback is 403 with the exact detail, reject (explicit and default) stays available, runs:create+cancel passes, session control unaffected; a source anchor pins the gate inside start_run. * fix(runs): keep observer joins from applying creator cancel-on-disconnect sse_consumer's finally block applied the record's on_disconnect=cancel policy on ANY consumer's disconnect. The join surfaces (GET /join and the action-less GET/POST stream join) feed it the existing RunRecord, so anyone with thread read access — including a runs:read-only PAT — could cancel a locally-owned running run simply by closing the SSE connection, without runs:cancel. The policy expresses the creator's intent for their own connection; an observer's disconnect must never be read as that intent. sse_consumer gains apply_on_disconnect (default True). The two join surfaces pass False; the creating endpoints (thread-scoped and stateless create-and-stream) keep the creator semantics unchanged. wait_for_run_completion needs no change: its callers are creator-side or post-explicit-cancel paths only. Regression exercises a real generator close — the same machinery Starlette drives on client disconnect — against the production sse_consumer: creator stream disconnect cancels, observer join disconnect does not; a wiring anchor pins both join call sites and the creator defaults. API.md documents the cancel-capability constraint (this fix plus the action/strategy gates) in PAT Constraints. * test(auth): pin the multitask gate behaviorally; state wait invariant Independent adversarial review of the round-5 fixes found the P1-a regression only mirror-pinned: the source anchor could be satisfied by a comment, and deleting the gate from start_run would not fail the suite. This drives the production start_run directly — a create-only auth context gets 403 with the exact detail for interrupt, and a reject request with no cancel permission at all proceeds past the gate (never a permission 403). Also documents wait_for_run_completion's creator-side invariant (every caller is the creating endpoint or post-explicit-cancel) so a future observer wiring thinks twice before reusing it — the one-caller- away variant of the observer-disconnect P1. * docs(changelog): correct the PAT entry's digest and route-policy description The entry said HMAC digests (the implementation stores SHA-256 digests, as documented in API.md and pinned by the repository tests) and claimed the route policy admits 'implemented stateless endpoints' (it admits the thread/run lifecycle routes, narrowing further by scopes). Also notes the cancel-capability gate now covering action and multitask strategies. * fix(auth): enumerate the PAT runs route policy per implemented subroute The runs subtree rule was a GET|POST /runs(/.*)? wildcard — it pre-authorized every current and future subroute under /runs, including methods the router never implemented (e.g. GET /runs/stream), which is the same latent default-deny weakening the threads collection rule was tightened for: a future route added under /runs would become PAT-reachable without an explicit policy change. The wildcard is replaced with six segment-precise rules covering exactly the 14 implemented method+path combinations; the {run_id} slot necessarily matches any single segment, so the POST-only collection names (stream, wait, regenerate, edit-regenerate) are excluded from the GET run-id rule via negative lookahead — no dead method stays pre-authorized. Behavior for implemented routes is unchanged. test_pat_runs_policy_admits_exactly_the_mounted_routes derives the expected set from the mounted thread_runs router instead of a hand-maintained list: every implemented GET/POST route under /runs must be admitted, routes in this router outside the subtree stay denied, and representative unimplemented neighbors are denied — so adding a route under /runs now fails CI until it is explicitly allowlisted, and a removed route leaves a dead rule visible. API.md's PAT constraints list the enumerated routes and drops a feedback mention that belonged to the stateless /api/runs axis. * docs(migration): add the 0017 renumbering coordination note to 0017 The PR's migration-coordination comment states each migration file carries the note; the file did not. Adds it: numbering was generated against main head 0016 alongside #5078 and #4843; whoever merges first keeps the slot, the others renumber on rebase (revision/down_revision plus the bootstrap head assertions). * fix(auth): pad base62 tokens to a fixed 43-char width int.from_bytes discards leading zero bytes, so the unpadded encoder returned a variable-length body — empty for all-zero input, and shorter than 40 characters for any draw below 62**39 (~1 in 14.5M), leaving test_generate_pat_token_format probabilistically flaky and the token body without stable width (review round 6, P3). _base62 now left-pads with "0" to _base62_width(len(data)) — the exact integer digit count (62^43 > 2^256 > 62^42, so 43 for 32 bytes). The format test asserts the exact fixed width instead of a probabilistic floor, and a new unit test pins the all-zero, leading-zero-byte, and max-value edges deterministically.	2026-08-29 23:50:45 +08:00
Zeren Wang	3b592c2053	feat(harness): subagent receipt citation verification (#5076) ... * feat(harness): subagent receipt citation verification - add receipt citation verification core - harvest subagent tool receipts at terminal status - transport subagent receipts and citation verdict via status contract - verify subagent report citations at task write-back - render citation verdicts in the delegation ledger * fix(gateway): strip forged receipt verdicts from the delegations channel normalize_input() and the checkpoint-state mutation sanitizer only stripped server-owned metadata from message-shaped values, so an external caller could submit a delegation entry carrying a forged receipt_verdict that render_delegation_ledger would present as runtime-owned execution evidence. Strip receipt_verdict from caller-supplied delegation entries on both the run-creation and thread-state mutation paths, with regression coverage for each. * fix(harness): close silent-pass gaps in the zero-citation heuristic The action-claim detector missed the most common completion verbs (fixed/added/tested/changed/...) and had no CJK coverage at all, so reports like 'I fixed the bug and added tests.' or '我已经创建了文件并运行了测试。' were treated as claim-free: citation_resolved=True with no ledger warning. Broaden the verb lists and add a language-independent safety net: when the run harvested receipts and a nontrivial (>=240 char) report cites none of them, flag it UNVERIFIED. Short claim-free confirmations remain a vacuous pass.	2026-08-29 16:56:56 +08:00
cui fliter	adfc307677	fix(channels): synchronize ChannelStore reads (#5083) ... Signed-off-by: cuishuang <imcusg@gmail.com>	2026-08-29 08:01:38 +08:00
Sunshine	9600414002	fix(channels): retain strong reference to Discord ack-reaction tasks (#5049) ... * fix(channels): retain strong reference to Discord ack-reaction tasks The event loop keeps only weak references to scheduled tasks, so the bare asyncio.create_task(self._add_reaction(message)) at both message-acceptance sites could be garbage-collected mid-flight and silently drop the ✅ acknowledgment. The module-level retention set holds each task until completion and logs failures, mirroring the deferred subagent cleanup fix in #4928 and the stream bridge cleanup fix in #4931. * fix(channels): drain in-flight ack reactions on Discord channel shutdown Adversarial follow-up to the retention fix: stop() cancelled typing tasks but left in-flight ack-reaction tasks in the module retention set when the channel stopped mid-HTTP-call, pinning the channel instance and the discord Message object graph across restart cycles. _cancel_ephemeral_tasks / _discard_ephemeral_tasks now cover both families at every stop() cleanup point and the _run_client finally. Also tests the done-callback error-log branch and documents the GC test as a contract pin. * test(channels): pin Discord ack-reaction drain wiring and sharpen wording Second adversarial pass found the drain test cancelled a never-started task (no yield between schedule and cancel), nothing exercised the real stop() cross-loop wiring, and the cleanup log messages still said "typing-task" while now covering both families. The drain test now yields so the task genuinely suspends first, a new test drives stop() through a real background loop and fails if the wiring reverts to typing-only cleanup, wording covers ephemeral tasks, and the discard path snapshots the set before iterating. * refactor(channels): scope Discord ack-reaction retention to the channel instance The retention set was module-level, so one DiscordChannel's stop() would cancel every other instance's in-flight ack reactions. Instance-level matches the typing-task bookkeeping and keeps shutdown scoped; pinned by a two-channel isolation test. * test(channels): drive two-channel ack isolation through full stop() Independent review of the instance-scoping refactor confirmed the P2 fix but suggested matching the review's letter exactly: the isolation test now shuts the first channel down via stop() instead of the drain helper, and one stale docstring reference to the former module-level set is corrected.	2026-08-27 17:56:56 +08:00
rayhpeng	ed336ec3dd	fix(gateway): enforce run-create authorization on stateless endpoints (#5030) ... * fix(gateway): enforce authz on stateless runs * fix(gateway): guard scheduled run creation	2026-08-27 14:59:31 +08:00
青榆牧	a94b2d8897	feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to MCP HTTP/SSE headers (#5010) ... * feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-27 10:42:42 +08:00
Xinmin Zeng	943d148e5e	feat(threads): distinguish branched conversations (#4983) ... * feat(threads): number branched conversation titles * feat(frontend): show branch lineage in recent chats * fix(threads): allocate unique branch suffixes * fix(threads): preserve suffix and filter semantics	2026-08-25 08:29:18 +08:00
Beautyl0ve	e8410cebfc	fix(gateway): preserve exact history attribution beyond event page limits (#4953) ... * fix(gateway): preserve exact history run attribution * fix(gateway): make history migration authoritative * docs(runtime): keep history contract within guidance budget * fix(runtime): fence final run duration write	2026-08-25 08:22:57 +08:00
Aari	ff0a6768c2	feat(subagents): add unified capacity and durable batch execution (#4998) ... * feat(subagents): add capacity controls and durable batches * fix(helm): sync subagent config schema version * fix(subagents): preserve batch history without worker * fix(subagents): support explicit factory runtimes * fix: address durable batch review findings	2026-08-25 07:49:38 +08:00
hataa	cc6a2657e7	feat(authz): enforce sandbox:execute authorization at sandbox acquisition (#4063 Phase 3) (#4911) ... Sandbox is an execution environment, not a named resource: multiple tools (bash, read_file, write_file, glob, grep, ...) depend on it, all funneled through ensure_sandbox_initialized / ensure_sandbox_initialized_async. Gate the single acquisition entry point (single source of truth) instead of maintaining a sandbox-tool-name set in middleware: - authorize_sandbox_execution helper (authz/sandbox_authz.py) checks authorize("sandbox", "execute", target="*") — a binary judgment (can this role use the sandbox at all); RBAC allow:"*"/true permits, allow:[]/false denies. - lazy path: ensure_sandbox_initialized (+ async) calls the gate before provider.acquire. - eager path: SandboxMiddleware.before_agent / abefore_agent call the gate before _acquire_sandbox. - deny raises SandboxAuthorizationError (SandboxError subclass) which propagates through tool execution as a friendly ToolMessage (RFC §9: 'not a crash'). - authorization.enabled: false is a no-op everywhere; provider errors follow fail_closed (deny) / fail_open (allow). 12 tests in tests/test_sandbox_authorization.py cover disabled/allow/deny/ deny-via-bool/no-policy-unrestricted/provider-error-fail-closed/open/ internal-caller + ensure_sandbox_initialized deny (never acquires) and allow (acquires) integration paths.	2026-08-24 16:32:06 +08:00
Aari	645ca08f16	fix(scheduler): enqueue busy scheduled task runs (#4918) ... * fix(frontend): clarify reuse-thread scheduling behavior * fix(scheduler): enqueue overlapping scheduled runs * fix(scheduler): preserve queue lease fencing * fix(scheduler): close queue concurrency races * fix(scheduler): harden queue timeout bookkeeping * fix(scheduler): preserve manual failure schedule --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-24 15:38:32 +08:00
Aari	1aa813ddb3	feat: add managed subagents and delegation scopes (#4887) ... * feat: manage and scope subagents * fix: address subagent review feedback * fix: address managed subagent review feedback * fix: harden subagent settings semantics * fix: harden managed subagent cache invalidation * fix: reuse assembled lead agent inputs * fix: migrate managed subagent definitions --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-24 11:04:23 +08:00
PiedPiper911	582fa20001	fix(artifacts): serve SHA-256 via ETag so preview/edit work on non-secure contexts (#4865) ... * fix(artifacts): serve SHA-256 via ETag so preview/edit work on non-secure contexts crypto.subtle is only available in secure contexts (HTTPS or localhost). The frontend fell back to it to compute an artifact's SHA-256 when the Gateway did not return one, which threw on http://<lan-ip>:<port> and broke both artifact preview and inline editing (issue #4864). - Gateway now returns the real SHA-256 as an ETag header for inline text and active-content artifact responses (and skill-archive members). - Frontend prefers the ETag and only computes a hash as a last resort, falling back gracefully (FNV-1a) instead of throwing when crypto.subtle is missing. * fix(artifacts): address PR review feedback for #4864 - Cache SHA-256 digests by (path, mtime_ns, size) so the many small Range requests a browser issues while scrubbing/paginating a preview do not each re-hash a potentially huge artifact from scratch (performance). - Gate inline editing on a real 64-hex revision: hasRevision requires sha256.length === 64, so the FNV-1a fallback on non-secure origins keeps preview working but no longer 422s on save (contract). - Anchor and lowercase the ETag regex and accept the weak W/ prefix gzip emits, so uppercase hex and longer digests (sha-384/512) can't masquerade as sha-256. - Cover the forced-download ETag on the backend and add frontend tests for weak-ETag parsing and the non-secure-context FNV fallback. Feedback from reviewer willem-bd on PR #4865. * style: fix ruff format and prettier issues - test_artifacts_router.py: collapse two over-split client.get() calls to satisfy ruff format (line-length 240) - loader.ts / artifact-file-detail.tsx / loader.test.ts: apply prettier formatting and restore LF line endings * style: fix ruff format and prettier issues - test_artifacts_router.py: collapse two over-split client.get() calls to satisfy ruff format (line-length 240) - loader.ts / artifact-file-detail.tsx / loader.test.ts: apply prettier formatting and restore LF line endings * style: fix ruff format and prettier issues - test_artifacts_router.py: collapse two over-split client.get() calls to satisfy ruff format (line-length 240) - loader.ts / artifact-file-detail.tsx / loader.test.ts: apply prettier formatting and restore LF line endings * style: fix ruff format and prettier issues - test_artifacts_router.py: collapse two over-split client.get() calls to satisfy ruff format (line-length 240) - loader.ts / artifact-file-detail.tsx / loader.test.ts: apply prettier formatting and restore LF line endings * style: reformat artifact-file-detail.tsx for prettier with tailwind class ordering * fix: invalidate SHA-256 cache after artifact edit Clear the LRU cache after os.replace() so the next preview request computes the new digest. Edits are rare, so clearing the whole 256-entry cache costs nothing (addressing PR review comment #5). * fix(artifacts): skip ETag for oversized files + CRLF->LF + cache invalidation (#4865) * fix(loader): use real empty-content SHA-256 for empty 416 range (#4865) * test(artifacts): assert oversized artifacts carry no SHA-256 ETag (#4865) * style(frontend): format long sha256 constant (prettier) * test(backend): fix oversized-artifact ETag assertions and formatting (ruff) * test(backend): keep oversized-payload line within ruff 240-col config	2026-08-24 07:45:30 +08:00
Aleksandr Sapronov	613b90b0e6	feat(scheduler): make scheduled-run recursion_limit configurable (#4848) ... Adds scheduler.recursion_limit to config.yaml (default 1000, clamped by max_recursion_limit) so scheduled background runs can use a different recursion limit than the web UI. The value is read at dispatch time, so a YAML edit applies to the next scheduled run without a Gateway restart. Also logs a warning when the resolver falls back to the default or clamps the configured value.	2026-08-24 07:09:08 +08:00
Zeren Wang	b36504edf2	fix(gateway): reject MCP task cancellation when the worker is stopped (#4963) ... The cancel endpoint resolved McpTaskService whenever SQL persistence was configured, even with mcp_tasks.enabled=false, and acknowledged the request by recording cancel_requested_at. The background loop that owns the remote cancel call only runs when enabled, so the fence was never claimed and the remote task kept running indefinitely. Gate the endpoint on app.state.mcp_tasks_available (set only after the service is started) and return 503 before writing the fence, consistent with the background-loop ownership contract. Read-only list/detail endpoints remain available while the worker is stopped.	2026-08-24 06:57:55 +08:00
Zeren Wang	4e35f0d1d4	feat(harness): deterministic tool receipts with model-visible ledger (RFC #4651, layer 1) (#4659) ... * feat(harness): add deterministic tool receipts with model-visible ledger Stamp an immutable per-call fact record (tool name, status, args/output hashes, byte count, timestamp) onto every tool result via a new ToolReceiptMiddleware, and inject the derived receipt ledger (r1..rN) into the model context so subagent reports can cite executed actions. - tool_receipt.py: receipt core (make/extract/render), newest-first budget eviction, ids derived from the append-only message stream - ToolReceiptMiddleware: stamps ToolMessages directly or inside Command-wrapped results; hidden ledger injection mirrors DurableContextMiddleware; sits between ToolProgress and ToolErrorHandling with a build-time ordering guard - config: new verification section (receipts on, judge off), config version 32 -> 33 with example/helm/docs updates * feat(harness): split receipt rendering from stamping; address PR review Review fixes (PR #4659): - output_sha256 now uses sort_keys=True for structured content, matching the order-invariant args fingerprint - stamping failures log at warning (silent ledger gaps would corrupt citations); tool execution remains never blocked - _insert_after_leading_system_messages extracted to shared public message_utils.insert_after_leading_system_messages; both middlewares depend on it instead of a private cross-module helper - code comments in English RFC #4651 revision-2 alignment: - receipts_render_mode config ('always' | 'delegation_only'): subagent chains always render the ledger (citations are produced there); the lead chain renders only while processing subagent results, removing the always-on token tax from ordinary turns - receipts gain bounded args_preview/output_preview (<=200 chars, tail for output) so later typed claim bindings (tests_passed) can anchor to a specific recorded execution * docs(harness): state receipt freshness caveat and vocabulary layering in module docstring * merge: upstream/main — resolve AGENTS.md split, bump config_version to 34, drop unused receipt previews - backend/AGENTS.md: take upstream's slimmed root guidance (#4799); move the ToolReceiptMiddleware chain entry into agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md and the verification.* hot-reload mention into config/AGENTS.md - config.example.yaml + helm values/README: config_version 33 -> 34 so existing v33 configs get the outdated-config prompt (review: willem-bd) - tool_receipt.py: drop args_preview/output_preview — no Layer 1 consumer reads them; re-add with the Layer 2 claim-binding consumer (review: willem-bd) * docs(harness): cover receipt id renumbering after compaction in module docstring Positional display ids are stable only while history is append-only; compaction drops ToolMessages and the survivors renumber, so Layer 2 citation verification must resolve [rN] against the ledger as of the citing turn (review: willem-bd, doc-only). * chore(config): bump config_version to 35 main reached 34 via #4780 without the verification section; publishing the new schema at the same number would silently skip the outdated-config prompt for configs synced from main in that window (review: willem-bd). * fix(skills): restore errno import dropped upstream in #4830 upstream/main adf6c422 uses errno.ENOTDIR in the drift guard but removed the import, so the PR merge ref fails lint-backend (F821). * fix(harness): harden tool receipts against forgery and turn-scope delegation_only Address willem-bd's pre-merge review on #4659: 1. Untrusted receipt metadata: the gateway now strips the server-owned deerflow_tool_receipt key from external input messages; stamping always overwrites any tool-supplied value instead of preserving it; and extract_tool_receipts validates persisted receipt shapes (required typed fields, unknown keys ignored) so malformed entries are skipped instead of crashing render or passing as runtime-stamped evidence. 2. delegation_only no longer sticks on: _should_render now scopes the subagent_status scan to the current turn (messages after the latest genuine user message), so an old completed delegation stops rendering the ledger on later ordinary turns. The genuine-user predicate moves to message_utils.is_genuine_user_message, shared with input sanitization. * fix(harness): stamp receipts outside short-circuiting tool middlewares Address willem-bd's review on #4659: ToolReceiptMiddleware was registered inside Guardrail/SandboxAudit/ReadBeforeWrite/ToolProgress, each of which can return a ToolMessage without invoking its handler — blocked calls (e.g. a read-before-write-denied write_file) never got a receipt, silently gapping the ledger on a default-enabled path. SandboxAudit additionally rebuilds medium-risk results, dropping an inner stamp. ToolReceiptMiddleware is now the outermost wrap_tool_call layer in the runtime tail. Normal results still carry deerflow_tool_meta (stamped by ToolErrorHandling on the inner return path); short-circuit messages self-stamp meta or fall back to message.status. The new invariant is declared as ordering constraints in deerflow.extensions.ordering, with composed-chain regression tests for a blocked write and a warn-rebuilt bash result.	2026-08-23 15:43:37 +08:00
AoHanBei	308948aa05	fix(mcp): compensate cancelled task submissions (#4933) ... * fix(mcp): compensate cancelled task submissions * fix(mcp): shield submission compensation * docs(mcp): preserve notification lifecycle contract * fix(mcp): bound submission compensation wait --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-23 15:30:21 +08:00
ajayr	7e95bef2e7	feat(mcp): per-user credential injection for shared MCP servers (#4868) ... * feat(mcp): per-user credential injection for shared MCP servers A single HTTP/SSE MCP server entry can now serve several users, each authenticated to the remote service with their own credential. A server opts in with a user_auth block mapping user ids to credential header values ($ENV_VAR references supported): "user_auth": { "header": "Authorization", "users": { "<user-id>": "$SERVICE_TOKEN_ALICE" } } The built-in user-scoped auth interceptor resolves the authenticated runtime user on every tool call (request runtime -> ambient LangGraph runtime -> auth config -> request-scoped user ContextVar) and rewrites the configured header via request.override(), the same per-call mechanism as the OAuth interceptor. It registers after OAuth in the shared assembly so its per-user value wins the header when a server declares both. The entry's static headers are used only for startup tool discovery. Fail-closed by default: an unmapped user - including the anonymous default-user fallback - or a credential whose env reference resolved empty gets an actionable ToolException instead of another user's credential; on_missing: "passthrough" opts out per server. Combined with the existing per-(user, thread) MCP session scoping this gives credential isolation on shared servers. Gateway API: user_auth.users values are masked in GET responses, and PUT round-trips preserve stored credentials for masked values (same contract as env/headers/oauth secrets); a masked value for a user id not already stored is rejected. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): address review — preserve stored user_auth sub-fields on partial PUT, warn-and-skip stdio, allow extras Review findings from #4868: 1. A partial user_auth payload (e.g. {"enabled": false}) merged to users={} and default on_missing, irreversibly wiping stored credentials on PUT. The merge is now sub-field-aware via model_fields_set — omitted sub-fields carry the stored values, an explicitly sent users map still replaces (so full-round-trip removal works), masked values still swap back for stored credentials. 2. user_auth on a stdio server was a silent no-op: rewritten headers go to call meta, never a transport header, while deny errors still fired. The interceptor builder now warns and skips non-sse/http servers, matching the tool_call_timeout transport-mismatch convention. 3. McpUserScopedAuthConfigResponse now allows extra keys like the harness-side model, and extras survive masking and merge, matching the server-level model_extra handling. Adds four regression tests (partial-PUT preservation, explicit-map replacement, extras round-trip, stdio warn-and-skip). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject blank user_auth.header at the gateway A blank header passed the gateway response model, was persisted, then failed the harness-side ExtensionsConfig validator on reload — the PUT returned 500 after the write and every later config load/startup failed until the file was hand-edited. Mirror the harness non-blank validator on McpUserScopedAuthConfigResponse so the PUT fails with 422 before anything is written. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * style: ruff format extensions_config.py Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): harden the trust chain and masking around user-scoped credential selection Address review round 4: - Scrub client-supplied user_id from run context/configurable for external callers in inject_authenticated_user_context, before every early return, and restamp only from request.state.user. Now that user_id selects which user's credential user-scoped MCP auth injects, a forged value must not survive any future path that skips the restamp. Internal callers (IM channels, scheduler) keep supplying end-user identity as before (PR #3294 contract). Regression tests pin both the scrub and that a forged body.context.user_id can never resolve as another user through merge + inject ordering. - Include the caller's own resolved user id in the fail-closed deny message so operators can copy the exact users key (it differs by deployment path), and document the key formats in the mcp.mdx doc. - Mask sensitive extra keys inside user_auth on GET like server-level extras, and swap masked sentinels back for stored values on PUT via _merge_extra_value_preserving_masked. - Extract the interceptor wrap loop into compose_tool_interceptors and pin the security property functionally: an OAuth interceptor that actually sets Authorization loses the final header to the per-user credential through the same composition the session-pool path uses. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-23 15:16:04 +08:00
Aari	236a068e77	fix(docker): let the Gateway write extensions_config.json in production (#4852) ... * fix(docker): let the Gateway write extensions_config.json in production AGENTS.md states extensions_config.json may be edited at runtime through the Gateway API, and the Gateway implements that for the MCP enable switch, PUT/PATCH /api/mcp/config and the skill update route. Two properties of the production compose stack made every one of those writes fail: - the file was mounted read-only, and - Docker mounts it as its own mount point, so the temp-file-plus-rename in atomic_write_extensions_config hit EBUSY. Linux refuses rename() over a mount point whether or not the mount is writable, so making the mount read-write alone is not enough. Mount it read-write and fall back to an in-place overwrite on EBUSY only. The fallback is deliberately non-atomic and says so in a warning; it is reached only where the atomic route cannot work, and any other errno still propagates. config.yaml stays read-only: no API writes it. docker-compose-dev.yaml mounts the whole project directory, so the destination is an ordinary file there and this never surfaced in development. * test(docker): parse mount options instead of matching a :ro suffix Docker's short-syntax options segment is comma-separated, so a read-only mount can legally be spelled ":ro,z" or ":z,ro" — common with SELinux relabelling. Matching the raw string for a ":ro" suffix reads those as writable, which silently defeats the guard: the writability assertion would pass on a read-only mount, and the config.yaml assertion would fail on a correctly read-only one. Parse the options segment and test membership instead, and cover the parser with the spellings that broke the suffix check. * fix(config): harden mutable extensions config	2026-08-23 15:08:39 +08:00
Ryker_Feng	e5bf3ccf45	fix(feishu): preserve inbound attachment files (#4903) ... * fix(feishu): preserve inbound attachment files * fix(feishu): harden inbound attachment handling * fix(dingtalk): reserve symlinked inbound filenames	2026-08-23 10:45:30 +08:00
Aleksandr Sapronov	74d9e6c2e0	fix(channels): move Telegram _attach_connection_identity to main event loop (#4815) ... Move SQL-dependent connection identity and /start bind work onto the Gateway main loop via _submit_threadsafe_coroutine, and send PTB replies through _run_on_telegram_loop so the Telegram worker never blocks or touches SQLAlchemy/HTTP across event loops. When the main loop is not running (e.g. during gateway shutdown), the bind path logs a warning and returns False instead of running SQLAlchemy on the wrong loop, matching the Feishu bind pattern.	2026-08-23 10:27:19 +08:00
Nan Gao	13f0a7f263	feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did (#4863) ... * feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did DeerFlow's extension system can contribute middleware, services and routes, but an extension cannot answer basic questions about a run without reaching into host internals. Several of the facts it would need are destroyed by the operations that produce them: * The middleware chain injects and rewrites a lot of context — date reminders, recalled memory, compaction summaries, durable-context data, image payloads, activated skill bodies. Downstream, none of it is attributable: at the model-call boundary an injected HumanMessage is indistinguishable from the user's own, and anything wanting to tell them apart has to pattern-match prompt wording, which breaks on the next copy edit. * Two runs of "the same agent" are only comparable if the chain enforced the same limits, prompts and thresholds. Recovering that from outside means reading private attributes and guessing which of them change behaviour — a guess that rots silently as middlewares gain fields. * The lead-agent factory resolves a model after runtime overrides, renders a prompt, filters tools through authorization and composes a stack, all inside one synchronous call, and none of it survives: a middleware sees its neighbours but not the prompt, the run worker sees a graph but not what went into it. * Summarization is destructive by design. N messages leave the context and one summary enters it; afterwards only the summary exists, so "which messages became this?" is not reconstructible. This adds seven neutral facilities so those facts are recorded where they are still true, and releases the contract package as 0.2.0. Message provenance Producers stamp `deerflow_content_kind` / `deerflow_producer_kind` onto the messages they inject or rewrite. Stamping is unconditional — a fact whose presence depends on whether an observer is installed is not a fact — and the keys are server-owned, so provenance cannot be forged from a request. Middleware self-description Twelve middlewares declare their own behaviour-affecting parameters through a duck-typed `release_policy_parameters()`. Long text is hashed rather than embedded: a declaration is an identity, not a copy of the prompt. Agent assembly descriptor `assemble_lead_agent()` returns the graph plus a descriptor whose fingerprint answers "did anything about this agent change between these two runs?". `make_lead_agent()` keeps its graph-only signature — it is the LangGraph Server ABI declared in langgraph.json. Tools and skills are sorted before hashing because their assembly order is incidental; middlewares are not, because stack order decides what wraps what. Host build identity is reported but excluded from the fingerprint, so a redeploy does not invalidate every agent's identity. Context compaction observation Summarization emits the content hashes of the messages it is about to remove joined to the summary that replaced them. Content is the only identity available at that seam: the summary does not become a message, and what later projects it into a request renders it bounded and escaped rather than verbatim. Neutral policy, transform and MCP-source facts Guardrail decisions are published to runtime context under a `__`-prefixed key; result-rewriting middlewares append a declared, ordered transform trail; MCP tools carry their credential-free logical origin. Extension route identity Contributed routes are session-authenticated and cannot opt out, but "logged in" and "administrator" are different questions. Extensions get a neutral projection of the caller rather than the host's auth context, and `require_admin` fails closed when identity cannot be determined. Extension-owned tables An extension that persists data owns its own MetaData and migration chain, so its tables are absent from Base.metadata and `alembic revision --autogenerate` proposes dropping them. Extensions declare a table prefix, which is rejected at registration if it would shadow a host table. The contract package stays dependency-free and imports no host code; every new Protocol method has a default so later additions remain additive. The loader's pre-1.0 rule requires an exact major.minor match, so extensions written against 0.1 are now refused at startup with an actionable install hint rather than loading into a host that implements a different surface. uv.lock records the contract package's new version, so `uv sync --locked` still resolves on a fresh checkout. * fix(backend): sort gateway service imports	2026-08-23 09:57:12 +08:00
Aari	5ffc2d3e27	feat(mcp): complete durable task notifications and chat UI (#4833) ... * feat(mcp): add reliable task notifications and cancellation * feat(mcp): add background task chat UI * fix(mcp): hide and sanitize task notification prompts * fix(mcp): sanitize projected task names * fix(mcp): harden task notifications and details * fix(mcp): harden task lifecycle recovery * fix(mcp): gate task UI and isolate cancellations * test: scope plain-text response locator * fix(mcp): align task notification boundaries * fix(mcp): bound task delivery retries * fix background task notification races	2026-08-22 16:53:32 +08:00
ajayr	556a178771	fix(buzz): drop replayed events across reconnects with a persistent seen-id store (#4888) ... * fix(buzz): drop replayed events across reconnects with a persistent seen-id store The Buzz connector's resubscribe filter replays by design: 'since' is the created_at of the last processed event and NIP-01 'since' is inclusive, so every relay reconnect redelivers at least that event. The guard against re-running the agent on it was the manager's inbound dedupe, whose default store is in-process with a 10-minute TTL — so any reconnect more than ten minutes after a channel's last message (or any gateway restart) re-answered that message. Users saw the agent respond to an old question after every relay restart. Fix: persist the ids of fully processed events per channel (BuzzSeenEventStore, JSON under {base_dir}/channels/, atomic writes) and drop redelivered ids in _handle_chat_event before the /connect branch — a replayed /connect would otherwise be re-answered with a spurious 'code invalid or expired'. Matching is by exact event id only, never timestamp, so a genuinely new event (same-second or clock-skewed author) can never be skipped, preserving the connector's fail-toward-replay invariant. Only fully processed events are recorded, mirroring the watermark rule: a gated drop or failed publish stays replayable. Fail-open in both directions: an unreadable store loads empty (costs one replayed reply, the previous behavior) and a failed write is logged and retried on the next record. Id lists and the channel map are bounded like the connector's other remote-fed maps. The persistent path is wired in ChannelService (like channel_store); directly constructed channels get a memory-only store so tests and tooling stay free of filesystem side effects. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(buzz): coalesce seen-store writes, clean up temp files, harden docs and coverage Address review on the seen-event store: - record() now marks the store dirty and coalesces persistence to one write per FLUSH_DELAY_SECONDS on the event loop, so a reconnect backlog burst pays one O(store) file write instead of one per event; sync callers (no running loop) keep immediate writes, and BuzzChannel.stop() flushes so a clean shutdown loses nothing. A crash inside the window only costs replay, never a skip. - _save() unlinks its temp file on failure (ChannelStore parity), so a persistently unwritable path no longer accumulates *.tmp litter. - Module docstring now documents that restart protection is bounded to the newest MAX_IDS_PER_CHANNEL ids per channel (and to raise it if a relay ever serves a deeper default backlog), and pins the single-event-loop assumption that makes the class safe without a lock. - New tests: MAX_CHANNELS LRU eviction, coalescing behavior, flush idempotence, temp-file cleanup, stop() flushing, and the ChannelService wiring that injects seen_event_store_path (the line that makes real deployments durable). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(buzz): reschedule the coalesced flush when the pending timer's loop is gone A pending flush handle pinned to a since-closed event loop kept _flush_handle non-None forever, so later record() calls on a new loop never scheduled a timer and the store silently stopped persisting until an explicit flush(). Track the scheduling loop (TimerHandle has no public get_loop()) and reschedule when it differs from the running one. Unreachable in production (one loop per process, stop() flushes), but now hardened and tested. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-08-22 16:34:45 +08:00
Aari	5ffaa09f5a	feat(memory): add hybrid fact eviction policy (#4789) ... * feat(memory): add hybrid fact eviction policy * refactor(memory): simplify confirmation count update * fix(memory): clean up eviction audit metadata * fix(memory): harden eviction cleanup boundaries * fix(memory): address hybrid eviction review	2026-08-17 08:20:42 +08:00
Mason Zhou	a181c3398b	fix: support Studio file-based app loading (#4838) ... * fix: support Studio file-based app loading * docs: clarify Studio loader invariant	2026-08-16 23:54:06 +08:00
Mason Zhou	432c09f6b0	fix: restore standalone LangGraph Studio compatibility (#4760) ... * fix: restore standalone LangGraph Studio compatibility * fix: secure standalone Studio assistant ownership * fix: harden Studio provenance reconciliation * fix: repair Studio persistence before runtime startup * fix: harden standalone Studio compatibility	2026-08-15 21:20:34 +08:00
Aari	47b258ebd7	feat(mcp): add ordinary durable task driver (#4690) ... * feat(mcp): add durable task runtime foundation * fix(chart): sync embedded config version * fix(mcp): isolate task polls during shutdown * feat(mcp): track consecutive poll errors on mcp_tasks poll_attempt_count grows on every claim (successful polls included), so it cannot drive a failure backoff without misjudging normal long tasks. Add consecutive_poll_error_count: incremented when a claim is released after a poll error, reset to zero by any applied snapshot. The backoff/terminal policy that consumes it lands with the first concrete driver. * fix(mcp): harden durable task lifecycle * feat(mcp): add ordinary durable task driver * test(mcp): address durable task review feedback * fix(mcp): preserve submit tool descriptions * fix(mcp): bound remote task calls * fix(mcp): bound persisted task payloads * fix(mcp): preserve task tool error details * fix(mcp): enforce durable task boundaries * test(mcp): cover task config snapshot lifecycle --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-15 14:26:38 +08:00
Copilot	1dd6ba1acb	fix: enforce global concurrent-run budget for manual triggers (#4769) ... * Initial plan * fix: enforce global concurrent-run budget for manual triggers Manual triggers now check count_active_runs() before dispatching and return a conflict result (409 at the router) when max_concurrent_runs is already reached, preventing the global cap from being exceeded. Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-15 00:08:39 +08:00
rain02333z-spec	828363705a	fix(scheduler): support safe multi-instance scheduler recovery (#4713) ... * fix(scheduler): reject unsafe multi-worker startup * fix(scheduler): support safe multi-instance recovery * fix(scheduler): make multi-instance recovery lease-safe * fix(scheduler): address multi-instance review feedback * docs(scheduler): add multi-instance upgrade notes --------- Co-authored-by: rain02333z-spec <225106191+rain02333z-spec@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-08-14 23:50:40 +08:00
Eilen Shin	15bbf3a4c1	fix(channels): await real cross-thread tasks on shutdown (#4816)	2026-08-14 23:29:04 +08:00
Eilen Shin	ce4ef1bb2f	fix(channels): bound inbound intake and worker lifecycle (#4800) ... * fix(channels): bound inbound intake and worker lifecycle * fix(channels): harden overload retry and shutdown draining * fix(channels): retain shutdown task ownership	2026-08-14 12:35:24 +08:00
Nan Gao	c542185a7f	feat(extensions): add gateway contribution points and packaged extension management (#4780) ... * feat(extensions): add gateway services and routers * feat(extensions): add standalone reference extension * fix(extensions): harden contributed gateway routes * docs(extensions): document gateway contribution points * feat(extensions): add operator CLI for packaged extension management Add `deerflow extensions install/list/enable/disable/remove` plus the root `make extension-*` wrappers, backed by an `ExtensionManager` that owns one transaction over backend/pyproject.toml, backend/uv.lock, the managed source snapshot, the uv environment, and the `plugins:` block in config.yaml. Install accepts a package requirement, a public HTTPS Git URL, or a local directory. Local directories are copied to backend/extensions/sources/ as deployable snapshots rather than editable installs, and the root .dockerignore re-includes that tree so snapshots reach the backend builder. Remote sources are HTTPS-only; SSH Git, file:// and local wheels are rejected because the stock Docker builder cannot reproduce them. Because environment configuration can still resolve a plain package name to a local wheel (a UV_FIND_LINKS wheelhouse, say), every uv add/remove is followed by an audit of the new lock: any local reference the stock image build cannot reproduce rolls back the whole transaction. A config carrying duplicate top-level `plugins:` keys is rejected outright rather than managed against one block while the Gateway reads another. Dependency synchronization now has one lock authority. The `extensions` dependency group joins [tool.uv].default-groups, every startup path syncs the same lock with --locked and launches with --no-sync, and the Docker images move to uv 0.11.1 for the --no-workspace boundary the manager needs. Loader gains `enabled`, `name` and `package` fields so a disabled extension is skipped before resolution and import. Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com> * fix(extensions): stop the managed plugins rewrite from destroying config Two data-safety defects in the managed `plugins:` block writer. The "next top-level key" boundary was a regex matching only `[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_-]*` or a quoted key. `AppConfig` is `extra="allow"`, so a config may legally carry any top-level key, and a key the pattern cannot recognize did not fail loudly — it read as "no next section", and the rewrite replaced that neighbour and its entire subtree with the managed block. `my.key`, `2fa`, `$schema`, `my key` and non-ASCII keys were all silently deleted by a plain `extension-enable`/`disable`. Both boundaries now come from the YAML parser's node marks, so key shape is irrelevant. The file-final branch never consulted the trailing-comment scan the has-next-key branch used, so any comment below the block was dropped. Since the manager appends `plugins:` at end of file, that is the steady-state shape for most installs: an operator note below the block was destroyed on the next toggle. Separately, every managed install wrote `required: true` while the loader defaults to false. That turned any later load failure — broken wheel, missing native library, deleted snapshot — into a Gateway startup abort recoverable only with shell access. New records are now written `required: false`, with an explicit `install --required` opt-in; adopting an existing hand-written record still preserves the operator's own choice. * fix(extensions): harden the manager transaction and correct its docs Follow-up hardening on the extension package manager. Security posture, which the docs already claimed: - Scrub `UV_PYTHON`, `UV_INSECURE_HOST`, `UV_CONSTRAINT` and `UV_NO_BUILD_ISOLATION` from the controlled uv environment. `UV_PYTHON` swaps the interpreter that the entry-point probe then imports and calls, and every later `uv run --no-sync` startup uses; `UV_INSECURE_HOST` removes the TLS validation the HTTPS-only source rule depends on. Neither is an index, proxy, cache or credential-provider setting, so neither was covered by the carve-out. - Recognize run-together and all-caps secret query parameters (`accesstoken`, `ACCESSTOKEN`, `key`, `pw`, `sas`, `code`). The camel-case splitter only fires on case transitions, so only the separated spellings were caught. Short generic words stay boundary-anchored, so `?keyword=` remains installable. - Validate the config before running any uv command. `uv add`/`uv sync` execute the package's build backend, so a config the manager could never write to must fail before that code runs rather than afterwards through rollback. Transaction integrity: - Run the second dependency-file restore from a `finally`. The recovery sync runs without `--locked` when the checkout had no lock, so uv writes one while resolving; if that sync then failed, the restore was skipped and the operator kept a lock file they never had. A failing recovery sync now also reports the original failure instead of replacing it. - Skip the recovery sync on cancellation. Answering Ctrl-C with a full dependency resolve invites a second interrupt that escapes the handler and strands the checkout mid-transaction; the declarations are already restored and the next locked startup sync reconciles the environment. - Retry a non-blocking lock on Windows instead of using `msvcrt.LK_LOCK`, which gives up after ~10s — far shorter than a real `uv add` plus `uv sync`, so contention surfaced as `Permission denied` rather than serializing. - Locate the entry-point probe's JSON payload instead of parsing stdout's first line, so a `sitecustomize`/`.pth` banner cannot roll back a good install. - Warn when the lock records a loopback source. `127.0.0.1` inside the image builder is a different machine, but unlike an environment-driven wheelhouse resolution this is a source the operator typed deliberately, so it is reported rather than rolled back. Private-network indexes are untouched: a builder on that network can reach them. Docs: the blanket claim that failed operations restore the config file was wrong — the conflict branches deliberately preserve a concurrent external edit and leave `remove` deactivated. Document that, the `required: false` default, the config preflight, the interrupt behaviour, and where the plugins-block boundaries come from. * test(gateway): pin the request-path projection agreement `get_request_route_path()` imports the private `starlette._utils.get_route_path` so the auth and CSRF predicates classify the exact string Starlette's router matches on. Its requirement is not "strip root_path correctly" but "return what the dispatcher is matching", so delegating to the router's own implementation keeps the two in lockstep by construction. Keep the private import rather than vendoring a copy: an import that disappears fails loudly at startup, while a stale copy diverges silently at a security boundary. Cover the property directly instead of the mechanism, so the tests survive a future reimplementation: - projection edge cases, including the segment-boundary guard that keeps root_path="/api" from slicing "/apifoo/models" into a string the router would never match - agreement with the router under nested mounts - the two bypasses these predicates exist to prevent: a protected route mounted under the "/health" public prefix must still 401, and a POST mounted under "/api/webhooks" must still require a CSRF token Both are verified to fail when the projection is reverted to `request.url.path` (9/13 red) and when a plausible vendored copy omits the boundary guard (the 2 boundary cases red). Declare starlette as a bounded direct dependency so a bump — which is security-relevant here — shows up in review rather than arriving silently through FastAPI. * ci: pin uv to the version production ships ExtensionManager is not a consumer of uv the build tool -- it is a program whose whole job is driving `uv` as a subprocess, depending on its CLI behavior (`--no-workspace`, `--no-sync`, what `uv add` writes into `[dependency-groups] extensions`) and on the `uv.lock` serialization format. uv is closer to a runtime dependency with a contract than to incidental tooling. backend/Dockerfile pins that binary to 0.11.1, but all eight astral-sh/setup-uv steps installed whatever was latest at run time, so CI exercised the manager against a uv that is not the uv production runs. The sharpest failure that allows: a newer uv bumps uv.lock's `revision`, CI stays green because the same uv reads back what it wrote, and the pinned uv in the production image cannot read the committed lock. `uv lock --check` is version-sensitive for the same reason -- it verifies the lock is what *this* uv would produce, and two versions can emit equivalent but non-identical output. Pin every step to 0.11.1 and lift the one lingering setup-uv@v3 to v7 so the steps share input and caching behavior. Pinning alone drifts apart again on the next bump, so add a constraint test in the style of test_compose_default_bind_host.py: the Dockerfile's UV_IMAGE tag is the single source of truth, and both compose defaults plus every setup-uv step must match it. Verified to fail when a pin drifts, when a step omits `version`, and -- the real scenario -- when the Dockerfile is bumped alone, which lights up the workflows and both compose files at once. * fix(gateway): state the extension route auth limit and abort a failed dev sync Two scoped review follow-ups. README: contributed routers cannot enter the host's reserved public prefixes, which makes every extension endpoint session-authenticated -- there is no way to expose an unauthenticated route. The rejection rule was documented but its consequence was not, so inbound provider webhooks and public status endpoints read as merely undocumented rather than out of scope for this release. docker/dev-entrypoint.sh: the self-heal retry reuses `--locked`, so it repairs a corrupt .venv but never a lock that disagrees with pyproject.toml. `set -e` already stopped the script there -- uvicorn was not being started against a stale environment -- but it exited on a bare uv exit code with no indication of what to do. Abort explicitly with the cause and the fix. Tests slice the sync block out of the real script and run it against a stub uv, so they exercise the shipped code rather than a copy of it (/app/backend only exists inside the container). They cover the success path, the retry that recovers, the abort, and the guidance. Verified against the pre-fix script: only the guidance case goes red, confirming the abort itself was already correct. * fix(extensions): point Git SSH shorthand at the HTTPS correction Git's SCP-like shorthand carries no URL scheme, so `git+git@host:org/repo.git` reached the scheme rules looking like a bare path and was rejected with "local path references are not deployable; pass a local directory so DeerFlow can snapshot it". The operator asked for a remote source, so that guidance points at the wrong fix. Detect the shorthand ahead of the scheme rules and report the public-HTTPS correction instead. The bare `git@host:org/repo.git` spelling took a different wrong turn: packaging parses it as a direct reference named `git`, leaving `host:org/repo.git`, whose `host` reads as a URL scheme and produced the generic HTTPS message. Both spellings now share one message, as does the PEP 508 named form. * docs: keep the root extension summary within its new budget #4799 split the depth out of the module guides and added a size gate; the root file's job is now orientation, and this branch had pushed it 192 bytes past the soft limit. The manager transaction, source rules, and lock discipline are already stated in full in the extensions guide, so the root keeps the one-line orientation and points there instead of restating them. --------- Co-authored-by: Codex <codex@openai.com>	2026-08-13 23:55:30 +08:00
Ryker_Feng	ccff5f5ce7	docs: govern agent guidance size (#4799) ... * docs: govern agent guidance size * refactor: split agent guidance by code scope * Clarify virtual path handling in AGENTS.md Updated the translation section to clarify the role of `LocalSandboxProvider` and the handling of virtual paths in the tool layer. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-08-13 21:49:04 +08:00
AoHanBei	38ff44778a	fix(wecom): serialize websocket shutdown (#4762) ... * fix(wecom): await connection task shutdown * fix(wecom): serialize websocket shutdown	2026-08-11 22:27:11 +08:00
Baldwinzc	baaf2bad47	fix(gateway): stamp turn_duration on last AI message only in /messages/page (#4755) ... _enrich_thread_message_page inlined its own turn_duration loop that stamped EVERY AI message of a run, re-introducing #4152 on the /messages/page endpoint (the legacy /messages and /history endpoints already route through stamp_turn_duration_on_last_ai after #4163, but that fix missed the page path introduced earlier in #4065). A multi-step turn thus rendered the same run lifetime beside every intermediate AI message, reading as repeated thinking latency. Replace the inline loop with the shared stamp_turn_duration_on_last_ai helper so all three message endpoints agree: the run's wall-clock duration lands on its final visible AI message only.	2026-08-11 22:00:57 +08:00