* fix(mcp): keep rotating OAuth refresh tokens across restarts and Gateway instances
MCP servers on the OAuth refresh_token grant lost their rotated refresh
token whenever a new process or manager started (restart, tool-cache
reset for non-task servers, every personal-connection run, a second
Gateway instance) and re-seeded with the consumed configured token,
getting invalid_grant for good.
- New table mcp_oauth_tokens (migration 0047_mcp_oauth_tokens), one row
per refresh_token connection keyed (scope, owner_user_id, server_key):
('deployment', '', name) or ('personal', owner, personal runtime
name). Access and refresh tokens are DEER_FLOW_CREDENTIALS_KEY
ciphertext; a config fingerprint (token_url, client_id, grant, scope,
audience, seed) makes a changed seed win.
- OAuthTokenManager re-reads the row under its process lock, adopts a
peer's valid token, and otherwise claims the refresh with a lease plus
a version compare-and-set (database clock), fetches outside any
transaction, writes under the lease and releases it on failure.
- The Gateway installs the store (sync engine via to_thread) around the
LangGraph runtime for sqlite/postgres; personal managers pass their
owner. client_credentials stays in process; an unloadable key falls
back to process memory; database errors fail the refresh.
- credentials_key_consumers lists refresh_token MCP OAuth servers, so a
declared multi-instance deployment needs the shared key.
Docs: MCP_SERVER.md, CONFIGURATION.md, Helm README, README, mcp and
migrations AGENTS.md, CHANGELOG (en/zh).
* docs(changelog): link the MCP OAuth token store entry to #7207
* fix(mcp): prune removed connections' OAuth token rows and ask owners to re-authorize on invalid_grant
Review follow-up (willem-bd):
- Both MCP config writers drop mcp_oauth_tokens rows of connections a
save removes (deployment: _commit_mcp_config_write; personal:
_mutate, keeping each connection's enabled/disabled runtime-name
variants so a toggle keeps its chain). Best effort; no startup sweep,
since a missing config file would look like every server removed.
- invalid_grant on a refresh_token request raises
McpOAuthReauthorizationRequired: the tool error names the server and
asks for a new refresh token, plus the shared-key hint when this
instance could not decrypt the stored chain.
- Annotate the gateway helpers' config as AppConfig.
* fix(mcp): renew the OAuth refresh lease, keep unstored rotations, and key access tokens by request parameters
Review follow-up (willem-bd, second round):
- HTTPX timeouts bound each I/O wait, not a whole response: the refresh
holder now renews its lease every third of REFRESH_LEASE_SECONDS while
the token request runs and abandons it after REFRESH_MAX_SECONDS (120 s);
waiters outlast a live holder. Regression uses a real loopback endpoint
that streams its body for three lease lengths.
- A refresh whose tokens could not be stored keeps them pending
(unsaved_base_version): they are written back before an older stored
token is adopted or refreshed with, retried every few seconds while the
access token is still valid, and dropped once a peer stored a newer
chain. A failed save releases the lease.
- New token_request_fingerprint (extra_token_params and response fields):
a stored access token is reused only under the same request parameters;
otherwise the stored refresh-token chain is refreshed.
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(mcp): fail durable tasks whose connection no longer resolves
A personal MCP runtime name is derived from the server's complete definition, and a deployment task server belongs to the Gateway startup snapshot. Editing, disabling, or deleting a personal server while a durable task is in flight therefore makes the persisted server name unresolvable. McpTaskToolCaller raised LookupError, which the service classifies as transient: status polls and cancellation retried forever, leaving the task stuck in working and impossible to cancel.
Raise a dedicated McpTaskConnectionUnavailableError instead, and terminalize it: status polls persist failed with the connection error and stop; a pending cancellation persists failed locally because the remote task can no longer be reached. Transient status/cancel errors keep their existing capped-backoff retry policy.
Tests: new service tests pin both terminal paths, and caller tests pin the exception for missing deployment and stale personal server names.
* fix(mcp): preserve LookupError compatibility for connection errors
McpTaskConnectionUnavailableError now subclasses LookupError instead of RuntimeError. The four existing personal-MCP assertions in test_personal_mcp.py still treat a missing or stale connection as a lookup failure; keeping that base preserves their behavior and avoids breaking callers that caught the previous type, while the task service still catches this exact type for permanent-failure classification.
Add a compatibility test and rerun the personal-MCP and task suites.
---------
Co-authored-by: Tong-bit-art <Tong-bit-art@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(mcp): add per-server discovery cache scaffolding
Introduce the per-server tool cache entry, canonical parsed-config snapshots on the applied revision, and the shared _binding_matches reuse predicate. Identity reuse is object-identity based on the pool's current binding (no value equality); snapshots and ownership handles stay out of repr. No selection, eviction or publication is wired yet.
* feat(mcp): selectively evict stale per-server tool cache entries
Evict per-server discovery results during selective reconciliation, after the new binding epoch is installed, so unchanged servers keep their exact entry objects while changed, removed or re-bound servers (including lifecycle-token rotations) are dropped. Delegate the binding verdict to _binding_matches so reuse and eviction cannot diverge.
Clear _server_tool_cache on every full reset, and count retained entries in the reconciliation state predicates so a lingering entry can never let a later config change be silently skipped.
* feat(mcp): reuse unchanged per-server results during initialization
Initialize MCP tools from per-server discovery instead of a single full pass: select reusable entries under the claim lock, discover only the missing servers with get_mcp_tools_by_server, then publish atomically after re-validating every candidate binding against the pool's current binding via _binding_matches. Failed servers stay absent (never cached as empty), and superseded or partially bound candidates are discarded whole. Test fixtures now drive the grouped entry point.
* fix(mcp): close T4 review gaps in per-server cache publication
Address four findings from the adversarial review: treat retained entries as unverifiable when the applied baseline is None so an interceptor change still forces a full reset; count retained entries in the claim-time shared-reset predicate; refuse to publish a false-success empty cache when every enabled server failed discovery; and hoist the lazy imports inside the initializer's try/finally so an import failure releases the initialization claim.
* fix(mcp): sanitize cache failure logging and document per-server cache
The outer lazy-initialization handler now logs only the exception type, never the raw message or traceback, so a discovery error cannot print a resolved $VAR credential. The committed-writer planner mirrors the reader's no-baseline guard so retained entries are never reused under an unknown interceptor chain. Document the per-server tool cache (reuse, invalidation, failure handling, remote tool changes) in MCP_SERVER.md and mcp/AGENTS.md, and drop phase-staging wording from the new code and tests.
* docs(mcp): keep the agent-guidance chain under its hard limit
F2's cache notes pushed the effective AGENTS.md instruction chain 905 bytes past its 98304-byte hard limit, failing the agent-guidance CI job. Compress the selective-reconciliation bullet to its invariants (the full cache behaviour lives in docs/MCP_SERVER.md), and reword the total-failure comment so it no longer implies that build-invalid connections were attempted.
* fix(mcp): fence cached tools by interceptor chain
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(mcp): skip task servers whose discovery failed instead of dropping all tools
Per-server discovery replaced a failed or timed-out server with an empty
tool list. For a server with task_toolsets, _configure_task_tools_for_server
then reported submit/status/cancel as missing and raised
McpTaskConfigurationError, which get_mcp_tools re-raises, so the tools of
every healthy server were discarded and the cache was never published:
each agent build rediscovered every server.
load_server_tools now returns None for a failed discovery, distinct from a
server that answered with zero tools, and the wrapping loop skips such
servers before task-toolset validation. A server that answers without its
configured raw tools still raises as a configuration error.
* docs(changelog): reference #6481
* docs(mcp): name the cache-reset endpoint as a task-server recovery path
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix(mcp): honor configured stdio working directories
* fix(mcp): preserve defaults for empty working directories
Treat empty stdio cwd values as omitted, including unresolved environment references. Add real subprocess regressions for discovery and pooled-call defaults, plus direct connection-dictionary coverage.
* fix(mcp): reject credentials that cannot travel as HTTP header values
A request-scoped secret or user_auth credential with a trailing newline
(the usual result of reading a token from a file, or a CRLF env-file),
CR/LF, surrounding whitespace, or characters outside Latin-1 sailed
through the credential interceptors into the HTTP client, where httpx/h11
reject it with an exception that echoes the full value:
LocalProtocolError: Illegal header value b'Bearer sk-...\n'
ToolErrorHandlingMiddleware copies that message into a model-visible
ToolMessage, so the secret landed in the prompt, the checkpoint, and
traces - everywhere headers_from_context promises it never goes.
Add illegal_header_value_reason to mcp/headers.py, mirroring the
transport's own rules (Latin-1 encodable; h11's field_vchar is [^\x00\s]
with SP/HTAB legal only between visible characters), and fail closed in
both interceptors before the value can reach the client. The denial names
only the secret key (plus the reason) and never repeats the value.
Illegal values are denied regardless of on_missing: the key is present,
so a passthrough fallback would silently run the call under the shared
discovery credential - the exact authority confusion the deny default
exists to prevent.
Values the transport accepts are not rejected: embedded SP/HTAB
('Bearer <token>'), Latin-1 high bytes, and DEL all still pass, pinned
by tests against h11's observed behaviour.
* fix(mcp): tighten header value validation to httpx's ASCII boundary
The validator mirrored h11's Latin-1 boundary, but the transport rejects
more than h11 does: build_server_params hands dict[str, str] headers
through the MCP SDK's create_mcp_http_client into httpx.AsyncClient, and
httpx (pinned 0.28.1) encodes str header values as ASCII - so a Latin-1
high byte like 'Bearer caf\xe9' passed validation here only to raise
UnicodeEncodeError inside httpx before h11 ever ran, with the exception
message repeating the offending value.
Validate str values against ASCII instead, flip the tests that pinned
Latin-1 high bytes as transportable, and pin the boundary against the
real client: create_mcp_http_client must reject what the validator
flags and construct cleanly for what it accepts (embedded SP/HTAB and
DEL still pass).
Addresses review feedback on the ASCII vs Latin-1 boundary.
* fix(mcp): validate OAuth and static header values at the same boundary
The validator added for headers_from_context and user_auth left two paths
uncovered. A token endpoint returning an access_token or token_type with a
newline reached httpx/h11, which raise with the full token in the message, and
ToolErrorHandlingMiddleware copies that message into a model-visible
ToolMessage -- the leak this PR set out to close. The operator's static headers
had the same hole.
OAuthTokenManager.get_authorization_header now renders the Authorization value
through one checked helper, so the tool interceptor, the initial discovery
headers and the durable task path are all covered by a single guard. The
rendered value is what gets checked rather than the two fields separately,
because that is what the transport sees: an access_token with leading
whitespace is legal once it follows "Bearer ".
build_server_params applies the same check to statically configured headers.
build_servers_config already isolates a per-server failure, so a bad value
drops that one server and logs the reason instead of the value.
* docs(mcp): correct which transport echoes the full header value
The rationale claimed httpx and h11 both render the full value into their
exception message. Only h11 does, on the line break and surrounding whitespace
cases. httpx's ASCII failure is a UnicodeEncodeError naming the offending
character and its position, not the credential, so at most one character
escapes there; refusing the value up front buys an actionable error rather than
an encode failure raised from inside the client.
Corrected in headers.py and in every copy of the claim: context_headers.py,
user_scoped_auth.py, oauth.py, client.py, mcp/AGENTS.md, docs/MCP_SERVER.md,
the frontend mcp.mdx, and the test comments carrying the same wording. No
behavior change.
---------
Co-authored-by: Terminator666666 <Terminator666666@users.noreply.github.com>
* feat(mcp): map request-scoped secrets to HTTP/SSE headers
`user_auth` binds a credential to a configured DeerFlow user, so a caller
that picks the credential per request — a multi-tenant gateway, a per-run
API key, one shared MCP server fronting several environments — had to
register one MCP server entry per credential.
Add a declarative `mcpServers.<server>.headers_from_context` block mapping
HTTP header names to keys of the run request's `config.context.secrets`
carrier. A new built-in interceptor resolves the mapping on every tool call
and rewrites those headers, mirroring `user_scoped_auth`. The config file
stores names only, never a credential, so the Gateway returns the block
unmasked.
Registered after OAuth and `user_auth` in the interceptor chain: the later
interceptor runs closer to the transport, and the value chosen for this one
request is the most specific, so it wins. Fail-closed by default — a mapped
key missing from the request raises a `ToolException` naming only that key,
because falling back to the server's discovery credential would send one
tenant's call under another tenant's authority. `on_missing: "passthrough"`
opts out.
Durable background tasks are excluded: `McpTaskToolCaller` drives status and
cancel polls after the Agent run ends, where no run context exists, so the
fail-closed interceptor would deny every poll. Those calls keep using
server-level credentials, and a server declaring both `headers_from_context`
and `task_toolsets` now logs a warning.
Also corrects the custom-interceptor example in docs/MCP_SERVER.md (and the
matching claim in skills/AGENTS.md), which read request secrets from
`langgraph.config.get_config()["context"]`. That key is `None` inside a tool
call — the run context rides the LangGraph runtime, not the RunnableConfig
propagated to child runnables — so interceptors written from that example
never saw a value. The example now reads `request.runtime`, and
tests/test_mcp_context_headers.py pins LangGraph's runtime-injection rule by
driving a real langchain-mcp-adapters tool through a real graph with the
ambient-runtime fallback disabled.
Closes#5005
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): resolve credential headers case-insensitively, carry them on durable submit
Review follow-ups on `headers_from_context`.
HTTP field names are case-insensitive, but every dict on the path to the wire
is not: `build_server_params` copies the operator's static `headers` spelling
verbatim, and langchain-mcp-adapters merges interceptor overrides into the
connection with a plain `{**connection_headers, **override_headers}` splat. A
static `authorization` and an injected `Authorization` therefore both reached
httpx as separate field lines, and a server reading the field with a
single-value accessor got the static discovery credential — inverting the
documented `headers` < `oauth` < `user_auth` < `headers_from_context`
precedence and running a per-request call under the shared credential.
Normalizing inside the interceptor cannot fix that on its own: the adapter
builds the request with `headers=None`, so an interceptor never sees the
connection's static headers and cannot displace them however it spells its own
key. A new `mcp/headers.py::apply_header_overrides` therefore drops any key
differing only in case and emits the spelling the connection already uses.
Applied to `headers_from_context`, `user_auth`, the OAuth interceptor, the
OAuth discovery-header write, and the durable-task connection merge, which all
carried the same collision. `headers_from_context.headers` now also rejects one
header mapped under two spellings at config load, in both the harness model and
the Gateway mirror.
Durable submit now carries the mapped headers, as docs/MCP_SERVER.md already
promised. `McpTaskToolCaller` disabled the interceptor for the whole caller, but
that caller serves submit as well as the polls, and submit is awaited inline
inside the Agent's tool call — where the run's LangGraph runtime is still the
ambient contextvar, so no secret has to be threaded through `TaskSubmitRequest`
or reach durable storage. The caller builds one chain and keeps a second view of
it without the context-headers interceptor; `call_tool` takes
`request_scoped_headers`, set only by `OrdinaryMcpTaskDriver.submit`. Status and
cancel keep server-level credentials, so background polls still cannot fail
closed, and the startup warning now describes the half it actually covers.
`_merge_preserving_secrets` restores masked extras inside `headers_from_context`
instead of writing the `***` sentinel back over the stored value, matching the
treatment `user_auth` extras and server-level extras already get; extras a PUT
omits carry over as well, while the declared mapping still replaces verbatim so
a round trip can remove an entry. `extra="allow"` plus name-based sensitivity
detection means the usual casualty is a name-valued key such as `tokenHeader`,
not only a credential.
The existing override test seeded the static header onto `request.headers`,
which production never does, so it modelled a merge that really happens one
layer down; the new tests drive a real adapter tool through a real connection
and assert on the headers the session is opened with, and the durable-submit
test runs through a real tool node with no runtime patching.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): reject case-insensitive duplicate static header names
* fix(mcp): preserve omitted headers_from_context fields on partial updates
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat(mcp): add durable task runtime foundation
* fix(chart): sync embedded config version
* fix(mcp): isolate task polls during shutdown
* feat(mcp): track consecutive poll errors on mcp_tasks
poll_attempt_count grows on every claim (successful polls included), so it
cannot drive a failure backoff without misjudging normal long tasks. Add
consecutive_poll_error_count: incremented when a claim is released after a
poll error, reset to zero by any applied snapshot. The backoff/terminal
policy that consumes it lands with the first concrete driver.
* fix(mcp): harden durable task lifecycle
* feat(mcp): add ordinary durable task driver
* test(mcp): address durable task review feedback
* fix(mcp): preserve submit tool descriptions
* fix(mcp): bound remote task calls
* fix(mcp): bound persisted task payloads
* fix(mcp): preserve task tool error details
* fix(mcp): enforce durable task boundaries
* test(mcp): cover task config snapshot lifecycle
---------
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
* fix: bound MCP server bring-up timeouts and exclude externalized tool outputs from delivery verification
Two related robustness fixes:
1. MCP server bring-up was unbounded. tool_call_timeout only covered
session.call_tool(); tool discovery (subprocess spawn + initialize +
tools/list) and persistent stdio session initialization could hang
forever, blocking agent construction (and on the Gateway event loop,
the whole process). Add a per-server session_init_timeout
(default DEFAULT_MCP_SESSION_INIT_TIMEOUT = 60s, null disables) that
bounds both discovery and pooled-session initialization. The session
pool's existing cancellation handling tears down a session stuck
mid-creation in its own task.
2. ToolOutputBudgetMiddleware externalizes oversized tool outputs into
outputs/.tool-results/ (configurable tool_output.storage_subdir). The
workspace-change scanner and run delivery verification counted those
files as produced artifacts, so any run that externalized a tool output
without also presenting a real artifact failed with
"Artifact delivery incomplete". Exclude TOOL_RESULTS_DIRNAME via a
shared constant (mirroring BROWSER_FRAMES_DIRNAME) and thread the
configured storage_subdir through snapshot capture so both
workspace-changes events and delivery verification stay clean.
* review: enforce single-segment tool_output.storage_subdir; document discovery-timeout cleanup
Address review feedback:
1. A custom tool_output.storage_subdir with a path separator (e.g.
cache/tool-results) silently no-oped the workspace-scanner exclusion:
os.walk yields one-segment dirnames, so a nested value never matched and
its files were counted as produced artifacts again. ToolOutputConfig now
validates storage_subdir as a single directory name (rejects separators,
.., absolute, empty) with tests, so the exclusion is always sound.
2. The discovery-timeout path now documents why cancellation is safe, mirroring
the session-init note: discovery runs inside the adapter's nested async
context managers, and stdio_client's finally terminates the process tree
(SIGTERM->SIGKILL on POSIX, process-tree on Windows), so a timed-out npx
subprocess and its children are reaped rather than accumulating.
* review: log session-init timeouts and align API response model default with runtime config
Address second-round review feedback:
1. A session-init timeout raised TimeoutError without any log, unlike the
discovery timeout which logs a WARNING. Wrap the bounded get_session in a
try/except that logs the timeout (server name + seconds) and re-raises, so
operators can diagnose tool-call failures caused by hung MCP sessions.
2. McpServerConfigResponse.session_init_timeout defaulted to None while
McpServerConfig defaults to 60s: a server created via PUT /api/mcp/config
without the field was persisted with null (no timeout) while the same
server created in the config file got 60s. Align the response-model default
to DEFAULT_MCP_SESSION_INIT_TIMEOUT so API-created and file-created servers
behave the same; an explicit null still opts out.
* review: narrow the discovery-timeout handler to the bounded wait_for path
The except TimeoutError clause covered both the bounded wait_for branch and
the bare discovery branch. With session_init_timeout opted out (None), a
TimeoutError raised by discovery itself would hit the %.1f format with None:
logging raises TypeError internally, the WARNING is silently dropped, and a
--- Logging error --- traceback goes to stderr.
Narrow the handler to wrap only the wait_for call, where the branch condition
guarantees the timeout value is not None. A discovery-internal TimeoutError on
the opted-out path now falls through to the generic failure handler and is
reported as 'tool discovery failed' with exc_info. Covered by a regression
test that asserts the skip is reported without any broken format.
* feat(mcp): auto-promote deferred MCP tools from routing hints
When tool_search.enabled=true defers MCP tool schemas, PR1 routing hints
still require the model to spend a tool_search discovery round trip before
it can call the tool the routing metadata already points at. This adds a
McpRoutingMiddleware that matches the latest user message against PR1
routing keywords and promotes the matching deferred schemas before the
model call, removing that round trip.
Design (soft routing, opt-in, additive):
- Matches only the latest real HumanMessage (shared is_real_user_message
helper, reused by SkillActivationMiddleware so the two cannot drift);
case-insensitive substring match, no tokenizer dependency.
- Ordering: priority desc, then tool name asc; capped by the new global
tool_search.auto_promote_top_k (default 3, clamped 1..5). Does not add or
consume a per-tool auto_promote_top_k (PR1 schema unchanged); a per-tool
value is ignored with a DEBUG note.
- Returns a plain {"promoted": ...} state update (not a Command) and relies
on ThreadState.merge_promoted for union/dedupe, so auto-promote and a
model-triggered tool_search converge on the same catalog hash.
- Installed before DeferredToolFilterMiddleware on every deferred-tool path
(lead agent, subagent, embedded client, webhook via shared builders);
a construction-time assert rejects the reversed order. catalog_hash is
None / no routing index is a complete no-op, so bootstrap and ACP skip it.
- Privacy: never executes tools, never promotes policy-filtered tools, adds
no routing keywords or matched tool names to trace metadata or INFO/WARN
logs.
No behavior change when tool_search.enabled=false.
Tests: index construction, matching semantics, middleware state updates,
same-cycle deferred-filter interaction, lead/subagent/embedded-client
builder wiring + order invariant, config clamping, config.example.yaml
parseability, and privacy assertions.
* refactor(mcp): address auto-promote review nits
- executor: access app_config.tool_search.auto_promote_top_k directly to match
the lead-agent and embedded-client paths (drop the over-defensive getattr that
masked missing config); update the subagent test mock to carry tool_search.
- tool_search / mcp_routing_middleware: cross-reference the duplicated routing
priority/keyword normalization between the builder and the middleware's
defensive _normalize_index so they cannot silently drift.
- MCP_SERVER.md: document that auto-promote keyword matching is a case-insensitive
substring test (not word-boundary), advising distinctive keywords.
* feat(mcp): add per-server tool_call_timeout for MCP tool calls
Add a configurable timeout for individual MCP tool calls to prevent
agent runs from blocking indefinitely when an MCP server becomes
unresponsive (e.g., rate-limited HTTP API, hung subprocess).
Uses the MCP SDK's built-in read_timeout_seconds parameter on
ClientSession.call_tool, which handles the timeout within the
session's own task — avoiding cross-task cancellation issues with
the session pool (ref #3379, #3203).
Config field is named tool_call_timeout (not timeout) to avoid
collision with langchain-mcp-adapters' existing timeout field on
HTTP/SSE connections.
Closes#3840
* fix(mcp): read tool_call_timeout from McpServerConfig, not connection dict
The previous implementation put tool_call_timeout into the connection dict
returned by build_server_params, which langchain's create_session then
passed to _create_stdio_session(), causing TypeError. Now reads the timeout
directly from ExtensionsConfig.mcp_servers where the wrapper is built,
keeping it out of the connection dict entirely.
Fixes P1 bug from review on #3843.
* test(mcp): regression test for tool_call_timeout not leaking into connection dict
Adds two tests:
- test_build_server_params_excludes_tool_call_timeout: verifies the connection
dict returned by build_server_params() does NOT contain tool_call_timeout
- test_stdio_tool_call_timeout_does_not_raise_typeerror: end-to-end test that
get_mcp_tools() with a stdio server having tool_call_timeout configured loads
tools without TypeError from _create_stdio_session()
Regression for PR #3843 P1 bug.
* fix(mcp): only pass read_timeout_seconds when tool_call_timeout is set
When tool_call_timeout is None, don't pass read_timeout_seconds=None to
session.call_tool(). This avoids breaking existing tests that assert on
exact call_tool arguments without the extra kwarg.
* docs(mcp): clarify stdio tool timeout
* feat(mcp): support custom tool interceptors via extensions_config.json
Add a generic extension point for registering custom MCP tool
interceptors through `extensions_config.json`. This allows downstream
projects to inject per-request header manipulation, auth context
propagation, or other cross-cutting concerns without modifying
DeerFlow source code.
Interceptors are declared as Python callable paths in a new
`mcpInterceptors` array field and loaded via the existing
`resolve_variable` reflection mechanism:
```json
{
"mcpInterceptors": [
"my_package.mcp.auth:build_auth_interceptor"
]
}
```
Each entry must resolve to a no-arg builder function that returns an
async interceptor compatible with `MultiServerMCPClient`'s
`tool_interceptors` interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* test(mcp): add unit tests for custom tool interceptors
Cover all branches of the mcpInterceptors loading logic:
- valid interceptor loaded and appended to tool_interceptors
- multiple interceptors loaded in declaration order
- builder returning None is skipped
- resolve_variable ImportError logged and skipped
- builder raising exception logged and skipped
- absent mcpInterceptors field is safe (no-op)
- custom interceptors coexist with OAuth interceptor
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Potential fix for pull request finding
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
* fix(mcp): validate mcpInterceptors type and fix lint warnings
Address review feedback:
1. Validate mcpInterceptors config value before iterating:
- Accept a single string and normalize to [string]
- Ignore None silently
- Log warning and skip for non-list/non-string types
2. Fix ruff F841 lint errors in tests:
- Rename _make_mock_env to _make_patches, embed mock_client
- Remove unused `as mock_cls` bindings where not needed
- Extract _get_interceptors() helper to reduce repetition
3. Add two new test cases for type validation:
- test_mcp_interceptors_single_string_is_normalized
- test_mcp_interceptors_invalid_type_logs_warning
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(mcp): validate interceptor return type and fix import mock path
Address review feedback:
1. Validate builder return type with callable() check:
- callable interceptor → append to tool_interceptors
- None → silently skip (builder opted out)
- non-callable → log warning with type name and skip
2. Fix test mock path: resolve_variable is a top-level import in
tools.py, so mock deerflow.mcp.tools.resolve_variable instead of
deerflow.reflection.resolve_variable to correctly intercept calls.
3. Add test_custom_interceptor_non_callable_return_logs_warning to
cover the new non-callable validation branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(mcp): add mcpInterceptors example and documentation
- Add mcpInterceptors field to extensions_config.example.json
- Add "Custom Tool Interceptors" section to MCP_SERVER.md with
configuration format, example interceptor code, and edge case
behavior notes
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: IECspace <IECspace@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Willem Jiang <willem.jiang@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
add oauth schema to MCP server config (extensions_config.json)
support client_credentials and refresh_token grants
implement token manager with caching and pre-expiry refresh
inject OAuth Authorization header for MCP tool discovery and tool calls
extend MCP gateway config models to read/write OAuth settings
update docs and examples for OAuth configuration
add unit tests for token fetch/cache and header injection
