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26 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
ChaseMoon
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9c1dd11160
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fix(mcp): preserve pooled stdio sessions after task timeouts (#5027) | ||
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青榆牧
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a94b2d8897
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feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to MCP HTTP/SSE headers (#5010)
* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers `user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to register one MCP server entry per credential. Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets` carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block unmasked. Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key, because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"` opts out. Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context` and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning. Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from `langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the ambient-runtime fallback disabled. Closes #5005 Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`. HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context` precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential. Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses. Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and the Gateway mirror. Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest` or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes `request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers. `_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context` instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`, not only a credential. The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`, which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names * fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ChaseMoon
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287f890c66
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fix(mcp): reconnect ordinary stdio tools after disconnect (#5018) | ||
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ajayr
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7e95bef2e7
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feat(mcp): per-user credential injection for shared MCP servers (#4868)
* feat(mcp): per-user credential injection for shared MCP servers
A single HTTP/SSE MCP server entry can now serve several users, each
authenticated to the remote service with their own credential. A server
opts in with a user_auth block mapping user ids to credential header
values ($ENV_VAR references supported):
"user_auth": {
"header": "Authorization",
"users": { "<user-id>": "$SERVICE_TOKEN_ALICE" }
}
The built-in user-scoped auth interceptor resolves the authenticated
runtime user on every tool call (request runtime -> ambient LangGraph
runtime -> auth config -> request-scoped user ContextVar) and rewrites
the configured header via request.override(), the same per-call
mechanism as the OAuth interceptor. It registers after OAuth in the
shared assembly so its per-user value wins the header when a server
declares both. The entry's static headers are used only for startup
tool discovery.
Fail-closed by default: an unmapped user - including the anonymous
default-user fallback - or a credential whose env reference resolved
empty gets an actionable ToolException instead of another user's
credential; on_missing: "passthrough" opts out per server. Combined
with the existing per-(user, thread) MCP session scoping this gives
credential isolation on shared servers.
Gateway API: user_auth.users values are masked in GET responses, and
PUT round-trips preserve stored credentials for masked values (same
contract as env/headers/oauth secrets); a masked value for a user id
not already stored is rejected.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): address review — preserve stored user_auth sub-fields on partial PUT, warn-and-skip stdio, allow extras
Review findings from #4868:
1. A partial user_auth payload (e.g. {"enabled": false}) merged to
users={} and default on_missing, irreversibly wiping stored
credentials on PUT. The merge is now sub-field-aware via
model_fields_set — omitted sub-fields carry the stored values, an
explicitly sent users map still replaces (so full-round-trip removal
works), masked values still swap back for stored credentials.
2. user_auth on a stdio server was a silent no-op: rewritten headers go
to call meta, never a transport header, while deny errors still fired.
The interceptor builder now warns and skips non-sse/http servers,
matching the tool_call_timeout transport-mismatch convention.
3. McpUserScopedAuthConfigResponse now allows extra keys like the
harness-side model, and extras survive masking and merge, matching
the server-level model_extra handling.
Adds four regression tests (partial-PUT preservation, explicit-map
replacement, extras round-trip, stdio warn-and-skip).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): reject blank user_auth.header at the gateway
A blank header passed the gateway response model, was persisted, then
failed the harness-side ExtensionsConfig validator on reload — the PUT
returned 500 after the write and every later config load/startup failed
until the file was hand-edited. Mirror the harness non-blank validator
on McpUserScopedAuthConfigResponse so the PUT fails with 422 before
anything is written.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style: ruff format extensions_config.py
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): harden the trust chain and masking around user-scoped credential selection
Address review round 4:
- Scrub client-supplied user_id from run context/configurable for
external callers in inject_authenticated_user_context, before every
early return, and restamp only from request.state.user. Now that
user_id selects which user's credential user-scoped MCP auth injects,
a forged value must not survive any future path that skips the
restamp. Internal callers (IM channels, scheduler) keep supplying
end-user identity as before (PR #3294 contract). Regression tests pin
both the scrub and that a forged body.context.user_id can never
resolve as another user through merge + inject ordering.
- Include the caller's own resolved user id in the fail-closed deny
message so operators can copy the exact users key (it differs by
deployment path), and document the key formats in the mcp.mdx doc.
- Mask sensitive extra keys inside user_auth on GET like server-level
extras, and swap masked sentinels back for stored values on PUT via
_merge_extra_value_preserving_masked.
- Extract the interceptor wrap loop into compose_tool_interceptors and
pin the security property functionally: an OAuth interceptor that
actually sets Authorization loses the final header to the per-user
credential through the same composition the session-pool path uses.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Nan Gao
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13f0a7f263
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feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did (#4863)
* feat(extensions): let an out-of-tree extension observe what the agent did
DeerFlow's extension system can contribute middleware, services and routes,
but an extension cannot answer basic questions about a run without reaching
into host internals. Several of the facts it would need are destroyed by the
operations that produce them:
* The middleware chain injects and rewrites a lot of context — date
reminders, recalled memory, compaction summaries, durable-context data,
image payloads, activated skill bodies. Downstream, none of it is
attributable: at the model-call boundary an injected HumanMessage is
indistinguishable from the user's own, and anything wanting to tell them
apart has to pattern-match prompt wording, which breaks on the next copy
edit.
* Two runs of "the same agent" are only comparable if the chain enforced the
same limits, prompts and thresholds. Recovering that from outside means
reading private attributes and guessing which of them change behaviour — a
guess that rots silently as middlewares gain fields.
* The lead-agent factory resolves a model after runtime overrides, renders a
prompt, filters tools through authorization and composes a stack, all
inside one synchronous call, and none of it survives: a middleware sees its
neighbours but not the prompt, the run worker sees a graph but not what
went into it.
* Summarization is destructive by design. N messages leave the context and
one summary enters it; afterwards only the summary exists, so "which
messages became this?" is not reconstructible.
This adds seven neutral facilities so those facts are recorded where they are
still true, and releases the contract package as 0.2.0.
Message provenance
Producers stamp `deerflow_content_kind` / `deerflow_producer_kind` onto the
messages they inject or rewrite. Stamping is unconditional — a fact whose
presence depends on whether an observer is installed is not a fact — and the
keys are server-owned, so provenance cannot be forged from a request.
Middleware self-description
Twelve middlewares declare their own behaviour-affecting parameters through
a duck-typed `release_policy_parameters()`. Long text is hashed rather than
embedded: a declaration is an identity, not a copy of the prompt.
Agent assembly descriptor
`assemble_lead_agent()` returns the graph plus a descriptor whose fingerprint
answers "did anything about this agent change between these two runs?".
`make_lead_agent()` keeps its graph-only signature — it is the LangGraph
Server ABI declared in langgraph.json. Tools and skills are sorted before
hashing because their assembly order is incidental; middlewares are not,
because stack order decides what wraps what. Host build identity is reported
but excluded from the fingerprint, so a redeploy does not invalidate every
agent's identity.
Context compaction observation
Summarization emits the content hashes of the messages it is about to remove
joined to the summary that replaced them. Content is the only identity
available at that seam: the summary does not become a message, and what later
projects it into a request renders it bounded and escaped rather than
verbatim.
Neutral policy, transform and MCP-source facts
Guardrail decisions are published to runtime context under a `__`-prefixed
key; result-rewriting middlewares append a declared, ordered transform trail;
MCP tools carry their credential-free logical origin.
Extension route identity
Contributed routes are session-authenticated and cannot opt out, but
"logged in" and "administrator" are different questions. Extensions get a
neutral projection of the caller rather than the host's auth context, and
`require_admin` fails closed when identity cannot be determined.
Extension-owned tables
An extension that persists data owns its own MetaData and migration chain, so
its tables are absent from Base.metadata and `alembic revision --autogenerate`
proposes dropping them. Extensions declare a table prefix, which is rejected
at registration if it would shadow a host table.
The contract package stays dependency-free and imports no host code; every new
Protocol method has a default so later additions remain additive. The loader's
pre-1.0 rule requires an exact major.minor match, so extensions written against
0.1 are now refused at startup with an actionable install hint rather than
loading into a host that implements a different surface.
uv.lock records the contract package's new version, so `uv sync --locked` still
resolves on a fresh checkout.
* fix(backend): sort gateway service imports
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Nan Gao
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a5acc25de6
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fix(mcp): exclude internal temp files from workspace changes (#4898)
* fix(mcp): exclude internal temp files from workspace changes * fix(mcp): address review — shared tmp subdir constant, any-depth docs, nested test - Export MCP_TMP_SUBDIR from constants.py and import it in both stdio launch paths (tools.py, task_tool_caller.py) so the "/tmp" suffix is composed once. - Document that the .mcp exclusion matches by directory name at any depth (like .git/node_modules) in README.md and mcp/AGENTS.md — subagent work dirs below the workspace root get their own .mcp/tmp. - Pin the any-depth semantic in test_workspace_changes.py with a nested workspace/project/.mcp assertion. * docs(mcp): correct any-depth exclusion rationale; re-home tmp pinning comment The previous commit justified the any-depth `.mcp` exclusion with subagent work dirs sitting below the workspace root — a mechanism that doesn't exist: subagents share the parent's thread_id and both stdio launch paths resolve sandbox_work_dir(thread_id), so `.mcp/tmp` is always pinned at the workspace root. Reword mcp/AGENTS.md and the test comment to the real justification (consistency with the other reserved dir names, robustness against a server creating a relative `.mcp` from another cwd). Also move the orphaned "pinning the process temp dir" rationale from tools.py to constants.py next to MCP_TMP_SUBDIR, where both importers see it. |
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Aari
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47b258ebd7
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feat(mcp): add ordinary durable task driver (#4690)
* feat(mcp): add durable task runtime foundation * fix(chart): sync embedded config version * fix(mcp): isolate task polls during shutdown * feat(mcp): track consecutive poll errors on mcp_tasks poll_attempt_count grows on every claim (successful polls included), so it cannot drive a failure backoff without misjudging normal long tasks. Add consecutive_poll_error_count: incremented when a claim is released after a poll error, reset to zero by any applied snapshot. The backoff/terminal policy that consumes it lands with the first concrete driver. * fix(mcp): harden durable task lifecycle * feat(mcp): add ordinary durable task driver * test(mcp): address durable task review feedback * fix(mcp): preserve submit tool descriptions * fix(mcp): bound remote task calls * fix(mcp): bound persisted task payloads * fix(mcp): preserve task tool error details * fix(mcp): enforce durable task boundaries * test(mcp): cover task config snapshot lifecycle --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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lllyfff
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99c926b7bb
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fix(mcp): bring-up has no timeout and externalized tool outputs are counted as undelivered artifacts (#4657)
* fix: bound MCP server bring-up timeouts and exclude externalized tool outputs from delivery verification Two related robustness fixes: 1. MCP server bring-up was unbounded. tool_call_timeout only covered session.call_tool(); tool discovery (subprocess spawn + initialize + tools/list) and persistent stdio session initialization could hang forever, blocking agent construction (and on the Gateway event loop, the whole process). Add a per-server session_init_timeout (default DEFAULT_MCP_SESSION_INIT_TIMEOUT = 60s, null disables) that bounds both discovery and pooled-session initialization. The session pool's existing cancellation handling tears down a session stuck mid-creation in its own task. 2. ToolOutputBudgetMiddleware externalizes oversized tool outputs into outputs/.tool-results/ (configurable tool_output.storage_subdir). The workspace-change scanner and run delivery verification counted those files as produced artifacts, so any run that externalized a tool output without also presenting a real artifact failed with "Artifact delivery incomplete". Exclude TOOL_RESULTS_DIRNAME via a shared constant (mirroring BROWSER_FRAMES_DIRNAME) and thread the configured storage_subdir through snapshot capture so both workspace-changes events and delivery verification stay clean. * review: enforce single-segment tool_output.storage_subdir; document discovery-timeout cleanup Address review feedback: 1. A custom tool_output.storage_subdir with a path separator (e.g. cache/tool-results) silently no-oped the workspace-scanner exclusion: os.walk yields one-segment dirnames, so a nested value never matched and its files were counted as produced artifacts again. ToolOutputConfig now validates storage_subdir as a single directory name (rejects separators, .., absolute, empty) with tests, so the exclusion is always sound. 2. The discovery-timeout path now documents why cancellation is safe, mirroring the session-init note: discovery runs inside the adapter's nested async context managers, and stdio_client's finally terminates the process tree (SIGTERM->SIGKILL on POSIX, process-tree on Windows), so a timed-out npx subprocess and its children are reaped rather than accumulating. * review: log session-init timeouts and align API response model default with runtime config Address second-round review feedback: 1. A session-init timeout raised TimeoutError without any log, unlike the discovery timeout which logs a WARNING. Wrap the bounded get_session in a try/except that logs the timeout (server name + seconds) and re-raises, so operators can diagnose tool-call failures caused by hung MCP sessions. 2. McpServerConfigResponse.session_init_timeout defaulted to None while McpServerConfig defaults to 60s: a server created via PUT /api/mcp/config without the field was persisted with null (no timeout) while the same server created in the config file got 60s. Align the response-model default to DEFAULT_MCP_SESSION_INIT_TIMEOUT so API-created and file-created servers behave the same; an explicit null still opts out. * review: narrow the discovery-timeout handler to the bounded wait_for path The except TimeoutError clause covered both the bounded wait_for branch and the bare discovery branch. With session_init_timeout opted out (None), a TimeoutError raised by discovery itself would hit the %.1f format with None: logging raises TypeError internally, the WARNING is silently dropped, and a --- Logging error --- traceback goes to stderr. Narrow the handler to wrap only the wait_for call, where the branch condition guarantees the timeout value is not None. A discovery-internal TimeoutError on the opted-out path now falls through to the generic failure handler and is reported as 'tool discovery failed' with exc_info. Covered by a regression test that asserts the skip is reported without any broken format. |
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Felix Wang
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e221bddb38
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feat: support per-server MCP tool name prefixes (#4624)
* feat: support per-server MCP tool name prefixes * refactor: pass MCP connection config directly * fix: preserve unprefixed MCP tool names in session pool |
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yjchen101
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6fe6bad001
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fix(mcp): ignore oversized path-like text (#4582)
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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VectorPeak
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07d8b98864
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fix(mcp): ignore malformed path-like text (#4456)
Co-authored-by: chatgpt-codex-connector[bot] <199175422+chatgpt-codex-connector[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Aari
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79cdd99fca
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fix(mcp): validate MCP tool names at load so deferred prompts stay inert (#4154)
* fix(tools): escape MCP tool names rendered into deferred prompts get_deferred_tools_prompt_section and get_mcp_routing_hints_prompt_section list MCP tool names into the <available-deferred-tools> and <mcp_routing_hints> system-prompt blocks without escaping, while the mirror get_skill_index_prompt_section (per its docstring) does escape. An MCP name is taken verbatim from an external server, so a crafted name could close the block and forge a framework tag. Escape names (and routing keywords) at render, mirroring the skill-index section. * fix(mcp): validate tool names at the load boundary Escaping at render only neutralizes < > &, so a tool name with newlines or markdown still injects free-form text into the deferred-tools prompt block. Deferred (tool_search) tools are never bound, so the provider's function-name check never runs on them. Drop any MCP tool whose name is not a valid identifier (^[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$) in get_mcp_tools() — the same charset the provider enforces at bind time — before it can enter the catalog or the prompt. Render-time html.escape stays as defense-in-depth. Mirrors the load-time skill-name validation in skills/storage/skill_storage.py. |
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Ryker_Feng
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5ba25b06ec
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feat(mcp): add MCP routing hints (#4004)
* feat: add MCP routing hints * test: isolate mcp routing prompt config * fix: address mcp routing review feedback |
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Aari
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94c852ac4a
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fix(mcp): route tools by source server, not name prefix (#3812)
* fix(mcp): route tools by source server to fix prefix-collision mis-routing get_mcp_tools() flattened the per-server tool lists and then re-derived each tool's server by scanning servers_config for a name that is a prefix of the (prefixed) tool name, taking the first match. When one server name is a prefix of another (e.g. "web" and "web_scraper"), a "web_scraper_search" tool matches "web" first, so it is pooled under the wrong server and invoked with the wrong stripped name — the call fails, or for mixed transports the stdio tool loses session pooling. Route each tool by the server that actually produced it (tools_by_server[i] corresponds to the i-th server in servers_config), keeping the prefix guard so unprefixed tools still fall through unwrapped. Add a regression test covering overlapping server-name prefixes. * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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bjtolo
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c9a5f23e7b
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feat(mcp): add per-server tool_call_timeout for MCP tool calls (#3843)
* feat(mcp): add per-server tool_call_timeout for MCP tool calls Add a configurable timeout for individual MCP tool calls to prevent agent runs from blocking indefinitely when an MCP server becomes unresponsive (e.g., rate-limited HTTP API, hung subprocess). Uses the MCP SDK's built-in read_timeout_seconds parameter on ClientSession.call_tool, which handles the timeout within the session's own task — avoiding cross-task cancellation issues with the session pool (ref #3379, #3203). Config field is named tool_call_timeout (not timeout) to avoid collision with langchain-mcp-adapters' existing timeout field on HTTP/SSE connections. Closes #3840 * fix(mcp): read tool_call_timeout from McpServerConfig, not connection dict The previous implementation put tool_call_timeout into the connection dict returned by build_server_params, which langchain's create_session then passed to _create_stdio_session(), causing TypeError. Now reads the timeout directly from ExtensionsConfig.mcp_servers where the wrapper is built, keeping it out of the connection dict entirely. Fixes P1 bug from review on #3843. * test(mcp): regression test for tool_call_timeout not leaking into connection dict Adds two tests: - test_build_server_params_excludes_tool_call_timeout: verifies the connection dict returned by build_server_params() does NOT contain tool_call_timeout - test_stdio_tool_call_timeout_does_not_raise_typeerror: end-to-end test that get_mcp_tools() with a stdio server having tool_call_timeout configured loads tools without TypeError from _create_stdio_session() Regression for PR #3843 P1 bug. * fix(mcp): only pass read_timeout_seconds when tool_call_timeout is set When tool_call_timeout is None, don't pass read_timeout_seconds=None to session.call_tool(). This avoids breaking existing tests that assert on exact call_tool arguments without the extra kwarg. * docs(mcp): clarify stdio tool timeout |
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Huixin615
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73874a9b35
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fix(mcp): isolate tool discovery failures (#3772) | ||
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Ryker_Feng
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9124f991de
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fix(mcp): make stdio MCP-produced files resolvable via virtual sandbox paths (#3597) (#3600)
* fix(mcp): migrate local MCP-produced files into sandbox outputs (#3597) Stdio MCP servers (e.g. Playwright) write files to host paths that the sandbox/artifact API cannot resolve, since it only serves paths under /mnt/user-data. Copy local files referenced by ResourceLink results into the thread's sandbox outputs dir and rewrite their URIs to /mnt/user-data/outputs/... so they become readable. Also scope pooled MCP sessions by user_id:thread_id instead of thread_id alone, matching the per-(user_id, thread_id) filesystem isolation. * fix(mcp): restrict file migration to trusted source roots (#3597) Add a source-root allowlist to the MCP file-migration path so a malicious or buggy MCP server cannot have us copy arbitrary host files (e.g. /etc/passwd) into a thread's outputs directory, from where the artifact API would serve them. Files are migrated only when located under the OS temp dir (Playwright's default), the thread's own user-data tree, or an operator-configured root via DEERFLOW_MCP_MIGRATION_SOURCE_ROOTS. Expand test coverage with allowlist/security cases (path escape refusal, trusted-root acceptance), URL-encoded file:// paths, converter content branches (image/embedded/error/structured), and copy/resolve failure fallbacks. * fix(mcp): harden local file migration into sandbox outputs Address robustness and security gaps in the MCP ResourceLink file migration: - Set migrated files to 0o644 so a differently-UID sandbox container can read them, instead of inheriting the source's (possibly 0o600) mode. - Enforce the 100MB size cap during the copy (chunked, byte-counted) rather than from a prior stat(), closing the grow-after-stat TOCTOU. - Create the destination atomically with O_CREAT|O_EXCL to remove the check-then-create name-collision race. - Document the shared-$TMPDIR multi-tenant read surface and mitigation. Add regression tests: symlink escape refusal, explicit $TMPDIR source migration, 0o644 mode, and the outputs/user-data resolve() OSError fallback branches. * fix(mcp): migrate playwright text file outputs * fix(mcp): translate MCP file outputs to virtual paths instead of copying (#3597) Pin stdio MCP subprocess cwd and TMPDIR/TMP/TEMP under the thread workspace so produced files always land in the mounted user-data tree, then rewrite returned references via deterministic host->virtual path translation. Free text is best-effort only: a reference is rewritten only when it resolves to an existing file inside the thread's tree, and bare filenames are matched against files created/modified by the same tool call. Replaces the previous copy-into-outputs + regex approach (which missed cases like temp/page-*.yml). * style(mcp): apply ruff format to mcp path translation tests * perf(mcp): offload stdio FS work off event loop and gate on transport Address review on #3600: - Wrap the workspace dir prep, snapshot diff, and per-token path resolution in asyncio.to_thread so they no longer block the event loop (matches the repo's blocking-IO gate convention). - Gate the cwd/temp pinning and snapshots on stdio transport only; SSE/HTTP servers skip the filesystem work entirely. - Skip the post-call snapshot diff when the result has no text content. * test(mcp): cover stdio transport gating and text-content after-walk skip Add unit/integration coverage for the new review-driven behavior: - _prepare_stdio_workspace dir/temp/snapshot bundle - _result_has_text_content detection (text, embedded text, image, empty) - non-stdio transport skips cwd/temp pinning and touches no workspace dirs - post-call snapshot diff is skipped without text content and runs with it * fix(mcp): address stdio path rewrite review feedback - Restrict the stdio MCP temp directory to 0700 instead of 0777. - Preserve operator-provided stdio cwd values while keeping injected cwd values as strings. - Add debug logging for deterministic path rewrites and bare-filename rewrite decisions. - Document the stdio cwd/temp pinning, virtual-path translation, and user/thread session scope. - Cover explicit cwd preservation and temp-dir permissions in session-pool tests. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
||
|
zhongli-sz
|
3ae82dc663
|
fix(mcp): add auth interceptor with channel user_id and keep header propagation to mcp tools (#3294)
* 修复channel中的user_id传递到interceptor中的bug, mcp可通过header传递user_id到mcp工具 Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(channel,mcp,gateway): normalize channel user_id and add regression tests Normalize external channel user ids into filesystem-safe runtime context while preserving raw channel_user_id, and document gateway user_id propagation semantics. Add regression coverage for channel user_id context mapping, gateway user_id precedence/internal-role behavior, and MCP interceptor header forwarding via meta.headers. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> * fix(auth,mcp): harden user id normalization and header handling Increase sanitized user-id digest suffix to 16 hex chars, replace internal system role magic string with a shared constant, and harden MCP header forwarding with Mapping type checks. Add regression tests for empty channel user_id handling, unsupported header types, and updated digest length behavior. Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> --------- Co-authored-by: zhongli <335302680@qq.com> Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com> |
||
|
Willem Jiang
|
162fb2143e
|
fix(mcp): skip session pooling for HTTP/SSE transports to avoid anyioRuntimeError (#3203) (#3224)
* fix(mcp): skip session pooling for HTTP/SSE transports to avoid anyio RuntimeError (#3203) HTTP/SSE transports use anyio.TaskGroup internally for streamable connections. These task groups have cancel scopes bound to the async task that created them, so closing a pooled session from a different task raises RuntimeError. Restrict session pooling to stdio transports only. * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * docs: clarify MCP pooling applies only to stdio tools Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow/sessions/2dd9881d-54c6-45fd-90bc-154a09e29841 Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
Willem Jiang
|
c881d95898
|
fix(mcp): persist MCP sessions across tool calls for stateful servers (#3089)
* fix(mcp): persist MCP sessions across tool calls for stateful servers MCP tools loaded via langchain-mcp-adapters created a new session on every call, causing stateful servers like Playwright to lose browser state (pages, forms) between consecutive tool invocations within the same thread. Add MCPSessionPool that maintains persistent sessions scoped by (server_name, thread_id). Tool calls within the same thread now reuse the same MCP session, preserving server-side state. Sessions are evicted in LRU order (max 256) and cleaned up on cache invalidation. Fixes #3054 * fix(sandbox): add group/other read permissions to uploaded files for Docker sandbox (#3127) When using AIO sandbox with LocalContainerBackend, uploaded files are created with 0o600 (owner-only) permissions by the gateway process running as root. The sandbox process inside the Docker container runs as a non-root user and cannot read these bind-mounted files, causing a "Permission denied" error on read_file. Add `needs_upload_permission_adjustment` attribute to SandboxProvider (default True) to indicate that uploaded files need chmod adjustment. LocalSandboxProvider opts out (same user). A new `_make_file_sandbox_readable` function adds S_IRGRP | S_IROTH bits after files are written, changing permissions from 0o600 to 0o644 so the sandbox can read the uploads. * fix(mcp): address review comments on session pool and tools - _extract_thread_id: return "default" instead of stringifying None when get_config() returns no thread_id - call_with_persistent_session: fix **arguments annotation from dict[str,Any] to Any - Replace private _convert_call_tool_result import with a local implementation that handles all MCP content block types - _make_session_pool_tool: accept tool_interceptors and apply the configured interceptor chain on every call (preserving OAuth and custom interceptors) - MCPSessionPool: replace asyncio.Lock with threading.Lock; restructure get/close methods to never await while holding the lock; add close_all_sync() that closes sessions on their owning event loops - reset_mcp_tools_cache: use pool.close_all_sync() instead of asyncio.run-in-thread to close sessions deterministically - test: add test_session_pool_tool_sync_wrapper_path_is_safe covering tool invocation via the sync wrapper (tool.func) path Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow/sessions/9e7f9e7f-1d2b-464a-b3b7-7f1649b74122 Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(mcp): extract SESSION_CLOSE_TIMEOUT to class constant Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/bytedance/deer-flow/sessions/9e7f9e7f-1d2b-464a-b3b7-7f1649b74122 Co-authored-by: WillemJiang <219644+WillemJiang@users.noreply.github.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding 'Empty except' Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: copilot-swe-agent[bot] <198982749+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
AochenShen99
|
bedbf2291e
|
fix(harness): wrap async-only config tools for sync client execution (#2878)
* fix(harness): wrap async-only config tools for sync clients * refactor(tools): share async tool sync wrapper |
||
|
IECspace
|
f394c0d8c8
|
feat(mcp): support custom tool interceptors via extensions_config.json (#2451)
* feat(mcp): support custom tool interceptors via extensions_config.json
Add a generic extension point for registering custom MCP tool
interceptors through `extensions_config.json`. This allows downstream
projects to inject per-request header manipulation, auth context
propagation, or other cross-cutting concerns without modifying
DeerFlow source code.
Interceptors are declared as Python callable paths in a new
`mcpInterceptors` array field and loaded via the existing
`resolve_variable` reflection mechanism:
```json
{
"mcpInterceptors": [
"my_package.mcp.auth:build_auth_interceptor"
]
}
```
Each entry must resolve to a no-arg builder function that returns an
async interceptor compatible with `MultiServerMCPClient`'s
`tool_interceptors` interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(mcp): add unit tests for custom tool interceptors
Cover all branches of the mcpInterceptors loading logic:
- valid interceptor loaded and appended to tool_interceptors
- multiple interceptors loaded in declaration order
- builder returning None is skipped
- resolve_variable ImportError logged and skipped
- builder raising exception logged and skipped
- absent mcpInterceptors field is safe (no-op)
- custom interceptors coexist with OAuth interceptor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): validate mcpInterceptors type and fix lint warnings
Address review feedback:
1. Validate mcpInterceptors config value before iterating:
- Accept a single string and normalize to [string]
- Ignore None silently
- Log warning and skip for non-list/non-string types
2. Fix ruff F841 lint errors in tests:
- Rename _make_mock_env to _make_patches, embed mock_client
- Remove unused `as mock_cls` bindings where not needed
- Extract _get_interceptors() helper to reduce repetition
3. Add two new test cases for type validation:
- test_mcp_interceptors_single_string_is_normalized
- test_mcp_interceptors_invalid_type_logs_warning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): validate interceptor return type and fix import mock path
Address review feedback:
1. Validate builder return type with callable() check:
- callable interceptor → append to tool_interceptors
- None → silently skip (builder opted out)
- non-callable → log warning with type name and skip
2. Fix test mock path: resolve_variable is a top-level import in
tools.py, so mock deerflow.mcp.tools.resolve_variable instead of
deerflow.reflection.resolve_variable to correctly intercept calls.
3. Add test_custom_interceptor_non_callable_return_logs_warning to
cover the new non-callable validation branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(mcp): add mcpInterceptors example and documentation
- Add mcpInterceptors field to extensions_config.example.json
- Add "Custom Tool Interceptors" section to MCP_SERVER.md with
configuration format, example interceptor code, and edge case
behavior notes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: IECspace <IECspace@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
DanielWalnut
|
d119214fee
|
feat(harness): integration ACP agent tool (#1344)
* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation (#37) * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation * build(harness): make ACP dependency required * fix(harness): address ACP review feedback * feat(harness): decouple ACP agent workspace from thread data ACP agents (codex, claude-code) previously used per-thread workspace directories, causing path resolution complexity and coupling task execution to DeerFlow's internal thread data layout. This change: - Replace _resolve_cwd() with a fixed _get_work_dir() that always uses {base_dir}/acp-workspace/, eliminating virtual path translation and thread_id lookups - Introduce /mnt/acp-workspace virtual path for lead agent read-only access to ACP agent output files (same pattern as /mnt/skills) - Add security guards: read-only validation, path traversal prevention, command path allowlisting, and output masking for acp-workspace - Update system prompt and tool description to guide LLM: send self-contained tasks to ACP agents, copy results via /mnt/acp-workspace - Add 11 new security tests for ACP workspace path handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(prompt): inject ACP section only when ACP agents are configured The ACP agent guidance in the system prompt is now conditionally built by _build_acp_section(), which checks get_acp_agents() and returns an empty string when no ACP agents are configured. This avoids polluting the prompt with irrelevant instructions for users who don't use ACP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix lint * fix(harness): address Copilot review comments on sandbox path handling and ACP tool - local_sandbox: fix path-segment boundary bug in _resolve_path (== or startswith +"/") and add lookahead in _resolve_paths_in_command regex to prevent /mnt/skills matching inside /mnt/skills-extra - local_sandbox_provider: replace print() with logger.warning(..., exc_info=True) - invoke_acp_agent_tool: guard getattr(option, "optionId") with None default + continue; move full prompt from INFO to DEBUG level (truncated to 200 chars) - sandbox/tools: fix _get_acp_workspace_host_path docstring to match implementation; remove misleading "read-only" language from validate_local_bash_command_paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(acp): thread-isolated workspaces, permission guardrail, and ContextVar registry P1.1 – ACP workspace thread isolation - Add `Paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)` for per-thread paths - `_get_work_dir(thread_id)` in invoke_acp_agent_tool now uses `{base_dir}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`; falls back to global workspace when thread_id is absent or invalid - `_invoke` extracts thread_id from `RunnableConfig` via `Annotated[RunnableConfig, InjectedToolArg]` - `sandbox/tools.py`: `_get_acp_workspace_host_path(thread_id)`, `_resolve_acp_workspace_path(path, thread_id)`, and all callers (`replace_virtual_paths_in_command`, `mask_local_paths_in_output`, `ls_tool`, `read_file_tool`) now resolve ACP paths per-thread P1.2 – ACP permission guardrail - New `auto_approve_permissions: bool = False` field in `ACPAgentConfig` - `_build_permission_response(options, *, auto_approve: bool)` now defaults to deny; only approves when `auto_approve=True` - Document field in `config.example.yaml` P2 – Deferred tool registry race condition - Replace module-level `_registry` global with `contextvars.ContextVar` - Each asyncio request context gets its own registry; worker threads inherit the context automatically via `loop.run_in_executor` - Expose `get_deferred_registry` / `set_deferred_registry` / `reset_deferred_registry` helpers Tests: 831 pass (57 for affected modules, 3 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): mount /mnt/acp-workspace in docker sandbox container The AioSandboxProvider was not mounting the ACP workspace into the sandbox container, so /mnt/acp-workspace was inaccessible when the lead agent tried to read ACP results in docker mode. Changes: - `ensure_thread_dirs`: also create `acp-workspace/` (chmod 0o777) so the directory exists before the sandbox container starts — required for Docker volume mounts - `_get_thread_mounts`: add read-only `/mnt/acp-workspace` mount using the per-thread host path (`host_paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)`) - Update stale CLAUDE.md description (was "fixed global workspace") Tests: `test_aio_sandbox_provider.py` (4 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): remove unused imports in test_aio_sandbox_provider Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix config --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
knukn
|
a9940c391c
|
fix(mcp): implement sync invocation wrapper for async MCP tools (#1287)
* fix(mcp): implement sync invocation wrapper for async MCP tools Since DeerFlowClient streams synchronously, invoking async-only MCP tools (loaded via langchain-mcp-adapters) resulted in a NotImplementedError. This commit bridges the sync/async gap by dynamically injecting a `func` wrapper into `StructuredTool` instances that only have a `coroutine`. Key changes: - Added `sync_wrapper` in `get_mcp_tools` to execute async tool calls. - Handled nested event loops by delegating to a global `ThreadPoolExecutor` when an event loop is already running, avoiding `RuntimeError`. - Added detailed error logging within the wrapper for better transparency. - Added comprehensive test coverage in `test_mcp_sync_wrapper.py` verifying tool patching, event loop behavior, and exception propagation. * refactor(mcp): extract sync wrapper to module level and fix test mocks Addressed PR review comments: - Extracted _make_sync_tool_wrapper to module level to avoid nested func definitions. - Refactored tests to use the actual production helper instead of duplicating logic. - Fixed AsyncMock patching for awaited dependencies in tests. - Added atexit hook for graceful thread pool shutdown. - Fixed PEP8 blank line formatting in tests. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
||
|
lhd
|
0091d9f071
|
feat(tools): add tool_search for deferred MCP tool loading (#1176)
* feat(tools): add tool_search for deferred MCP tool loading When multiple MCP servers are enabled, total tool count can exceed 30-50, causing context bloat and degraded tool selection accuracy. This adds a deferred tool loading mechanism controlled by `tool_search.enabled` config. - Add ToolSearchConfig with single `enabled` field - Add DeferredToolRegistry with regex search (select:, +keyword, keyword) - Add tool_search tool returning OpenAI-compatible function JSON - Add DeferredToolFilterMiddleware to hide deferred schemas from bind_tools - Add <available-deferred-tools> section to system prompt - Enable MCP tool_name_prefix to prevent cross-server name collisions - Add 34 unit tests covering registry, tool, prompt, and middleware * fix: reset stale deferred registry and bump config_version - Reset deferred registry upfront in get_available_tools() to prevent stale tool entries when MCP servers are disabled between calls - Bump config_version to 2 for new tool_search config field Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(tests): mock get_app_config in prompt section tests for CI CI has no config.yaml, causing TestDeferredToolsPromptSection to fail with FileNotFoundError. Add autouse fixture to mock get_app_config. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
||
|
DanielWalnut
|
76803b826f
|
refactor: split backend into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) (#1131)
* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |