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10 Commits
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0cd55067f3
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fix(skills): reject colon in zip member names to close NTFS ADS smuggling gap (#4236)
Neither is_unsafe_zip_member (installer.py) nor its duplicated check in skillscan/orchestrator.py rejected a colon in a zip member name. On Windows/NTFS, a name like scripts/run.sh:hidden.txt addresses an Alternate Data Stream on run.sh instead of creating a new file, so the hidden content is invisible to Path.rglob()/os.walk()-based scanning in both the deterministic static scanner and the extracted-file content scanner, while still landing genuinely on disk. Reject any colon in a zip member's relative path outright in both files; a colon has no legitimate use there since zip entries use forward slashes and a real Windows drive prefix is already caught by the existing absolute-path check. |
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1ae02913ea
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fix(skills): cap archive entry count in safe_extract_skill_archive (#4241)
safe_extract_skill_archive() capped total uncompressed bytes (zip bomb defence) but had no limit on member count, so a small archive with tens of thousands of tiny/empty entries extracted with no error. The same entry-count cap already existed in scan_archive_preflight() (skillscan orchestrator, 4096 members) with the comment "a huge member count is a bounded DoS vector even when the total size is small" -- but that scan only runs when the optional skill_scan.enabled kill switch is on (default true, but operator-configurable), so disabling it silently dropped this specific protection while config.example.yaml's comment implied safe archive extraction alone still covered it. Move the same 4096 cap into safe_extract_skill_archive itself as an early-abort before any per-member work, so it applies unconditionally regardless of skill_scan.enabled. Leaving scan_archive_preflight's own cap in place as defense in depth (it fires earlier, on preflight, with a structured finding for reporting). Related: #2618 requested exactly this hardening; #2619 (closed, unmerged) implemented a broader version of it, including this same entry-count cap directly in the extractor. |
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658c39ccf7
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feat(skills): Add native SkillScan phase 1 for skills (#3033)
* Add phase 1 skill static scanning * Rework SkillScan phase 1 as native scanner * refactor(skillscan): align phase 1 with trimmed RFC contract - SecurityFinding: 7 fields (rule_id, severity, file, line, message, remediation, evidence); category/analyzer derive from the rule_id prefix, confidence/column/fingerprint/metadata removed - scan_archive_preflight()/scan_skill_dir() are pure functions: no ScanContext, no policy schema; CRITICAL-blocks is a code constant and skill_scan.enabled is applied by enforce_static_scan()/callers - secret-* evidence is redacted before findings leave the scanner - de-dup keys on (rule_id, file, line) so repeated occurrences keep distinct locations for agent self-correction - cloud-metadata detection consolidated into network-cloud-metadata - nested zip members get a one-level stdlib magic-byte peek; an executable member escalates package-nested-archive to CRITICAL - install metadata sidecar removed (Phase 7 decides if it is needed) - rule specs moved next to their analyzers; skillscan/rules/ removed - tests updated + new anchors: redaction, dedup lines, nested-zip escalation, single cloud-metadata rule, bundled-skill zero-CRITICAL * fix(skillscan): tighten reverse-shell/secret/archive scan rules from review Address PR #3033 review feedback on the native SkillScan analyzers: - Reverse-shell false positives: split shell detection by signal strength (/dev/tcp/, nc -e stay CRITICAL; bash -i, mkfifo -> new HIGH shell-reverse-shell-heuristic, warn->LLM). The Python check is now AST-anchored on real socket.socket/os.dup2/subprocess call sites instead of raw-text substring matching, so prose/docstrings no longer hard-block. - Secret evidence: _redact_secret_evidence returns [redacted] with no secret bytes (was value[:6], which leaked 2 real token bytes past the prefix). - Archive DoS: cap outer archive member count (_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS=4096); scan_archive_preflight early-aborts with a package-too-many-members CRITICAL finding (routes through the existing blocked->400 fail-closed path). - shell-destructive-command: broaden the rm -rf matcher to sensitive system roots (/home, /usr, /*, --no-preserve-root /) while leaving safe subpaths unflagged. - Dead code: collapse _decode_text_for_analysis to a single decode path and drop the unused _TEXT_SUFFIXES set and _has_text_shebang helper. - local_skill_storage: document why the host_path branch keeps app_config possibly-None (lazy kill-switch resolution; avoids eager get_app_config in config-free environments such as CI). Tests: new negative/positive coverage in test_skillscan_native.py. Full backend suite 6616 passed, 26 skipped. |
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9a088805d7
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fix(skills): close skill install security scan coverage gap (#3924)
* fix(skills): close install-path scan coverage gap Skill installs only sent scripts/* and document files under references/ and templates/ to the LLM security scanner. Code at the skill root or under lib/, bin/, src/, etc., and binary files could be installed without any scan. - Scan code files anywhere in the skill tree (by extension, plus shebang detection for extensionless files) with the executable policy: only an explicit allow admits them. - Reject ELF/PE/Mach-O executable binaries by magic bytes during safe archive extraction; non-executable binary assets remain allowed. Interim hardening ahead of the SkillScan framework (RFC #2634); the deterministic full-tree scanner from PR #3033 supersedes the per-file LLM coverage when it lands. * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * test(skills): pin magic coverage and shebang offload boundary Follow-up to the applied review suggestions: cover every Mach-O magic variant with tests (plus the fat64 pair and a partial-prefix asset that must stay installable), name the pure classification helper so the call-site logic reads as policy, drop the now-unused sync _is_code_file, and pin that only extensionless files get the shebang sniff. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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8decfd327e
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Fix custom skill install permissions (#3241)
* Fix custom skill install permissions * Fix skill upload test portability * Keep custom skill writes sandbox readable * Clear sandbox write bits on skill permissions * Limit custom skill write permission updates |
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1ad1420e31
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refactor(skills): Unified skill storage capability (#2613) | ||
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707ed328dd
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fix(skills): scan skill archives before install (#2561)
* fix(skills): scan skill archives before install Fixes #2536 * fix(skills): scan archive support files before install * style(skills): format archive installer * fix(skills): address archive install review comments |
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b9583f7204
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Fix Windows backend test compatibility (#1384)
* Fix Windows backend test compatibility * Preserve ACP path style on Windows * Fix installer import ordering * Address review comments for Windows fixes --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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d119214fee
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feat(harness): integration ACP agent tool (#1344)
* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation (#37) * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation * build(harness): make ACP dependency required * fix(harness): address ACP review feedback * feat(harness): decouple ACP agent workspace from thread data ACP agents (codex, claude-code) previously used per-thread workspace directories, causing path resolution complexity and coupling task execution to DeerFlow's internal thread data layout. This change: - Replace _resolve_cwd() with a fixed _get_work_dir() that always uses {base_dir}/acp-workspace/, eliminating virtual path translation and thread_id lookups - Introduce /mnt/acp-workspace virtual path for lead agent read-only access to ACP agent output files (same pattern as /mnt/skills) - Add security guards: read-only validation, path traversal prevention, command path allowlisting, and output masking for acp-workspace - Update system prompt and tool description to guide LLM: send self-contained tasks to ACP agents, copy results via /mnt/acp-workspace - Add 11 new security tests for ACP workspace path handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(prompt): inject ACP section only when ACP agents are configured The ACP agent guidance in the system prompt is now conditionally built by _build_acp_section(), which checks get_acp_agents() and returns an empty string when no ACP agents are configured. This avoids polluting the prompt with irrelevant instructions for users who don't use ACP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix lint * fix(harness): address Copilot review comments on sandbox path handling and ACP tool - local_sandbox: fix path-segment boundary bug in _resolve_path (== or startswith +"/") and add lookahead in _resolve_paths_in_command regex to prevent /mnt/skills matching inside /mnt/skills-extra - local_sandbox_provider: replace print() with logger.warning(..., exc_info=True) - invoke_acp_agent_tool: guard getattr(option, "optionId") with None default + continue; move full prompt from INFO to DEBUG level (truncated to 200 chars) - sandbox/tools: fix _get_acp_workspace_host_path docstring to match implementation; remove misleading "read-only" language from validate_local_bash_command_paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(acp): thread-isolated workspaces, permission guardrail, and ContextVar registry P1.1 – ACP workspace thread isolation - Add `Paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)` for per-thread paths - `_get_work_dir(thread_id)` in invoke_acp_agent_tool now uses `{base_dir}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`; falls back to global workspace when thread_id is absent or invalid - `_invoke` extracts thread_id from `RunnableConfig` via `Annotated[RunnableConfig, InjectedToolArg]` - `sandbox/tools.py`: `_get_acp_workspace_host_path(thread_id)`, `_resolve_acp_workspace_path(path, thread_id)`, and all callers (`replace_virtual_paths_in_command`, `mask_local_paths_in_output`, `ls_tool`, `read_file_tool`) now resolve ACP paths per-thread P1.2 – ACP permission guardrail - New `auto_approve_permissions: bool = False` field in `ACPAgentConfig` - `_build_permission_response(options, *, auto_approve: bool)` now defaults to deny; only approves when `auto_approve=True` - Document field in `config.example.yaml` P2 – Deferred tool registry race condition - Replace module-level `_registry` global with `contextvars.ContextVar` - Each asyncio request context gets its own registry; worker threads inherit the context automatically via `loop.run_in_executor` - Expose `get_deferred_registry` / `set_deferred_registry` / `reset_deferred_registry` helpers Tests: 831 pass (57 for affected modules, 3 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): mount /mnt/acp-workspace in docker sandbox container The AioSandboxProvider was not mounting the ACP workspace into the sandbox container, so /mnt/acp-workspace was inaccessible when the lead agent tried to read ACP results in docker mode. Changes: - `ensure_thread_dirs`: also create `acp-workspace/` (chmod 0o777) so the directory exists before the sandbox container starts — required for Docker volume mounts - `_get_thread_mounts`: add read-only `/mnt/acp-workspace` mount using the per-thread host path (`host_paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)`) - Update stale CLAUDE.md description (was "fixed global workspace") Tests: `test_aio_sandbox_provider.py` (4 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): remove unused imports in test_aio_sandbox_provider Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix config --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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b8bc80d89b
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refactor: extract shared skill installer and upload manager to harness (#1202)
* refactor: extract shared skill installer and upload manager to harness Move duplicated business logic from Gateway routers and Client into shared harness modules, eliminating code duplication. New shared modules: - deerflow.skills.installer: 6 functions (zip security, extraction, install) - deerflow.uploads.manager: 7 functions (normalize, deduplicate, validate, list, delete, get_uploads_dir, ensure_uploads_dir) Key improvements: - SkillAlreadyExistsError replaces stringly-typed 409 status routing - normalize_filename rejects backslash-containing filenames - Read paths (list/delete) no longer mkdir via get_uploads_dir - Write paths use ensure_uploads_dir for explicit directory creation - list_files_in_dir does stat inside scandir context (no re-stat) - install_skill_from_archive uses single is_file() check (one syscall) - Fix agent config key not reset on update_mcp_config/update_skill Tests: 42 new (22 installer + 20 upload manager) + client hardening * refactor: centralize upload URL construction and clean up installer - Extract upload_virtual_path(), upload_artifact_url(), enrich_file_listing() into shared manager.py, eliminating 6 duplicated URL constructions across Gateway router and Client - Derive all upload URLs from VIRTUAL_PATH_PREFIX constant instead of hardcoded "mnt/user-data/uploads" strings - Eliminate TOCTOU pre-checks and double file read in installer — single ZipFile() open with exception handling replaces is_file() + is_zipfile() + ZipFile() sequence - Add missing re-exports: ensure_uploads_dir in uploads/__init__.py, SkillAlreadyExistsError in skills/__init__.py - Remove redundant .lower() on already-lowercase CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS - Hoist sandbox_uploads_dir(thread_id) before loop in uploads router * fix: add input validation for thread_id and filename length - Reject thread_id containing unsafe filesystem characters (only allow alphanumeric, hyphens, underscores, dots) — prevents 500 on inputs like <script> or shell metacharacters - Reject filenames longer than 255 bytes (OS limit) in normalize_filename - Gateway upload router maps ValueError to 400 for invalid thread_id * fix: address PR review — symlink safety, input validation coverage, error ordering - list_files_in_dir: use follow_symlinks=False to prevent symlink metadata leakage; check is_dir() instead of exists() for non-directory paths - install_skill_from_archive: restore is_file() pre-check before extension validation so error messages match the documented exception contract - validate_thread_id: move from ensure_uploads_dir to get_uploads_dir so all entry points (upload/list/delete) are protected - delete_uploaded_file: catch ValueError from thread_id validation (was 500) - requires_llm marker: also skip when OPENAI_API_KEY is unset - e2e fixture: update TitleMiddleware exclusion comment (kept filtering — middleware triggers extra LLM calls that add non-determinism to tests) * chore: revert uv.lock to main — no dependency changes in this PR * fix: use monkeypatch for global config in e2e fixture to prevent test pollution The e2e_env fixture was calling set_title_config() and set_summarization_config() directly, which mutated global singletons without automatic cleanup. When pytest ran test_client_e2e.py before test_title_middleware_core_logic.py, the leaked enabled=False caused 5 title tests to fail in CI. Switched to monkeypatch.setattr on the module-level private variables so pytest restores the originals after each test. * fix: address code review — URL encoding, API consistency, test isolation - upload_artifact_url: percent-encode filename to handle spaces/#/? - deduplicate_filename: mutate seen set in place (caller no longer needs manual .add() — less error-prone API) - list_files_in_dir: document that size is int, enrich stringifies - e2e fixture: monkeypatch _app_config instead of set_app_config() to prevent global singleton pollution (same pattern as title/summarization fix) - _make_e2e_config: read LLM connection details from env vars so external contributors can override defaults - Update tests to match new deduplicate_filename contract * docs: rewrite RFC in English and add alternatives/breaking changes sections * fix: address code review feedback on PR #1202 - Rename deduplicate_filename to claim_unique_filename to make the in-place set mutation explicit in the function name - Replace PermissionError with PathTraversalError(ValueError) for path traversal detection — malformed input is 400, not 403 * fix: set _app_config_is_custom in e2e test fixture to prevent config.yaml lookup in CI --------- Co-authored-by: greatmengqi <chenmengqi.0376@bytedance.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: DanielWalnut <45447813+hetaoBackend@users.noreply.github.com> |