4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
ChenglongZ
ca16b64b26
feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares (#3964)
* feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares

* fix(agent): preserve configured extension middlewares

* fix(agent): address middleware extension review

* fix(agent): tighten middleware extension docs and tests
2026-07-21 09:39:44 +08:00
Huixin615
c9b6131f8f
fix(skills): reload mounted skills without restarting Gateway (#4264)
* fix(skills): add admin-only reload endpoint

* fix(skills): preserve cache when reload fails
2026-07-17 23:22:16 +08:00
Zhipeng Zheng
53a80d3ad1
feat(skills): per-user custom skill isolation with sandbox mounting (#3889)
* feat(skills): per-user skill isolation (#2905)

Implement user-scoped skill storage that isolates custom skills between
users while sharing public skills globally.

Key changes:
- Add UserScopedSkillStorage class for per-user custom skill directories
- Introduce get_or_new_user_skill_storage() factory with user_id context
- Auth middleware sets effective_user_id for request-scoped storage
- Agent/prompt/middleware now use user-scoped storage and prompt cache
- Sandbox mounts user-scoped skill directories for search/read tools
- Add validate_skill_file_path() to SkillStorage for path security
- Migration script supports --all-users bulk migration
- Frontend: add editable field to Skill type, error check in enableSkill
- All skill categories can be toggled (custom skills default to enabled)
- Update skill-creator SKILL.md with isolation-aware instructions

Tests:
- Add test_user_scoped_skill_storage.py (new)
- Update all existing skill tests for user-scoped storage
- Update sandbox, client, and router tests

* fix(skills): address second-round PR review feedback (#3889)

- P1-1: restrict legacy skill mount to users without custom skills
- P1-2: fail-closed for _is_disabled_skill_path (OSError → return True)
- P2-1: AND-merge global extensions_config skill disabled state
- P2-2: atomic write for _skill_states.json (mkstemp + replace)
- P2-3: normalize X-DeerFlow-Owner-User-Id in trusted boundary
- P2-4: LRU-bounded _enabled_skills_by_config_cache (OrderedDict, maxsize=256)
- P2-5: clear global prompt cache on PUBLIC skill toggle
- P2-6: invalidate skill caches on client.update_skill

* fix(tests): correct tool policy test after merge

* fix(skills): use DEFAULT_SKILLS_CONTAINER_PATH in UserScopedSkillStorage

The "/mnt/skills" literal in UserScopedSkillStorage.__init__ triggers
test_skill_container_path_defaults::test_mnt_skills_literal_is_owned_by_skill_constants_module
on CI. Migrate the default to the existing deerflow.constants constant,
matching the pattern already used by LocalSkillStorage, SkillStorage, and
the durable/tool_error middlewares.

---------

Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
2026-07-04 13:54:04 +08:00
Yi Deng
331c949b95
fix(gateway): require admin for global skills management endpoints (#3855)
* fix(gateway): require admin for global skills management endpoints

The skills router exposed its management endpoints with no authorization
check (only Depends(get_config)), while the MCP router guards the
equivalent global extensions_config mutations with require_admin_user
(added in the #3425 security hardening). Skills storage is global/shared
across users (no per-user path), lives in the same extensions_config.json
as MCP servers, and custom skill SKILL.md content is injected into every
user's agent system prompt. Any authenticated non-admin user could mutate
or read global skills that affect all tenants:

- POST /api/skills/install: install from an arbitrary thread_id, writing
  into the global custom skills tree
- PUT /api/skills/custom/{skill_name}: rewrite a global skill, injecting
  instructions into all users' agent prompts (cross-tenant prompt injection)
- DELETE /api/skills/custom/{skill_name} and rollback: tamper with global skills
- GET /api/skills/custom, GET .../{skill_name}, GET .../history: read raw
  global custom skill bodies/history
- PUT /api/skills/{skill_name} (enable toggle): writes the shared
  extensions_config.json and refreshes the system prompt for every tenant,
  so a non-admin could enable/disable any skill globally. There is no
  per-user skill state, so this is a global mutation, not a preference.

Add require_admin_user to every endpoint above, mirroring the MCP router.
The shared read path used internally by update/rollback was extracted into
a non-auth helper (_read_custom_skill_response) so internal reuse does not
double-check auth.

Only the read-only GET /api/skills and GET /api/skills/{skill_name} stay
open to normal users: they return just name/description/enabled and back
the user-facing settings UI.

Tests:
- New tests/test_skills_router_authz.py: a non-admin user gets 403 on every
  guarded endpoint (including the enable toggle); basic listing stays open;
  admins can still toggle.
- Update tests/test_skills_custom_router.py to authenticate as admin.
- pytest tests/ -k skill -> 350 passed, 1 skipped; ruff clean.

Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(frontend): gate skill enable/install UI behind admin + handle 403

Follow-up to the backend change that made the global skills mutations
admin-only. Without a matching UI change, a non-admin user would hit a
silent 403 when toggling a skill in Settings -> Skills or clicking
"Install skill" on a .skill artifact.

- core/skills/api.ts: add SkillRequestError (status + isAdminRequired),
  throw it from loadSkills/enableSkill on non-ok responses and from
  installSkill on 403 (other install errors keep the soft-failure
  contract).
- core/skills/hooks.ts: useSkills no longer retries on SkillRequestError.
- skill-settings-page.tsx: show an "admin required" message on 403, and
  disable the enable toggle for non-admins (mirrors the MCP tools page).
- artifact-file-detail.tsx / artifact-file-list.tsx: only render the
  "Install skill" action for admins, and surface an admin-required toast
  if a 403 still occurs.
- i18n: add settings.skills.adminRequired / installAdminRequired (en + zh).

Auth/no-auth and static-website modes synthesize an admin user, so these
gates do not affect single-user/local deployments.

Verified locally: pnpm check (eslint + tsc) passes with no new errors,
pnpm build succeeds, and the dev server renders / and /login (200) with
no compile/runtime errors.

Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com>

* style(frontend): format skills hook for prettier

Keep the admin-guard skills hook aligned with Prettier output so the frontend format check passes in CI.

---------

Signed-off-by: DengY11 <151997860+DengY11@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-02 11:17:23 +08:00