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9 Commits
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e66f455d51
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fix(skills): don't treat a lazily evaluated PEP 695 type alias as a network sink (#4315)
* fix(skills): don't treat a lazily evaluated PEP 695 type alias as a network sink * test(skills): cover type alias parameter bounds |
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6544d96cc4
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fix(skills): close AST literal-only shell=True bypass in SkillScan (#4057)
* fix(skills): close AST literal-only shell=True bypass in SkillScan SkillScan's Python analyzer only classified a subprocess call as the CRITICAL, hard-blocked python-shell-exec rule when its shell= keyword was the literal AST constant True. Any non-literal value with the same runtime effect - a variable (shell=shell_flag) or an expression (shell=bool(1)) - fell through to the HIGH, non-blocking python-subprocess classification instead, silently bypassing enforce_static_scan's deterministic CRITICAL gate despite behaving identically to shell=True at runtime. _call_has_shell_true is renamed to _call_shell_may_be_true and now fails closed on ambiguity: any shell= value that is not a literal, statically-provable False is treated as CRITICAL, matching the literal shell=True case. A call with no shell= keyword at all is unaffected (subprocess already defaults to shell=False). Adds regression tests for the variable and expression bypass shapes, plus a boundary test locking in that literal shell=False remains a non-blocking warning. * fix(skills): fail closed on **-unpacked shell= in SkillScan _call_shell_may_be_true only checked keyword.arg == "shell", so a subprocess.* call that supplies shell via **-unpacking (a keyword node with arg is None) fell through to the non-blocking python-subprocess classification instead of the CRITICAL python-shell-exec path. Treat any **-unpacked keyword as shell-ambiguous and fail closed, same as the existing shell=variable/shell=expression handling. This intentionally over-blocks a **-unpack that carries no shell key, since a mapping's contents are not knowable by static analysis; that tradeoff is documented inline and covered by a dedicated test. |
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a8bf54cbbb
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feat(skillscan): detect exfil through instance/dataflow network clients (#4265)
* feat(skillscan): detect exfil through instance/dataflow network clients * fix(skillscan): resolve client handles with Python lexical scopes _walk_client_nested_scope copied every live handle into a nested scope after excluding only parameters. That is not Python's name resolution: a class namespace is not a closure scope for its methods, a function-local binding shadows an enclosing name across the whole body, and comprehensions bind their targets in a scope of their own. Benign skills were therefore blocked as python-env-dump-exfil (CRITICAL) even where the outbound-looking call provably cannot run on the tracked client. Derive each scope's bindings lexically instead: - a class body reads its enclosing scope, but the names it binds are not passed into the methods defined in it; - comprehensions are their own scope, so only the outermost iterable is evaluated outside and every for-target shadows first; - a function-local prepass excludes names the body binds anywhere, with global/nonlocal opting back out. Detection is unchanged where the client really is reachable: a comprehension calling an unshadowed handle, a method closing over an enclosing function's handle, and a global-declared module handle all still block. * fix(skillscan): apply target rebinding in Python evaluation order The generic ast.iter_child_nodes() fallback yields fields in declaration order, which for `for`/`async for`, `:=` and `+=` puts the binding target ahead of the expression Python evaluates to produce it. Visiting the target first dropped the handle before the call that actually runs on it, so `for s in s.post(host, ...)` reported nothing even though Python calls post() on the client before binding the loop target. Match captures bind through a plain `name` string rather than a Name node, so the Store branch never saw them and a rebound name kept a stale handle. Assignment expressions inside a comprehension were applied only to the comprehension-local map, leaving the containing scope stale as well. Give every bind-after-evaluate construct its own branch: - `for`/`async for` walk the iterable against the pre-loop binding, then rebind the target, then walk the body; - `:=` walks its value first and binds into the containing scope too, since PEP 572 puts a comprehension's walrus target there; - `+=` walks its value before dropping the target; - match captures drop the handle, matching how a rebind under `if`/`try` that may equally not execute is already treated. The bypasses this closes are the reason detection widens here; the comprehension walrus and match cases narrow it back where the client provably cannot be the receiver. * fix(skillscan): preserve scoped client handle semantics * fix(skillscan): scan sinks inside assignment target expressions The Assign/AnnAssign, AugAssign, For/AsyncFor, with, and comprehension branches evaluated only the value and rebound the target, so a client call placed in an attribute receiver or a subscript value/index -- both evaluated at bind time -- was never scanned. os.environ could exfil through a tracked client while python-env-dump-exfil reported nothing. Add _walk_client_target_exprs to walk the executable parts of a binding target (attribute receiver, subscript value+slice, recursing through tuple/list/starred) in Python evaluation order, without treating Store name leaves as reads. The AnnAssign annotation expression is walked too. Name-leaf invalidation is unchanged. * fix(skillscan): apply assignment targets and annotations in runtime order The round of assignment-target scanning walked every target then rebound the names in one batch, and always walked an AnnAssign annotation before the target. Python instead binds chained and destructured targets left to right (so `session = out[session.post(...)] = cfg` runs the subscript on the already-rebound name), evaluates a variable annotation only in module or class scope (never in a function, never under `from __future__ import annotations`), and evaluates an executed annotation after the target. The scanner therefore hard-blocked benign skills. Bind each target left to right via _bind_client_targets (walk its executable sub-expressions against the current bindings, then rebind before the next target), and walk an annotation only for the nodes _evaluated_annotation_nodes marks as actually evaluated, after the target. Target-expression scanning and name-leaf invalidation are otherwise unchanged. * fix(skillscan): scan client sinks in evaluated function-signature annotations A function's parameter and return annotations are evaluated at def time in the enclosing scope, like its decorators and defaults, so a tracked client sink placed in one is a real egress. _client_scope_prelude walked the decorators and defaults but not the annotations, so os.environ could exfil through `def f() -> session.post(host, json=dict(os.environ))` while python-env-dump-exfil reported nothing. Record function/async-function defs in _evaluated_annotation_nodes (their signatures evaluate at def time unless from __future__ import annotations postpones them) and, for those nodes, add the parameter and return annotation expressions to the enclosing-scope prelude walk. * fix(skillscan): match runtime evaluation order for annotations and except handlers * fix(skillscan): scope try/match branches to their own selection state * fix(skillscan): propagate branch bindings to everything that observes them A branch's net effect has to be visible exactly where Python makes it visible. The walker isolated `except`/`else`/`match` bodies into scope copies and then discarded them, so a client created on the branch was invisible to `finally`, to the code after the statement, and to anything defined inside the branch, while a name the branch replaced stayed a sink receiver. - `except*` clauses are sequential, not alternatives: thread one scope through body, clause types and clause bodies in source order instead of reusing the mutually exclusive copies ordinary `except` needs. - Fold each `except`/`else`/`match` branch's net effect back into the scope that `finally` and the following code read, and make the branch scope what nested definitions close over. - Keep a fallthrough scope across `match` guards, so a guard that returned false still hands its side effects to the next case, while pattern captures stay isolated to their own case. - Keep an `as` target path-local: Python unbinds it only on the path that ran, so dropping it for every path erased a live handle where no such handler executed. Adds a 14-case runtime-oracle regression covering both directions at every branch site; each of the ten guards was deleted on its own to confirm the test that pins it goes red. * fix(skillscan): join alternative branches instead of overwriting one with another Only one of a statement's alternative branches runs, but the walker folded each one into a single destructive binding map. Whichever branch was visited last therefore decided the state: a handler that rebinds the name erased a sibling that leaves the client in place (missing a client Python really calls), and a handler that builds one was credited on paths where it never ran (inventing a CRITICAL sink). Alias targets had the mirror problem, since only key presence was compared, so replacing `import x as name` on a live branch was ignored. - Join alternatives into a may-state: a name stays a sink receiver when any feasible branch leaves it a client, and stops being one only when every feasible branch replaced it. Alias targets join toward the target that can still name a constructor. - Treat each `except*` clause as optional rather than threading every clause body unconditionally, so a clause whose type never matched cannot erase a handle the next clause calls. - Keep the fall-through state (no exception raised, no case matched) as one more alternative, and drop it only where the source decides the outcome: a literal always-raising body selecting one handler, a literal exception group choosing `except*` clauses, a wildcard or literal-equal `match` case. Also corrects an existing match-capture test that asserted the non-exhaustive case is benign: the runtime oracle shows the original client still takes the call on the path where nothing matched. Adds runtime-oracle regressions for both directions at every alternative site; each of the nine guards was deleted on its own to confirm the test pinning it goes red. * fix(skillscan): model feasible conditional client flow * fix(skillscan): preserve feasible control-flow outcomes * fix(skillscan): model expression evaluation paths * fix(skillscan): narrow instance-client detection to lexical statement order The construction-to-use signal had grown into a path-aware interpreter: exception selection, except* subgroup consumption, match capture timing, finally override, comprehension laziness, annotation evaluation order, and may-state joins over feasible branches. That is the heavyweight analysis RFC #2634 rules out of Phase 5, and because the signal feeds a CRITICAL rule it hard-blocks skill installation, so every ambiguity it resolved by over-reporting cost a benign skill instead of a human review. Replace it with ordinary statement order over a one-level handle map: a known constructor bound to a simple name (including `with ... as`), a direct outbound method call on that name in the same lexical scope, rebinding invalidation, and name-to-name alias propagation so `s = session` does not shed the handle. A sink is recorded at the call, so a rebind after the call cannot retract it. Compound statements are not interpreted. Every name an if/try/except*/loop/ match may bind is dropped before its bodies are walked, and each body is walked from an isolated copy. Dropping before rather than after is what keeps a `finally` that runs after a handler rebound the name, a later except* clause, and a second loop iteration from reporting a client the runtime never calls. Bodies are still walked, or wrapping any construction in `if True:` would be a universal bypass. Lexical scoping is unchanged: class namespaces are not closures for their methods, comprehension targets and function-local bindings shadow, and alias visibility stays per scope. The cases this gives up are false negatives by construction and are recorded in #4296, pinned by a test that asserts the runtime really calls the client while the scanner stays silent. Verified: 102 SkillScan tests; full suite 8 failed / 7851 passed, the same network-dependent web-fetch tests that fail on clean main; per-clause red check 12/12 guards red; 925 repo-owned files scanned branch vs main with 0 new and 0 lost CRITICAL findings; #4158 bypass BLOCKED and #4153 false positive allowed with 0 findings through the real enforce_static_scan gate. * test(skillscan): pin closure boundary * refactor(skillscan): narrow client handle analysis * fix(skillscan): close client handle correctness gaps * fix(skillscan): require proven client imports |
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0cd55067f3
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fix(skills): reject colon in zip member names to close NTFS ADS smuggling gap (#4236)
Neither is_unsafe_zip_member (installer.py) nor its duplicated check in skillscan/orchestrator.py rejected a colon in a zip member name. On Windows/NTFS, a name like scripts/run.sh:hidden.txt addresses an Alternate Data Stream on run.sh instead of creating a new file, so the hidden content is invisible to Path.rglob()/os.walk()-based scanning in both the deterministic static scanner and the extracted-file content scanner, while still landing genuinely on disk. Reject any colon in a zip member's relative path outright in both files; a colon has no legitimate use there since zip entries use forward slashes and a real Windows drive prefix is already caught by the existing absolute-path check. |
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65afc9b1d2
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fix(skills): apply allowed-tools only to active skills (#4098)
* fix(skills): scope allowed-tools to active skills * fix(skills): tolerate stale active skill paths * chore: retrigger CI * fix(skills): document policy activation limits * perf(skills): reuse per-step tool policy decisions * fix(skills): harden runtime tool policy contracts * fix(skills): redact cached policy decisions * fix(skills): make slash tool policy authoritative * fix(skills): preserve policy-safe discovery tools * test(skills): cover explicit task delegation policy |
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81b3ed0188
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fix(skillscan): recognize remaining outbound network sinks (#4153)
_call_is_network_sink missed the HEAD/OPTIONS verbs on requests/httpx, socket.create_connection, and urllib.request.urlretrieve. A bulk env dump or reverse shell shipped through any of these slipped past the CRITICAL exfil/reverse-shell rules whenever the URL was assembled at runtime (the non-literal case the string-literal URL check can't cover). Also treat socket.create_connection as the socket primitive in the reverse-shell shape. http.client.HTTP(S)Connection is intentionally left out: only the lazy constructor is statically visible (the request()/connect() that performs the I/O is an instance method the call-name analyzer can't resolve), so flagging the constructor would hard-block benign code that only builds a connection object. Cover the alias-resolved forms too: the sink check runs on the name after from-import / import-as resolution, a path the suite exercised only on the env-read side (#4087) and not on the sink side. |
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cbbd72a1ab
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fix(skillscan): recognize remaining requests/httpx HTTP methods as network sinks (#4130)
python-env-dump-exfil flags a file that both reads the bulk process environment and reaches a network sink. The call-based sink check only listed requests get/post/put/request and httpx get/post, so a bulk env dump sent through an equally body-carrying method (requests.patch/delete, httpx.put/patch/delete, or the generic httpx.request/stream) evaded the CRITICAL finding whenever the destination URL was not a plain string literal (e.g. built at runtime) -- the exact evasion the string-literal URL sink is meant to resist. requests.post was caught but requests.patch was not, an arbitrary gap on clients the analyzer already covers. Complete the requests and httpx HTTP-verb surface in _call_is_network_sink so an obfuscated-URL exfil through those methods is flagged like post/put. Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com> |
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897be7e064
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fix(skillscan): detect os.environ access via from-import pattern (#4087)
* fix(skillscan): detect os.environ access via from-import pattern * fix(skillscan): detect os.environ access via from-import pattern |
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658c39ccf7
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feat(skills): Add native SkillScan phase 1 for skills (#3033)
* Add phase 1 skill static scanning * Rework SkillScan phase 1 as native scanner * refactor(skillscan): align phase 1 with trimmed RFC contract - SecurityFinding: 7 fields (rule_id, severity, file, line, message, remediation, evidence); category/analyzer derive from the rule_id prefix, confidence/column/fingerprint/metadata removed - scan_archive_preflight()/scan_skill_dir() are pure functions: no ScanContext, no policy schema; CRITICAL-blocks is a code constant and skill_scan.enabled is applied by enforce_static_scan()/callers - secret-* evidence is redacted before findings leave the scanner - de-dup keys on (rule_id, file, line) so repeated occurrences keep distinct locations for agent self-correction - cloud-metadata detection consolidated into network-cloud-metadata - nested zip members get a one-level stdlib magic-byte peek; an executable member escalates package-nested-archive to CRITICAL - install metadata sidecar removed (Phase 7 decides if it is needed) - rule specs moved next to their analyzers; skillscan/rules/ removed - tests updated + new anchors: redaction, dedup lines, nested-zip escalation, single cloud-metadata rule, bundled-skill zero-CRITICAL * fix(skillscan): tighten reverse-shell/secret/archive scan rules from review Address PR #3033 review feedback on the native SkillScan analyzers: - Reverse-shell false positives: split shell detection by signal strength (/dev/tcp/, nc -e stay CRITICAL; bash -i, mkfifo -> new HIGH shell-reverse-shell-heuristic, warn->LLM). The Python check is now AST-anchored on real socket.socket/os.dup2/subprocess call sites instead of raw-text substring matching, so prose/docstrings no longer hard-block. - Secret evidence: _redact_secret_evidence returns [redacted] with no secret bytes (was value[:6], which leaked 2 real token bytes past the prefix). - Archive DoS: cap outer archive member count (_MAX_ARCHIVE_MEMBERS=4096); scan_archive_preflight early-aborts with a package-too-many-members CRITICAL finding (routes through the existing blocked->400 fail-closed path). - shell-destructive-command: broaden the rm -rf matcher to sensitive system roots (/home, /usr, /*, --no-preserve-root /) while leaving safe subpaths unflagged. - Dead code: collapse _decode_text_for_analysis to a single decode path and drop the unused _TEXT_SUFFIXES set and _has_text_shebang helper. - local_skill_storage: document why the host_path branch keeps app_config possibly-None (lazy kill-switch resolution; avoids eager get_app_config in config-free environments such as CI). Tests: new negative/positive coverage in test_skillscan_native.py. Full backend suite 6616 passed, 26 skipped. |