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5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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Xinmin Zeng
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09988caf95
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feat(skills): request-scoped secrets for skills (closes #3861) (#3871)
* feat(sandbox): per-call env injection + platform-secret scrubbing for skills Add an env parameter to Sandbox.execute_command (abstract + local + AIO) so request-scoped secrets can be injected into skill subprocesses, and scrub platform credentials (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*/*PASSWORD*/*CREDENTIAL*) from the inherited environment by default so scoped injection is not security theatre. LocalSandbox always passes an explicit scrubbed env; AioSandbox routes env-bearing commands through bash.exec(env=) on a fresh session and leaves the legacy persistent-shell path unchanged. Part of #3861. BEHAVIOR CHANGE: execute_command no longer inherits the full os.environ; Windows encoding tests updated to assert the scrubbed dict. * feat(skills): parse required-secrets frontmatter declaration Add SecretRequirement and Skill.required_secrets, and parse the required-secrets SKILL.md frontmatter field (a string list or {name, optional} mappings), dropping malformed entries with a warning so one bad declaration does not invalidate the skill. The declared name is both the context.secrets key and the env var injected at activation. Part of #3861. * feat(runtime): request-scoped secret carrier (context.secrets) Add SECRETS_CONTEXT_KEY + extract_request_secrets, centralising the context.secrets carrier contract. The existing context passthrough (build_run_config -> _build_runtime_context) already carries the sub-key to runtime.context without mirroring it into configurable; characterization tests lock that behaviour. Part of #3861. * feat(skills): inject declared secrets at slash-activation into bash env Binding point A: when a skill is slash-activated, SkillActivationMiddleware resolves its declared required-secrets against the request's context.secrets and writes the per-run injection set to runtime.context. The bash tool forwards that set to execute_command(env=). A skill cannot harvest a host platform credential (is_host_platform_secret guard, cf. GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf), and injected values are redacted from bash output (mask_secret_values) so an echoed secret never re-enters the prompt/trace. Part of #3861. * test(skills): lock the five secret leak surfaces + add trace redaction helper Regression tests assert the secret value is absent from all five surfaces: prompt (activation message), checkpoint (graph state vs context separation), audit (journal records names only), trace (metadata builder never copies context; never mirrored to configurable), and stdout (mask_secret_values). Add redact_secret_context_keys as a defensive helper for any context serialization. Part of #3861. * docs(backend): document request-scoped secrets for skills Add Request-Scoped Secrets subsection (Skills) + env policy note (Sandbox) and the execute_command(env=) signature change, per the doc-sync policy. Part of #3861. * fix(skills): close gaps found by end-to-end verification of request-scoped secrets Real-gateway e2e + independent review of #3861 surfaced three defects, now fixed: 1. Slash activation never fired in the live chain. InputSanitizationMiddleware wraps user input in BEGIN/END markers before SkillActivationMiddleware sees it, and the original text was only preserved when an upload or IM channel set it. For a plain text message the slash command became undetectable, so no secret was ever resolved. Fix: the sanitizer now setdefaults the pre-wrap text into ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY (additive; sanitization behaviour unchanged), so slash activation works for all messages. Pre-existing latent bug surfaced here. 2. The raw request config (with context.secrets) was persisted to runs.kwargs_json and echoed by the run API (RunResponse.kwargs). Fix: redact_config_secrets() strips secret-bearing context keys from the persisted/echoed copy in start_run; the live config that drives the run keeps them. build_run_config now also sets configurable.thread_id on the context path (the checkpointer requires it). 3. Connection-string credentials (DATABASE_URL, REDIS_URL, SENTRY_DSN, GH_PAT, ...) were not scrubbed from the inherited sandbox env. Fix: env_policy adds a *DSN* pattern plus an explicit connection-string denylist (no blanket *URL* — benign service URLs stay readable). Verified end-to-end via a real gateway run (real LLM + skill activation + bash): the secret reaches the sandbox subprocess and appears in NONE of prompt, trace, checkpoint, audit, stdout, runs.kwargs_json, or the run API. Part of #3861. * docs(backend): document the env scrub, persistence redaction, and sanitizer interaction Sync the Request-Scoped Secrets section with the verification-driven fixes: inherited-env scrub (incl. connection-string denylist), run-record/run-API redaction as the 6th sealed leak surface, and the sanitizer preserving original content so slash activation fires. Part of #3861. * fix(skills): inject caller secret over scrubbed host value; drop redundant host-name guard A real-world demo (a skill calling a third-party cloud API with a request-scoped key) exposed that the is_host_platform_secret guard was both wrong and harmful: it refused to inject a caller-supplied secret whenever a same-named variable existed in the Gateway env — which is exactly the #3861 use case (a per-user key overriding a shared platform key). The guard was also redundant: build_sandbox_env already scrubs secret-looking names from the inherited env before injection, so a skill can never read a host credential — it only ever receives the caller's value. Remove the guard; the injected (caller) value simply wins over the scrubbed host value. Verified end-to-end: the agent called the real cloud API successfully with the caller's key, the host's same-named key was scrubbed and never used, and the caller's key leaked to none of the surfaces. Part of #3861. * fix(skills): address review on request-scoped secrets (#3861) Review fixes from PR #3871: - E2BSandbox.execute_command now accepts env/timeout and routes them to commands.run(envs=, timeout=). The bash tool passes env= unconditionally, so the prior signature (command only) raised TypeError on every e2b bash call and broke e2b deployments entirely. env=None stays backward-compatible. - SkillActivationMiddleware clears the active-secret set before resolving each activation, so a later skill in the same run never inherits an earlier skill's injection set (the #3861 contract: a skill only receives what the caller supplied AND that skill declared). - AioSandbox env path uses a dedicated _DEFAULT_HARD_TIMEOUT — bash.exec exposes no idle/no-change timeout, so the prior reuse of the legacy idle constant conflated wall-clock vs idle semantics. The env path also retries on the ErrorObservation signature now, sharing the legacy persistent-shell recovery contract. - mask_secret_values skips values below a minimum length floor so a short declared secret (e.g. "42") cannot shred unrelated bytes (exit codes, timestamps, sizes) of tool output. The secret is still injected into the subprocess; only the output mask skips it. session_id reuse on the env path is intentionally NOT added: a shared session could let request-scoped secrets ride the session env into later commands, which the SDK does not contractually forbid. The fresh-session choice matches the LocalSandbox model (each call is a fresh subprocess); the trade-off (consecutive env-bearing calls do not share cwd/venv/exports) is documented on _execute_with_env. |
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Eilen Shin
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bd45cb2846
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fix(sandbox): disable msys path conversion (#2766) | ||
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Admire
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68c9e09a7a
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fix: add Windows shell fallback for local sandbox (#1505)
* fix: add Windows shell fallback for local sandbox * fix: handle PowerShell execution on Windows * fix: handle Windows local shell execution --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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DanielWalnut
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d119214fee
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feat(harness): integration ACP agent tool (#1344)
* refactor: extract shared utils to break harness→app cross-layer imports Move _validate_skill_frontmatter to src/skills/validation.py and CONVERTIBLE_EXTENSIONS + convert_file_to_markdown to src/utils/file_conversion.py. This eliminates the two reverse dependencies from client.py (harness layer) into gateway/routers/ (app layer), preparing for the harness/app package split. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor: split backend/src into harness (deerflow.*) and app (app.*) Physically split the monolithic backend/src/ package into two layers: - **Harness** (`packages/harness/deerflow/`): publishable agent framework package with import prefix `deerflow.*`. Contains agents, sandbox, tools, models, MCP, skills, config, and all core infrastructure. - **App** (`app/`): unpublished application code with import prefix `app.*`. Contains gateway (FastAPI REST API) and channels (IM integrations). Key changes: - Move 13 harness modules to packages/harness/deerflow/ via git mv - Move gateway + channels to app/ via git mv - Rename all imports: src.* → deerflow.* (harness) / app.* (app layer) - Set up uv workspace with deerflow-harness as workspace member - Update langgraph.json, config.example.yaml, all scripts, Docker files - Add build-system (hatchling) to harness pyproject.toml - Add PYTHONPATH=. to gateway startup commands for app.* resolution - Update ruff.toml with known-first-party for import sorting - Update all documentation to reflect new directory structure Boundary rule enforced: harness code never imports from app. All 429 tests pass. Lint clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: add harness→app boundary check test and update docs Add test_harness_boundary.py that scans all Python files in packages/harness/deerflow/ and fails if any `from app.*` or `import app.*` statement is found. This enforces the architectural rule that the harness layer never depends on the app layer. Update CLAUDE.md to document the harness/app split architecture, import conventions, and the boundary enforcement test. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat: add config versioning with auto-upgrade on startup When config.example.yaml schema changes, developers' local config.yaml files can silently become outdated. This adds a config_version field and auto-upgrade mechanism so breaking changes (like src.* → deerflow.* renames) are applied automatically before services start. - Add config_version: 1 to config.example.yaml - Add startup version check warning in AppConfig.from_file() - Add scripts/config-upgrade.sh with migration registry for value replacements - Add `make config-upgrade` target - Auto-run config-upgrade in serve.sh and start-daemon.sh before starting services - Add config error hints in service failure messages Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix comments * fix: update src.* import in test_sandbox_tools_security to deerflow.* Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: handle empty config and search parent dirs for config.example.yaml Address Copilot review comments on PR #1131: - Guard against yaml.safe_load() returning None for empty config files - Search parent directories for config.example.yaml instead of only looking next to config.yaml, fixing detection in common setups Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: correct skills root path depth and config_version type coercion - loader.py: fix get_skills_root_path() to use 5 parent levels (was 3) after harness split, file lives at packages/harness/deerflow/skills/ so parent×3 resolved to backend/packages/harness/ instead of backend/ - app_config.py: coerce config_version to int() before comparison in _check_config_version() to prevent TypeError when YAML stores value as string (e.g. config_version: "1") - tests: add regression tests for both fixes Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: update test imports from src.* to deerflow.*/app.* after harness refactor Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation (#37) * feat(harness): add tool-first ACP agent invocation * build(harness): make ACP dependency required * fix(harness): address ACP review feedback * feat(harness): decouple ACP agent workspace from thread data ACP agents (codex, claude-code) previously used per-thread workspace directories, causing path resolution complexity and coupling task execution to DeerFlow's internal thread data layout. This change: - Replace _resolve_cwd() with a fixed _get_work_dir() that always uses {base_dir}/acp-workspace/, eliminating virtual path translation and thread_id lookups - Introduce /mnt/acp-workspace virtual path for lead agent read-only access to ACP agent output files (same pattern as /mnt/skills) - Add security guards: read-only validation, path traversal prevention, command path allowlisting, and output masking for acp-workspace - Update system prompt and tool description to guide LLM: send self-contained tasks to ACP agents, copy results via /mnt/acp-workspace - Add 11 new security tests for ACP workspace path handling Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * refactor(prompt): inject ACP section only when ACP agents are configured The ACP agent guidance in the system prompt is now conditionally built by _build_acp_section(), which checks get_acp_agents() and returns an empty string when no ACP agents are configured. This avoids polluting the prompt with irrelevant instructions for users who don't use ACP. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix lint * fix(harness): address Copilot review comments on sandbox path handling and ACP tool - local_sandbox: fix path-segment boundary bug in _resolve_path (== or startswith +"/") and add lookahead in _resolve_paths_in_command regex to prevent /mnt/skills matching inside /mnt/skills-extra - local_sandbox_provider: replace print() with logger.warning(..., exc_info=True) - invoke_acp_agent_tool: guard getattr(option, "optionId") with None default + continue; move full prompt from INFO to DEBUG level (truncated to 200 chars) - sandbox/tools: fix _get_acp_workspace_host_path docstring to match implementation; remove misleading "read-only" language from validate_local_bash_command_paths Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(acp): thread-isolated workspaces, permission guardrail, and ContextVar registry P1.1 – ACP workspace thread isolation - Add `Paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)` for per-thread paths - `_get_work_dir(thread_id)` in invoke_acp_agent_tool now uses `{base_dir}/threads/{thread_id}/acp-workspace/`; falls back to global workspace when thread_id is absent or invalid - `_invoke` extracts thread_id from `RunnableConfig` via `Annotated[RunnableConfig, InjectedToolArg]` - `sandbox/tools.py`: `_get_acp_workspace_host_path(thread_id)`, `_resolve_acp_workspace_path(path, thread_id)`, and all callers (`replace_virtual_paths_in_command`, `mask_local_paths_in_output`, `ls_tool`, `read_file_tool`) now resolve ACP paths per-thread P1.2 – ACP permission guardrail - New `auto_approve_permissions: bool = False` field in `ACPAgentConfig` - `_build_permission_response(options, *, auto_approve: bool)` now defaults to deny; only approves when `auto_approve=True` - Document field in `config.example.yaml` P2 – Deferred tool registry race condition - Replace module-level `_registry` global with `contextvars.ContextVar` - Each asyncio request context gets its own registry; worker threads inherit the context automatically via `loop.run_in_executor` - Expose `get_deferred_registry` / `set_deferred_registry` / `reset_deferred_registry` helpers Tests: 831 pass (57 for affected modules, 3 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sandbox): mount /mnt/acp-workspace in docker sandbox container The AioSandboxProvider was not mounting the ACP workspace into the sandbox container, so /mnt/acp-workspace was inaccessible when the lead agent tried to read ACP results in docker mode. Changes: - `ensure_thread_dirs`: also create `acp-workspace/` (chmod 0o777) so the directory exists before the sandbox container starts — required for Docker volume mounts - `_get_thread_mounts`: add read-only `/mnt/acp-workspace` mount using the per-thread host path (`host_paths.acp_workspace_dir(thread_id)`) - Update stale CLAUDE.md description (was "fixed global workspace") Tests: `test_aio_sandbox_provider.py` (4 new tests) Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(lint): remove unused imports in test_aio_sandbox_provider Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix config --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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-Astraia-
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191b60a326
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fix: issue 1138 windows encoding (#1139)
* fix(windows): use utf-8 for text file operations * fix(windows): normalize sandbox path masking * fix(windows): preserve utf-8 handling after backend split |