* fix(authz): cover create/run/memory/agent routes with permission checks; scope USER.md per user
Route permissions: the AuthorizationProvider model only applied to routes
carrying @require_permission, so POST /api/threads, /api/threads/search,
POST /api/runs/stream and /api/runs/wait (runs:create), every /api/memory
route and the custom-agent routes ran with authentication only — a
provider configured to deny threads:write/runs:create/... could not
enforce those decisions. Add the missing decorators (threads:write,
threads:read, runs:create, memory:read/write, agents:read/write) and
register the new permission names in authz.Permissions. No owner checks
are added: per-user data scoping stays in the repository layer.
User profile: GET/PUT /api/user-profile read and wrote a single global
{base_dir}/USER.md, so in a multi-user deployment any authenticated user
could overwrite the prompt context injected for everyone else (and read
it). Scope the file to the caller's bucket
({base_dir}/users/{user_id}/USER.md) like user-scoped skills; no other
consumer of the old global path exists in the tree (verified by grep and
the updated tests). test_put_user_profile asserted the wrong effective
user under the autouse conftest user fixture; fixed to test-user-autouse.
* fix(authz): bind positional args in require_permission; migrate legacy USER.md
Review follow-up on #4989 (willem-bd):
- require_permission's wrapper only looked for request in keyword
arguments, so direct positional calls like
create_thread(body, request) made the injected keyword stub collide
with the positional request (TypeError: multiple values). The wrapper
now binds the wrapped signature via inspect.signature().bind() and
honors a positionally-passed request (and thread_id) instead of
assuming kwargs; the test-stub injection only fires when request is
absent everywhere. The two positional callers in
tests/test_threads_router.py pass again (8/8 channel tests).
- migrate_user_isolation.py now claims the legacy global USER.md for
--user-id (default 'default') like the other unowned legacy
artifacts; without it, upgrading installs with an existing profile
would read content: null and later strand the old file beside the
new per-user one. Conflict handling mirrors migrate_memory (rename to
USER.legacy.md).
* style(scripts): keep migrate_user_isolation help within the line budget
* test(authz): give internal-request stubs realistic auth fields
The create_thread permission wrapper added in this PR authenticates
the direct calls in the internal-owner tests; their SimpleNamespace
requests had state.user but no auth_source and no cookies, so
get_current_user_from_request fell through to request.cookies.get and
raised AttributeError (verified introduced by this branch: both tests
pass on the base commit).
The stubs now carry cookies={} and
state.auth_source=AUTH_SOURCE_INTERNAL, which is exactly what
AuthMiddleware stamps on real internal requests, so state.user is
honored without the JWT path. All 80 tests in the file pass.
* fix(pat): keep memory/agent permissions out of PAT scopes by design
The route permissions exist (they guard the memory/agent routers) but PATs
govern the thread/run lifecycle only: _PAT_ROUTE_RULES default-denies those
routers for PAT callers regardless of scopes. The alignment invariant
becomes a subset check plus a pinned exclusion, and pat.py documents that
opening these scopes is a product decision requiring three synchronized
changes.
* test/docs: cover migrate_user_profile; drop the unclaimed USER.md injection wording
Five-scenario test class mirroring the sibling migration steps (move,
conflict-rename, noop, both under dry-run). The GET/PUT descriptions no
longer say USER.md is 'injected into agents' — nothing at this head consumes
it for prompts; the routes are storage/retrieval only. The memory AGENTS.md
migration pointer now enumerates skills/ and the global USER.md.
* docs(paths): align the USER.md layout comment with the injection disclaimer
* test(authz): align effective permission contracts
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* feat(settings): persist account preferences across browsers
* docs(settings): scope preference guidance to user persistence
* fix(settings): preserve SSR and fence custom-agent defaults
* test: include user persistence in scoped guidance inventory
* fix(settings): sync explicit edits and preserve local tab updates
* feat(artifacts): preview CSV and TSV files as bounded tables
* chore: keep preview screenshots out of the PR file diff
* fix(artifacts): detect record newlines outside quoted fields
* test(auth): include project permissions in me contract expectations
* feat(authz): surface effective route permissions on GET /auth/me (Phase 4, #4063)
GET /api/v1/auth/me now returns the effective route permissions alongside
the user identity, so the frontend can hide actions the caller's role
cannot perform (RFC #4063 Phase 4).
The value reuses the AuthContext that AuthMiddleware already resolves per
request (including PAT-scope intersection and internal-caller semantics),
so /me adds zero extra provider evaluations; a middleware-less composition
falls back to the same resolution _authenticate uses.
Credential-creation responses (register/initialize) leave the field None:
they are public paths where the middleware does not run, and resolving
there would introduce fresh on-loop config loads on those routes.
* test(e2e): expect /auth/me permissions in auth-disabled contract
PR #5228 adds the effective route permissions to GET /auth/me, so the
strict toEqual against the bare AUTH_DISABLED_USER object no longer
holds: the received payload carries six extra keys (the permissions
array). Extend the expected payload with the full registered permission
set in _ALL_PERMISSIONS order — with authorization disabled the gateway
grants exactly that static list, so the pin stays deterministic.
The runtime frontend is unaffected (auth-disabled SSR never calls /me,
and userSchema strips unknown keys); only this contract pin needed the
new field.
* refactor(authz): public resolve_route_permissions_for_request wrapper
Address review nits on the middleware-less fallback: the router reached
into the private authz._is_internal_caller, so expose a thin public
wrapper pairing resolve_route_permissions with the internal-caller
heuristics, and use it from both _authenticate and the /me fallback so
the two cannot drift apart. Also drop an unused tmp_path parameter from
test_auth_disabled_me_includes_default_admin_permissions (_setup_auth
provisions its own tmp directory).
No behavior change: the wrapper delegates to the exact pair of calls the
fallback made before.
