* fix(security): block forged framework tags in the input guardrail
InputSanitizationMiddleware's _BLOCKED_TAG_NAMES neutralizes forged
framework tags in untrusted input, but missed soul, thinking_style, and
critical_reminders -- which the lead-agent system prompt's System-Context
Confidentiality section names as internal framework data -- and the
underscore spelling system_reminder emitted by the todo/terminal
middlewares (only the hyphen spelling was blocked). A user, or an
attacker-controlled web_fetch/web_search page via the shared
neutralize_untrusted_tags primitive, could forge these blocks. Add them.
* fix(security): cover framework authority blocks as a class, not a subset
The confidentiality section declares every framework structured tag trusted
("and all other structured tags"), so the denylist must cover the authority
blocks as a class. Add the live blocks still passing both sanitization paths
(clarification_system, self_update, response_style, citations, skill_index,
available_skills, disabled_skills, memory_tool_system, durable_context_data,
slash_skill_activation), and pin the set against drift with a test that scans
the framework source and fails when a new block is not blocked.
* fix(security): scan the whole harness for framework blocks, fail closed
The drift guard added in the previous revision scanned a hand-listed set of
source files. That is the same forgot-to-update-a-list root cause the guard was
meant to eliminate, one level up, and it failed exactly that way: tool_search.py
was not in the list, so <mcp_routing_hints> and <available-deferred-tools> —
both rendered into the lead-agent system prompt via the {deferred_tools_section}
/ {mcp_routing_hints_section} placeholders — passed both sanitization paths
unneutralized.
Replace the file list with a repo-wide scan plus an exemption set that states a
reason per tag. The point is the failure direction, not the breadth: a new
framework block anywhere in the harness now turns CI red until it is either
blocked or exempted on the record, where before a block emitted from an unlisted
file was silently unguarded.
The scan reads raw source rather than AST string literals on purpose: an
attributed block built as an f-string splits its '>' into a separate literal
chunk, so an AST-on-literals scan misses it (verified against
<consolidation_candidates>). Raw source has one comment false positive, exempted.
Exempted with reasons: leaf/wrapper elements; the memory-updater and summarizer
prompts, which are built from checkpointed state rather than the ModelRequest
this middleware rewrites, so blocking them here would be false coverage, not
protection; and the MindIE provider wire format, parsed out of model output.
The scan surfaced five further live authority blocks beyond the two reported.
Subagents reuse _build_runtime_middlewares and therefore share this denylist, so
their system-prompt blocks are in the same class: file_editing_workflow,
guidelines, output_format, working_directory. goal_continuation is a
framework-authored hidden HumanMessage injected into the lead agent.
Also loosen the scanner regex to match the tolerance of _BLOCKED_TAG_PATTERN so
an attributed block cannot hide from the guard.
* fix(runtime): persist original human input outside model sanitization
* refactor(history): load thread messages by global event sequence
* fix(frontend): make summarization rescue a transient history bridge
* fix(frontend): old message not append tail
1. add identity anchor
2. add bridgeOrder
* fix(frontend): lint error fix
* fix: address review feedback and harden pagination coverage
- defer transient history ref writes until after render commit
- cover large middleware-only history scans
- verify infinite-query refetch recalculates page cursors
- document AI event types and anchor-weaving differences
* fix: harden message pagination and enrichment
- append unmatched live tails after canonical history
- warn and stop when pagination has_more lacks a cursor
- deep-copy restored UI messages to isolate model-facing content
- log invalid event sequence and non-advancing cursor errors
- pass user_id explicitly through event-store history queries
- cover middleware-only AI runs across memory, JSONL, and DB stores
* fix: address pagination review feedback
* fix(frontend): checkpoint has unknow redener content, optimize the anchor policy
* fix(frontend): unit test issue missed previously, remove the TanStack cache trimming
* fix(gateway): harden message history queries and provenance
- reject externally forged original_user_content metadata
- validate provenance metadata in upload and sanitization middleware
- make run lookups fail closed by default
- batch feedback queries by run ID
- align memory message filtering with persistent stores
* feat(frontend): add structured human input cards for ask_clarification
Implement a reusable Human Input Card flow for ask_clarification while keeping
the existing text fallback for older clients and IM channels.
Backend:
- Add structured ToolMessage.artifact.human_input payloads for clarification requests.
- Preserve ToolMessage.content as the readable Markdown/text fallback.
- Normalize clarification options from native lists, JSON strings, plain strings,
mixed scalar values, None, and missing options.
- Derive input_mode as choice_with_other when options exist, otherwise free_text.
- Keep disable_clarification non-interactive behavior as a plain ToolMessage with
no human_input artifact.
- Cover artifact persistence and Gateway message metadata preservation in tests.
Frontend:
- Add human input protocol types, runtime guards, extractors, response builders,
and thread-state helpers.
- Add reusable HumanInputCard with option buttons, free-text input, pending,
read-only, disabled, and answered states.
- Render structured clarification cards from artifact.human_input, with Markdown
fallback for malformed or legacy tool messages.
- Preserve line breaks in structured question/context/option text.
- Hide submitted clarification bridge messages from the chat UI via
additional_kwargs.hide_from_ui.
- Send structured human_input_response metadata through the fourth sendMessage
options argument, preserving run context in the third argument.
- Wire submissions for normal chats, custom agent chats, agent bootstrap chats,
and sidecar chats.
- Derive answered state from raw thread.messages so hidden replies still update
the original card.
- Clear pending state when the hidden reply arrives, dispatch is dropped, or a
later async stream failure appears on thread.error.
* perf(frontend): optimize HumanInputCard UI interactions
- Support Enter key to submit text input (Shift+Enter for newline)
- Render question and context fields as Markdown instead of plain text
- Replace deprecated FormEventHandler type with structural typing
* test(frontend): add unit test cover optimize HumanInputCard UI interactions
* feat(frontend): disabled chatbox when has new human-input-card
* fix(style): lint error fix
* fix: sanitize hidden human input replies
- Preserve IME composition safety for human input card Enter submits
- Treat hidden human input responses as genuine user messages for sanitization
- Keep hidden card replies in memory filtering while excluding malformed/internal hidden messages
- Add regression coverage for card IME handling and hidden reply sanitization
* fix: tighten human input response validation
- Reject empty hidden human input response values
- Remove invalid list ARIA role from human input card options
- Add backend coverage for empty response payloads
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
