* feat(clarification): structured form fields for human-input cards
Add a request-side v2 `form` mode to the ask_clarification protocol so
business flows (e.g. expense reimbursement) can collect several values
in one card instead of sequential free-text questions:
- `ask_clarification` gains a restricted `fields` parameter (text /
textarea / number / select / multi_select / checkbox / date)
- ClarificationMiddleware validates and normalizes fields explicitly
(whitelisted types, unknown -> text, select-likes without options ->
text, duplicate/invalid entries dropped, all-invalid falls back to
the legacy modes) since the middleware short-circuits before tool
execution; the plain-text fallback lists fields for IM channels
- Form payloads carry `version: 2` so older frontends degrade to the
text fallback; replies stay on the v1 response protocol — the card
submits a readable summary as `response_kind: "text"`, so journal
persistence and answered-card recovery are unchanged
- Frontend renders typed field controls with required-field validation
and compact multi-select chips
Part of #4400 (scope narrowed per maintainer feedback: request-side
only, no new response kinds, no top-level multi_choice).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(clarification): harden form protocol per review feedback
Address the five review points on #4406:
- Reject field names colliding with JS Object.prototype members on both
sides; frontend reads form values via own-property access only, so
`constructor`/`toString`-style names can no longer leak inherited
members into required validation or the submitted summary
- Close open requests answered through the legacy text fallback: a
visible plain human reply (no response metadata) now marks every
previously-opened request as answered, so upgrading to a v2-aware
frontend cannot leave the composer locked on an already-answered card
- Give checkbox fields deterministic boolean semantics: values are
seeded to an explicit false ("no" in the summary) and `required` means
must-agree/consent; documented in the tool schema
- Make middleware field validation atomic: structurally broken entries
(bad/duplicate/reserved names, over-cap field/option counts or text
lengths) degrade the whole form instead of silently dropping fields;
options are trimmed/deduped with blanks removed so the backend never
emits payloads the frontend parser rejects
- Associate form labels/controls (htmlFor/id), aria-required,
aria-invalid, and error descriptions for accessibility
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* refactor(clarification): type the fields item schema via TypedDict
Replace `fields: list[dict[str, Any]]` with `list[ClarificationFormField]`
(a TypedDict with `name` required and the type whitelist as a Literal) so
the provider-facing tool schema documents the item shape instead of an
opaque object relying on the docstring. Runtime validation is unchanged
and stays in ClarificationMiddleware, which intercepts the call before
tool execution. Addresses the non-blocking review suggestion on #4406.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(frontend): drop unsupported aria-invalid from multi-select group
jsx-a11y: role=group does not support aria-invalid; the error linkage
stays via aria-describedby.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(clarification): coerce numeric required flags and normalize fields once
- `_normalize_bool` now coerces 1/0 (some providers serialize booleans
as integers), so `required: 1` no longer silently flips to optional
- `_handle_clarification` normalizes `fields` once and passes the result
to both the text fallback and the payload builder
Addresses the non-blocking review nits on #4406.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(clarification): harden form protocol per contract review round 2
Backend:
- Guard unhashable JSON in the intercept path: `type: []`/`{}` degrades
the field to text and `clarification_type: []` coerces to str instead
of raising TypeError (which, with return_direct, ended the turn with
an error and no card or fallback)
- Add a total budget over the serialized normalized fields (16KB UTF-8
bytes): per-item caps alone admitted forms whose IM text fallback
exceeded channel delivery limits (Slack 40k chars, Feishu ~30KB card),
silently truncating trailing fields; a boundary test proves any
accepted form's fallback stays deliverable
Frontend:
- Submission value now appends a JSON block keyed by stable field names
(readable summary alone is delimiter-ambiguous), with a collision
regression test
- Parser boundary tightened to match backend constraints: empty option
values (Radix SelectItem crash), duplicate option ids/values,
duplicate field names, and the form<->version-2 binding are rejected
- Keep the error node mounted while any field is still invalid so
aria-describedby never points at a removed element (happy-dom
interaction test)
- Required semantics are now accessible: native checkbox control (no
HTML required attribute — it would intercept the custom submit path),
visually-hidden localized "required" markers next to the aria-hidden
asterisks
- Legacy-fallback closure narrowed to the latest unanswered request:
nothing guarantees a single outstanding clarification across runs, and
closing all would silently swallow older decisions; an older request
left open becomes the active card again
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(frontend): keep clarification selects controlled
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(checkpoint): production-shaped full/delta benchmark with configurable snapshot frequency
- Group benchmark scripts into per-family folders (checkpoint/, sandbox/)
- Extract shared benchmark infrastructure into checkpoint_bench_common.py
- Add checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency config (default 1000, process-frozen);
freeze it in make_lead_agent and DeerFlowClient; key the state-schema
adaptation cache by resolved frequency
- New bench_production.py: per-case child processes run N ainvoke turns through
the real lead-agent graph (scripted deterministic model, real AsyncSqliteSaver),
then measure GET /state + POST /history through the real Gateway route stack
in one event loop (httpx ASGITransport), cold/warm accessor-cache split,
cross-mode digest gates
- New summarize_production.py: delta/full ratios plus decision metrics
(snapshot_write_spike, cache_effect_ms, checkpoint_write_share,
auto-discovered history per-limit ratios)
* fix(checkpoint): address production benchmark review
* fix(runtime): linearize delta-mode checkpoint resume
Resuming a run from an older checkpoint forks the lineage, and in delta
mode that fork's state cannot be materialized correctly: the delta
history walk collects every pending_writes entry stored on each on-path
ancestor, but a shared parent also carries the writes of the sibling
child that was abandoned. Those writes replay into the fork, so the run
starts from a message list that still contains the answer it was meant to
replace — regenerating in a branched thread surfaced this as the
superseded assistant message reappearing beside the new one after a
reload. All three saver implementations are affected, so write-to-child
ownership is a gap in the upstream delta contract rather than one
saver's slip.
Rather than reimplement that walk, express the fork as what it means:
materialize the requested checkpoint's state, write it as an Overwrite on
the current head (which has no siblings), and run linearly. The abandoned
turn stays in history as the rewritten head's ancestry.
This runs after the rollback point is captured, so cancel-with-rollback
still restores the real pre-run head, and fails closed — an unreadable
resume checkpoint raises instead of falling back to the corrupt fork.
Full mode keeps forking: its checkpoints carry complete channel_values
and need no replay.
* fix(runtime): restore complete delta resume state
* fix(runtime): linearize delta rollback restoration
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(runtime): serialize delta resume preparation
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(memory): signals-based update pipeline + always-on watermark/trivial filter
Refactor the DeerMem memory update pipeline (message_processing -> queue ->
updater) around a signals frozenset seam, replacing the
(filtered, correction_detected, reinforcement_detected) 3-tuple with
(filtered, signals: frozenset[str]) end to end.
message_processing:
- Externalize signal-detection patterns to YAML (message_patterns/*.yaml).
- Extend signals from correction/reinforcement to a 6-class set
(correction/reinforcement/preference/identity/goal/decision); detect_signals
returns a frozenset aligned with the fact category enum.
- Pure-acknowledgment turns ("ok"/"好的"/...) are always filtered out before
enqueue (whole-message fullmatch), saving an extraction LLM call.
queue (core/queue.py):
- In-memory list + debounce timer, with flush_sync (graceful-shutdown drain
that joins an in-flight worker under a hard timeout) and queue_max_depth
backpressure (signal-bearing updates always admitted; QueueFull otherwise).
- Same-key updates coalesce with a signal union; per-batch success/fail summary.
updater (core/updater.py):
- head500+tail500 message truncation (replaces the 1000-char head chop).
- Always-on per-thread watermark: feed only messages added since the last
extraction. The watermark is in-memory and is not advanced on failure, so a
failed/lost update is re-fed on the next conversation turn.
- [MANUAL] prompt marker for user-authored facts (source.type="manual").
- Post-invoke extraction_callback (host-injected) emitting facts_extracted /
facts_accepted / rejected_low_confidence; the host default logs metrics and
flags >60% rejection.
Confidence filtering remains in _apply_updates (the existing
fact_confidence_threshold check); there is no separate write gate.
Consolidation stays opt-in (lossy). The ABC add/add_nowait signature is
unchanged, so the summarization flush hook and host are unaffected.
Tests: add test_message_processing_signals, test_updater_truncation,
test_updater_watermark; update queue/updater/consolidation/staleness/pluggable
tests for the signals seam.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(memory): harden update pipeline per PR review
- Catch QueueFull in DeerMem.add/add_nowait so backpressure degrades to
'update skipped' instead of propagating into after_agent /
summarization_hook and breaking the agent run (peer middlewares
self-guard; MemoryMiddleware was the lone exception). Emergency
(add_nowait) always admits under backpressure -- its data cannot be
re-fed next turn.
- Rewrite the watermark from index-based to content/identity-based
(_message_identity + _feed_after_watermark) so it stays correct when
summarization removes the conversation front -- an index watermark
pointed at the wrong message and silently skipped un-extracted tail
turns. The emergency flush bypasses the watermark (bypass_watermark on
ConversationContext, threaded through update_memory) and coexists with
(does not replace) a pending normal update, so a flush cannot drop a
pending update's un-extracted tail.
- Populate facts_accepted / rejected_low_confidence inside _apply_updates
at the real confidence-filter site (passed_threshold) instead of
re-deriving the threshold in _finalize_update -- eliminates metric drift.
- Emit extraction metrics in a finally with an 'attempted' flag so
exception failures (parse error, apply_changes raise after retry) are
observable, not only the happy path.
- Re-detect signals on the post-watermark feed for the extraction hint so
it no longer references turns the LLM cannot see; admission-time signals
still drive backpressure.
- Move the post-batch reschedule inside the queue lock to close a
non-atomic self._timer race with a concurrent add.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(memory): address follow-up review nits (LRU, metric name, docstring)
- Bound the in-memory watermark cache with a configurable LRU
(watermark_max_keys, default 4096, 0=unbounded). A dropped key re-extracts
one batch on that thread's next turn (the documented restart behavior), so
eviction is safe and preserves the content-identity watermark's
front-removal guarantee. Adds _watermark_get/_watermark_set helpers and a
bounded-LRU regression test.
- Rename the extraction metric facts_accepted -> facts_passed_confidence so
the name matches what the >60% rejection-rate warning assumes (a
confidence-gate signal, not a persisted-fact count); drop the stale
"historical semantics" justification. Brand-new callback, one consumer.
- Fix the stale test_message_processing_signals module docstring: the signals
seam is already swapped to frozenset, and a stale stage-numbering prefix is
removed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(frontend): pin recent chats
* fix(threads): address pin-chat review feedback
- Stop bumping updated_at on metadata-only PATCH (pin/unpin) via a new
update_metadata(touch=False) path so unpinning no longer jumps a chat
to the top of the updated_at-sorted recent list.
- Narrow patchThreadMetadata to a ThreadMetadataPatchResponse matching
the Gateway's actual response (no values/context).
- Namespace the pinned metadata key as deerflow_pinned for consistency
with deerflow_sidecar / deerflow_branch.
- Cover touch/touch=False behavior in repo + router tests; document the
e2e mock's updated_at preservation now mirrors production.
* style(frontend): format thread utils test
* fix(threads): make pinned ordering server-side
* test(frontend): keep infinite-scroll fixture order stable
* test(frontend): stabilize lark reconnect e2e
* docs: clarify thread pin metadata contract
* fix: surface length-capped model responses
* fix: avoid the influence of the mid-turn
* fix: correcting semantic annotations
* fix: add ModelLengthTerminationDetector to compatible providers
* fix:delete redundancy code
* fix:supplementing log information improves observability
* fix: align the document and complete the assertions.
* fix: unit test
* fix: revert AGENTS.md
* fix: unit test
* fix: add annotation and skip AIMessage has empty content
* fix(gateway): stop persisting Overwrite wrappers into empty reducer channels on branch
Thread branching (and POST /state on a never-written channel) wraps copied
reducer values in Overwrite. Upstream BinaryOperatorAggregate.update seeds
an empty (MISSING) channel with values[0] verbatim without unwrapping, so
Union-typed channels (sandbox/goal/todos/promoted) stored the wrapper
literally and the next consumer crashed with TypeError: 'Overwrite' object
is not subscriptable (#4380). Patch the channel to unwrap the first write
(mirroring DeltaChannel semantics), and stop copying thread-scoped channels
(sandbox, thread_data) into branches: the parent's sandbox_id would bind
the branch to the parent's workspace and release lifecycle.
* refactor(checkpoint): drop private _get_overwrite import for a local Overwrite check
Importing langgraph's underscored _get_overwrite at module top level meant an
upstream refactor that drops it - plausibly the same release that fixes the
bug - would fail this module's import and crash startup before the probe can
stand the patch down. Replace it with a local helper on the public Overwrite
type, and fix two test docstring nits.
* refactor(checkpoint): write patch flags via their constants to avoid drift
Both saver patches read their "already patched" idempotence flag through a
module constant (_PATCH_FLAG / _BINOP_PATCH_FLAG) but wrote it as a hard-coded
attribute literal, so renaming the constant would silently break the guard and
double-apply the patch. Write via the same constant (setattr), dropping the
now-unneeded attr-defined ignores.
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(sandbox): unwrap Overwrite-wrapped sandbox state in after_agent
Fork-restored checkpoints can deliver the sandbox channel still wrapped
in langgraph.types.Overwrite: the rollback restore applies replace-style
writes through a state-mutation graph in delta checkpoint mode, and
after_agent/aafter_agent then crash subscripting the wrapper
("TypeError: 'Overwrite' object is not subscriptable") on the next
sandbox tool run in the forked conversation. Unwrap before reading the
sandbox id, and pin both hooks against an Overwrite-wrapped state.
Refs #4380 (bug 1 of 2; the history-loss half is a separate display path)
Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(sandbox): don't release fork-restored parent sandboxes
The Overwrite-wrapped value replays the parent thread's sandbox state, so releasing it from the forked run would evict the parent's warm sandbox. _unwrap_sandbox now reports the wrapped form, and both after_agent hooks skip the release for it while keeping the normal path unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat: add lark cli integration
* fix: polish lark integration actions
* feat: support lark incremental permissions
* fix: detect lark authorization completion
* fix: harden lark integration install
* feat: expand lark auth scopes and reuse host auth in sandbox
Default lark auth to least-privilege (recommend=false, base sign-in only)
and expose the full set of lark-cli --domain business domains as native
--domain grants instead of a 4-domain read-only mapping. Resolve the
skill pack from the latest larksuite/cli GitHub release at install time
with content-hash integrity, and surface version/runtime drift in status.
Share the per-user lark-cli config/data profile between the Gateway
Settings auth flow and agent conversations by mounting the integration
dirs into the AIO sandbox and injecting the matching env for lark-cli
commands, with an allowlisted extra_mounts path in the provisioner/K8s
backend and traversal guards on integration paths.
* style: fix lint issues from ruff and prettier
Sort imports in the provisioner PVC test and re-wrap two long i18n
description strings to satisfy backend ruff and frontend prettier CI.
* fix(lark): address managed integration review feedback
* fix(frontend): stabilize integrations settings e2e
* test(sandbox): isolate remote backend legacy visibility check
* test: fix backend unit failures after merge
* Harden Lark integration review fixes
* Format Lark integration E2E test
* fix(lark): harden sandbox credential exposure and status disclosure
Address willem_bd's security review on PR #3971:
- Mount the per-user lark-cli config dir (long-lived appSecret) read-only
into the AIO sandbox; only the refreshable-token data dir stays writable.
- Redact host filesystem paths (install_path, cli.path) from
GET /lark/status and the config/auth complete responses for non-admin
callers, fail-closed on any auth error.
- Document the npm postinstall trade-off (--ignore-scripts is not viable
because @larksuite/cli fetches its platform binary in postinstall).
- Document the sandbox credential trust boundary in AGENTS.md and README,
pointing at the sidecar-broker follow-up (#4338).
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Branch creation seeds the new thread's run-event feed from its checkpoint
so inherited history survives the first run (#4380). Every seeded row
carried one shared run id, but run_id is a *turn* identity to the feed's
consumers, not a provenance tag: regenerating the inherited answer
resolves that row's run id as the superseded source, and
GET /messages/page then drops every row carrying it. One shared id for
the whole seed therefore deleted the complete inherited history on a
branch's first regenerate, leaving only the regenerated turn.
Group seeded rows into one synthetic run per inherited turn
(branch-seed-{thread_id}-{n}), a new turn opening at each persisted human
message — the same boundary a real run has, including the allowlisted
hidden ask_clarification reply, which resumes as its own run. Supersession
is then confined to the turn actually regenerated.
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(summarization): own the run model for compaction; bound failure
With summarization.model_name: null the summary model resolved to
config.models[0] while the executing model is selected per run; when they
differ and models[0]'s provider is broken (expired key, quota, outage)
compaction silently failed every triggered turn and context grew unbounded
until the main provider 400s the run (#3103's shape), even though the run's
own model was healthy.
Model ownership is now sourced from the builders, not re-derived at runtime:
- The lead, subagent, and manual /compact builders each pass the resolved run
model into create_summarization_middleware(run_model_name=...). The middleware
no longer reads runtime.context / get_config(), which do not carry a custom
agent's or a subagent's resolved model, so a custom-agent lead run and a
distinct-model subagent now summarize with their own model, not models[0] /
the parent's. Runtime re-resolution and the per-name model cache are removed.
- model_name: null summarizes with the run's own model; an explicitly configured
summary model generates and falls back to the run model on failure. The
fallback is built lazily after the primary fails and its construction is
guarded, so a broken fallback cannot skip a healthy primary or escape the
automatic failure boundary.
Failure is bounded and side-effect-safe:
- An empty or whitespace-only response is treated as a generation failure, not a
valid summary, so compaction never removes all history for an empty replacement.
- compact_state/acompact_state take raise_on_failure independent of force: the
manual /compact path always surfaces a generation failure (even force=false)
and routes it to the existing ContextCompactionFailed path (HTTP 500 ->
frontend error toast) instead of an unconsumed response reason. The automatic
path leaves compaction state unchanged.
- before_summarization hooks fire only after a replacement summary exists.
SummarizationConfig.model_name, config.example.yaml, and docs/summarization.md
document the final lead/subagent/manual ownership rules.
Part of RFC #4346 (section A). Evaluating fraction/triggers against the run
model's profile (profile ownership) is a separate follow-up.
* fix(summarization): manual /compact model ownership + fail-open construct/parse
Manual /compact carried only agent_name, so it derived the run model from the
custom-agent model or config.models[0] and missed the request-selected model the
run path uses (request -> custom-agent -> default). Carry model_name through
ThreadCompactRequest and the frontend compact call, resolve with the same
precedence, and move the custom-agent config read off the event loop (asyncio
.to_thread) with user_id so the strict blocking-IO gate is not bypassed by the
broad except.
Make one summary attempt own its full lifecycle so the fail-open boundary covers
construction and response parsing, not just invocation: build each candidate model
lazily and guarded (a raising constructor falls through to the healthy run model
instead of breaking agent construction), build the model_name:null primary from the
run model rather than config.models[0], and run response text extraction inside the
invocation try so a failing .text accessor falls back instead of escaping compaction.
Adds factory-level constructor-failure, response-extraction-failure (sync/async), and
route-path model-ownership tests.
* fix(subagents): align prompt and middleware subagent limit; allow min of 1
SubagentLimitMiddleware clamped max_concurrent to [2, 4] internally, but
agent.py and client.py fed the raw config value into the system prompt, so
a user-configured 1 (or 5) produced a prompt that disagreed with the
enforced middleware limit. Lower MIN_SUBAGENT_LIMIT to 1 and clamp the raw
config value with _clamp_subagent_limit() at both the agent factory and the
embedded client so the prompt and middleware see the same value.
* fix: remove unused imports MAX_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS, MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS, clamp_subagent_concurrency
* fix: harmonize clamp range [1,4] across middleware, config, and prompt path; fix lint
- Changed MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS from 2 to 1 so prompt.py's
clamp_subagent_concurrency and the middleware's _clamp_subagent_limit
both clamp to [1,4] — eliminating the divergence where the prompt told
the model 'max 2 task calls' but the middleware enforced 1.
- Applied _clamp_subagent_limit at build_middlewares (agent.py:360) so
all 3 construction sites (agent.py:360, agent.py:450, client.py:259)
consistently clamp the config-resolved limit.
- Derived MIN_SUBAGENT_LIMIT / MAX_SUBAGENT_LIMIT from
MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS / MAX_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS so the
two module-level definitions stay in sync.
- Added TestConfigParity.test_prompt_path_and_middleware_clamp_agree
regression test.
- Fixed lint.
* fix(lint): add missing imports for MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS and MAX_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS
* docs+test: update AGENTS.md clamp range to 1-4; add prompt/middleware parity regression test
- backend/AGENTS.md still documented the old [2,4] clamp in two places;
updated to [1,4] to match MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS = 1.
- Added test_apply_prompt_template_single_subagent_limit_matches_middleware:
renders the real system prompt with max_concurrent_subagents=1 and asserts
the advertised HARD LIMITS value equals SubagentLimitMiddleware's enforced
max_concurrent — the end-to-end check that would have caught the [1,4] vs
[2,4] prompt-path divergence flagged in review.
* refactor: simplify per review — restore clamp delegation, drop redundant call-site clamps
Per willem-bd's review, reduce the PR to the one behavioral change plus
docs/tests:
- _clamp_subagent_limit delegates to clamp_subagent_concurrency again
instead of inlining a byte-identical copy; with a single source of
truth the TestConfigParity sync-check class is unnecessary — dropped.
- Revert the call-site clamps in agent.py (build_middlewares,
_make_lead_agent) and client.py (_ensure_agent) to main: both
downstream consumers (SubagentLimitMiddleware.__init__ and the prompt
path) already clamp internally, and the cross-module private import
of _clamp_subagent_limit goes away with them.
- Keep MIN_CONCURRENT_SUBAGENT_CALLS = 1 (the fix), the [1, 4]
docstring updates, the AGENTS.md range corrections, and the
end-to-end prompt/middleware parity test for single-subagent mode
(docstring reworded: on main a configured 1 was bumped to 2 by both
paths — there was no divergence to fix, just a silently raised floor).
* test: fix stale comment referencing reverted agent.py/client.py call-site clamps
---------
Co-authored-by: nankingjing <nankingjing@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Enforce one queued or running scheduled-task run per task with a partial unique index. The migration resolves legacy duplicates before creating the index, and losing inserts use the existing conflict or skip outcomes.
Normalize YAML frontmatter keys in the shared parser so validation and review report malformed fields instead of failing while sorting mixed key types.
Add GIF to the view_image allowlist: map the .gif extension to
image/gif and detect the GIF87a/GIF89a magic bytes so the existing
extension/content cross-check accepts GIFs instead of rejecting them
as an unsupported format. Covered by a new success test.
* fix(runtime): stop subgraph stream frames impersonating root frames
The web frontend always requested stream_subgraphs, and since delegated
subagent graphs inherit the parent checkpoint namespace (#4215), their
values snapshots and token chunks ride the parent stream. The worker's
_unpack_stream_item dropped the namespace and published every subgraph
frame under a bare event name, so a subagent's values snapshot replaced
the whole thread view in SDK clients (#4399), its token chunks flooded
the parent message stream, and a subagent's LLM error fallback could be
mistaken for the parent run's.
Publish subgraph frames under namespace-qualified SSE event names
(mode|ns1|ns2, LangGraph Platform style) and keep root-only consumers
(file-tool chunk batcher, subagent event persistence, error-fallback
detection) on root frames only. Drop streamSubgraphs from the frontend
submit paths: subtask progress arrives via root-namespace task_* custom
events, so the flag only exposed the leak.
* test(runtime): add production-shaped subgraph stream regression tests
Address review: the namespace tests validated the publishing helpers
with hand-fed namespaces, while the #4399 regression lived in the
integration between LangGraph's delegation routing and the worker's
stream loop. Add TestWorkerSubgraphStreamIntegration: a real parent
graph delegates through the real SubagentExecutor and streams through
run_agent into a real MemoryStreamBridge, locking both stream_subgraphs
modes -- delegated frames arrive namespaced (never bare), a delegated
error fallback cannot mark the parent run as errored, and without the
flag delegated frames stay out while task_* custom events remain.
An empty assistant message from a provider safety filter (content_filter with
no content, no tool calls) was persisted into thread history and replayed to
strict OpenAI-compatible providers, which reject it with HTTP 400 ("message ...
with role 'assistant' must not be empty") — breaking every later turn until a
new chat is started.
SafetyFinishReasonMiddleware only handled the tool-call case (#3028) and
TerminalResponseMiddleware only the post-tool case (#4027), so a plain empty
content-filter response fell through both. Extend the safety middleware to
backfill a user-facing explanation when a safety-terminated message is
otherwise blank, so the persisted turn is non-empty (and the user sees why it
was blocked).
Fixes#4393
* fix(gateway): seed branch run-events so inherited history survives (#4380)
The thread feed (GET /messages, /messages/page) reads the run-event store,
but branch creation only wrote checkpoint state - a fresh branch had no
message rows, so the parent history vanished from the UI as soon as the
branch's first run refreshed the feed. Seed the branch's run_events from
the same checkpoint snapshot the branch was created from, mirroring
RunJournal's message-event contract (event types, hidden-message rules,
original-user-text restoration). Best-effort: a seeding failure degrades
to the old behavior and is reported as history_seed_mode=failed.
* docs(gateway): correct branch-seed docstring on RunJournal divergences
The "consumers cannot tell a seeded row from a journaled one" claim was
overstated for AI rows: seeded rows omit run-scoped enrichment (usage /
latency_ms / llm_call_index) and stamp caller=lead_agent rather than the
message's original caller, neither recoverable from a checkpoint message.
Rewrite the docstring to state these divergences explicitly and note they
are display-invisible today (no consumer indexes those keys; per-message
caller drives no attribution). Also add a code comment marking the
hide_from_ui filter as intentionally stricter than the live paths.
* fix(gateway): seed dict-shaped checkpoint messages + persist hidden AI/tool rows
Two review-driven fixes to build_branch_history_seed_events:
1. Checkpoint messages can arrive as model_dump()-shaped dicts (the
branch-matching helpers in threads.py already handle both BaseMessage
and dict). The seed only handled BaseMessage, so a dict-backed
checkpoint seeded nothing and the branch reported skipped_empty while
history existed. Coerce dicts back to BaseMessage via messages_from_dict
(faithful: tool_calls / tool_call_id / additional_kwargs survive);
unparseable dicts are dropped best-effort.
2. RunJournal.on_llm_end and _persist_tool_result_message persist
hide_from_ui AI/tool rows unconditionally (the frontend hides them
client-side); the hide check only gates the reconciliation pass. The
seed dropped them, so a hidden turn vanished from a forked feed and
seeded rows diverged from journaled ones. Match RunJournal and write
them, restoring true row-level parity.
Adds tests for dict deserialization, the unparseable-dict drop, and the
hidden AI/tool persistence contract.
Declaring the injected runtime arg as `Annotated[Runtime, InjectedToolArg] | None`
made the top-level annotation a Union, so LangChain no longer treated it as
injected. It leaked into the model-facing schema and pydantic raised
PydanticInvalidForJsonSchema on the ToolRuntime dataclass the moment the tool
was bound to a model. The tool is bound by default for the lead agent, so any
default run on an OpenAI-compatible provider failed at tool-bind time.
Declare runtime as a bare Runtime first param, matching every other built-in
tool (present_files, view_image, task, ...), which LangChain auto-injects and
auto-excludes from the schema. Add a schema regression test that binds the tool.
* feat(agents): database-backed storage for custom agent definitions
Add an agent_storage.backend switch (default file, behaviour-unchanged) with a
db backend that stores each custom agent as a row in the shared SQL persistence
layer, so a multi-instance deployment sees the same agents on every node
(#4331, #4357). Introduces an AgentStore interface routing all read/write
surfaces, an agents table + migration 0006, startup validation, and a file->db
importer. Follows the thread_meta store / run_events backend-switch /
0003_scheduled_tasks migration patterns; no new dependency.
* fix(agents): make db storage path production-ready (review round 1)
Addresses review feedback on the db/sync agent-storage path:
- sql.py: mirror the async engine's per-connection SQLite PRAGMAs on the sync
engine (busy_timeout=30000, synchronous=NORMAL, foreign_keys=ON, WAL) so both
engines behave identically against the shared DB; guard the engine cache with
a lock (double-checked) so concurrent first-touch cannot build duplicate
engines or register the connect listener twice.
- routers/agents.py + routers/assistants_compat.py: offload the sync-store reads
that ran on the event loop (list/get/check, update's pre-read + legacy guard +
refresh, and assistants_compat's four list routes) via asyncio.to_thread — on
db+postgres each was a network round trip stalling the loop. Writes were
already offloaded.
- file.py: translate the create() mkdir(exist_ok=False) race FileExistsError
into AgentExistsError (router 409, matching SqlAgentStore's IntegrityError
path); correct the _write docstring — per-file atomic replace, two commits
sequential not transactional.
Tests: sync-engine PRAGMA + engine-cache reuse assertions; file create-race ->
AgentExistsError; strict Blockbuster anchor over the read endpoints so a
regression back onto the loop fails CI.
* fix(agents): address round-2 review on the db store path
- update_agent tool: align the docstring/inline comment with FileAgentStore._write.
Cross-field write atomicity is db-only; the file backend commits config then
soul via two sequential os.replace (a crash between them can leave a fresh
config.yaml beside a stale SOUL.md). The dropped partial-write *reporting* is
an intentional tradeoff — the stage-then-replace safety is preserved
(test_update_agent_soul_failure_does_not_replace_config still holds).
- SqlAgentStore.update(): true upsert. Catch IntegrityError on the
insert-on-missing branch, re-fetch and apply, so two concurrent first-time
writes (e.g. two setup_agent handshakes) converge instead of surfacing a raw
UNIQUE(user_id, name) violation as a 500. Symmetric with create().
- get_agent_store(): document the graph-subprocess config-resolution invariant
(the except->file fallback is a genuine no-config path, not a mask for a
misconfigured graph process) and pin it with two tests driving the real
get_app_config() file resolution: db resolves from an on-disk config.yaml,
file fallback when config is unresolvable.
* test(agents): cover SqlAgentStore.update() write-race upsert recovery
Mandatory-TDD test for the round-2 fix in 0680340a: two concurrent first-time
update()s where the loser's insert hits UNIQUE(user_id, name). Deterministically
forces the IntegrityError recovery path by making the first _row probe miss the
committed winner, and asserts last-writer-wins instead of a surfaced 500.
* fix(mcp): use threading.Lock for OAuth token refresh to avoid cross-thread deadlock
OAuthTokenManager created one asyncio.Lock per server for the process
lifetime. The embedded/TUI sync tool-call path (DeerFlowClient.stream()
-> LangGraph's ToolNode._func -> a ThreadPoolExecutor ->
make_sync_tool_wrapper's per-call asyncio.run()) invokes
get_authorization_header from a fresh event loop on a fresh OS thread
for every concurrent tool call. asyncio.Lock binds to whichever loop
first contends on it; when a caller on a different loop later releases
or wakes a waiter, it does so without call_soon_threadsafe, so the
waiting loop's selector is never woken and that caller hangs forever
with no exception. A third concurrent caller instead raises a
synchronous RuntimeError ("bound to a different event loop"). Either
way, two concurrent OAuth-protected tool calls (including the very
first cold-start token fetch) can freeze the entire agent turn.
Gateway's async path (ToolNode._afunc) is unaffected.
Replace the asyncio.Lock with a plain threading.Lock, acquired via
asyncio.to_thread so the blocking wait never blocks the event loop,
and released synchronously in a finally block. This keeps the
single-fetch de-duplication the lock provided while making it safe
across however many event loops/threads call into the same server's
lock.
Adds a regression test that runs three threads, each with its own
event loop, calling get_authorization_header concurrently for the same
server, and asserts (with a bounded join timeout so a regression fails
fast instead of hanging the suite) that none hang or raise, and that
only one real token fetch happens.
* fix(mcp): make OAuth lock acquisition cancellation-safe
get_authorization_header acquired the per-server threading.Lock via a
bare `await asyncio.to_thread(lock.acquire)`, with the try/finally that
guarantees release only starting after that await returned. Once the
executor thread had actually started running lock.acquire(), cancelling
the awaiting caller only stopped the caller -- Python cannot interrupt a
running OS thread. CancelledError was still delivered to the caller
immediately, but the thread kept blocking until the current holder
released, then silently acquired the lock with nobody left to call
release() for it. The lock stayed locked forever and every later OAuth
token refresh for that server blocked permanently at the same line --
the exact cross-thread deadlock this lock was introduced to prevent,
reintroduced via a different path under cancellation (e.g. a caller
wrapped in asyncio.wait_for/asyncio.timeout, or task-group cancellation).
Run the acquisition as an explicit asyncio.create_task, awaited via
asyncio.shield() so cancelling the caller no longer cancels the
underlying acquisition task. If the caller is cancelled, keep
(re-)waiting on the still-shielded acquisition task -- tolerating
further cancellation during this cleanup by simply retrying -- until it
actually finishes, release the lock immediately, and only then
re-raise. This guarantees the lock is released regardless of when or
how many times the caller is cancelled: before the acquisition is even
scheduled, while queued, or after it has already been silently granted.
Adds a regression test that holds the per-server lock, starts a second
caller that has to wait for it, cancels that caller while it is
genuinely blocked in its executor thread, releases the original holder,
and asserts a third caller completes within a bounded asyncio.wait_for
and still performs exactly one token fetch. Every potentially-hanging
await is bounded so a regression fails the test quickly instead of
hanging the suite.
invoke_acp_agent had no timeout anywhere in its call path, and
ACPAgentConfig had no timeout field. If the ACP agent subprocess answers
initialize/new_session correctly but then hangs inside prompt(), the tool
call - and therefore the whole agent turn - blocks indefinitely, with the
child process left running. MCP stdio servers already guard against this
class of hang via tool_call_timeout; ACP agent invocations had no
equivalent.
Add ACPAgentConfig.timeout_seconds (default 1800, ge=1), mirroring the
shape/default of subagents.timeout_seconds, and wrap the conn.prompt()
call in asyncio.wait_for(). On TimeoutError, return a clear error instead
of hanging; exiting the spawn_agent_process context block triggers the
ACP library's own graceful-then-forceful subprocess cleanup, so the hung
process is actually terminated.
* refactor(memory): pluggable MemoryManager interface for backend onboarding
Optimize the MemoryManager interface layer so new backends (mem0/openviking)
onboard with less code and the contract stays stable as capabilities are
added. A minimal backend now implements only from_config + add + get_context
(verified by test_memory_manager_interface.py::_MinimalBackend onboarding via
the factory); the factory no longer knows a backend's private hooks.
- MemoryManager: ABC -> pydantic BaseModel; three-tier methods (tier-1
add/get_context abstract; tier-2 management defaults; tier-3 optional hooks
warm/reload/fact + on_pre_compress/on_turn_start). Dropped 3 self-serving
hooks. 6 hasattr probe sites -> direct call + try/except NotImplementedError.
- from_config classmethod: factory thins to resolve + inject storage_path +
collect host hooks + call from_config; DeerMem-specific hook consumption
moved from factory to DeerMem.from_config.
- Invariants: @model_validator (mode='tool' requires search via supports_search
ClassVar); DeerMemConfig storage_path-is-file check moved here from factory.
- Async: aadd/aget_context/asearch default to the sync path (speculative).
- Callbacks: MemoryCallbacks + LangfuseMemoryCallbacks; on_memory_llm_call
subsumes tracing_callback (same signature/timing/mutation); deleted the
tracing_callback field. DeerMem decoupled from langfuse (portability).
- noop keeps read-op empty overrides (avoids router 500s on the
disable-memory-via-noop path); only delete/export inherit the base raise.
Behavior preserved: 661 passed / 13 skipped. Docs: backends/README.md rewritten
(three-tier + from_config + callbacks); samples README updated; removed stale
private doc paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(memory): 501 on unsupported read/manage endpoints + accurate warm log
Review follow-up on the three-tier MemoryManager refactor.
- Read/manage endpoints (GET /memory, /memory/export, /memory/status,
DELETE /memory, POST /memory/import) and the /memory/reload fallback now
catch NotImplementedError -> 501, matching the fact-CRUD endpoints. The
hasattr->try/except migration had skipped these: they were @abstractmethod
before (every backend implemented them, so they never raised), so once they
became tier-2 default-raise a minimal backend (only add + get_context) hit a
raw 500 -- there is no global NotImplementedError handler. get_memory is
shared via _get_memory_or_501 (covers /memory, export, status, reload
fallback). noop is unchanged: its read-op empty overrides never raise.
- warm() base default returns None (tri-state: True=warmed, False=failed,
None=nothing to warm) so the Gateway lifespan logs "skipping" for a
non-DeerMem backend (e.g. noop) instead of the inaccurate "warmed
successfully" it never earned. DeerMem.warm keeps True/False.
- Tests: 6 router 501 tests (read/manage + reload fallback) + 2 lifespan
warm-log tests (None->skipping, False->warning); conformance/pluggable
assert warm() is None.
705 passed / 13 skipped; lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(memory): review follow-ups - search-flag consistency, client reload, backend_config purity
Address review feedback on the three-tier MemoryManager refactor:
- [Medium] supports_search/search drift: the invariant now requires the
supports_search ClassVar flag to MATCH whether search() is actually
overridden (type(self).search is not MemoryManager.search), so the flag
can't drift from the impl. Catches both directions at instantiation: a
backend that overrides search() but forgets supports_search=True (was a
misleading tool-mode rejection), and one that sets the flag without
overriding (was a runtime NotImplementedError on the first memory_search).
noop sets supports_search=True to match its search() override. Conformance
adds drift + consistent-backend tests.
- [Low] client.reload_memory fallback: wrap the get_memory fallback so a
minimal backend (only add + get_context) surfaces a clean NotImplementedError
("implements neither reload_memory nor get_memory") instead of an uncaught
propagation -- mirrors the router's 501. Test added.
- [Low] backend_config purity: DeerMem.from_config restores backend_config to
the pure data the host passed after model_post_init parses the injected hooks
into DeerMemConfig (self._config, PrivateAttr); the field stays serializable
(no callables/LLM) and matches the README ("host hooks NOT in backend_config").
Test asserts purity + hooks wired.
- [Low] CHANGELOG: breaking-change note that mode='tool' + non-search backend
now fails fast at startup (was silently empty) so operators recognize it on
upgrade.
- [Nit] .gitignore: drop the env-specific .tmp-pytest/ entry (--basetemp is
local-only, not make test/CI).
709 passed / 13 skipped; lint clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(changelog): correct memory tool-mode fail-fast note
The CHANGELOG entry said mode='tool' + a non-search backend "(e.g. noop)"
fails fast at startup, but noop overrides search() (returns []) and sets
supports_search=True (required by the consistency invariant), so noop IS
search-capable and noop+tool does NOT fail fast. The fail-fast only affects a
custom backend that onboards without overriding search(). Reworded to drop the
misleading noop example and state both shipping backends implement search().
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(sandbox): bound E2B output synchronization resources
E2B release-time output sync pulled every changed file back from the
remote VM with only a per-file size cap and no aggregate bound, so a
pathological outputs tree (thousands of files, or many sub-cap files
summing to gigabytes, or a slow VM) could make release download
unboundedly on a hot path that runs at every agent turn end.
Add three aggregate ceilings on top of the per-file cap — total bytes,
file count, and a wall-clock deadline — enforced in the sync loop. When
a ceiling is hit the pass stops early, logs what it dropped, and defers
the rest to the next release. A truncated pass skips stale-manifest
pruning so files it never reached are reconciled next time instead of
being forgotten and re-downloaded.
Closes#4340
* test(sandbox): pin multi-pass convergence of bounded output sync
The four truncation tests each exercise a single capped pass. Add a
two-pass test that locks in the invariant the design relies on for
correctness: already-synced files are skipped before the budget check,
so they never consume the cap and the deferred tail drains over
successive releases instead of the leading files being re-downloaded
every turn. A refactor that let a skipped file consume the cap would
pass the single-pass tests but fail this one.
* feat(uploads): lazy-load historical files via list_uploaded_files tool
Replace per-turn injection of all historical upload metadata with on-demand
discovery via a new `list_uploaded_files` built-in tool, following the same
deferred-discovery pattern used by skills.
- Rename <uploaded_files> block to <current_uploads> (current-run files only)
- Add list_uploaded_files tool with include_outline: bool|list[str]
- Extract outline helpers to shared deerflow/utils/file_outline.py
- Update system prompt to reflect lazy-loading behaviour
- Historical file scan removed from UploadsMiddleware.before_agent()
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(uploads): clear uploaded_files state when no new files in current turn
When before_agent() returns None on empty turns, the LastValue
uploaded_files field retains the previous turn's filenames.
list_uploaded_files then incorrectly excludes those files as
"current-run" files, making them invisible until the next upload.
Fix: return {"uploaded_files": []} instead of None to explicitly
clear state. Add two-turn regression test covering the exact
scenario from review feedback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve CI lint errors and stale test assertion from merge
- Split long prompt line to fit 240-char limit
- Add missing `Any` import in list_uploaded_files_tool
- Remove unused `re` import in file_conversion (outline code moved)
- Remove unused `os` import in middleware test
- Fix test assertion: <uploaded_files> → <current_uploads> after main merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: resolve CI lint errors and stale test assertion from merge
- Split long prompt line to fit 240-char limit
- Add missing `Any` import in list_uploaded_files_tool
- Remove unused `re` import in file_conversion (outline code moved)
- Remove unused `os` import in middleware test
- Fix test assertion: <uploaded_files> → <current_uploads> after main merge
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: add current_uploads to input sanitization exempt tags
The lazy-loading PR renamed <uploaded_files> to <current_uploads>.
The anti-drift guard scans all framework XML blocks and requires each
to be either blocked or explicitly exempted. current_uploads wraps
trusted server-generated file metadata, not user input, so it belongs
in the exempt set.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test: regenerate replay golden after uploaded_files state change
before_agent now returns {"uploaded_files": []} instead of None,
adding uploaded_files to SSE values events. Regenerated via
DEERFLOW_WRITE_GOLDEN=1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: review feedback — memory pipeline, stale tags, state clearing, nits
- Match both tags in memory stripping pipeline (uploaded_files|current_uploads)
- Remove stale uploaded_files from _BLOCKED_TAG_NAMES
- Clear uploaded_files on all before_agent early-return paths
- Fix ponytail: stray word in file_conversion re-export comment
- Remove dead total_omitted branch in _format_omitted_summary
- ruff format fixes
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix: block current_uploads, sanitize only original user content
Per review feedback: instead of exempting <current_uploads> (which
allows user forgery), move it to _BLOCKED_TAG_NAMES and change
InputSanitizationMiddleware._process_request to scan only the
original user content (ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY) when available.
Server-injected trusted blocks are no longer checked against the
blocked-tag denylist.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: clarify fallback reason in input sanitization comment
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* @
fix: third-round review feedback — state visibility, sanitization, regex, nits
- list_uploaded_files_tool: logger.warning instead of silent try/except
on runtime.state read failure (High)
- input_sanitization_middleware: _extract_text_from_content skips empty
text blocks to match message_content_to_text behaviour; rfind fallback
path logs warning for observability (Medium)
- memory pipeline regexes: backreference (?P<tag>)(?P=tag) in
message_processing.py and prompt.py (Low)
- file_conversion.py: re-export moved to top of file (Low)
- Tests: middleware→tool state bridge test; integrated forged-tag +
multimodal sanitization tests
PR #4174 — Follow-up issues: #4212, #4213, #4214
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@
* @
fix: 4th-round review — denylist, sanitization, scandir, nits
- Add "uploaded_files" back to _BLOCKED_TAG_NAMES (old tag still processed by
deermem; user forgery must be escaped) (consistency)
- Fix inaccurate rfind-fallback comment: UploadsMiddleware keeps string as
string, fallback is unreachable for strings (doc fix)
- Distinguish "empty string key" (upload without text) from "non-string key"
(caller forgery) so empty-text uploads never escape the server block (edge)
- Merge dual os.scandir(uploads_dir) calls into one list re-use (minor)
- Add comment on .md sibling skip known limitation: user-uploaded .md files
whose stem collides with a converted doc are hidden (boundary, no code change)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@
* @
fix: tighten rfind-failure fallback — distinguish server blocks from user blocks
When _extract_text_from_content and message_content_to_text disagree on
multimodal list content and rfind fails, use content[0] (server-injected
<current_uploads> block) vs content[1:] (user blocks) to sanitize only
user blocks. Raw strings and non-standard dict blocks that
_extract_text_from_content misses are now also sanitized.
Non-distinguishable paths (< 2 text blocks, non-list content) still
degrade to full sanitization (safe — server block may be escaped but
user forgery never leaks). All fallback paths log via logger.warning.
Decision 18 / willem-bd 4th-round comment #3
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@
* @
fix: correct comments referencing text_blocks → content in rfind fallback
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
@
* fix: 5th-round review — dead code, subagent gating, integration test, perf, consistency
- Delete unreachable ORIGINAL_USER_CONTENT_KEY guard in rfind fallback
branch (original_user_content guaranteed non-empty str at that point)
- Remove list_uploaded_files from BUILTIN_TOOLS; add include_upload_tool
param to get_available_tools(), default True; task_tool.py passes False
so subagents no longer receive a tool whose state exclusion is broken
- Add integration test exercising real create_agent graph (not mocked
runtime.state) to verify LangGraph propagates before_agent state writes
into ToolRuntime.state during same-turn tool calls
- Cache DirEntry.stat() st_size in candidates tuple to avoid second
per-file syscall in the rendering loop
- Make the upload-tag pre-check case-insensitive (content_str.lower())
to match _UPLOAD_BLOCK_RE re.IGNORECASE
PR #4174 — willem-bd 5th-round review items #1-#5
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(channels): pass files metadata through _human_input_message() for IM uploads
_human_input_message() was not passing additional_kwargs.files to the
downstream message. UploadsMiddleware read no files, wrote
uploaded_files=[], and list_uploaded_files reported same-run IM
attachments as historical files (fancyboi999 repro).
Fix: add files parameter to _human_input_message(), call site passes
files=uploaded. Regression test locks the contract.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(channels): remove legacy <uploaded_files> manual prepend to fix double-injection regression
Commit 8d86dbf6 added files= pass-through to UploadsMiddleware but
left the manual _format_uploaded_files_block() prepend in place.
Every IM attachment reached the model twice — once via the legacy
<uploaded_files> block and once via <current_uploads>.
This commit removes the manual prepend and the now-dead
_format_uploaded_files_block() function. UploadsMiddleware is the
sole upload-context producer for both IM and web paths.
Reported-by: fancyboi999 (PR review)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs: update #4212 issue body to reflect completed fixes and narrowed remaining scope
* chore: remove temporary scratch file
* fix(middleware): neutralize user-derived values inside <current_uploads> block
Upload-derived filenames, paths, outline titles, and preview text are
interpolated verbatim inside the trusted <current_uploads> wrapper,
which InputSanitizationMiddleware exempts from sanitization. A crafted
filename or document heading containing blocked authority tags would
bypass the guardrail and enter model context as trusted framework data.
Fix: call neutralize_untrusted_tags() on all four user-derived values
inside _format_file_entry(), preserving the outer <current_uploads>
wrapper untouched.
Reported-by: fancyboi999 (P1 security review)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(middleware): neutralize extension labels in omitted-file summary
Files exceeding the 10-item context cap bypass _format_file_entry().
Their extensions, derived from user-controlled filenames via
_extension_label(), were interpolated verbatim into the trusted
<current_uploads> wrapper — another path for blocked authority tags
to escape the guardrail.
Fix: neutralize extension values inside _extension_label(), the
single extraction point for all extension labels.
Reported-by: fancyboi999 (P1 security review)
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tools): neutralize user-derived values in list_uploaded_files tool result
Apply neutralize_untrusted_tags() to every model-visible user-derived value
returned by list_uploaded_files: filename, virtual path, extension, outline
titles, outline preview lines, and omitted-file extension summary.
This closes the last remaining injection bypass in the upload lazy-loading
path - the <current_uploads> block and its omitted summary were already
neutralized (previous commits), but the list_uploaded_files tool produced
a second exit for the same attacker-controlled metadata that
ToolResultSanitizationMiddleware did not cover.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(tests): add missing include_upload_tool=False to task_tool mock assertions
PR #4174 added include_upload_tool parameter to get_available_tools().
task_tool.py correctly passes include_upload_tool=False for subagents
but 5 existing tests' assert_called_once_with expectations were not
updated, causing CI failures.
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(agents): per-agent model and generation settings
Let each custom agent choose its own model and sampling settings
(temperature, max_tokens) plus thinking / reasoning_effort defaults,
so agents sharing a model profile are no longer stuck with one shared
temperature and output length (#4336).
AgentConfig gains optional model_settings / thinking_enabled /
reasoning_effort (None = inherit). create_chat_model applies per-caller
model_overrides on top of the profile before the thinking/Codex
transforms; the lead agent resolves each knob with precedence
request > agent config > profile/default. The /api/agents create/update
routes persist the fields and reject an unknown model. The default lead
agent path is unchanged (no agent config -> overrides None). The agent
chat composer also stops force-overriding an agent's configured default
model with models[0].
* fix(agents): tri-state thinking control and default-model capability gating
The model-settings dialog seeded the thinking switch to false, so opening
it to tweak temperature and saving silently disabled thinking (the runtime
default is on) with no way back to inherit. It also hid the thinking /
reasoning controls whenever the agent inherited the global default model,
since `__default__` never resolved through `models.find`.
Give thinking an explicit Inherit / On / Off tri-state so an untouched save
is a no-op, and resolve `__default__` to the effective default (models[0])
for the capability check. Logic lives in the tested helpers module.
str_replace guards the replacement with `if old_str not in content`, which
cannot reject an empty old_str -- `"" in content` is always true. So an
empty old_str reached `str.replace("", new_str)`, which inserts new_str at
every character boundary, and the tool rewrote the file while still
returning "OK":
old_str='', new_str='# H\n' -> OK, file silently prepended
old_str='', new_str='X', replace_all -> OK, 'XdXeXfX XmXaXiXnX(X)X:X\nX...'
The empty-file branch above it already handles this case (`if not content:
if not old_str: return "OK"`), and the existing test states the intent
directly: "An empty old_str is a no-op edit and remains a benign OK". That
contract just never held once the file had content.
The tool is registered by default (config.example.yaml) and its schema
declares old_str as a plain string with no minLength, so a model can emit
"" legitimately; read-before-write only compares a hash and lets it past.
Check old_str first so the no-op holds whatever the file contains. The
empty-file case folds into the same not-found branch, which keeps its
message and behaviour.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
