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21 Commits
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4f64ca2ae0
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fix(config): revalidate the extensions config singleton by file signature (#6386)
* fix(config): revalidate the extensions config singleton by file signature `get_extensions_config()` parsed `extensions_config.json` once per process and only the process that handled a write ever reloaded it. With several uvicorn workers, or several Pods sharing one volume, every other process kept its startup copy: the MCP servers the agent could use and the local-bash absolute path allowlist derived from the filesystem MCP server differed between replicas until each one restarted. The singleton now records the resolved path and the file's (mtime, size, sha256) signature and reloads when either changes, like `get_app_config()` does for `config.yaml` and `mcp/cache.py` does for the tools cache. After a successful load, a revision that cannot be loaded (file gone, truncated, invalid) keeps the last-known-good configuration and is logged once with the exception type only; the first load still raises. `set_extensions_config()` pins the injected instance until a reload or reset. The cached AppConfig's `extensions` snapshot is built from the singleton instance and refreshes when that instance changes, so it inherits the same fail-soft policy instead of parsing the file again. * docs(changelog): link the extensions config freshness entry to #6386 * fix(config): follow an explicitly reloaded extensions config path `reload_extensions_config(config_path=X)` recorded X, but the freshness probe re-resolved the default path, so the next read either flipped the cache back to the default file or pinned a stale copy of X. The cache now remembers the explicit path and both the probe and later reloads follow it until a reset or an argument-less reload. Also shortens the pointer in backend/AGENTS.md so the nested guidance chains stay under the hard size limit enforced by the agent-guidance check. * docs: keep backend guidance within the inherited size budget * fix(config): reload the probed extensions config path --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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d700ad9edf
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feat(memory): add Jev pre-screening and signal classification over a shared TypeSafe client (#5906)
* feat(memory): add Jev pre-screening and signal classification over a shared TypeSafe client - refactor(typesafe): extract a shared Jev (TypeSafe) client and unify its configuration: one connection-precedence rule, credential fingerprint, wire-size counting and error taxonomy, shared by the guardrail gate and the memory hooks. - feat(memory): wire `memory.prescreen` and `memory.signal_classification` into DeerMem through one injected judge hook (both off by default, `enforce` gated by the shadow evaluation). - config: add the top-level `typesafe:` block and the two judging slots to `config.example.yaml` and the Helm values, bump `config_version` to 50, and sync the Helm README example with it. - test(memory): add the shadow-evaluation script (`eval_memory_prescreen.py`) with per-stratum gates, censoring and the no-network baseline. Review follow-ups folded in: - `mutations_accepted` counts only facts that survive capacity enforcement and the upload-event scrub that precedes persistence, only removals/reinforcements of ids that existed, and persisted near-duplicate merges (matched by id, or by identity for legacy id-less facts); it is published only after persistence succeeds. - The cached manager hot-reloads its judge when a memory slot or the shared `typesafe` block changes (including a credential rotation); publication is serialized and revalidates the config generation, so a build started before an `enforce` -> `off` rollback cannot land after it. - Cache provenance is per answer: the `cached` flag and the reported model follow the answers a side actually consumed, across partial merges and answerless retries. - An oversized noul integer stays a per-question error instead of raising. - Incremental call savings use the shared scored denominator. - The sensitive-stratum gate requires evidence for each of identity, preference and correction. * fix(typesafe): resolve one credential per layer and refuse unusable connection values Review follow-ups on the shared TypeSafe client (#5906): - A consumer's `api_key_env` is no longer overridden by a literal `api_key` in the shared `typesafe:` block: the first layer that sets either credential setting decides it, and inside one layer the literal key wins (the standalone semantics). A consumer whose endpoint does not accept the block's key no longer sends it on every call, and the missing-credential message keeps naming the variable that layer configured. - `base_url` is validated where it is configured: `http(s)` only, with no query, fragment, embedded credentials, whitespace or control characters, and a malformed port fails at construction instead of on every request (httpx raises `UnsupportedProtocol` / `InvalidURL` per call, and the query would have been swallowed into the appended endpoint path). - A credential that cannot travel as a header value — surrounding whitespace from a secret mounted from a file, a non-printable character — is refused when the connection resolves. It used to construct fine and then put the whole `Bearer <key>` value into h11's `LocalProtocolError` message, which the guardrail middleware's `logger.exception` prints. - The client raises transport failures without chaining the original exception, so that message can no longer carry the credential through the cause chain; the exception type stays in the message for diagnosis. - `TypeSafeConfig` validates in strict mode, agreeing with the consumer `config` path: `max_attempts: true` was silently read as `1`. An integer stays a usable float, so `timeout: 5` keeps working. Tests: 20 cases across `tests/test_typesafe_config.py` and `tests/test_typesafe_client.py`, each red on the previous revision and green now. 367 focused typesafe/memory/config tests, `make test-blocking-io` (167) and the eval-script suites (50) pass; `ruff check` and `ruff format --check` are clean. Docs synced: `backend/docs/GUARDRAILS.md`, `typesafe/AGENTS.md`, `config.example.yaml`. * fix(typesafe,memory): bound the reply, record request failures, gate enforce on the evidence Second review round on #5906: the remaining items from the review thread and from the follow-up pass. Typesafe client (the reply is treated as hostile input too): - Send `Accept-Encoding: identity`, refuse a body that carries a non-identity `Content-Encoding`, and read through a bounded `iter_bytes` that stops past `MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES` (64 KiB). A gzip body that expands to 128 MiB used to be decoded in full and, on the gate path, allowed the tool call unexamined; it is now `invalid_response` (a denial with `fail_closed: true`). - Map `RecursionError` from `json.loads` to `invalid_response`: deep nesting escaped the module's taxonomy, so the memory consumers lost the round's record instead of recording a fallback. Memory judge: - A request-level failure is recorded as `request_failed`, never `no_verdict` (`REASON_REQUEST_FAILED` was defined and never emitted, so an unreachable endpoint was indistinguishable from a provider with no usable answer). The adapters' `decide()` now propagates `TypeSafeError` for the coordinator to record and log; `no_verdict` stays for a question-level failure, and an ineligible side keeps its own reason even when the round's request failed. Shadow evaluation (the enablement gate reads the evidence, not one number): - The miss-rate gate requires the exact one-sided Clopper-Pearson upper bound to meet the 1% target; a sample that only meets the point estimate is `INSUFFICIENT` (0/250 was reported as a pass with a 1.19% bound). - New `baseline_incremental_savings` gate: a baseline that saves as many calls as the model — the shipped all-trivial sample — fails instead of enabling. - Negative counts (`mutations_accepted`, message / batch / token counts) are treated as absent rather than scored: `-3` read as "nothing lost", adding a phantom saving to the numerator and the denominator. Docs: the design documents cited but absent from the repository are replaced with in-repo pointers (`MEMORY_IMPROVEMENTS.md`, `agents/memory/AGENTS.md`, `GUARDRAILS.md`), and the gate and limit wording now matches what the code enforces. Tests: 31 new or updated cases, each red on the previous revision (compressed body refused even when it decodes to a valid envelope, body over the cap refused, body at the cap answered, deep nesting mapped, `request_failed` on each request-level failure, the bound and baseline gates, the negative counter). 454 focused tests, `make test-blocking-io` (167) and the eval suites pass; `ruff check` and `ruff format --check` are clean. * fix(memory-eval): pair the baseline comparison on the same records Review follow-up on the incremental-savings gate added in ed930478 (P2): both sides of the comparison are now the records the no-network baseline can score (`trivial_only` plus a readable signals list). Subtracting that subset's heuristic savings from model savings over *all* scorable skips credited the model with batches the baseline never saw: 300 reviewed skips with a single annotated record computed 300-1=299 "incremental", passed the gate and set `enable_recommended`, while the paired comparison was model=1 against heuristic=1 (incremental 0). - `Evidence` carries the paired numbers (`baseline_paired_skips`, `baseline_model_saved_calls`, `baseline_heuristic_saved_calls`) instead of one heuristic count, filled by `build_report` from the baseline summary. - The gate reports `INSUFFICIENT` when no scored skip carries the annotation and when the annotation covers only a subset of the scored skips (the message carries the paired counts and the `paired of scored` coverage), `FAIL` on a non-positive paired gain, and `PASS` only on a positive gain over the full paired set. - Docs state the pairing/coverage requirement in `backend/docs/MEMORY_IMPROVEMENTS.md` and in the script docstring. Tests: the reviewer's counterexample as a report-level regression (it failed with `assert 'PASS' == 'INSUFFICIENT'` on ed930478 while `enable_recommended` was true), a unit case for the paired-subset `INSUFFICIENT`, and the renamed paired fields. 344 focused tests, `make test-blocking-io` (167) and the eval suites pass; `ruff check` / `ruff format --check` clean. * fix(typesafe): bound the sync body read by the deadline `deadline_seconds` only covered the sync path's headers, the completed body and the parse, so an endpoint that drips bytes just under the read timeout held the caller for one read per piece — the whole of `MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES` past the budget. The read loop now checks the budget before every transport read, which bounds the overshoot to one read. The pieces are the transport's own reads, not re-chunked output: `iter_bytes(chunk_size)` pulls many reads inside a single yielded chunk, so a check at that granularity would never see a drip. `tests/test_typesafe_client.py` pins it with a valid envelope delivered as 24 pieces of 50 ms against a 0.2 s deadline: red before (24 pieces pulled), green now (~5), on both the sync and async paths. Docstring and `typesafe/AGENTS.md` track the new granularity. * fix(memory): read the YAML off spelling, and veto a skip over the whole batch Two review findings on the memory judging path. `memory.prescreen.mode` / `memory.signal_classification.mode` rejected the `mode: off` spelling `config.example.yaml` ships and a rollback types: YAML 1.1 parses the unquoted value as a boolean, so both fields saw `False`. The failed reload left the previous judge running, so both fields now normalize `False` to `off` before the `Literal` runs. `True` stays a validation error (no mode it could mean). The examples quote the value, and the docs record why. The pre-screen's L3 veto read `detect_signals`' 6-message window while the batch it answers for is the whole post-watermark feed, so an explicit correction in an earlier turn of an eight-message batch did not stop the skip that then advanced the watermark past it. `detect_signals` gains a `window` parameter (default unchanged) and the updater scans the full feed for the veto; the extraction hint and the reinforcement gate keep the window. Both regressions are red on the previous head: the config test reproduced the `input_value=False` rejection through `AppConfig.from_file`, and the batch test reproduced the prescreen judging (and skipping) a batch whose first turn carries the correction. |
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38b82057e1
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fix(config): sign the bytes the config cache parsed, not a second read (#5848)
* fix(config): sign the bytes the config cache parsed, not a second read _load_and_cache_app_config parsed config.yaml through AppConfig.from_file and then called get_config_signature, which opens and hashes the file again. A write landing between those two reads left the cache holding the older content under the newer content's signature. get_app_config() compares the on-disk signature against the recorded one, so from then on it saw "unchanged" and the edit only surfaced when yet another edit changed the signature — silently stale until then, with no self-healing. Read the file once through a new shared helper, file_signature.read_config_with_signature, which returns the bytes together with the (mtime, size, sha256) of exactly those bytes, and parse them through AppConfig._from_yaml_text (from_file's body, split out; from_file itself is unchanged). The recorded signature now always describes the parsed content: a write that races the load can only produce a signature mismatch on the next call, i.e. one extra reload. Signing before parsing but re-reading for the parse would not be enough — an edit that lands between the two reads and is then reverted would be served forever — so the tests pin that the parsed bytes are the signed bytes. The stale-metadata reload test now routes the loader's read through the same stale-stat simulation it already applies to the probe, since the loader no longer records the probe's result. * docs(changelog): reference #5848 in the config cache entries --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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82671596f3
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feat(authz): add plugin resource targets, provenance, action and management enforcement (#5842)
* feat(authz): add plugin resource targets, provenance, action and management enforcement
PR1 of the extension-tool-authorization series
(docs/plans/2026-09-24-extension-tool-authorization-spec.md): plugin
authorization plumbing, no new author-facing declaration.
- `authz/plugin_targets.py` is the single encoder/validator for composite
targets (`namespace/part`), with one validating composer behind three
kind-checked constructors; invalid input raises instead of degrading.
- `authz/plugin_authz.py` is the harness decision layer (`plugin_action`,
`plugin_management`, plus the batch filters the page slice will consume):
disabled is a no-op, an explicit deny raises, and provider errors follow
`fail_closed` like the sandbox gate.
- `POST /api/plugins/{ns}/actions/{name}` decides `plugin_action:invoke`
after the action resolves and before the body is streamed.
- `deerflow_extension_api.auth` publishes `require_plugin_management` /
`arequire_plugin_management` with two `app.state` resolver keys; the
Gateway installs both. Contract version 0.2.3 -> 0.2.4.
- `tools/tool_provenance.py` records host-written plugin provenance for
display (assembly descriptor, Layer-2 context later); no decision reads a
label.
- Plugin providers use a `(config signature, loop key)` cache so a
loop-affine provider is never handed to another loop or to a sync caller.
- RBAC gains `plugin_actions` / `plugin_management` aliases;
`config_version` 47 -> 48 across the three mirrors.
Tests: new plugin target/provenance/action/management suites plus a
blocking-IO anchor whose offloads were reverted to prove red->green.
* fix(authz): decide plugin resources from the request's config snapshot
Review round 1 on PR #5842 (willem-bd).
P1 — the decision layer no longer reloads the configuration. The six
`authz/plugin_authz.py` functions take a required `app_config` snapshot (the
same request-scoped config the Gateway used to resolve the provider), and
`resolve_/aresolve_plugin_authorization` return it as a third element, so
`enabled`/`fail_closed` can never come from a second read that drifted from
the one that produced the provider. A snapshot the caller could not read at
all is *unavailable*, not disabled: it fails closed as
`authz.config_unavailable`. The Gateway's `_plugin_app_config` now separates
an absent `config.yaml` (no gate, today's behavior) from a config that exists
but cannot be read or validated (deny) instead of swallowing both through
`safe_app_config`.
P2 — `_validated_decision` requires `type(decision.allow) is bool` on both
the sync `authorize` and async `aauthorize` paths, so a provider returning
`AuthzDecision(allow="false")` is a malformed verdict that follows
`fail_closed` instead of being read as an allow.
Both fixes are covered by regression tests that were verified red against the
pre-fix behavior (P1: 200 vs 403 and resolver True vs False; P2: 12 cases
across fail_closed/fail_open and sync/async), plus tests pinning that an
absent config and `authorization.enabled: false` keep today's behavior.
* fix(authz): treat a request-time config absence as unavailable
Review round 2 on PR #5842 (willem-bd).
P1 — `_plugin_app_config[_async]` no longer maps a missing `config.yaml` to
`None` ("no gate"). A Gateway cannot have started without a readable config
(`app/gateway/app.py` reads it through this same accessor in `lifespan`), so
absence *during a request* means the configuration this process was running on
became unavailable — a hot reload, an atomic replace, a ConfigMap remount. It is
unavailable, not disabled: the error propagates,
`resolve_/aresolve_plugin_authorization` raise
`_PluginAuthorizationUnavailable(fail_closed=True)`, the action dispatcher
returns 403 and the management resolvers answer `False`. The dead
`(None, None, None)` allow path is gone, the resolvers return a non-optional
`AppConfig` as their third element, and callers key "authorization disabled" on
`provider is None` alone. This matches the rule the decision layer already
documented (`authz.config_unavailable`) and the public docs.
P2 — `_deny_reason_code` is total: a `reasons` that is not iterable degrades the
code to `authz.denied` instead of raising `TypeError` outside the guarded
provider path, which turned a denial into an unhandled error. It is deliberately
not folded into `_validated_decision`: `allow` was a real `bool`, so the verdict
is a valid denial, and treating it as malformed would flip it to an allow under
`fail_closed: false`.
Both fixes are covered by regression tests verified red against the pre-fix
behavior (P1: resolver True vs False, async `PermissionError` not raised, route
200 vs 403; P2: `TypeError: 'NoneType' object is not iterable` at
`plugin_authz.py:113`). The action-route tests in
`tests/test_plugin_contributions.py` now install a readable
`authorization.enabled: false` config instead of relying on a config-less
process, and `docs/full-stack-plugins.md` plus the PR1 decision log record the
new rule.
* fix(authz): apply the running policy when the plugin config is unreadable
Follow-up to f03d2ea9 (review round 2 on PR #5842, willem-bd).
The first attempt read the P1 finding as "absence is never disabled" and failed
every config read closed unconditionally. That is too broad for this repo: a
config-less host is deliberately treated as having no policy to apply
(`_get_route_authorization_config` falls back to a disabled config,
`sandbox_authz.safe_app_config` documents the same no-op for "CI runners and
direct-call tests"), and the rule turned the config-less e2e plugin host
(`extension_test_fixtures.bookmark_plugin_gateway`) into a 403 — the three
`bookmark-plugin.spec.ts` cases lost the save action. Reproduced locally:
`POST /api/plugins/community.bookmarks/actions/save` against that fixture host
returned 403 before, 200 after this change.
The rule is now "has this process loaded a configuration?", not "was the last
read successful?":
- No loaded config (`peek_loaded_app_config()`, new read-only accessor on
`deerflow.config.app_config`) and no `config.yaml`: no policy to apply, so the
gate stays a no-op — unchanged for CI runners, direct-call tests and hosts
that mount only the plugins router.
- A loaded config whose file disappears or cannot be read: *unavailable*, never
*disabled*. The resolvers raise `_PluginAuthorizationUnavailable` carrying the
failure flag of the configuration this process runs on (authorization
disabled there -> no gate; enabled -> that policy's `fail_closed`, `True` by
default), so an enabled Gateway answers 403/False in the window instead of
letting protected plugin actions and management routes through.
- A config file that exists but cannot be read or validated right now: fail
closed when nothing is loaded (round 1's rule), otherwise the loaded policy
decides.
`peek_loaded_app_config()` is preferred over a Gateway-side startup snapshot: it
reflects the last successfully loaded config, so a hot-reloaded policy is what
applies during the window, and there is no lifecycle hook to keep in sync.
Evidence: the three no-config/lost-config branches in
`tests/test_plugin_management_guard.py` and
`tests/test_plugin_action_authorization.py`, round 1's unreadable-config tests
unchanged, `test_peek_loaded_app_config_survives_a_missing_file` in
`tests/test_app_config_reload.py`, and the fixture-host probe above. Docs
(`docs/full-stack-plugins.md`, `reference.mdx` en/zh) and the PR1 decision log
state the final rule; the log records the superseded variant.
* fix(authz): keep a denial whose reasons raise while being read
* fix(authz): intersect plugin batch filters with the candidates
The plugin_page/plugin_management batch helpers returned the provider's
`filter_resources` answer verbatim, so a custom provider could hand the
projections a target that was never asked about ("*", another namespace,
a phantom page). Every other filter call site re-projects from its own
candidate list; do the same here, state the intersection on the provider
contract, and pin it with a regression test that fails on the old
pass-through.
* docs(plugins): map a management denial to 403 in the route example
The contributed-route example called `arequire_plugin_management` and let
the documented `PermissionError` escape. The Gateway installs no
`PermissionError` handler, so a route copied from the example answered 500
on a normal policy denial instead of 403. Both example routes now translate
the denial, and the surrounding bullets say why the translation is the
route's job.
* docs(extensions): point the 0.2.4 contract row at the PR that ships it
Every other row in the version-history table links the pull request that
shipped the version; 0.2.4 linked the authorization tracking issue instead.
Both the English and Chinese tables now link this PR.
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82ac1612e3
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feat(storage): add a content-addressed blob store contract (issue #4189 item 2) (#5361)
* feat(storage): add a content-addressed blob store contract (#4189 item 2) Addresses the review on the previous head: * the retention/dedup claim in the doc now states the deletion rule (liveness from the durable references) instead of promising refcount-free deletion, and the sidecar records the first writer as advisory provenance only; * one validate_blob_kind() owns the kind grammar, so the message a producer sees is the pattern that is enforced; * adds the missing storage/AGENTS.md (registry entry included) that both docstrings already pointed at; * drops the dead _import_backend_module() by routing the folder scan through it; * exports BlobNotConfiguredError from the package; * renames _KIND_MAX_BYTES to _MAX_BLOB_BYTES (it caps one put, not a kind); * delete failures raise the neutral BlobStoreError instead of BlobReadError. Rebased onto current main so the guidance-budget test matches upstream. Signed-off-by: zeng-bohan <zengbh1@gmail.com> * fix(storage): restore the config module and backend packages dropped by the squash The force-push to e72b435 silently lost four items the surviving code imports, breaking `import deerflow.storage` and the test suite at collection: - deerflow/config/blob_storage_config.py (BlobStorageConfig + get/set_blob_storage_config + load_blob_storage_config_from_dict, mirroring memory_config's host-shared schema and hot-reload pattern) - app_config.py wiring: the blob_storage AppConfig field, the import, and the _apply_singleton_configs -> load_blob_storage_config_from_dict call (memory stayed wired; blob did not) - storage/backends/__init__.py (drop-in contract docstring) - storage/backends/local_fs/__init__.py (LocalFsBlobStore re-export + STORE_CLASS for _scan_backends) Verified: pytest tests/test_blob_store.py tests/test_app_config_reload.py tests/test_app_config_name_indexes.py -> 67 passed; ruff format/check clean on all four files. * fix(storage): name the failing digest check; document the 64 MiB per-put cap - get_bytes: split the corruption message into size mismatch (truncation / partial write) vs digest mismatch (same-size bit rot, reporting what the content hashes to vs what the ref names) — the combined message reported 'got 1024 bytes, expected 1024' on same-size corruption and sent the debugger in the wrong direction. - docs/blob-storage.md + storage/AGENTS.md: state the _MAX_BLOB_BYTES cap (64 MiB) and that it is backend-level defense-in-depth rather than part of the BlobStore contract, so the externalized-tool-results follow-up sees the limit before the first production put fails. * test(storage): pin both get_bytes corruption branches separately The pre-split test corrupted the blob with different-size bytes, so only the size-mismatch branch ever ran and neither new message was asserted. Now: different-size corruption asserts 'size mismatch', and a same-size reversal (bit rot) asserts 'digest mismatch' — the branch the split was actually about. * docs(config): document blob_storage in config.example.yaml Add the blob_storage section (enabled/backend/backend_config) mirroring the memory section's shape, matching the Configuration section of backend/docs/blob-storage.md, and bump config_version 46 -> 47 per the example-file convention for schema additions. Default state is unchanged: enabled: false, purely opt-in. * fix(helm): align chart config version with example * fix(storage): refresh blob store on config changes --------- Signed-off-by: zeng-bohan <zengbh1@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: zengbohan1 <310902929+zengbohan1@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: zeng-bohan <310902929+zeng-bohan@users.noreply.github.com> |
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4470932118
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feat(extensions): allow constructor kwargs on config-declared middlewares (#5312)
* feat(extensions): allow constructor kwargs on config-declared middlewares
extensions.middlewares entries may be a class-path string or {class, kwargs}.
String entries keep the zero-argument constructor. Unknown fields and blank
class paths fail at config validation. Constructor errors still fail at
agent creation.
Fixes #5311
* fix(extensions): coerce middleware kwargs to JSON types
YAML timestamps became datetime objects while JSON kept strings, so
constructors and to_file_dict() json.dump saw different types. Validate
kwargs as JSON types at config load, stringify dates, reject NaN and
other non-JSON values, and cover the raw-dict loader branch.
* style(extensions): wrap middleware Field description for ruff E501
make lint failed: the middlewares description was 289 chars (limit 240).
Wrap it and run ruff format on the two files this PR last touched.
* docs: compact configured middleware guidance to satisfy size limit
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
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063d62c3c3
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feat(persistence): support custom postgres schema (#3442)
* feat(persistence): support custom postgres schema * fix(persistence): address CI lint/test failures and review feedback - Map missing psycopg import to actionable POSTGRES_INSTALL guidance in sync/async schema-creation helpers - Accept SQLAlchemy compound DSN schemes (postgresql+asyncpg) when injecting search_path, normalizing to a libpq-consumable DSN - Guard keyword-DSN tests with importorskip so they skip without psycopg - Set database=None in sync checkpointer none-fix test to avoid MagicMock backend resolution - Apply ruff import sort and format * fix(persistence): address pg-schema review feedback - Restrict postgres_schema regex to lowercase-only so the quoted CREATE SCHEMA matches the unquoted search_path (PG case-folds it), fixing the mixed-case bug where tables silently fell back to public. - Replace shlex.join/split with libpq-correct backslash escaping for the options parameter so values containing spaces survive intact. - Add normalize_libpq_dsn() and route the async checkpointer pool through dsn_with_search_path() so a +asyncpg suffix is stripped and existing DSN options (e.g. statement_timeout) are merged instead of overridden. - Extract shared ensure_postgres_schema()/ensure_postgres_schema_async() helpers (mapping missing psycopg to the install hint) used by all four provider sites. - Tests: reject mixed-case schemas, preserve space-containing libpq option, cover normalize_libpq_dsn, and assert pool search_path via DSN. * fix(persistence): align pg-schema test with merged store API The main merge moved the sync Store factory to the single-path _resolve_store_config/_sync_store_cm design, dropping the PR's _sync_store_from_database helper. The integration test still imported the removed symbol, breaking test collection (backend-unit-tests). Resolve the store config from a DatabaseConfig and drive it through _sync_store_cm instead. * fix(persistence): address pg-schema review feedback - reject trailing/leading whitespace in postgres_schema via re.fullmatch (a $-anchored re.match let "deerflow\n" through, silently landing tables in public) - re-escape all whitespace (TAB/CR/LF) when re-joining libpq options so a caller's pre-existing options value round-trips losslessly - re-validate the identifier inside create_schema_sql as defense-in-depth at the SQL-emitting boundary - accept the postgres:// short scheme in the alembic search_path injection - close the sync psycopg connection explicitly (psycopg3 __exit__ does not close()), mirroring the async path - drop the partial checkpointer/store reset on a database config change; database is restart-required and the ORM engine is not rebuilt, so a partial reset would half-migrate the deployment * docs(config): complete the postgres_schema migration checklist Address PR review (P1): the documented `public`->schema migration only moved runs, run_events, threads_meta, feedback, and users. That strands every other DeerFlow-owned table -- the four channel_* tables, both scheduled_* tables, agents, and (critically) alembic_version -- in `public`. On restart bootstrap treats the partially-populated target schema as unversioned, re-baselines it, and replays migrations while the real rows stay invisible in `public`. List the full owned set explicitly, call out alembic_version as required, and keep the "discover the rest" query for version-drift safety. * refactor(checkpointer): drop test-only _sync_checkpointer_from_database Address PR review: the helper was only reached by the env-gated integration test and re-implemented the DatabaseConfig->CheckpointerConfig backend resolution that _resolve_checkpointer_config already owns, so a future backend added there would silently miss this path. Mirror the store side of the same test, which reuses the production path directly: _resolve_checkpointer_config(...) + _sync_checkpointer_cm(...). |
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c48de5e70b
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feat(checkpoint): make delta snapshot_frequency configurable (#4516)
* feat(checkpoint): make delta snapshot_frequency configurable * fix(config): carry legacy checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency with warning Addresses review on #4516: the rename from the flat database.checkpoint_delta_snapshot_frequency key to nested database.checkpoint_delta.snapshot_frequency silently dropped the old value (pydantic extra="ignore"). Add a before-validator that maps the legacy key onto the nested one with a deprecation warning (nested key wins when both are set), plus a CHANGELOG breaking-change note covering the rename and the 1000 -> 10 default change. * fix(checkpoint): validate frozen snapshot frequency |
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42baed8c8c
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feat(checkpoint): dual-mode checkpoint storage with LangGraph DeltaChannel (#4292)
* feat(checkpoint): dual-mode checkpoint storage with LangGraph DeltaChannel
Add a restart-required database.checkpoint_channel_mode ("full" default,
"delta") that stores the messages channel via LangGraph 1.2 DeltaChannel,
cutting checkpoint storage from O(n^2) to O(n) for append-only history.
Existing full checkpoints seed delta state transparently; no data migration.
- config: mode schema + freeze-on-first-use with
CheckpointModeReconfigurationError; mode marker persisted in checkpoint
metadata; unsafe delta->full downgrade rejected fail-closed with
CheckpointModeMismatchError (run-level error, failed state read)
- state: delta message state schema; CheckpointStateAccessor centralizes
materialized reads for all consumers (threads API, branches,
regeneration, compaction, state updates, memory, goal workers)
- runtime: raw writers (run durations, interrupted title, thread goal)
parent their checkpoints to the checkpoint they derive from, preserving
delta ancestry; rollback forks the pre-run lineage through a state
mutation graph with Overwrite restores; InMemorySaver delta-history
override delegates to the base walk (fixes dropped first write after
migration, also present upstream)
- tests: conformance suite over {memory, sqlite, postgres} covering
migration replay, stable message IDs, storage shape and writer
preservation; conftest fixture isolates the frozen mode between tests;
stale config fakes refreshed
- ci: backend unit tests gain a postgres service
* fix(checkpoint): close materialization gaps in goal flow, guard public factory
- Route goal-continuation message reads through CheckpointStateAccessor:
raw channel_values reads see the delta sentinel in delta mode, which
disabled goal continuation (stand_down=no_durable_end_of_turn) after
durable assistant turns. Raw tuples remain for tuple-only metadata
(checkpoint id, pending_writes).
- Reject checkpoint_channel_mode='delta' + checkpointer in
create_deerflow_agent at construction: factory-built persisted graphs
bypass mode-marker injection and the fail-closed gate, reproducing
silent mixed-mode state loss. Delta without persistence stays allowed.
- Import the postgres saver lazily (pytest.importorskip in the fixture)
so the documented default install collects the suite; add a CI job
running pytest --collect-only on uv sync --group dev without extras.
- Fix test_checkpointer fallback test to patch get_app_config at its
use site (provider module), making it deterministic when a local
config.yaml selects a persistent backend.
* fix(gateway): preserve extension-owned channels in state mutations, bump config version
- build_state_mutation_graph / build_checkpoint_state_mutation_accessor
accept an explicit state_schema; branch and POST /state now compile the
mutation graph from the thread's effective schema
(graph_state_schema on the assistant graph). The base-ThreadState
fallback silently discarded channels contributed by custom
AgentMiddleware.state_schema on branch (data loss) and returned a
false-success 200 on POST /state.
- POST /state validates values keys against the mutation graph's
channels and rejects unknown fields with 422 instead of ignoring
them; reducer detection covers extension channels
(BinaryOperatorAggregate or DeltaChannel) so Overwrite replace
semantics work for middleware reducers in both modes.
- Endpoint regression: custom AgentMiddleware.state_schema value
survives branch, updates through POST /state, and an unknown field
receives 422.
- config_version 26 -> 27 for the new database.checkpoint_channel_mode
(example, Helm chart values + README, support-bundle fixture), so
existing installs get the outdated-config warning and
make config-upgrade merges the field; covered by a test driving the
real example file and the real config-upgrade script.
* fix(gateway): resolve assistant schema via one boundary, copy branch reducer values with Overwrite
GET /threads/{id}/state now resolves the thread's assistant_id through a
single reusable boundary (thread metadata -> assistant_id -> effective
graph), so channels contributed by a custom AgentMiddleware.state_schema
are materialized instead of dropped by the default lead schema. POST
/state uses the same boundary instead of resolving the schema ad hoc.
Branch writes wrap every copied reducer channel in Overwrite (derived
from the effective mutation graph: BinaryOperatorAggregate + DeltaChannel),
not just messages, so already-aggregated values are never re-merged.
Regression tests use a real AgentMiddleware.state_schema with a
non-identity reducer in both full and delta modes: GET /state returns the
extension value, POST /state replaces it, branch preserves it
byte-for-byte; the unknown-field 422 is a separate assertion.
* refactor(checkpoint): collapse read-path round-trips and ship dual-mode parity tests
Address review round 4 on PR #4292:
- Push ahistory/history limit through Pregel into checkpointer.alist
(SQL LIMIT) instead of materializing all rows and breaking in Python
- Fold the read-side mode-compat gate onto the returned snapshot's
metadata; only writes keep the pre-write tuple fetch (fail-closed)
- Cache factory-built accessor graphs per (assistant_id, mode) with
factory-identity revalidation; state reads no longer build a lead
agent per request
- get_thread: one snapshot fetch + one raw pending_writes fetch on the
resolved checkpoint (post-checkpoint __error__ writes never surface
in snapshot.tasks; verified empirically)
- DeerFlowClient.get_thread: single checkpointer.list walk collects
pending_writes per checkpoint instead of N get_tuple calls
- InMemorySaver delta-history patch: stand-down when the upstream
override disappears, try/except guard, validated-version warning,
guard tests
- make_lead_agent mode precedence: first freeze is owned by app_config
(client-supplied configurable key ignored); once frozen, injected
key/app_config must match or fail closed
- Rollback: lock in non-message channel restoration via fork
inheritance with a dedicated reducer-channel test
- Add tests/test_threads_checkpoint_mode.py and
tests/test_gateway_checkpoint_mode.py referenced by AGENTS.md and
the PR validation section: lifecycle parity (memory + sqlite),
per-step blob-count storage guard, gateway endpoint parity
Counted-saver tests pin checkpoint round-trips for aget/ahistory so
these regressions cannot silently return.
* fix(checkpoint): precise mode-mismatch HTTP mapping, gate E2E, and accessor resilience
- threads router: map CheckpointModeMismatchError to 409 (with cause and
thread id) and CheckpointModeReconfigurationError to 503 across all state
endpoints instead of swallowing both into a generic 500
- gate coverage: seed a real delta checkpoint into AsyncSqliteSaver and
assert aget/aupdate/ahistory fail closed; assert 409 at the HTTP boundary
through the real route stack
- rollback: compile the restore mutation graph with the thread's effective
state schema per the build_state_mutation_graph contract
- inheritance contract locks: rollback and manual compaction preserve
middleware-contributed channels via checkpoint fork cloning
- services: revalidate the accessor-graph cache against app_config identity
so config.yaml hot-reloads never serve a stale compiled graph
- services: degrade full-mode state reads to raw checkpointer reads when the
agent factory is unavailable (delta gate still applies; delta mode has no
fallback)
- deps: override websockets==16.0 (langgraph-sdk 0.4.2's <16 pin silently
downgraded 16.0 -> 15.0.1; pin is not grounded in any API incompatibility)
and bump the langchain lower bound to what the lockfile actually resolves
* fix(checkpoint): include anchor checkpoint in degraded history walk + cover get_thread
- _RawCheckpointReadAccessor.ahistory: alist(before=...) is exclusive while
pregel's get_state_history treats config.checkpoint_id as the inclusive
start; fetch the anchor explicitly so both read paths paginate identically
- extend the degraded-path gateway test: GET /thread returns raw values, and
POST /history with before starts at the anchor checkpoint
* fix(gateway): preserve degraded checkpoint timestamps
* fix(gateway): harden degraded checkpoint access
* fix(gateway): resolve assistants for checkpoint reads
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
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9eebc6a9e5
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fix(config): sync _memory_config with AppConfig auto-reload (#4208)
* fix(config): sync _memory_config with AppConfig auto-reload get_memory_config() now calls get_app_config() before returning the cached _memory_config singleton. get_app_config() auto-reloads when the config file signature changes, and its _apply_singleton_configs() calls load_memory_config_from_dict() to populate _memory_config. Without this side effect, changing memory.mode in config.yaml (e.g. from "middleware" to "tool") would never take effect at runtime because _memory_config retained the stale value. Only call get_app_config() when _app_config has already been loaded to avoid picking up a config file as a side effect of the first access to get_memory_config(), which would break callers that expect module-level defaults (e.g. unit tests). Catch FileNotFoundError for environments without a config file. Closes #4204. * fix(memory): broaden config-reload guard and add isolated-path tests Addresses two review findings from willem-bd: 1. Broken-config crash risk: broaden the except from FileNotFoundError to Exception so transiently broken config.yaml (YAMLError, ValidationError, ValueError) falls back to the last-good singleton instead of crashing per-turn hot paths (memory_middleware, summarization_hook, lead_agent/prompt.py). 2. Missing regression test: add test_get_memory_config_self_syncs_... (calls get_memory_config() after file mutation with no intervening get_app_config() call) and test_get_memory_config_falls_back_on_... (verifies broken config does not crash, returns cached value). |
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ca16b64b26
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feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares (#3964)
* feat(agent): support config-declared lead middlewares * fix(agent): preserve configured extension middlewares * fix(agent): address middleware extension review * fix(agent): tighten middleware extension docs and tests |
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1073393e07
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Revert "fix(memory): follow config reload in get_memory_config (#4216)" (#4320)
This reverts commit cd0f1e2212b0e910a5a3bd5f5e6f060b5bfe5cfa. |
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cd0f1e2212
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fix(memory): follow config reload in get_memory_config (#4216)
* fix(memory): follow config reload in get_memory_config get_memory_config() returned the _memory_config singleton directly, and that singleton is only refreshed as a side effect of get_app_config() reloading (via _apply_singleton_configs -> load_memory_config_from_dict). A reader that reaches memory config without going through get_app_config() first -- e.g. the agent factory deciding whether to bind the memory tools via `feat.memory_config or get_memory_config()` -- therefore saw a stale memory.mode after a config.yaml edit, even though memory.* is documented as hot-reloadable. The agent kept the old mode until some unrelated get_app_config() call happened to refresh the singleton. Trigger the same signature-checked reload inside get_memory_config() so the singleton follows the config file, mirroring how the other config getters already resolve through get_app_config(). When no config file is on disk (tests, or a minimal deployment running purely on defaults / set_memory_config) get_app_config() raises FileNotFoundError; swallow it and fall back to the in-memory singleton so the accessor is never more fragile than before. Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com> * test(memory-config): pin malformed-config behavior for get_memory_config Address review feedback: the narrow except FileNotFoundError means a config file that exists but fails validation surfaces through get_memory_config() rather than being swallowed, consistent with every other unguarded get_app_config() caller. Add a regression test pinning that a malformed edit raises ValidationError and leaves the last-good singleton intact (not half-applied), and document the contract on the guard. Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Yufeng He <40085740+he-yufeng@users.noreply.github.com> |
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c177d0e542
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fix(config): coerce null object config sections to their defaults (#3573)
* fix(config): coerce null object config sections to their defaults #3434 made commented-out list sections (models/tools/tool_groups) parse as [] instead of crashing, but the same scenario still crashes for object sections: commenting out every key under e.g. memory: / summarization: / guardrails: makes PyYAML parse the value as None, and AppConfig then raises "Input should be a valid dictionary" for that section — breaking the documented `cp config.example.yaml config.yaml` first-run flow. Generalize the handling: a model_validator(mode="before") drops None-valued sections so each field falls back to its default (list sections -> [], object sections -> their default config). This subsumes the previous list-only field_validator and the database special-case. Required sections without a default (sandbox) still error when null. Adds test_app_config_coerces_commented_out_object_sections; the existing list-section regression test still passes. * docs+test: address review on null-section coercion - Correct the _drop_null_config_sections docstring: it does not subsume the database special-case; _apply_database_defaults still owns `database` and applies concrete defaults beyond null-coercion. - Strengthen test_app_config_coerces_commented_out_object_sections to assert each null section falls back to its expected default config type, not just that it is non-None. - Add test_app_config_null_required_section_still_errors covering the required-section (sandbox) "still errors when null" claim. --------- Co-authored-by: ly-wang19 <ly-wang19@users.noreply.github.com> |
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ec16b6650d
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fix(channel): force reload config on channel restart (#3619)
* fix: force reload config on channel restart * fix: detect config content changes for reload |
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05be7ea688
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fix(subagents): raise general-purpose max_turns to 150 and default timeout to 30min (#3610)
* fix(subagents): raise general-purpose max_turns to 150 and default timeout to 30min Deep-research subtasks failed out of the box with GraphRecursionError (Recursion limit of 100 reached): the built-in general-purpose subagent caps at max_turns=100. Raise it to 150 and bump the default subagent timeout from 900s (15min) to 1800s (30min) so the extra turns have time to run instead of shifting the failure to a timeout. The lead agent recursion_limit (100) is unchanged; the failures are subagent-only. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(subagents): clarify lead recursion_limit is independent of subagent max_turns Add comments at both lead recursion_limit=100 sites (gateway services + channel manager) explaining the lead's LangGraph super-step budget is separate from subagent depth, so the two 100s are not conflated. Comment-only, no behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(subagents): clarify built-in vs custom timeout scope; pin bash max_turns in test Review follow-ups: (1) clarify SubagentConfig docstring + global timeout field/comment that the 1800 default applies to built-in subagents (custom agents keep their own timeout_seconds); (2) pin bash.max_turns==60 in the defaults regression test so the config.example.yaml doc cannot drift; (3) rename test_default_timeout_preserved_when_no_config -> test_explicit_global_timeout_propagates_to_general_purpose since it intentionally exercises an explicit non-default 900. No runtime behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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8db16bb3d8
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fix(config): coerce null config.yaml list sections to empty list (#3434)
Copying config.example.yaml to config.yaml and starting DeerFlow crashed with `pydantic ValidationError: models — Input should be a valid list [input_value=None]`, because the example ships every entry under `models:` commented out, so PyYAML parses the key as null. Reported in #1444. Add a field_validator(mode="before") on AppConfig that coerces null models/tools/tool_groups to [] (matching their default_factory=list), and emit an actionable warning from from_file when no models are configured (pointing to config.example.yaml / make setup). Adds regression tests. Closes #1444 Co-authored-by: ly-wang19 <ly-wang19@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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4ead2c6b19
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fix(config): reset config-backed singletons on hot reload (#2588)
* Fix stale config singletons on reload * fix(config): update checkpointer imports after runtime move * Fix config reload singleton mutation on validation failure --------- Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> |
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35ef8b7c13 | feat: add default database configuration for AppConfig and update example config | ||
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a7e7c6d667
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fix: disable custom-agent management API by default (#2161)
* fix: disable custom-agent management API by default * style: format agents API hardening files * fix: address review feedback for agents API hardening * fix: add missing disabled API coverage |
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644501ae07
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fix(config): reload AppConfig when config path or mtime changes (#1239)
* fix(config): reload AppConfig when config path or mtime changes - Track resolved path + mtime; invalidate cache on change - Preserve set_app_config() injection behavior - Add regression tests (test_app_config_reload.py) - Document behavior in README and backend/CLAUDE.md Signed-off-by: Gao Mingfei <g199209@gmail.com> * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Signed-off-by: Gao Mingfei <g199209@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Copilot <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com> |