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88 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
nonoge
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183280ebfc
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fix browser extra detection for indentless YAML (#4367) | ||
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Ryker_Feng
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fa496c0c8d
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feat(browser): add agentic browser control (#4187)
* feat(browser): add agentic browser control
* fix(frontend): format browser view changes
* fix(browser): keep browser optional and isolate sidecar layout
* fix(browser): address PR review security and IME findings
- Nginx: add a browser-stream WebSocket location before the generic
/api/threads regex so Live upgrades instead of downgrading to HTTP
(both nginx.conf and nginx.local.conf).
- Ownership: require an existing owned thread for the WS stream and REST
navigate, and tear down the browser session on thread deletion so a
later caller cannot reuse a retained page/cookies by guessing the id.
- SSRF: enforce the URL policy at the browser request boundary via a
context-level route guard covering redirects, popups, iframes, and
subresources (skipped for CDP-attached Chrome).
- IME: skip key forwarding while a composition is active so confirming a
CJK candidate with Enter no longer submits the remote page form.
Adds regression tests for the request guard, session teardown on delete,
and the composing-Enter key decision.
* fix(frontend): smooth streaming in long tool threads
* Revert "fix(frontend): smooth streaming in long tool threads"
This reverts commit f0462516eabe77f138d4027ea1c714fb226683cf.
* fix(browser): address review security and lifecycle findings
- Reject cross-origin WebSocket upgrades on the live browser stream
(Origin allow-list reuse of CORS/same-origin helpers) to close a
WS-CSRF hole, and fail closed when the ownership store is absent.
- Warn when a CDP-attached session runs with the SSRF request guard
off, and drop the unreachable CDP screencast teardown dead code.
- Read browser session launch config from a single canonical source
(browser_navigate) so it is deterministic regardless of call order.
- Bound per-thread Chromium accumulation with idle-timeout eviction
and an LRU max-sessions cap.
- Reset the Live reconnect counter on a successful open so the stream
can't permanently stall after the cumulative attempt cap.
* fix(frontend): reduce long tool thread render stalls
Reuse stable historical message groups during streaming, defer heavy Markdown and browser previews, and lazy-decode message images.
* fix(browser): keep live control responsive during continuous input
Why: Manual browser control felt laggy — a physical click ran the remote
Playwright click three times and each non-move input synchronously awaited a
JPEG screenshot, so events queued behind capture (queue wait up to ~237ms).
The first async attempt used a trailing-edge debounce, which froze the visible
page until a wheel/keyboard gesture stopped ("scroll finishes, then it jumps").
What:
- Frontend forwards one `click` per physical click instead of also emitting
`down`/`up`, so the remote page is not clicked twice per gesture.
- Backend detaches live-frame capture from input dispatch: non-move actions
start a rate-limited background refresh loop (leading frame + bounded cadence)
that keeps emitting frames while input continues and never blocks dispatch.
- Add regression tests: input dispatch no longer awaits the screenshot, rapid
inputs coalesce, and continuous input keeps refreshing before it stops.
Scenarios: Verified in the live Browser panel — a single click completes in
~57ms (was blocked behind a 171ms capture), and a 1.14s sustained wheel gesture
renders ~7 frames throughout the scroll instead of one frame after it ends.
* fix(browser): harden worker and session lifecycle
* fix(browser): address latest review feedback
* fix(frontend): preserve optimistic new-chat message
* test(e2e): preserve mocked message run ids
* fix(browser): address capability review feedback
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
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Aari
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5eb59cb130
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fix(sandbox): stop multi-worker orphan reconcile from killing peer sandboxes (#4221)
* fix(sandbox): stop multi-worker orphan reconcile from killing peer sandboxes Docker sandboxes are shared across gateway workers, but each worker kept its own in-memory warm pool. Startup reconciliation adopted every running container, so a peer idle reaper could destroy sandboxes another worker still owned and tool calls hit 502 / Connection refused. Add file-based ownership leases under sandbox-leases/, only adopt true orphans, refuse idle/replica/shutdown destroy while a foreign lease is live, and renew the lease on create/get/release/reclaim. Fixes #4206 * fix(sandbox): close lease fail-open, hot-path IO, and check→destroy race Address review of the multi-worker orphan lease (#4206): - read_lease returns None only for a genuinely-absent lease and raises (CorruptLeaseError/OSError) when a lease is unreadable or corrupt, so the ownership check fails closed instead of mistaking an unprovable peer lease for a free container. clear_lease still removes a stuck/corrupt file. - get() no longer renews the lease (blocking mkdir/fsync/os.replace on the event loop path used by ensure_sandbox_initialized_async); active leases are renewed off the event loop from the idle checker (_renew_active_leases). - The ownership check and container stop run under a per-sandbox flock guard (lease_ownership_guard); every lease write takes the same guard so a peer's touch cannot interleave with a destroy. Same-host multi-worker scope, not a multi-pod distributed lock. Also fixes the ruff format lint on the branch. Adds regression tests: corrupt and unreadable lease fail closed, a tests/blocking_io anchor keeping get() non-blocking on the event loop, and a peer-touch/destroy interleave test. * fix(sandbox): share container ownership across gateway instances Rework of the #4206 fix per review: ownership state is shared through a third-party service instead of being maintained per gateway instance, following the stream_bridge precedent (sandbox.ownership.type: memory | redis). The file lease and its same-host flock guard are deleted, not ported — they only covered workers on one host, while the deployment that hits #4206 is a load-balanced multi-instance gateway. A lease answers "who reaps this container", not "who may use it". Containers are deterministic per (user, thread), so consecutive turns legitimately land on different instances: take() transfers ownership on acquire, while claim() gates every adopt/reap path. Leases carry a state — own: or del: — so a takeover is refused against a teardown in progress. Without it an unconditional take() would overwrite a destroyer's claim and the peer's container stop would land on a sandbox the new owner had already handed to an agent. renew() distinguishes a lapsed lease from one a peer took; only the latter drops the sandbox. Collapsing them meant a Redis restart evicted every in-flight sandbox on every instance at once. Renewal runs on its own thread with a TTL derived from its interval, never from idle_timeout: renewal used to ride the idle checker, which does not start at idle_timeout: 0, so leases silently lapsed on a supported config. Ownership establishment is fail-closed: a sandbox whose ownership cannot be published is never handed out, and a just-created container is destroyed rather than leaked as an adoptable orphan. Every destroy path claims before untracking. The memory store is single-instance only and says so; the resolver reads app_config.stream_bridge and the env var in the bridge's own order, so deployments already using Redis get a redis ownership store without extra config. * fix(sandbox): wait out a recovery grace before adopting a keyless container An absent ownership lease meant two opposite things on two paths. Renewal reads it as LAPSED and re-establishes it: nobody took the lease, so the container is still ours. Reconciliation read the same absent key as "orphan" and adopted on sight. After the store loses its keys (a Redis restart without persistence, or eviction under maxmemory) every owner is alive and merely pre-renewal-tick. Whichever instance reconciled first therefore adopted every live container; each real owner's next renewal reported LOST and dropped a sandbox it was serving mid-turn, leaving it for the adopter to idle-destroy — #4206 through the back door, in the very case the LAPSED handling was added to make safe. Not limited to startup: an already-running instance hits the same window from the idle checker's periodic reconcile. _adoptable_after_grace requires an untracked container to be seen unowned across a full lease TTL before it can be adopted. That rebuilds the delay the state loss erased: a live owner republishes within one renewal interval, shorter than the TTL by construction, while a crashed owner never does, so its containers are still adopted one grace later rather than leaking. A republished lease resets the grace; a pausing-only timer would still expire over a live owner's lease. The peek is read-only — the atomic claim still gates adoption. The grace is skipped when the store cannot coordinate across processes: no peer can hold a lease such a store would show us, so single-instance deployments keep instant orphan cleanup, and a grace could not help a multi-worker gateway on memory anyway. * fix(sandbox): hold the teardown lease for as long as the container stop runs claim(..., for_destroy=True) wrote the del: marker with the ordinary lease TTL and nothing refreshed it. renew() extends only own: and deliberately reports a teardown as LOST, and the destroy paths drop the sandbox from the maps the renewal loop iterates — so a container stop that outlived the TTL let the marker lapse, a peer's take() succeeded against the still-running container, and the stop then landed on the turn that had just been handed it. That is the exact window the del: state exists to close, reopened by its own expiry. The two lease states alone never made the per-sandbox flock redundant, as I claimed when deleting it: a held lock cannot expire, a lease can. The exclusion has to be held deliberately rather than assumed to outlast the work it guards. _held_teardown_lease wraps both _backend.destroy() call sites and re-claims the marker every renewal_interval_seconds until the stop returns. No store change is needed: claim(for_destroy=True) already refreshes an existing del: marker on both backends. Reachable without an abnormal backend. The schema bounds only renewal_interval_seconds (> 0) and ttl_multiplier (>= 2), so a legal config puts the TTL below a normal container stop; and LocalContainerBackend._stop_container passes no timeout to subprocess.run, so a wedged daemon blocks unbounded even at the default 120s TTL. The TTL stays finite on purpose: the heartbeat dies with the process, so a destroyer that crashes mid-stop still releases the container one TTL later instead of marking it undestroyable forever. * fix(sandbox): hold the teardown lease on every del: stop, and pin the claims that had no test 90936b49 said `_held_teardown_lease` wrapped "both" `_backend.destroy()` call sites. There are three. `_drop_unhealthy_sandbox` marks `del:` and then blocks on the same unbounded stop, and it untracks *before* claiming, so `_renew_owned_leases` cannot see the id either — nothing refreshed the marker. Reproduced against a real redis: the peer's `take()` succeeds 1.0s into a 2.5s stop. Same window, third path. That miss came from the habit the rest of this commit addresses: a property asserted in prose, with no test that could falsify it. Auditing every load-bearing claim in this feature — AGENTS.md, the store docstrings, the provider's design comments — against the test that would go red turned up several more, each verified by mutating the code and watching the suite stay green. Tests that could not fail: - `test_reconcile_fails_closed_when_ownership_unknown` reached the grace gate, not the claim. A bare MagicMock answers `owner()` with a truthy mock, so the container read as peer-owned and deferred; `claim()` was never called. It stayed green with `_claim_ownership` failing open. Adding the grace ahead of the claim is what hollowed it out — inserting a gate can silently disarm the tests for the gate behind it. - `test_adoption_grace_restarts_when_a_live_owner_republishes` never distinguished reset from pause. Those diverge only on a *second* lapse, which it never drove, so it passed with the reset deleted. Claims with no test at all, each now pinned (mutation → red, per test): - `destroy()`, `_evict_oldest_warm`, `_reclaim_warm_pool_sandbox`, `_register_created_sandbox` and `shutdown()`'s warm loop were each the one untested sibling of an "every path does X" enumeration. `shutdown()` was never driven with a non-empty warm pool, so a loop bypassing the ownership claim — stopping a live peer's container on our exit — went unnoticed. - Renewal's unknown-is-not-lost rule, the single deliberate exception to fail-closed. Inverting it drops every active and warm sandbox on every instance the moment the store blinks. - Both hops of the stream-bridge redis inference. Deleting either left the suite green while every config.yaml-native multi-instance deployment silently fell back to memory — #4206 reopened on exactly the deployments the inference exists for. Claims narrowed instead, because they promised more than the code delivers: - "run against both backends ... cannot drift" — CI provisions no redis, so the merge gate runs the memory tier only and the Lua never executes there. - "Every destroy path claims before untracking" — `_drop_unhealthy_sandbox` untracks first, deliberately, under its `expected_info` TOCTOU guard. - "Atomic: concurrent claims from different instances cannot both succeed" — true via Lua on redis, vacuous on the single-instance memory store, and pinned by neither, since the contract suite drives sequential calls. A concurrency test against the memory store would make the claim look covered while the mechanism that carries it still never runs in CI. * fix(sandbox): release the teardown marker when a destroy() stop fails The three `del:`-marked stop paths disagreed on failure. `_destroy_warm_entry` releases on both outcomes and says why: the stop failed, so the container is probably still up, and a marker left behind refuses its own thread's `take()` until the TTL lapses. `_drop_unhealthy_sandbox` does the same. `destroy()` had no such guard — a raising backend propagated straight past `_release_ownership`, and the thread could not re-acquire for a full TTL. Fails safe rather than fatal: a stuck marker stops peers from touching the container, it is not the cross-instance kill. But the paths must agree, and this one is the odd one out. Release, then re-raise. Swallowing would be the easier symmetry with `_destroy_warm_entry`'s `return False`, but `destroy()` has no failure return and `shutdown()` logs per sandbox off the exception, so swallowing would silently narrow what callers can see. Found by comparing the three paths after @fancyboi999 asked for release to be handled "consistently with the other destroy paths" on the unhealthy path — which 0d2377b2 already does. This is the sibling that wasn't. * fix(deploy): bump chart config_version to 27 for sandbox.ownership config.example.yaml went to 27 with the new sandbox.ownership section, but the chart embeds its own copy and stayed at 26, so validate-chart failed. A bare bump: the chart already sets stream_bridge.type=redis, which is what resolve_ownership_config infers a redis ownership store from, so no field change is needed. * fix(sandbox): release the teardown lease from its heartbeat, not the caller `_held_teardown_lease` joined its heartbeat only briefly and the caller cleared the `del:` marker right after the stop. A refresh `claim` still in flight (`RedisOwnershipStore` had no socket timeout, so a round trip could block) could land *after* that release and rewrite `del:` on a container whose stop had already completed — refusing a fresh `take()` (or rolling back a fresh create) until the TTL. Move the release into the heartbeat's own `finally`, after its loop stops, so no refresh can run after it. The three destroy paths no longer release after the `with` (`destroy()`'s no-container branch still does, since no lease was held there). Bound every store round trip with a socket timeout so the in-flight refresh — and thus the deferred release — stays finite, and broaden the heartbeat's `except` so an unexpected error cannot strand the marker during a long stop. Also fold in the review follow-ups: stop re-resolving an already-resolved ownership config in the factory, document the Redis-outage-vs-TTL boundary in config.example.yaml, and add a tests/blocking_io anchor pinning that `release()`'s store round trip stays off the event loop. * fix(sandbox): refuse a non-destroy claim that would unwind our own teardown `claim(for_destroy=False)` against our own `del:` lease fell through and overwrote it with `own:`, cancelling a teardown that was already in flight. The container stop cannot be recalled, so downgrading the marker would let a `take()` hand out a container that is about to die -- #4206, self-inflicted. No caller does this today: the two non-destroy callers run against an absent key (the LAPSED re-claim) or an unowned one (post-grace reconcile). The contract has to forbid it rather than rely on that staying true. Fixed in both backends. The redis rule lives in Lua and the memory rule in Python, so fixing one only would let them drift silently -- and the shared contract suite is what is supposed to catch that drift, so it now covers this. Also adds a contention test for `claim`. The suite drove sequential calls only, so it pinned the exclusion predicate but not the atomicity that predicate depends on; eight instances now race for one container and exactly one must win. * fix(sandbox): bound the container stop so it cannot outlive its teardown lease `_stop_container` passed no `timeout` to `subprocess.run`, so a wedged container runtime blocks it forever. The `del:` marker is what keeps a peer from re-acquiring the container while the stop runs, but a marker is a lease and a lease can lapse: a store outage longer than the TTL frees it, a peer's `take()` succeeds against the still-running container, and the stop then lands on the turn that was just handed it -- the exact #4206 failure. The teardown heartbeat already covers the case where the store stays reachable. This bounds the worst case independently of the ownership layer, which is the point: it holds even when the ownership layer is the thing that failed. A timeout is not swallowed like a `CalledProcessError`. That error means the runtime answered "I could not stop it"; a timeout means we do not know, and the container is probably still running -- returning normally would let `_destroy_warm_entry` report a clean stop and drop the warm entry, leaking a running container nothing tracks. * fix(sandbox): exclude this instance's own reapers from its acquire path An ownership lease excludes peers and nothing else. `claim()` and `take()` both succeed against our own `own:` lease by design -- that is what lets a destroy path claim what it already owns -- so `del:` says nothing to this process's other threads. Meanwhile every reaper decides outside `_lock`, because a store round trip must not be held under the lock that guards every acquire. So each reaper acts on a decision its own acquire path may already have invalidated, and the store cannot see the difference. Six paths end in an irreversible act (a container stop, or closing a host-side client) on a decision made outside the lock. All six reproduce: _evict_oldest_warm re-checks warm membership, then releases the lock _reap_expired_warm no re-check at all _cleanup_idle_sandboxes re-verifies idle, then releases the lock _renew_owned_leases acts on a stale renew() -> LOST release() same staleness on its own refresh _drop_unhealthy_sandbox untracks before claiming, opening discovery Both warm reapers are a regression from the deferred pop this branch introduced: `WarmPoolLifecycleMixin` popped under the lock, so a reclaim's membership check failed and the race could not occur. Deferring the pop is still right (popping first loses the container on a refused claim), so the exclusion has to be made explicit instead. The idle path is pre-existing in shape, but this branch widened it from a few instructions to a network round trip by claiming ownership before untracking. Two guards, because the two directions want opposite answers: Reaping -- nothing may promote it. The reaper reserves the id, and every promote path refuses a reserved id exactly as it refuses a peer's `del:` (drop and cold-start). The "is this still reapable?" test travels with the reservation as a predicate and runs in the same critical section, because checking first and reserving second is the window, not a narrower version of it. Forgetting -- the peer legitimately wins, so the promote is what to detect. `_publish_ownership` bumps a per-id acquire epoch; the callers that decide from a store round trip snapshot it first, and the pop is skipped if it moved. Object identity cannot substitute: the reuse path re-publishes ownership while handing out the same tracked `AioSandbox`, so an identity check sees nothing and the pop closes a client mid-turn. `still_reapable` is required rather than defaulting to unconditional -- the safe default is the one that makes a new call site think about it. That diverges from the mixin hook, which is safe because this provider overrides both mixin callers, and loud rather than silent if those are ever dropped. Also closes a client leak on the discover path: "nothing to roll back" was true of the container but not of the HTTP client constructed before the publish, which the sibling create path already closes. The shared-store test view rebound `owner_id` outside the store's lock, so a concurrent claim could execute under the wrong id and read its own lease as a peer's. Serialized, so the heartbeat-hold tests stop flaking. * fix(sandbox): mark acquire intent before the ownership round trip A guard must become visible no later than the transition it guards. The acquire epoch cannot manage that for `take()`: the takeover is durable before `take()` returns -- redis has committed the SET while the reply is still in flight -- and the epoch can only be written afterwards. In that interval the store already says the container is ours while the epoch still reads as it did when a renewal decided `LOST`, so the stale forget walks through, drops the maps and closes the client the acquire is about to hand back. Acquire then returns an id the provider no longer tracks and `get()` answers `None` for the rest of the turn. `_publish_ownership` now publishes an intent mark under `_lock` before the round trip; the epoch keeps covering the other half, "an acquire completed since you decided". `_forget_lost_sandbox` honours the intent mark unconditionally rather than only when an epoch is supplied -- today's epoch-less callers cannot reach the window, but "no epoch" reading as "no guard" is how the next caller of a dangerous primitive gets written. The same invariant had four more instances, all reproduced: reuse returns a decision the forget already invalidated -- before the mark is set a `LOST` is both current and correct, so the forget legitimately runs and the entry reuse decided to hand out is gone. Re-check after publishing and fall through to discovery instead. reclaim installs an entry a reaper reserved after its check -- the warm entry is still visible during the stop, and the reaper's claim succeeds because reclaim's own take() just made the lease ours. Re-check likewise. the reservation was released before the entry was removed -- the pop belonged to the caller, leaving a gap where the container is stopped, the entry is still in `_warm_pool`, and nothing marks it. `_destroy_warm_entry` removes it itself, inside the reservation; the pop stays deferred relative to the stop, just not to the reservation. reconcile adopts a container this instance is tearing down -- adoption is a promote and needs the same reservation check as the others. Neither existing guard excludes it: the claim succeeds because the lease is ours, and on `memory` the recovery grace is skipped outright. The pre-round-trip checks in reuse and reclaim are kept as early-outs, since they skip a health check and a store round trip on a doomed entry, and are pinned to that job rather than to a correctness role they no longer hold. The teardown reservation predicate runs under `_lock`, so it must not touch the lock. Documented rather than engineered around: making the lock reentrant to tolerate it would trade a loud hang for a quiet class of re-entrancy bugs across the rest of the provider. * fix(sandbox): honor local teardown after ownership publish * fix(sandbox): clear a stale warm entry when an id becomes active Active and warm are exclusive states, and the two register paths were the only place that could hold both: they inserted into `_sandboxes` without popping `_warm_pool`, so one container ended up with two reapers. `_reap_expired_warm` judges an entry by its warm timestamp and never consults `_last_activity`, so it stops a container an agent is actively using while `_sandboxes` still hands out its client. Reachable because `_reconcile_orphans` adopts an untracked-but-running container into the warm pool inside the register's publish -> track window, and on the `memory` store it adopts on sight: `_adoptable_after_grace` short-circuits when `supports_cross_process` is False, so an id carrying this process's own lease reads as adoptable. That window is new to this branch -- on main the track was a single locked insert with nothing before it. Both register paths now pop the warm entry inside the same locked section that installs the active one. * fix(sandbox): harden ownership renewal teardown --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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Daoyuan Li
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283cea567e
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fix(scripts): broaden support bundle secret-key redaction denylist (#4242)
* fix(scripts): broaden support bundle secret-key redaction denylist SECRET_KEY_RE only matched a fixed keyword allowlist, so a secret stored under an unanticipated key name inside an open-ended config dict (e.g. guardrails.provider.config, an arbitrary provider-kwargs dict) was emitted verbatim into config-summary.json even though manifest.json claims redacted_secret_fields=true. This gap was flagged on PR #3886's review before merge but not fully addressed. Broaden the key-name match to mirror env_policy.py's wildcard denylist (*KEY*/*SECRET*/*TOKEN*/*PASS*/*CREDENTIAL*/*DSN*) already used for sandbox env-scrubbing, plus its no-flag credential exact names (GH_PAT/GITHUB_PAT/ REDIS_AUTH/REDISCLI_AUTH/PGSERVICEFILE). The new bare key/pass/dsn alternatives are boundary-guarded so they match only their own delimited token, not an unrelated word that starts with the same letters (routing "keywords", guardrails "passport"). * fix(scripts): stop the pass token boundary from missing passphrase/passcode SECRET_KEY_RE's bare "pass" alternative, (?<![a-zA-Z])pass(?![a-zA-Z]), excludes any key where "pass" is followed by another letter. That correctly keeps "passport" out of the redaction set, but it also excludes genuine secret-bearing key names like "passphrase" and "passcode" -- both of which env_policy.py's *PASS* substring denylist does catch, so a secret stored under either name in an open-ended config dict (e.g. guardrails.provider.config) would still leak into config-summary.json. Narrow the lookahead to only exclude a trailing "port" -- pass(?!port) -- so passphrase/passcode/pass/db_pass all match while passport stays excluded; compass/bypass stay excluded via the existing leading-letter lookbehind, independent of the lookahead. Added a regression test covering both the newly-caught names and the still-excluded ones in one place. Reverting to the old lookahead reproduces the exact leak (passphrase left unredacted); with the fix, tests/test_support_bundle.py (30 tests) is green, and ruff check/format are clean. |
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Zheng Feng
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d57f695769
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fix(helm): default sandbox Services to ClusterIP (#3929) (#4190)
* fix(helm): default sandbox Services to ClusterIP (#3929) The K8s sandbox provisioner supports both NodePort and ClusterIP via SANDBOX_SERVICE_TYPE (added in #4016), but the Helm chart never set it, so real-cluster installs inherited the NodePort default. That bound the code-execution sandbox on every node's interfaces - including externally reachable ones on GKE/EKS/AKS - and pinned every sandbox URL to one node IP (SPOF on node reboot/drain/ephemeral-IP). Default the chart to ClusterIP: the provisioner returns a cluster-DNS URL (http://sandbox-<id>-svc.<ns>.svc.cluster.local:8080) so the gateway-> sandbox hop stays inside the cluster network - no node IP, no 30xxx port, no external exposure. The chart always runs the gateway in-cluster, so ClusterIP is always correct there. NodePort remains an opt-in (provisioner.sandboxServiceType: NodePort + nodeHost) for the Docker-Compose/hybrid path where the gateway is not in K8s and cannot resolve .svc.cluster.local; the provisioner code default stays NodePort for that path. - values.yaml: add provisioner.sandboxServiceType ("ClusterIP") - provisioner-deployment.yaml: emit SANDBOX_SERVICE_TYPE; gate the NODE_HOST block on NodePort mode (default "ClusterIP" for upgrade safety) - NOTES.txt + README.md: document ClusterIP default + NodePort opt-in No change to docker/provisioner/app.py (already mode-aware since #4016) or RBAC (services verbs already cover ClusterIP). * test(helm): assert sandbox Service-type gating + CHANGELOG the default flip (#3929) Address review on #4190: - Add scripts/check_chart_sandbox_service.sh: renders the chart for the default (ClusterIP, no NODE_HOST), the NodePort opt-in (both emitted), and NodePort+nodeHost (literal value, not downward API). Locks in the #3929 gating so a regression (e.g. re-adding an unconditional NODE_HOST, or dropping the `default "ClusterIP"` upgrade-safety fallback) fails CI. Wired into .github/workflows/chart.yaml validate-chart job. (#2) - CHANGELOG [Unreleased] -> Changed: note the NodePort->ClusterIP default flip on upgrade + the `sandboxServiceType: NodePort` opt-back-in. (#4) No chart template changes (the gating itself landed in the first commit). --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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Daoyuan Li
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656f6b364c
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fix(skills): recognize fully deleted public skill packages in review CI (#4169)
select_skill_packages() resolved every changed non-SKILL.md path to its owning package via an unconditional depth-3 fallback, then queued that path for review. When a PR deletes an entire public skill package (not just SKILL.md, but its scripts/assets/etc. too), the fallback still returned the package directory even though it no longer exists on disk post-deletion. The review CLI then reported a false structure.missing-skill-md blocker for a path that isn't there, failing CI on a routine, correct package removal. Skip a resolved package only when every changed file under it was a deletion and the package directory itself is gone from disk - i.e. the whole package was intentionally removed. A package left in a broken/partial state (e.g. SKILL.md deleted while sibling files remain) still resolves to an existing directory, so it is unaffected and continues to be queued and flagged. |
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pclin
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fabadae416
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add Volcengine Coding Plan to quikly setup (#4141)
* add Volcengine Coding Plan to quikly setup * modify model list |
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Zheng Feng
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7d1a8fb753
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ci: add nightly build for images + helm chart (#4050)
* ci: add nightly build workflow for images + helm chart Nightly build of backend/frontend/provisioner images and the helm chart, pushed to GHCR with nightly + nightly-YYYYMMDD tags (latest stays on v* releases). amd64 only. Gated to the upstream repo (bytedance/deer-flow). Documented in RELEASING.md. * ci(nightly): harden chart patch + dedupe config_version check Address PR #4050 review feedback: - Gate the in-workflow chart patches with grep assertions so a drifted Chart.yaml/values.yaml fails loudly instead of silently shipping a chart that pulls the release `latest` images (sed exits 0 on zero matches). - Suffix the nightly chart version with the short SHA (<base>-nightly.<date>-<sha>) so a same-day re-dispatch re-publishes cleanly; OCI chart versions are immutable and otherwise collide. - Note in the image-tags comment that :nightly-<date> is mutable within a day and :sha-<short> is the only truly immutable pin. - Extract the config_version drift check into scripts/check_config_version.sh, shared by chart.yaml and nightly.yaml, so the parsing logic lives in one place. |
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Ryker_Feng
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41658c5ff4
|
feat(skills): add skill review quality gate (#4037)
* feat(skills): add skill review quality gate * fix(skills): skip review eval fixtures in CI * fix(skills): ignore review eval fixtures in bundled scans * fix(skill-review): harden review gate boundaries * fix(skills): address skill review gate feedback |
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Zheng Feng
|
bc9ee9645c
|
feat(deploy): first-class Helm chart for Kubernetes deployment (#3987)
* feat(helm): add production-ready Helm chart for Kubernetes deployment Adds deploy/helm/deer-flow, a native-Kubernetes translation of the production docker-compose stack, plus CI to publish its images and chart. * ci(release): gate releases on version-source consistency Add a reusable verify-versions workflow invoked by both chart.yaml and container.yaml on v* tags. It runs scripts/verify_versions.sh against the tag and fails the release — skipping all image and chart publishing — when Chart.yaml (version + appVersion), backend/pyproject.toml, or frontend/package.json don't all match the tag. Add scripts/verify_versions.sh (the check, also runnable locally) and scripts/bump_version.sh (bumps all four sources in lockstep, then self-verifies). Document the release flow in RELEASING.md and link it from AGENTS.md. * fix(deploy): address Helm chart review feedback (#3987) Three review items from willem-bd: 1. nginx IPv6 listen strip never matched. The sed pattern required a `;` immediately after `2026`, but the rendered config emits `listen [::]:2026 default_server;` (space + `default_server` before the `;`), so the line was never deleted and nginx crash-looped on pods without IPv6 (`socket() :::2026 failed (97: Address family not supported)`). Drop the trailing `;` from the pattern so it matches. Same latent bug fixed in docker-compose-dev.yaml. 2. Passwords were spliced into DSNs verbatim, so a password containing URL-special chars (@ : / # ? % [ ] space) produced a malformed DSN and a confusing parse error. Add a `deer-flow.urlEscape` helper (replace-based: Sprig lacks urlqueryescape, and regexReplaceAllLiteral treats the replacement as a regex template so `[`/`]`/`?` break it) and apply it to the password in the postgres and redis DSNs. The raw `postgres-password` / `redis-password` keys stay unencoded - they back POSTGRES_PASSWORD / REDIS_PASSWORD, not a URL segment. 3. NODE_HOST defaulted to "gateway", which can never route: the gateway Service is ClusterIP:8001 and knows nothing of a sandbox NodePort, so a user who skips the caveat gets unreachable sandboxes with no error at install time. Default NODE_HOST to the provisioner pod's node IP via the downward API (status.hostIP) - a NodePort is exposed on every node, so <node-IP>:<NodePort> routes from the gateway on most clusters. `provisioner.nodeHost` remains an override for CNIs/policies that block pod->node-IP traffic. Updated NOTES.txt, values.yaml, and the chart README. (#3929 remains the long-term fix - ClusterIP + cluster-DNS URL removes NODE_HOST and the NodePort exposure entirely.) Validated with helm lint, helm template (incl. a special-char password rendering the encoded DSNs), and a sed pattern-match check. * fix(deploy): address round-2 Helm chart review feedback (#3987) Three "Medium" items from willem-bd: 1. No helm lint / helm template gate before publish. A template regression ships as an immutable OCI artifact (GHCR won't overwrite --version), so gate packaging on `helm lint` + `helm template --include-crds` in chart.yaml before `helm package`. (ct lint / helm-unittest deferred.) 2. Action pinning inconsistent + PR body overstates it. SHA-pin actions/checkout (v6.0.3, df4cb1c0) and actions/attest-build-provenance (v2.4.0, e8998f94) across the publishing workflows (chart.yaml, container.yaml, verify-versions.yml), matching the existing docker/* SHA-pin pattern. Resolves the checkout @v4/@v6 mismatch and makes the "SHA-pinned actions" claim accurate. Other pre-existing workflows left untouched (out of scope for this PR). 3. Provisioner RBAC broader than needed. Dropped the unused update/patch verbs and the pods/exec + events rules from the provisioner Role - audited against docker/provisioner/app.py, which only calls get/create/delete on pods and get/list/create/delete on services. Fixed NOTES.txt to accurately describe the grant instead of understating it as "create Pods and Services". The remaining scope concern - verbs apply to all Pods in the namespace, not just sandbox Pods - is still deferred (RBAC can't scope by label; needs a dedicated namespace or admission control), now noted in NOTES.txt and README. Validated with helm lint + helm template (narrowed Role renders with exactly get/list/watch/create/delete). * feat(helm): enable sandbox+web tools out of the box The chart's default config loaded zero agent tools (config.tools empty -> "Total tools loaded: 0"), so a fresh install gave an agent that could do nothing useful. Add tool_groups + tools to the default config block: - web: web_search (ddg), web_fetch (jina), image_search - no API key - file:read: ls, read_file, glob, grep - file:write: write_file, str_replace - bash The file/bash tools run inside the AIO sandbox the chart already configures; the web tools need outbound internet from the gateway pod (swap backends or drop entries for air-gapped clusters - see config.example.yaml). Also bump config_version 15 -> 19 to match config.example.yaml (the chart had drifted behind). NOTES.txt and the README example updated to match. * ci(helm): add chart validation + config_version drift check on PR Extend the chart workflow with a PR-triggered validate-chart job that runs helm lint, helm template --include-crds, and a config_version drift check: it parses config_version from both config.example.yaml and the chart's values.yaml and fails the build (with a ::error:: naming the files to bump) if the chart is behind the example. This catches the kind of drift this PR is fixing - the chart sat at v15 while the example moved to v19 - before it can merge again. verify-versions and publish-chart stay tag-only; publish-chart now needs: [verify-versions, validate-chart]. validate-chart runs on both PRs and tag pushes: the tag arm is required because a job that `needs` a skipped job is itself skipped under the default success() check, so validate-chart must actually run on tag pushes or publish-chart would never fire. * Bump config version to 20 |
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Xinmin Zeng
|
857fb96269
|
fix(sandbox): stop setup-sandbox from pre-pulling the stale :latest sandbox image (#3983)
* fix(sandbox): stop setup-sandbox from pre-pulling the stale :latest image scripts/setup-sandbox.sh's fallback (used whenever config.yaml has no uncommented sandbox.image) pulled the volces mirror's :latest tag. We confirmed in #3921/#3922 that this tag is frozen on the pre-1.9.3 all-in-one-sandbox digest (1.0.0.156), which lacks the /v1/bash/* routes required-secrets skills need — so the one script whose entire job is 'pre-pull a working sandbox image' was pre-pulling a known-broken one. Pin the fallback to :1.11.0 instead. Also update config.example.yaml's commented image: example and 'Recommended' line to the same version, so uncommenting the example doesn't reproduce the same trap. Out of scope on purpose: aio_sandbox_provider.py's DEFAULT_IMAGE constant (the harness-level default for AioSandboxProvider itself) is a separate, broader default-image decision already flagged to maintainers in #3921 — this PR only fixes the pre-pull helper script. Reported in #3914 (a real user deleted their stale local image, reran make setup-sandbox, and got the same broken :latest image back). * fix(sandbox): make setup-sandbox warn when the pull won't affect the runtime image Self-review caught a real gap in the previous commit: AioSandboxProvider resolves its image as `sandbox_config.image or DEFAULT_IMAGE` (aio_sandbox_provider.py:214), and DEFAULT_IMAGE is deliberately left untouched (still the frozen :latest, per #3921 — that's a maintainer decision, not this PR's scope). So when config.yaml has no uncommented sandbox.image, pre-pulling :1.11.0 alone creates a NEW inconsistency: the script reports success pulling a modern image, but the sandbox that actually starts still falls back to the broken :latest — silently leaving the user's underlying required-secrets/bash.exec problem unfixed, which is worse than the previous consistent-but-broken behavior (pre-pull :latest, run :latest). Make the unconfigured path loud about this instead of silent: print the exact config.yaml snippet needed to make the pulled image actually take effect. |
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ly-wang19
|
f0f9dd6656
|
feat(setup): ask whether OpenAI-compatible gateway models support thinking (#3428)
The "Other OpenAI-compatible" wizard provider lets users supply a custom base_url and model name but never asked whether that model supports thinking/reasoning, so the generated config.yaml always left supports_thinking at its default of false — even for reasoning models behind the gateway. Add an explicit ask_thinking_support flag on LLMProvider (enabled for the "other" provider) plus a pure with_thinking_support() helper. When the flag is set, the LLM step prompts via ask_yes_no; confirming wires the standard OpenAI-compatible enable/disable thinking toggles, declining records supports_thinking=false. Provider definitions are copied with dataclasses.replace, never mutated. Adds unit tests for the helper and the interactive step. Closes #3162 Co-authored-by: ly-wang19 <ly-wang19@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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Vanzeren
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6060d95ee0
|
fix(wizard): update DeepSeek provider models to v4 (#3939)
Update DeepSeek references from deprecated model names to the V4 lineup: - deepseek-reasoner → deepseek-v4-pro - deepseek-chat → deepseek-v4-flash Keep docs and frontend mocks aligned with the wizard provider list. |
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Janlay
|
72f033fbbe
|
feat(gateway): add redis stream bridge (#3191)
* feat: add redis stream bridge * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(gateway): address redis stream bridge review Redis was imported eagerly through deerflow.runtime and declared as a hard dependency, which made memory-only installs load redis.asyncio at startup and left the lazy factory import ineffective. Move redis behind an optional extra, remove the public eager re-export, and keep make_stream_bridge as the only runtime import path with an actionable install hint when the extra is missing. Because Docker deployments now default the stream bridge to Redis via DEER_FLOW_STREAM_BRIDGE_REDIS_URL, install the redis extra explicitly in Docker/dev container flows and teach the local uv-extra detector to infer redis from both stream_bridge.type and the Redis URL env var. This keeps Docker working while preserving slim non-Docker installs. Harden the Redis bridge by batching XREAD replay, replacing brittle ResponseError string matching with a single fallback to 0-0 for malformed Last-Event-ID values, documenting connection/retention/fail-hard behavior, and adding fake plus opt-in real Redis coverage for XADD/XREAD, replay, invalid IDs, and MAXLEN trimming. * fix(config): bump config version for stream bridge * fix redis stream bridge terminal handling * fix: repair uv.lock, format redis.py, and align Dockerfile extras test The uv.lock file was missing a closing bracket for the redis extras section, redis.py had a formatting issue caught by ruff, and the Dockerfile extras test did not account for the hardcoded --extra redis flag. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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NekoPunch
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629477fd5c
|
docs: fix stale docs and typos (#3913) | ||
|
ajayr
|
1f74082987
|
feat(community): add Crawl4AI web_fetch provider (#3821)
* feat(community): add Crawl4AI web_fetch provider
Crawl4AI is a self-hosted, no-API-key web fetcher: it runs headless
Chromium and returns server-cleaned "fit" markdown directly via its
POST /md endpoint, so no client-side readability extraction is needed.
It sits alongside the existing self-hosted Browserless provider.
- deerflow.community.crawl4ai: async Crawl4AiClient + web_fetch_tool
(reads base_url/timeout_s/token/filter from config; "Error:" string
convention; 4096-char cap), mirroring the browserless provider
- tests: 17 unit cases (success, HTTP error, success:false, empty,
timeout, request error, token header, truncation, config reads)
- config.example.yaml: commented web_fetch example
- doctor: register as a no-key (free) web_fetch provider
- setup wizard: add to WEB_FETCH_PROVIDERS (no API key)
- docs: README, CONTRIBUTING, CONFIGURATION, AGENTS provider lists
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(community): address Crawl4AI provider review feedback
- timeout: robust _coerce_timeout (bool / non-numeric -> default) mirroring
jina, so 'timeout: off' no longer becomes 0.0 and times out every request
- read web_fetch config once per invocation and pass values into the client,
so a concurrent hot-reload can't split base_url from filter
- rename config key timeout_s -> timeout to match jina/infoquest (the
default providers); update config.example.yaml + setup wizard
- validate + normalize the markdown filter against {fit,raw,bm25,llm};
unknown values fall back to fit with a warning instead of an opaque HTTP 400
- client: a non-JSON 200 body (reverse proxy / auth wall) now reports the
content-type + snippet instead of a generic JSONDecodeError
- tests: 22 cases (added non-JSON-200, _coerce_timeout, _coerce_filter,
invalid-filter fallback, read-config-once)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: DanielWalnut <45447813+hetaoBackend@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
|
||
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Ryker_Feng
|
ddb097a72f
|
feat(community): add Brave image search community tool (#3866)
* Add Brave image search community tool * fix(community): length-cap Brave web_search queries Apply _clean_query in web_search_tool so over-long queries are trimmed to Brave's 400-char limit before the API call, matching image_search_tool and avoiding HTTP 422 from the Brave Search API. * fix(community): harden Brave image search SSRF guard and dimension mapping Address PR review findings: - Catch ValueError from urlparse so a malformed bracketed-IPv6 URL skips one item instead of crashing the whole image_search call - Reject IPv6 literals embedding a non-global IPv4 (IPv4-mapped, 6to4, NAT64, IPv4-compatible), closing the loopback/private SSRF bypass - Report width/height from the dict of the URL actually returned, so a surviving thumbnail no longer reports the dropped original's dimensions --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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Ryker_Feng
|
a8f950feb6
|
feat(community): add Browserless web_capture screenshot tool (#3881)
* feat(community): add Browserless web_capture screenshot tool Add a web_capture tool that renders a page via Browserless /screenshot and presents it through the artifact system, alongside the existing Browserless web_fetch provider. Hardening: - SSRF guard: reject URLs resolving to private/loopback/link-local (incl. the 169.254.169.254 cloud-metadata endpoint)/reserved/multicast/unspecified addresses; opt out via allow_private_addresses for internal targets. - Surface a warning when Browserless renders a target page that itself responded with a non-2xx/3xx status (X-Response-Code), so an error/anti-bot page is not mistaken for valid visual evidence. - Dedupe colliding output filenames instead of silently overwriting prior captures. Docs: comment out token: $BROWSERLESS_TOKEN in tool examples (an unset $VAR fails AppConfig startup) and document allow_private_addresses. * fix(community): format web_capture guard + document local Browserless startup Address PR #3881 review: fix the lint-backend failure (ruff format on browserless/tools.py) and add local Browserless startup instructions to CONFIGURATION.md so reviewers can run the service to try web_fetch/web_capture. |
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Zhou Kai
|
dd05e1a76d
|
fix(docker): production Postgres UV extras detection (#3897)
* Fix production postgres UV extras detection * fix(backend): validate Docker build UV extras |
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|
Ryker_Feng
|
cf02646489
|
feat(scripts): add redacted community support bundle generator (#3886)
* feat(scripts): add redacted community support bundle generator Add `make support-bundle` (scripts/support_bundle.py) to help users file high-signal, privacy-safe GitHub issues for local setup/config/runtime problems. The command produces: - `*-issue-summary.md` to paste into the issue body - `*-issue-draft.md` scaffold for AI-assisted filing (REQUIRED placeholders, never invents repro/expected/summary facts) - an optional evidence zip under `.deer-flow/support-bundles/` containing a stable `triage.json` plus redacted environment/config/extensions/git/doctor evidence Privacy: secrets are redacted across config values, URL userinfo, query strings, CLI flags, custom headers, bearer/sk- tokens, and home paths. The bundle never includes `.env`, raw conversation messages, or user file contents; optional `--thread-id` adds file manifests only. `thread_id` input is validated against path traversal. Wire it into the Makefile, AGENTS.md, README/README_zh, CONTRIBUTING, and the bug-report issue template. Covered by backend/tests/test_support_bundle.py. * fix(scripts): redact MCP env values by default in support bundle Address PR #3886 review (willem-bd, P2): the key-name allowlist let literal secrets under non-standard env keys (e.g. SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, R2_ACCESS_KEY, hardcoded AIza… keys) leak verbatim into the bundle that users are told is safe to share publicly. Mask all MCP `env` values by default, keeping only `$VAR`/`${VAR}` references visible, and broaden SECRET_KEY_RE (access_key, pwd, private_key). Add tests for non-keyword env secrets, broadened key names, and end-to-end zip redaction. |
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|
ly-wang19
|
b32ee26454
|
fix: reap macOS nginx processes on stop (#3828)
Co-authored-by: ly-wang19 <ly-wang19@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
jp0xz
|
a6dd2876f0
|
feat(community): add GroundRoute web search + fetch engine (#3675)
* feat(groundroute): add GroundRoute community web_search + web_fetch tools
GroundRoute is a meta search layer over six engines (Serper, Brave, Exa,
Tavily, Firecrawl, Perplexity) with price-based routing and failover. This
adds a self-contained community engine module (httpx only, no new required
deps) mirroring community/brave + community/tavily:
- web_search: POST /v1/search, normalize to {title,url,snippet,source_engine}.
- web_fetch: fetch a URL via mode=page.
- unit tests covering normalization, auth, clamping, and graceful errors.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(groundroute): register GroundRoute search + fetch in wizard and config
Add GroundRoute to the setup wizard provider lists (SEARCH_PROVIDERS +
WEB_FETCH_PROVIDERS) and as commented web_search + web_fetch examples in
config.example.yaml, mirroring tavily/serper/brave so SEARCH_API can select it.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* style(groundroute): apply repo ruff format (line-length 240)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(groundroute): add GroundRoute to tools docs and config reference
Adds GroundRoute as a web_search and web_fetch option in the en + zh
tools.mdx pages (new tab alongside Tavily/Brave/Exa/etc.) and documents
GROUNDROUTE_API_KEY in CONFIGURATION.md.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(groundroute): define empty groundroute extra for clean install
The docs install line 'uv add deerflow-harness[groundroute]' (mirroring the
tavily/exa/firecrawl pattern) referenced an undefined extra, which uv accepts
but warns about. GroundRoute needs no extra packages (httpx is a core dep), so
declare an empty 'groundroute' extra in deerflow-harness optional-dependencies
so the documented command resolves without a warning.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(groundroute): per-tool api key + honor caller max_results (review)
Address maintainer review on PR #3675:
- _get_api_key(tool_name): web_fetch now reads the web_fetch config block's key
instead of always web_search, so a flow that pairs GroundRoute fetch with a
different search engine authenticates correctly. Mirrors serper/exa/firecrawl.
- web_search honors a caller-supplied max_results (sentinel default None),
falling back to the configured value only when omitted, so the documented
parameter is no longer silently discarded.
- warn-once is now keyed per tool. Tests cover both fixes (web_fetch key,
agent max_results honored).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
|
||
|
Recep S
|
9072075311
|
feat: add fastCRW provider (#3585)
* feat: add fastCRW provider * test(fastcrw): fix env isolation and cover error, no-content, and env-fallback paths --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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|
zhernrong92
|
e97d93503d
|
fix: make local-dev (make dev) work on non-root / NFS hosts (#3590)
* fix(scripts): avoid lsof hang during make dev cleanup on NFS
`_is_deerflow_pid` and `_report_reclaimed_ports` call `lsof -p <pid>` to
enumerate a process's open files. On hosts whose working tree or home is
on a network filesystem (NFS/autofs), `lsof -p` blocks indefinitely on the
kernel stat calls, so `make dev` / `make stop` hang forever at
"Stopping all services...".
Add `-b` (avoid kernel blocking functions) and `-w` (suppress the
resulting warnings) to both calls. The network-only `lsof -nP -iTCP`
probes are unaffected and already returned quickly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(nginx): set global error_log so local-dev nginx starts as non-root
nginx.local.conf only declared `error_log` inside the `http {}` block.
nginx opens its compiled-in default error log (on Debian/Ubuntu builds,
the absolute /var/log/nginx/error.log) at startup, before it reaches the
http-block directive. When `make dev` launches nginx as a non-root user
that path is not writable, so startup fails with:
[emerg] open() "/var/log/nginx/error.log" failed (13: Permission denied)
Declare a global (main-context) `error_log logs/nginx-error.log warn;`.
Combined with the existing `-p $REPO_ROOT`, logging resolves to the
repo-local logs/ directory and nginx starts without elevated privileges.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
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Ryker_Feng
|
0bbbbc06f4
|
feat(community): add Serper Google Images provider for image_search (#3575)
* feat(community): add Serper Google Images provider for image_search Add a Serper-backed `image_search` tool alongside the existing Serper `web_search` provider, so users with a SERPER_API_KEY can pull Google Images results as reference images for downstream image generation. - Share request/response handling between web_search and image_search via `_serper_post` / `_response_items`, with bounded `max_results` (capped at 10) and query normalization. - Add a best-effort SSRF guard (`_safe_public_url`) that rejects non-http(s), localhost and private/non-global IP image URLs; filtered entries are dropped and never consume the result limit. - doctor: flag literal `api_key` values in config as a warning and steer users toward `.env` + `$SERPER_API_KEY`. - Docs/config: document the Serper image_search provider and SERPER_API_KEY, and discourage committing literal keys to config.yaml. - Tests: cover the provider end-to-end (100% line coverage on tools.py) and the doctor literal-key warning path. * fix(community): block obfuscated IPv4 literals in Serper image SSRF guard The image_search SSRF guard only rejected dotted-decimal IP literals; encoded forms such as decimal (http://2130706433/), hex (0x7f000001) and octal (0177.0.0.1) raised ValueError in ip_address() and were allowed through, even though many HTTP clients resolve them to private addresses like 127.0.0.1. Add _decode_ipv4() to permissively decode these inet_aton-style encodings and apply the same is_global check; hostnames that do not decode to an IP (e.g. cafe.com) are still treated as hosts and left to fetch-time re-validation. Addresses PR review feedback. Tests cover decimal/hex/octal loopback and private encodings plus non-IP edge cases; tools.py stays at 100% line coverage. * test(community): cover IPv4-mapped IPv6 URL filtering * fix(community): address Serper image search review feedback - Block trailing-dot hostname SSRF bypass (localhost./127.0.0.1.) in _safe_public_url by stripping the FQDN root label before checks. - Keep a filtered image/thumbnail URL empty instead of collapsing onto its counterpart, preserving the high-res/preview contract. - Evaluate the SSRF guard once per field rather than twice. - Treat a null-typed organic/images field as "no results" rather than a malformed payload. - doctor.py: when a config $VAR is unset, fall through to the default env var before reporting it as not set. |
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Zheng Feng
|
5851f8250e
|
fix(sandbox): make setup-sandbox.sh script executable (#3618) | ||
|
Xinmin Zeng
|
5d61718c80
|
fix(security): mount host Docker socket only in aio (DooD) sandbox mode (#3517)
* fix(security): mount host Docker socket only in aio (DooD) sandbox mode The default Compose stack mounted /var/run/docker.sock read-write into the root gateway container in every sandbox mode, including the default `local` mode that never uses it -- an unnecessary host-escape surface (DooD = root-equivalent host control). deploy.sh already gated the socket *check* on sandbox_mode != local, but the Compose files mounted it unconditionally. Move the socket mount to an opt-in docker/docker-compose.dood.yaml overlay that deploy.sh / docker.sh append only when detect_sandbox_mode() returns `aio`. Default (local) and provisioner/Kubernetes modes no longer expose the host daemon. Tighten the socket existence check from != local to == aio. Document the DooD threat model in SECURITY.md. Reported by @greatmengqi. * refactor(docker): address review on socket-hardening PR - docker.sh: use absolute path for the dood overlay (match deploy.sh, drop cwd dependency) - deploy.sh: drop now-dead DEER_FLOW_DOCKER_SOCKET exports in down/build paths - docker-compose.yaml: fix stale header comment to point at the overlay Addresses codex + reviewer feedback on #3517. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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Ryker_Feng
|
6e839342a7
|
feat(community): add Brave Search web search tool (#3528)
* feat(community): add Brave Search web search tool Add a community web_search provider backed by the official Brave Search API (https://api.search.brave.com/res/v1/web/search). API key is read from the tool config (inline api_key) or the BRAVE_SEARCH_API_KEY env var. Output schema (title/url/content) matches existing search tools. No new dependencies (uses the existing httpx). Also wires up the setup wizard, doctor health check, config example, and EN/ZH docs. * refactor(community): drop redundant [:count] slice in Brave search The Brave API already caps results via the `count` request param, so client-side slicing was redundant. Tests now simulate the API honoring `count` instead of relying on the slice. Addresses PR review nit. * style(tests): apply ruff format to test_doctor.py Collapse multiline write_text calls onto single lines to satisfy the CI ruff formatter (lint-backend was failing on format --check). |
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Airene Fang
|
cad6e89a19
|
fix(scripts):start with make start-daemon,can not stop next-server with make stop (#3498)
* fix(scripts):start with make start-daemon,can not stop next-server with make stop * fix(scripts):start with make start-daemon,can not stop next-server with make stop |
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AochenShen99
|
a838546a2b
|
chore(blocking-io): fail-loud repo-root resolution and shared detector CLI shim (#3512)
* chore(blocking-io): fail-loud repo-root resolution and shared detector CLI shim The three detectors resolved REPO_ROOT with depth-indexed Path(__file__).resolve().parents[4]. If a detector file ever moves to a different directory depth, scan roots resolve under the wrong directory and the detector reports zero findings with no error — a silent-zero failure shape for a detection tool. - Add support/detectors/repo_root.py: resolve the repo root by walking upward to the .git marker (checked with exists() so git worktrees, where .git is a file, also resolve), raising RuntimeError when no marker is found. All three detectors use it at import time, so a relocated detector fails loudly instead of scanning an empty tree. - Extract scripts/_detector_cli.py from the three character-identical CLI shims; the sys.path computation lives in one place and raises when backend/tests cannot be found. - tests/test_detector_repo_root.py pins: resolution from an unmarked location raises instead of returning an empty scan; all three detectors share the resolved root; each CLI shim delegates to its detector. Testing: backend `make test` (4278 passed); smoke-ran `make detect-blocking-io`, `make detect-thread-boundaries`, and `scripts/scan_changed_blocking_io.py --base upstream/main`. Closes #3510 (review follow-up to #3503). * chore(blocking-io): declare detector modules import-only, drop script-mode residue Adversarial review caught that blocking_io_static.py and thread_boundaries.py kept shebangs and __main__ blocks but can no longer run as plain scripts: the new `from support.detectors.repo_root import` executes before anything puts backend/tests on sys.path, so direct invocation dies with ModuleNotFoundError before argparse. Direct execution was never a documented entry point (Makefile targets, the scripts/ shims, the blocking-io-guard skill, and tests all go through the support.detectors package), so converge on import-only instead of re-adding per-module bootstrap: drop the shebangs and the now unreachable __main__ blocks (plus the `import sys` they kept alive) and state the supported entry points in each module docstring. The shim delegation tests in test_detector_repo_root.py pin the supported CLI paths. Testing: backend `make test` (4278 passed); `make detect-blocking-io` and `make detect-thread-boundaries` smoke-ran. |
||
|
DanielWalnut
|
aa015462a7
|
feat(im): Add user-owned IM channel connections (#3487)
* Add user-owned IM channel connections
* Fix dev startup and channel connect popup
* Use async channel connect flow
* Harden dev service daemon startup
* Support local IM channel connections
* Align IM connections with local channels
* Fix safe user id digest algorithm
* Address Copilot IM channel feedback
* Address IM channel review comments
* Support all integrated IM channel connections
* Format additional channel connection tests
* Keep unavailable channel connect buttons clickable
* Fix IM channel provider icons
* Add runtime setup for enabled IM channels
* Guard global shortcut key handling
* Keep configured IM channels editable
* Avoid password autofill for channel secrets
* Make channel threads visible to connection owners
* Persist IM runtime config locally
* Allow disconnecting runtime IM channels
* Route no-auth channel sessions to local user
* Use default user for auth-disabled local mode
* Show IM channel source on threads
* Prefill IM channel runtime config
* Reflect IM channel runtime health
* Ignore Feishu message read events
* Ignore Feishu non-content message events
* Let setup wizard enable IM channels
* Fix frontend formatting after merge
* Stabilize backend tests without local config
* Isolate channel runtime config tests
* Address channel connection review comments
* Use sha256 user buckets with legacy migration
* Ensure runtime IM channels are ready after restart
* Persist disconnected IM channel state
* Address channel connection review comments
* Address channel connection review findings
Frontend connect flow:
- Open the runtime-config dialog only when a provider still needs
credentials; configured providers go straight to the connect flow, so
the binding-code/deep-link path is reachable from the UI again.
- After saving credentials, continue into the connect flow when a user
binding is still required (multi-user mode) instead of stopping at a
"Connected" toast.
- Extract shared provider-state helpers to core/channels/provider-state
and add unit + e2e coverage for the direct-connect and
configure-then-connect paths.
Provider status semantics:
- Report connection_status from the user's newest connection row;
with no binding it is not_connected, except in auth-disabled local
mode where a configured running channel is effectively connected.
Concurrency and event-loop correctness:
- Offload ChannelRuntimeConfigStore construction and writes, channel
service construction, and Slack connection replies to threads; add a
tests/blocking_io/ anchor for the runtime-config handlers.
- Consume binding codes with a conditional UPDATE so a code can only be
used once under concurrent workers; retry upsert_connection as an
update when a concurrent insert wins the unique constraint.
- Serialize ensure_channel_ready per channel so concurrent provider
polls cannot double-start a channel worker.
Config and migration hardening:
- Stop mutating the get_app_config()-cached Telegram provider config;
the runtime store now owns the UI-entered bot username.
- Register channel_connections in STARTUP_ONLY_FIELDS with the
standardized startup-only Field description.
- Match the legacy unsafe-id bucket by recomputing its exact SHA-1 name
so another user's same-prefix bucket can never be migrated.
- Remove the unused Telegram process_webhook_update path and document
src/core/channels in the frontend docs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Address PR review comments on authz scoping and channel runtime
Security (review feedback from ShenAC-SAC):
- Scope internal-token callers to the connection owner carried in
X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id instead of bypassing owner checks outright,
in both require_permission(owner_check=True) and the stateless run
endpoints. Internal callers keep access to their own and
shared/legacy threads, and may claim a default-owned channel thread
for its real owner, but a leaked internal token no longer grants
cross-user thread access.
- Require admin privileges for POST/DELETE /api/channels/{provider}/
runtime-config: runtime credentials and channel workers are
instance-wide shared state (same model as the MCP config API).
Read-only provider listing stays available to all users.
Performance (review feedback from willem-bd):
- Skip the redundant thread channel-metadata PATCH after the first
successful backfill per thread.
- Reuse the per-connection Slack WebClient until its token changes
instead of constructing one per outbound message.
- Reconcile channel readiness for all providers concurrently in
GET /api/channels/providers.
Also resolve the code-quality unused-import flag in the blocking-io
anchor by pre-importing the channel service via importlib.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix prettier formatting in provider-state test
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Reconcile UI runtime channel config with config reload on restart
Main now reloads a channel's config.yaml entry on restart_channel()
(#3514, issue #3497). Adapt the user-owned connection flow to coexist:
- configure_channel() restarts with reload_config=False — the caller
just supplied the authoritative config (browser-entered credentials
that are never written to config.yaml), so a file reload must not
clobber it with the stale on-disk entry.
- _load_channel_config() re-applies the UI runtime-store overlay used
at startup, so an operator-triggered restart keeps browser-entered
credentials for channels without a config.yaml entry and does not
resurrect a channel disconnected from the UI.
- Offload the reload's disk IO (config.yaml + runtime store) with
asyncio.to_thread, matching the blocking-IO policy on this branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
||
|
AochenShen99
|
dc2ababf00
|
feat(skill): add blocking-io-guard — SOP skill for blocking-IO triage and runtime anchors (#3503)
* feat(blocking-io): add changed-lines blocking-IO scanner (L1) * feat(blocking-io): add scan-changed CLI wrapper * feat(skill): add blocking-io-guard developer SOP skill * docs(blocking-io): point contributors at the blocking-io-guard skill * style(blocking-io): apply ruff format to scanner and tests * docs(backend): document changed-lines blocking-IO scanner in CLAUDE.md * feat(skill): add post-fix re-scan check and PR batching policy * refactor(skill): fix SOP step ordering, align template with repo conventions - Move re-scan into an explicit 'apply the fix' step (was wedged after anchor generation while telling you to go back before the anchor) - Renumber steps 0-6; drop undefined 'L1' jargon - Mode A: document that the diff is <base>...HEAD (commit first) - Mode B: prefer make detect-blocking-io + findings JSON file - anchor template: module-level pytestmark per tests/blocking_io convention - CLAUDE.md: fix 'git diff --base' phrasing * fix(skill): catch findings introduced without touching the blocking line Review follow-up: changed-line intersection alone misses the case where a new async caller exposes an old sync helper — the static finding sits on the untouched blocking line, so Mode A returned empty and the SOP stopped on a false 'no blocking-IO surface'. Selection is now a union over the changed files: - findings on added lines of git diff <base>...HEAD (kept: a second identical symbol in an already-flagged function collides on the stable key and only this selection sees it); - findings new versus the merge base, matched by (path, function, symbol) — never line numbers. Base sources are materialized via git show <merge-base>:<path>; files absent at base count every head finding as new. SKILL.md now states the residual same-file-only blind spot (cross-file async callers) instead of treating an empty list as proof of zero exposure, and only requires reading sop-skeleton.md when generalizing to another detector domain. * docs(skill): examples teach test-writing, the teeth check defines the rule All examples in the references/template are filesystem-flavored; make explicit that they are instances, not the SOP's boundary — the same rules apply to every detector category (FILE_IO, HTTP, SUBPROCESS, SLEEP) and acceptance is always red/green teeth, never similarity to an example. Neutralize the template's arrange comment accordingly. * fix(blocking-io): harden changed-lines scanner per review - Dedup the union selection by the stable key (path, function, symbol) instead of dict identity, so a future selector returning copied dicts cannot silently empty the result. - parse_changed_lines now handles any unified diff: context lines advance the new-file counter, \-markers and deletions do not, and the counter resets at each +++ header. Previously correct only for --unified=0. - Add blocking_io_static.scan_source (in-memory scan); base-version comparison no longer round-trips through temp files. - Empty Mode A report now prints the same-file-only reachability caveat at the point of use instead of relying on the SOP text alone. * docs(skill): bound best-effort cleanup when the offload sits in finally Lesson from the #3505 review: the SOP routinely drives 'offload the cleanup branch' transformations, and an awaited cleanup in finally can mask or stall the primary exception. One sentence in Step 2 closes that gap at the point where the fix is written. |
||
|
tanghang97
|
18bbb82f07
|
Fix 'make dev' failure in Windows environment (#3236)
* fix: Solving the problem of "make dev" failing to start in Windows environment * fix: revert the change to the startup_config and fix the lint errors * fix: Address Copilot review feedback - Validate wait-for-port input and avoid PowerShell port interpolation - Require Python 3 in serve.sh launcher detection - Keep Windows event loop policy setup in sitecustomize only - Clarify sitecustomize process-wide backend behavior |
||
|
AochenShen99
|
93e3281cbf
|
fix(dev): create backend/sandbox before uvicorn reload-exclude (#3459) (#3460)
* fix(dev): create backend/sandbox before uvicorn reload-exclude (#3459) #3426 switched the dev gateway's --reload-exclude patterns to absolute paths. uvicorn only excludes an absolute path directly when it already exists as a directory; otherwise it globs the pattern, and Python 3.12's pathlib raises NotImplementedError("Non-relative patterns are unsupported") for an absolute glob pattern. serve.sh mkdir'd the .deer-flow excludes but not backend/sandbox, so `make dev` crashed on startup on a fresh checkout under Python 3.12 (#3454). docker/dev-entrypoint.sh had the same latent gap. Create backend/sandbox in both launchers so every absolute exclude stays on uvicorn's is_dir() short-circuit. Add a regression test that pins the uvicorn mechanism (crash on missing dir, safe once created) and enforces that every absolute --reload-exclude is mkdir'd before launch. Closes #3459 * test(dev): harden reload-exclude invariant parser against false pass/negatives The launcher invariant test parsed shell with a "mkdir -p" line filter and a substring membership check. Two latent gaps (sub-threshold for this fix, but this code guards a user-facing startup path, so close them): - A `\`-continued multi-line `mkdir` would drop arguments on continuation lines, silently weakening coverage. - Substring membership could false-pass when an exclude is a path-prefix of a different created dir (e.g. `/app/backend/sandbox` "found" inside `/app/backend/sandbox-other`). Fold line-continuations, drop comments, and shlex-tokenize each `mkdir` argument list into an exact set (quotes stripped, `$VAR` literal); assert exact set membership. Same shlex handling for `--reload-exclude` values. Verified the parser still flags the pre-fix missing `backend/sandbox` (RED preserved) and no longer false-passes on a path-prefix. * fix(dev): gitignore backend/sandbox runtime dir + pin mkdir-before-launch Address two review findings on the #3459 fix: - backend/sandbox was described as "gitignored runtime state" but no ignore rule actually matched it. Add an anchored `/sandbox/` to backend/.gitignore (anchored so it does NOT shadow the source package backend/packages/harness/deerflow/sandbox/) so sandbox artifacts created at runtime can't pollute the working tree or be committed by accident. New test asserts content under backend/sandbox is ignored, making the claim verifiable. - The launcher invariant test only proved the sandbox mkdir exists somewhere, not that it runs before uvicorn starts. Add an order test (sandbox mkdir line must precede the `uv run uvicorn` launch) so a future edit can't move the mkdir below the launch and silently reintroduce the crash. * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> * test(dev): fix reload-exclude parser to handle serve.sh's quoted flag bundle The previous autofix tokenized each whole line with shlex, but serve.sh packs every flag into a single double-quoted `GATEWAY_EXTRA_FLAGS="..."` assignment. shlex collapses that into one token, so no `--reload-exclude` flag is found and `test_launcher_precreates_every_absolute_reload_exclude[scripts/serve.sh]` failed CI with "expected at least one absolute reload-exclude". Parse `--reload-exclude` with a regex that matches a balanced single/double quoted group or a bare token, so the assignment's surrounding `"` is never swallowed into the value. This recovers all three serve.sh excludes (the prior regex also silently dropped the last `$BACKEND_RUNTIME_HOME` because the adjacent closing quote broke shlex) while still covering dev-entrypoint.sh and the space-separated `--reload-exclude <value>` form. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
AochenShen99
|
0fb18e368c
|
refactor(lead-agent): make build_middlewares public to drop the last cross-module private import (#3458)
`client.py` imported the private `_build_middlewares` from `agent.py` across a module boundary and called it as public API. Because the `_` name signals "module-private, no external callers", any future rename or signature change silently breaks the embedded `DeerFlowClient` path — and the test suite even monkeypatched `deerflow.client._build_middlewares`, baking the leak in. `DeerFlowClient` is a lead-agent variant that genuinely needs the lead agent's full middleware composition, so make the dependency honest: promote the helper to a documented public entry point `build_middlewares` and update every in-repo caller. Found during #3341 review; #3341 already removed one such leak (`_assemble_deferred` -> public `assemble_deferred_tools`) and left this one out of scope on purpose. - agent.py: rename def + both internal call sites; expand the docstring into a public-entry-point contract and document the previously-undocumented model_name / app_config / deferred_setup params - client.py: import + call site now use the public name (removes the last cross-module private import) - scripts/tool-error-degradation-detection.sh: update its import + call site - tests (5 files): update monkeypatch/patch targets and direct calls - docs (backend/CLAUDE.md, plan_mode_usage.md, middlewares.mdx): sync the live references that describe the symbol as current API Pure mechanical rename, no behavior change. Historical design docs (rfc, superpowers spec) intentionally keep the old name as point-in-time records. Closes #3431 |
||
|
Ryker_Feng
|
f92a26d56f
|
fix(web_fetch): support proxy for Jina reader in restricted networks (#3418) (#3430)
* fix(web_fetch): support proxy for Jina reader in restricted networks The web_fetch tool built a bare httpx.AsyncClient() with no proxy awareness, so users behind a corporate proxy / in Docker / WSL could not reach https://r.jina.ai and web_fetch timed out. - Add optional `proxy` / `trust_env` params to JinaClient.crawl and wire them from the `web_fetch` tool config (with type coercion for YAML string values). - Pass internal service hostnames through NO_PROXY in both compose files so proxy env inherited via env_file does not break in-cluster calls (gateway/provisioner/etc). - Load proxy vars from .env into the shell in scripts/docker.sh so the NO_PROXY interpolation can merge user-provided values on `make` path. - Document proxy/trust_env options in config.example.yaml. Closes #3418 * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
||
|
zgenu
|
67ad6e232f
|
fix(dev): exclude runtime state from gateway reload (#3426) | ||
|
DanielWalnut
|
cd5bedaa74
|
feat: MiniMax provider for image/video/podcast skills + new music-generation skill (#3437)
* docs(spec): MiniMax integration for generation skills + new music skill
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(plan): MiniMax generation providers implementation plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(skills): add importlib loader + FakeResp for skill tests
* test(skills): register loaded module in sys.modules; raise requests.HTTPError in FakeResp
* feat(image-generation): add MiniMax provider with env auto-detect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(image-generation): guard unknown provider, derive ref MIME, strengthen tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(video-generation): add MiniMax provider with async poll/download
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(video-generation): surface base_resp errors while polling; add timeout test
* feat(podcast-generation): add MiniMax t2a_v2 provider with env auto-detect
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(podcast-generation): restore TTS credential guard; add volcengine + voice tests
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(music-generation): new MiniMax music skill via skill-creator
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(music-generation): treat empty lyrics as absent; test no-audio-data path
* refactor(skills): add request timeouts to MiniMax network calls
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding 'Explicit returns mixed with implicit (fall through) returns'
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(models): strip inconsistent user-message names for MiniMax chat
DeerFlow middlewares tag user messages with provenance names (user-input, summary, loop_warning); langchain serializes them into the OpenAI-compatible payload and MiniMax rejects mismatched user-message names with "user name must be consistent (2013)". PatchedChatMiniMax now drops the per-message name from user-role messages. Point the config.example MiniMax models at PatchedChatMiniMax so they also get reasoning_content mapping.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(image-generation): MiniMax sends JSON prompt field, guard 1500-char limit
MiniMax image-01 takes one text string capped at 1500 chars, but the skill was sending the whole structured JSON. The MiniMax provider now extracts the JSON `prompt` field (relying on prompt_optimizer to expand it) and fails fast with a clear error before calling the API when that field exceeds 1500 chars. Authoring stays provider-agnostic; Gemini still receives the full JSON.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(podcast-generation): per-provider TTS concurrency and retry/backoff
Each TTS provider owns its concurrency internally — MiniMax runs single-threaded to reduce rate-limit failures, Volcengine keeps 4 workers — with automatic retry and backoff on transient HTTP and base_resp errors. No caller-facing concurrency knob.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(skills): address Copilot review comments on generation skills
- video: add raise_for_status + timeout to the Gemini download/POST/poll calls so non-2xx responses surface as clear HTTP errors instead of JSON/KeyError or hangs
- video: check the task Fail status before the generic base_resp check so the failure keeps its task_id context
- video/image: create the output file parent directory before writing (matching music-generation) so nested output paths do not raise FileNotFoundError
- music: require a non-empty prompt and fail fast with ValueError instead of sending an empty prompt to the API
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(scripts): reclaim dev ports across worktrees in make stop/dev
All deer-flow worktrees (main checkout + linked worktrees) hardcode the same dev ports (8001/3000/2026), so a service started from any worktree must be reclaimable from another. stop_all now resolves the set of worktree roots (DEERFLOW_ROOTS) and treats a process as deer-flow-owned when its open files live under any of them. It also force-kills survivors on 2026 alongside 8001/3000, fixing `make dev` aborting on the nginx port preflight when a prior nginx lingered on 2026.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(view-image): hide the injected image-context message from the UI
ViewImageMiddleware injects a HumanMessage (text + base64 images) so the vision model can see viewed images, but it was the only internal injector that set neither hide_from_ui nor a hidden name, so it leaked into the chat UI (and IM channels) as a user bubble reading "Here are the images you've viewed:". Mark it with additional_kwargs={"hide_from_ui": True}, matching todo/dynamic_context injections, which the frontend isHiddenFromUIMessage and the channel sender already honor. The model still receives the full content.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(minimax): mark M2.7 models as text-only (no vision)
MiniMax M2.7 / M2.7-highspeed do not support vision; only M3 does. The
provider config asserted vision support for M2.7 in four places.
- config.example.yaml: 4 M2.7 entries -> supports_vision: false
- backend/docs/CONFIGURATION.md: M2.7 + highspeed -> supports_vision: false
- wizard: add LLMProvider.model_vision_overrides + extra_config_for() so
selecting an M2.7 model writes supports_vision: false while M3 (default)
keeps vision; wire it through setup_wizard.py
- tests: M2.7-highspeed fixture -> supports_vision=False; add
test_minimax_vision_is_per_model
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <223894421+github-code-quality[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
|
||
|
Nan Gao
|
3b4c9ff733
|
fix(setup): refresh LLM provider wizard defaults (#3421) | ||
|
Admire
|
0d0968a364
|
chore: add sandbox memory profiling tools (#3249)
* chore: add sandbox memory profiling tools * chore: keep sandbox memory PR profiling-only * Format sandbox memory profiling script |
||
|
Xinmin Zeng
|
aca7acc105
|
feat(ci): PR/issue auto-labeling + declarative label sync (#3360)
- .github/labels.yml: declarative source of truth (29 namespaced labels) - scripts/sync_labels.py + label-sync.yml: idempotent label sync (self-bootstraps on merge) - labeler.yml + pr-labeler.yml: area:* labels by changed path (actions/labeler) - pr-triage.yml: size/*, risk:*, needs-validation, first-time-contributor, reviewing - issue-triage.yml: needs-triage on new issues (self-healing) All PR workflows use pull_request_target but never check out or run PR code (read changed-file metadata via the API only). |
||
|
FallingSnowFlake
|
d6a604d5a1
|
fix(makefile): extract setup-sandbox inline bash to script for Windows compatibility (#3326) | ||
|
AochenShen99
|
da41701f87
|
Add static blocking IO inventory (#3208)
* feat(detectors): add static blocking IO inventory * refactor(detectors): drop superseded runtime probe; clarify static report path - Remove the #2924 custom runtime blocking IO probe entirely: backend/tests/support/detectors/blocking_io.py, backend/tests/test_blocking_io_detector.py, backend/tests/test_blocking_io_probe_integration.py, and the pytest_addoption / pytest_runtest_call / pytest_runtest_teardown / pytest_sessionfinish / pytest_terminal_summary hooks plus the blocking_io_detector fixture from backend/tests/conftest.py. Its narrow DEFAULT_BLOCKING_CALL_SPECS (time.sleep, requests, httpx, os.walk, Path.resolve, Path.read_text, Path.write_text) cannot serve as a CI gate; a Blockbuster-backed runtime detector will land in a separate follow-up PR. Leaving the half-coverage probe alongside the static inventory in this PR added a redundant detect path with no production value. - Address Copilot review comments on backend/README.md and backend/CLAUDE.md by stating explicitly that the JSON report writes to .deer-flow/blocking-io-findings.json at the repository root, whether the target is invoked from the repo root or from backend/. Verified: pytest tests/test_detect_blocking_io_static.py (18 passed), ruff check + format on touched files (passed), make detect-blocking-io from both repo root and backend/ produce the same 105-finding report at <repo-root>/.deer-flow/blocking-io-findings.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
||
|
Stellar鱼
|
b00749a8a6
|
fix(auth): share internal gateway token across workers (#3184)
* fix(auth): share internal gateway token across workers * fix: restore deploy script executable bit * Update deploy.sh to skip the auth_token setup for the down command --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
||
|
DanielWalnut
|
9abe5a18e6
|
fix: clean up local nginx on stop (#3005)
* fix: clean up local nginx on stop * fix: scope local service cleanup to repo * fix: address serve port review comments |
||
|
john lee
|
8cd4710b16
|
fix(deploy): fall back to python/openssl when python3 is absent for secret generation (#3074)
* fix(deploy): fall back to python/openssl when python3 is absent for secret generation Bare python3 call in deploy.sh exits 49 on systems without python3 in PATH (e.g. some Alpine/minimal containers, or Windows environments where only 'python' is on PATH). Add a fallback chain: python3 → python → openssl rand -hex 32. If all three are unavailable, emit a clear error message and exit with a non-zero status instead of a cryptic recipe failure. Closes #2922 Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * Potential fix for pull request finding Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |
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|
AochenShen99
|
0c22349029
|
chore(dev): add async/thread boundary detector (#2936)
* chore(dev): add thread boundary detector * chore(dev): reduce thread boundary detector false positives |
||
|
Yi Tang
|
48e038f752
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feat(channels): enhance Discord with mention-only mode, thread routing, and typing indicators (#2842)
* feat(channels): enhance Discord with mention-only mode, thread routing, and typing indicators
Add mention_only config to only respond when bot is mentioned, with
allowed_channels override. Add thread_mode for Hermes-style auto-thread
creation. Add periodic typing indicators while bot is processing.
* fix(discord): include allowed_channels in mention_only skip condition (line 274)
* docs: fix Discord config example to match boolean thread_mode implementation
* style: format with ruff
* fix(discord): apply Copilot review fixes and resolve lint errors
- Remove unused Optional import
- Fix thread_ts type hints to str | None
- Fix has_mention logic for None values
- Implement thread_mode fallback to channel replies on thread creation failure
- Fix thread_mode docstring alignment
- Fix allowed_channels comment formatting in config.example.yaml
* fix(discord): reset context for orphaned threads in mention_only mode
When a message arrives in a thread not tracked by _active_threads,
clear thread_id and typing_target so the message falls through to
the standard channel handling pipeline, which creates a fresh thread
instead of incorrectly routing to the stale thread.
* fix(discord): create new thread on @ when channel has existing tracked thread
When mention_only is enabled and a user @-s the bot in a channel
that already has a tracked thread, create a new thread instead of
incorrectly routing to the old one.
* fix(discord): allow no-@ thread replies while skipping no-@ channel messages
The skip block for no-@ messages was too aggressive — it blocked
continuation replies within tracked threads AND incorrectly routed
no-@ channel messages to the existing thread.
Now:
- Thread message, no @ → routed to existing tracked thread
- Channel message, no @ → skipped
- Channel message, with @ → creates new thread
* feat(discord): add checkmark reaction to acknowledge received messages
* Move discord.py to optional dependency and auto-detect from config.yaml
- Add discord extra to [project.optional-dependencies] in pyproject.toml
- Update detect_uv_extras.py to map channels.discord.enabled: true -> --extra discord
- Set UV_EXTRAS=discord in docker-compose-dev.yaml gateway env
* fix(discord): persist thread-channel mappings to store for recovery after restart
Discord's _active_threads dict was purely in-memory, so all channel-to-thread
mappings were lost on server restart. This fix bridges ChannelStore into
DiscordChannel:
- Save thread mappings to store.json after every thread creation
- Restore active threads from store on DiscordChannel startup
- Pass channel_store to all channels via service.py config injection
Store keys follow the pattern: discord:<channel_id>:<thread_id>
* fix(discord): address Copilot review — fix types, typing targets, cross-thread safety, and config comments
* fix(tests): add multitask_strategy param to mock for clarification follow-up test
* fix(tests): explicitly set model_name=None for title middleware test isolation
* fix(discord): use trigger_typing() instead of typing() for typing indicators
discord.py 2.x TextChannel.typing() and Thread.typing() are async context
managers, not one-shot coroutines. Use trigger_typing() for periodic
typing indicator pings.
* fix(discord): cancel typing tasks on channel shutdown
Prevents 'Task was destroyed but it is pending' warnings when the
Discord client stops while typing indicator loops are still running.
* fix(scripts): detect nested YAML config for discord extra
section_value() only matched top-level YAML sections. Added
nested_section_value() that handles two-level nesting (e.g.,
channels.discord.enabled), so auto-detection of the discord
extra works when config uses the standard nested format.
* fix(docker): remove hard-coded UV_EXTRAS=discord from dev compose
Relies on auto-detection via detect_uv_extras.py instead of forcing
discord.py install even when channels.discord.enabled is false.
Matches production docker-compose.yaml behavior (UV_EXTRAS:-).
* refactor(nginx): move proxy_buffering/proxy_cache to server level
DRY cleanup — these directives were repeated in 14 location blocks.
Set at server level once, reducing duplication and risk of drift.
* fix(discord): use dedicated JSON file for thread persistence
Replace ChannelStore usage for Discord thread-ID persistence with a
dedicated discord_threads.json file. ChannelStore is designed to map
IM conversations to DeerFlow thread IDs — using it to persist Discord
thread IDs was semantically wrong and confusing.
Changes:
- _save_thread() now reads/writes a simple {channel_id: thread_id} JSON dict
- _load_active_threads() reads directly from the JSON file
- File path derived from ChannelStore directory (when available) or
defaults to ~/.deer-flow/channels/discord_threads.json
- Removed unused ChannelStore import
* fix(discord): address WillemJiang's code review comments on PR #2842
1. Remove semantically incorrect message_in_thread variable. At this code
point (after the Thread case is handled above), we're guaranteed to be in
a channel, not a thread. Always apply mention_only check here.
2. Add _active_thread_ids reverse-lookup set for O(1) thread ID membership
checks instead of O(n) scan of _active_threads.values(). Keep the set
in sync with _active_threads in _load_active_threads() and _save_thread().
3. Add _thread_store_lock (threading.Lock) to protect _active_threads and
the JSON file from concurrent access between the Discord loop thread
(_run_client) and the main thread (_load_active_threads, _save_thread).
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|
Xinmin Zeng
|
94da8f67d7
|
fix(scripts): preserve uv extras across make dev restarts (#2754) (#2767)
`make dev` ran `uv sync` unconditionally on every restart, wiping any
optional extras the user had installed manually with
`uv sync --all-packages --extra postgres`. The Docker image-build path
already solved this via the `UV_EXTRAS` build-arg in backend/Dockerfile;
the local serve.sh path and the docker-compose-dev startup command
were the remaining outliers.
`scripts/serve.sh` now resolves extras before `uv sync`:
1. honors `UV_EXTRAS` (parity with backend/Dockerfile and
docker/docker-compose.yaml — no new convention introduced);
2. falls back to parsing config.yaml — `database.backend: postgres`
or legacy `checkpointer.type: postgres` auto-pins
`--extra postgres`, so the common case needs zero extra config.
3. detector stderr is no longer suppressed, so whitelist warnings or
crashes surface to the dev terminal (review feedback).
Detection lives in `scripts/detect_uv_extras.py` (stdlib-only — has to
run before the venv exists). Extra names are validated against
`^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$` so a stray shell metacharacter in `.env`
cannot reach `uv sync` downstream (defense in depth).
`docker/docker-compose-dev.yaml`'s startup command is now extracted to
`docker/dev-entrypoint.sh` (review feedback — the inline command had
grown to a ~350-char one-liner). The script:
- parses comma/whitespace-separated UV_EXTRAS, applying the same
`^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_-]*$` whitelist as the local detector;
- emits one `--extra X` flag per token, so `UV_EXTRAS=postgres,ollama`
works in Docker dev too (harmonized with local — review feedback);
- calls `uv sync --all-packages` (PR #2584) so workspace member
extras (deerflow-harness's postgres extra) are installed;
- keeps the existing self-heal `(uv sync || (recreate venv && retry))`
branch;
- exposes `--print-extras` for dry-run testing.
The compose file mounts the script read-only at runtime, so script
edits take effect on `make docker-restart` without an image rebuild.
The `--no-sync` alternative (a separate suggestion in the issue thread)
was considered but rejected for dev paths because it would drop the
self-heal branch and the auto-pickup of new pyproject deps. `--no-sync`
is already in use for the production CMD (`backend/Dockerfile:101`)
where it's appropriate.
Updates the asyncpg-missing error message to include the
`--all-packages` flag (matching #2584) plus the persistent install flow,
and expands `config.example.yaml` so all three install paths
(local / docker dev / docker image build) are documented with their
multi-extra capabilities.
Tests:
- `tests/test_detect_uv_extras.py` (21 tests) — local-path env parsing,
YAML edge cases, env-vs-config precedence, whitelist rejection of
shell metacharacters.
- `tests/test_dev_entrypoint.py` (15 tests) — docker-path validation
via `--print-extras`, multi-extra parsing, metacharacter abort.
- `tests/test_persistence_scaffold.py` (22 tests, unchanged) — passes
with the merged `--all-packages --extra postgres` error message.
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
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|
JeffJiang
|
7bf618de67 |
Refactor DeerFlow to use Gateway's LangGraph-compatible API
- Updated documentation and comments to reflect the transition from LangGraph Server to Gateway. - Changed default URLs in ChannelManager and tests to point to Gateway. - Removed references to LangGraph Server in deployment scripts and configurations. - Updated Nginx configuration to route API traffic to Gateway. - Adjusted frontend configurations to utilize Gateway's API. - Removed LangGraph service from Docker Compose files, consolidating services under Gateway. - Added regression tests to ensure Gateway integration works as expected. Co-authored-by: Copilot <copilot@github.com> |