2 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
万家良	c324f351ee	fix(sandbox): truncate quarantine path keys to stay under Windows MAX_PATH (#6880) ... * fix(sandbox): truncate quarantine path keys to stay under Windows MAX_PATH The quarantine nests three hashed path components (scope, sandbox id, container id). Three full 64-char SHA-256 hexdigests exceed Windows' 260-char MAX_PATH once the quarantine root lives under a long path, so mark() fails with ENOENT creating the generation record. Truncate the digest to 16 hex chars, matching the sandbox-naming convention used elsewhere in this module. * test(sandbox): pin quarantine key truncation to 16 hex chars Guard against a regression that reverts the key digest to a full 64-char SHA-256 hexdigest: three nested 64-char components exceed Windows' 260-char MAX_PATH and re-break record creation, while Linux CI still passes. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-10-15 11:00:01 +08:00
Storm	b9a75b869d	fix(sandbox): attest lark broker mode per Pod and quarantine uncertain shell outcomes (#6436) ... * fix(sandbox): attest lark broker mode per Pod and quarantine uncertain shell outcomes Why this change: Two fail-open paths in the AIO sandbox lifecycle. First, the lark broker capability probe collapsed "provisioner unreachable" into "broker not configured": one 1.5s timeout cached a negative for 300s, so new sandboxes were created without the broker sidecar while the per-user credential directories were still bind-mounted into the container, and existing Pods kept being reused without their actual mode ever being read. Second, an implicit-shell command that timed out or returned an unknown status only marked the current client object; warm-pool reclaim and rediscovery built a fresh client that re-entered a container whose shell state could not be proven clean, and nothing about that ambiguity survived a Gateway restart. What changed: - The capability cache stores confirmed observations only, keyed per provisioner endpoint/auth identity; an unknown answer (timeout, malformed payload) raises instead of selecting credential placement, while a confirmed broker requirement is retained through outages. One in-flight probe per identity shares success and failure, and a Pod-attested mode contradicting the cache forces one shared refresh. - Execution uses the mode attested for the actual sandbox: SandboxInfo.lark_cli_broker flows from the provisioner's atomic Pod observation into the client, so a probe outage delays drift detection but never denies reuse of an attested runtime, and never trusts an unattested one. - The provisioner reports each Pod's actual broker mode, generation (Pod UID) and shell capacity from one read, rejects lark requests conflicting with its configuration (409/503 carrying a capability-refresh marker the Gateway uses to drop the stale cache entry), rejects conflicting or Terminating Pods on coordination creates while reporting Terminating as data to status/get/list, and answers Pod presence independently of Service readiness. - A persistent quarantine (DEER_FLOW_HOME/sandbox-quarantine, keyed by scope/sandbox/generation) fences containers after uncertain implicit shell outcomes across client rebuilds and restarts; in-process reuse, warm reclaim, discovery, create responses and orphan reconciliation all pass one policy gate, and replacement runs under the existing ownership and teardown fences. A fenced sandbox still tracked after a failed release-recycle is destroyed inline on the next acquire. - Quarantine records retire only after confirmed absence, retrying partial cleanup for the quarantined generation and releasing remembered ports under the same fences; local stop failures now propagate instead of being logged away, and remote destroy errors surface to callers. Problem solved: A provisioner blip could silently strip broker isolation from new lark sandboxes for minutes at a time, and ambiguous shell outcomes let corrupted default shells persist across warm reuse, rediscovery and restarts. Docs updated: README, aio_sandbox and skills AGENTS.md. * docs(changelog): record sandbox attestation and quarantine fix (#6436) * fix(sandbox): preserve active leases and fail closed on unattested broker modes Concurrent uploads could recycle a healthy AIO runtime while another holder was creating or cleaning up a command session. Older provisioner responses could also trigger destructive replacement before failing admission. - Distinguish pending session creation from ambiguous outcomes and reserve idle teardown until execution and upload holders finish scope cleanup. - Reject stale fork lookups and reconcile cancelled acquires without releasing a sandbox still borrowed by another holder. - Default Lark broker mode to unverified and preserve unattested Pods until the provisioner is upgraded. - Recognize Docker 29 absence diagnostics while matching resource names exactly. - Preserve Gateway upload errors and cover admission and lifecycle regressions. * fix(sandbox): scope the unverified-broker refuse path to attested providers The fail-closed raise in _lark_cli_env_from_runtime treated every Sandbox without a lark_cli_broker attribute as unverified, but only AioSandbox carries the attestation — E2B, OpenSandbox, Tenki, and Boxlite have no broker sidecar, no credential mounts, and no provisioner to upgrade, so every lark-cli command on those providers failed with an unactionable error. Declare the tri-state on the Sandbox base class (defaulting to False, the only mode brokerless providers have) so the None fail-closed path stays scoped to AioSandbox's deliberate unverified default. - Add lark_cli_broker: bool | None = False to the Sandbox ABC, mirroring the persistent_shell_sessions tri-state pattern - Add a regression test pinning the non-broker overlay for a provider without the attribute * fix(sandbox): close review gaps in broker attestation and teardown lifecycle Address the latest #6436 review round: - The provisioner's post-build broker-mode 409 now carries the capability-refresh marker, so an incompatible-mode conflict surfaced by idempotent re-create, attestation drift or post-create verification drops the Gateway's cached capability observation instead of repeating the same 409 for the full negative-cache TTL. - AioSandboxProvider.destroy() returns the _destroy_tracked outcome: False when teardown is deferred because an execution/upload holder or a peer teardown is still active, so callers can no longer mistake a deferred destroy for a completed one. - A live replacement under the same logical ID proves the fenced old generations are absent; retire_replaced_generations prunes only those stale records so they cannot strand future creates, while the live generation's fence and unversioned crash fences are never touched. - SandboxInfo.from_dict keeps a missing lark_cli_broker attestation unverified (None) instead of silently rehydrating as attested non-broker. - The restricted-network inspect path shares the strict _is_no_such_network_error parser, closing the substring loophole for context-name collisions and wrong-target errors. * docs(sandbox): condense lease notes to keep the AGENTS.md chain under the size gate The three lease notes added in 26c307f3 pushed the effective guidance chain to 98,312 bytes — 8 over the 98,304 hard limit enforced by agent-guidance (AG002). Fold them into two lines carrying the same rules. --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>	2026-10-10 07:56:09 +08:00