diff --git a/README.md b/README.md index 73124751b1..3f08c486e1 100644 --- a/README.md +++ b/README.md @@ -1275,6 +1275,8 @@ Each message can still select up to 1000 documents. When more than 100 documents Advanced deployments can enable pluggable authorization with `authorization.enabled` in `config.yaml`. A configured `AuthorizationProvider` filters denied tools before they reach the model or deferred-tool catalog, then the same provider is checked again before every business-tool execution through the existing guardrail middleware. Gateway `threads:*` and `runs:*` route permissions are derived from the same provider, while existing owner checks and admin-only management gates remain in force. Every HTTP route that starts or enables a future Agent run requires `runs:create`: this includes the stateless `POST /api/runs/stream` and `POST /api/runs/wait` endpoints plus scheduled-task create, update, resume, and manual-trigger mutations. Scheduled-task mutations retain their existing `threads:write` requirement, and the stateless routes separately enforce ownership when the optional thread ID is supplied in the request body. A generated `tool_search` may bypass the second tool check only when it fronts the current build's already-filtered deferred catalog. Model access follows the same provider: the Gateway `models` list is filtered per principal, `model:use` is enforced on model detail requests and again when the runtime resolves the agent's model, and a denied default model falls back to the first remaining candidate that also passes `model:use`. The built-in RBAC provider supports per-role `tools`, `routes`, `models`, `skills`, and `sandbox` allow/deny policies and validates that `default_role` names a configured role; authorization is disabled by default. See `config.example.yaml` and the [authorization RFC](docs/plans/2026-07-10-pluggable-authorization-rfc.md). +For vision-capable agents, `view_image` and the subsequent model-context image read also require `sandbox:execute`. Allowing the tool name alone does not grant image-file access; a role denied sandbox execution cannot reread previously recorded image metadata after its permissions change. + Advanced deployments can also extend the agent runtime itself by declaring `AgentMiddleware` classes under `extensions.middlewares` in `config.yaml` or `extensions_config.json`. Each entry is a `module.path:ClassName` string (zero-argument constructor) or an object `{class, kwargs}` whose `kwargs` are passed to the constructor. `kwargs` values must be JSON types (object, array, string, number, boolean, or null); YAML dates and timestamps are coerced to ISO strings so they match JSON. DeerFlow loads the same configured list into the lead-agent and subagent pipelines after their built-in runtime middlewares and loop/token guards, but before the terminal-response/safety/clarification tail, so enterprise forks can add domain guardrails, tool-call governance, or observability hooks without patching the built-in middleware builders. Missing packages, invalid classes, broken modules, and constructor errors fail loudly at agent creation. Treat `config.yaml` and `extensions_config.json` as trusted operator-controlled files: middleware paths are code execution, just like custom tool, model, sandbox, guardrail, MCP server, and MCP interceptor declarations. Gateway skill/MCP toggle endpoints preserve this field but do not expose an API write path for `extensions.middlewares`. Separate lead-only/subagent-only middleware lists are not supported yet. For packaged and configurable runtime integrations, use DeerFlow's extension manager. diff --git a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md index beecab73d5..daa5ad3ad3 100644 --- a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md +++ b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/AGENTS.md @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Before changing a later authorization phase, read the [authorization RFC](../../ 21. **TokenUsageMiddleware** - *(optional, if `token_usage.enabled`)* Records token usage metrics; subagent usage is read from terminal `ToolMessage.additional_kwargs` in the current run and merged back into the dispatching AIMessage by message position. The same state update marks the ToolMessage with `subagent_token_usage_attributed=true`, so checkpoint replay or middleware re-entry cannot add the cumulative snapshot twice; missing/malformed usage or a result with no matching dispatch remains unmarked and retryable. 22. **TitleMiddleware** - Auto-generates the thread title after the first complete exchange and normalizes structured message content before prompting the title model. If a first-turn run is interrupted before this middleware can write a title, `runtime/runs/worker.py` keeps the run in a finalizing state, persists a local fallback title from the latest checkpoint or original run input, and then syncs it to `threads_meta.display_name`. Replacement runs admitted by `multitask_strategy="interrupt"` / `"rollback"` wait for older same-thread finalization before entering the graph; the interrupted run only skips the fallback title write once a later run has started and may have advanced the checkpoint. 23. **MemoryMiddleware** - Queues conversations for async memory update (filters to user + final AI responses); captures the runtime-resolved user so standalone LangGraph Server reads and writes stay in the same bucket -24. **ViewImageMiddleware** - *(optional, if the model supports vision)* Appends a hidden HumanMessage with base64 image data, identified by a reserved ID prefix plus a server-owned metadata marker, to `ModelRequest.messages` in `wrap_model_call` / `awrap_model_call`. The payload lives only in that request and is never returned as a state update, so no checkpoint carries it and an interrupted run cannot strand it in history; state keeps only the lightweight `viewed_images` metadata. It owns that context and rebuilds it per call: its own message is swept out of the request first — a thread checkpointed by the earlier `before_model`/`after_model` pair (which wrote the payload into state and took it back out with `RemoveMessage`) can carry one that reached state but was never removed, and leaving it in would resend that base64 in every later request for the life of the thread — then a freshly built one is appended when warranted. The sweep requires both the reserved ID prefix and the server-owned marker, so a client cannot get its own message dropped; unmarked leftovers predating the marker are left in place and merely not duplicated +24. **ViewImageMiddleware** - *(vision models only)* Rebuilds hidden base64 image context in `ModelRequest.messages`, never in new checkpoint state; state retains lightweight `viewed_images` metadata. `_image_injection_plan` first sweeps stale server-marked context (including payloads stranded by the old `before_model`/`after_model` lifecycle), then shares one read-eligibility predicate between sync injection and async authorization. The sweep requires both the reserved ID prefix and server-owned marker, preserving user messages and unmarked legacy payloads. Before reading images, both paths recheck `sandbox:execute`, including restored views after role changes; denial skips I/O and removes marked stale context. Only the async wrapper passes `authorization_checked=True` after its gate, avoiding a duplicate synchronous provider call in its worker. 25. **McpRoutingMiddleware** - Auto-promotes deferred schemas matching the latest real user message before `DeferredToolFilterMiddleware`, without executing tools. New names emit `middleware:tool_promotion` with `source=routing_hint`; repeat passes emit nothing 26. **DeferredToolPromotionAuditMiddleware** - Observes final `tool_search` `Command`s; keep it outer of `SkillToolPolicyMiddleware` so denied names are excluded. It atomically claims new names per lead run or subagent execution to dedupe parallel searches, derives subagent attribution from the server-installed recorder, returns the original `Command`, and omits private payloads 27. **DeferredToolFilterMiddleware** - *(optional, if `tool_search.enabled`)* Hides deferred (MCP) tool schemas from the bound model until `tool_search` or `McpRoutingMiddleware` promotes them (reads per-thread promotions from `ThreadState.promoted`, hash-scoped) diff --git a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/view_image_middleware.py b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/view_image_middleware.py index de1c618538..0b93300c20 100644 --- a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/view_image_middleware.py +++ b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/agents/middlewares/view_image_middleware.py @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import base64 import hashlib import logging -from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable +from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable, Mapping from pathlib import Path from typing import override from uuid import uuid4 @@ -365,11 +365,26 @@ class ViewImageMiddleware(AgentMiddleware[ViewImageMiddlewareState]): }, ) - def _inject(self, request: ModelRequest) -> ModelRequest: + @staticmethod + def _authorization_context(request: ModelRequest) -> Mapping: + context = getattr(request.runtime, "context", None) + return context if isinstance(context, Mapping) else {} + + def _image_injection_plan(self, request: ModelRequest) -> tuple[list[AnyMessage], bool, bool]: + """Share message cleanup and read eligibility across sync/async paths.""" + messages = [message for message in request.messages if not self._is_image_context_message(message)] + should_inject = self._should_inject_image_message(messages) + needs_authorization = should_inject and bool((request.state or {}).get("viewed_images")) + return messages, should_inject, needs_authorization + + def _inject(self, request: ModelRequest, *, authorization_checked: bool = False) -> ModelRequest: """Rebuild the request's image context from ``viewed_images``. Args: request: The pending model request + authorization_checked: True only after ``awrap_model_call`` has + enforced ``sandbox:execute`` for this exact request; skips the + synchronous recheck inside its worker thread. Returns: A request whose messages carry exactly the image context this call @@ -384,14 +399,25 @@ class ViewImageMiddleware(AgentMiddleware[ViewImageMiddlewareState]): # request for the life of the thread. Matching requires both the reserved # ID prefix and the server-owned marker, and Gateway strips that marker # from client input, so this can never drop a user-authored message. - messages = [message for message in request.messages if not self._is_image_context_message(message)] + messages, should_inject, needs_authorization = self._image_injection_plan(request) dropped_stranded = len(messages) != len(request.messages) if dropped_stranded: logger.debug("Dropping %d stranded image context message(s) from the model request", len(request.messages) - len(messages)) - if not self._should_inject_image_message(messages): + if not should_inject: return request.override(messages=messages) if dropped_stranded else request + if needs_authorization and not authorization_checked: + from deerflow.authz.sandbox_authz import authorize_sandbox_execution, safe_app_config + from deerflow.sandbox.exceptions import SandboxAuthorizationError + + try: + authorize_sandbox_execution(context=self._authorization_context(request), app_config=safe_app_config()) + except SandboxAuthorizationError: + # A restored view may predate a role/policy change. Never read + # its host mirror or remote sandbox for an unauthorized request. + return request.override(messages=messages) if dropped_stranded else request + # Mixed content (text + images) for the model only, so hide it from the # chat UI and IM channels (matches the other middleware-injected context # messages) even though it never leaves this request. @@ -421,5 +447,17 @@ class ViewImageMiddleware(AgentMiddleware[ViewImageMiddlewareState]): # blocking work without allowing cancellation to outlive a sandbox # client operation. The outer run lease may release the client as soon as # cancellation propagates. - injected_request = await run_sync_lifecycle_operation(self._inject, request) + messages, _, needs_authorization = self._image_injection_plan(request) + if needs_authorization: + from deerflow.authz.sandbox_authz import authorize_sandbox_execution_async, safe_app_config_async + from deerflow.sandbox.exceptions import SandboxAuthorizationError + + try: + await authorize_sandbox_execution_async(context=self._authorization_context(request), app_config=await safe_app_config_async()) + except SandboxAuthorizationError: + # Still sweep any old model-only image context before handing + # the request on; do not schedule a read in a worker. + return await handler(request.override(messages=messages)) + + injected_request = await run_sync_lifecycle_operation(self._inject, request, authorization_checked=True) return await handler(injected_request) diff --git a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/AGENTS.md b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/AGENTS.md index 7f0641b0d5..4e4d2ad0c0 100644 --- a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/AGENTS.md +++ b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/AGENTS.md @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ Only standalone tool discovery without a model falls back to the base profile. 3. **Built-in tools**: - `present_files` - Make output files visible to user (only `/mnt/user-data/outputs`); virtual paths use `resolve_runtime_user_id(runtime)` so validation resolves the same user-scoped outputs directory established by `ThreadDataMiddleware` - `ask_clarification` - Request clarification (intercepted by ClarificationMiddleware, which preserves text fallback and adds `artifact.human_input` for Web UI Human Input Cards). Beyond free text and single choice, the request-side v2 protocol supports `fields` (structured form card collecting several values at once; field types: text/textarea/number/select/multi_select/checkbox/date, validated and normalized server-side in the middleware — invalid entries are dropped, unknown types degrade to `text`; a standalone multi-select question is a one-field form). Replies stay on the v1 response protocol (`text`/`option`): the form card submits a readable text summary - - `view_image` - Read image bytes for vision-capable models; live sandbox bytes win for the same sandbox generation, replacement-sandbox recovery uses only SHA-256-verified synchronized host bytes, and async tool invocation drains blocking reads before cancellation may release the sandbox lease + - `view_image` - Read image bytes for vision-capable models; both sync and async entry points require `sandbox:execute` before any host or sandbox read. Live sandbox bytes win for the same sandbox generation, replacement-sandbox recovery uses only SHA-256-verified synchronized host bytes, and async tool invocation drains blocking reads before cancellation may release the sandbox lease - `setup_agent` - Bootstrap-only: persist a custom agent's `SOUL.md` and `config.yaml`. Re-bootstrapping preserves the owner's existing `display_name`. Bound only when `is_bootstrap=True`. - `update_agent` - Custom-agent-only: persist self-updates to the current agent's `SOUL.md` / `config.yaml` from inside a normal chat (partial update + atomic write). Bound when `agent_name` is set and `is_bootstrap=False`. 4. **Subagent tool** (if enabled): diff --git a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/builtins/view_image_tool.py b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/builtins/view_image_tool.py index 6368cedacb..96103de318 100644 --- a/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/builtins/view_image_tool.py +++ b/backend/packages/harness/deerflow/tools/builtins/view_image_tool.py @@ -122,6 +122,14 @@ def _view_image( Args: image_path: Absolute /mnt/user-data virtual path to the image file. Common formats supported: jpg, jpeg, png, webp, gif. """ + from deerflow.sandbox.tools import sandbox_authorization_scope + + with sandbox_authorization_scope(runtime): + return _view_image_authorized(runtime, image_path, tool_call_id) + + +def _view_image_authorized(runtime: Runtime, image_path: str, tool_call_id: str) -> Command: + """Read image bytes only after the sandbox execution gate has passed.""" from deerflow.sandbox.exceptions import SandboxRuntimeError from deerflow.sandbox.overwrite import unwrap_sandbox from deerflow.sandbox.sandbox_provider import get_sandbox_provider @@ -288,13 +296,15 @@ async def _aview_image( ) -> Command: """Run the blocking image read without letting cancellation outlive it.""" from deerflow.sandbox.lease import run_sync_lifecycle_operation + from deerflow.sandbox.tools import sandbox_authorization_scope_async - return await run_sync_lifecycle_operation( - _view_image, - runtime, - image_path, - tool_call_id, - ) + async with sandbox_authorization_scope_async(runtime): + return await run_sync_lifecycle_operation( + _view_image_authorized, + runtime, + image_path, + tool_call_id, + ) view_image_tool = StructuredTool.from_function( diff --git a/backend/tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py b/backend/tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..eb3441eac2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backend/tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +"""Offline regression and CLI probe for view_image sandbox authorization. + +From ``backend/``:: + + .venv/bin/python tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py --expect vulnerable + .venv/bin/python tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py --expect blocked + .venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_view_image_sandbox_authorization_regression.py -q + +The probe uses one synthetic GIF in a temporary directory. It needs no server, +model provider, credentials, or network access. +""" + +import argparse +import base64 +import json +import tempfile +from pathlib import Path +from types import SimpleNamespace +from unittest.mock import patch + +import pytest +from langchain.agents.middleware.types import ModelRequest +from langchain_core.language_models.fake_chat_models import FakeMessagesListChatModel +from langchain_core.messages import AIMessage, HumanMessage, ToolMessage + +from deerflow.agents.middlewares.view_image_middleware import ViewImageMiddleware +from deerflow.authz.adapter import GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter +from deerflow.authz.rbac import RbacAuthorizationProvider +from deerflow.authz.sandbox_authz import authorize_sandbox_execution +from deerflow.authz.tool_filter import apply_tool_authorization +from deerflow.config.app_config import AppConfig +from deerflow.config.authorization_config import AuthorizationConfig +from deerflow.config.model_config import ModelConfig +from deerflow.config.sandbox_config import SandboxConfig +from deerflow.guardrails.provider import GuardrailRequest +from deerflow.sandbox.exceptions import SandboxAuthorizationError +from deerflow.tools.builtins.view_image_tool import view_image_tool + +GIF_BYTES = base64.b64decode("R0lGODlhAQABAIAAAAAAAP///yH5BAEAAAAALAAAAAABAAEAAAIBRAA7") +IMAGE_PATH = "/mnt/user-data/uploads/synthetic.gif" + + +def _setup(root: Path, monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch, *, sandbox_allowed: bool): + uploads = root / "uploads" + uploads.mkdir() + image_file = uploads / "synthetic.gif" + image_file.write_bytes(GIF_BYTES) + context = {"thread_id": "synthetic-thread", "user_id": "synthetic-user", "user_role": "reviewer"} + runtime = SimpleNamespace( + state={"thread_data": {"workspace_path": str(root / "workspace"), "uploads_path": str(uploads), "outputs_path": str(root / "outputs")}}, + context=context, + config={}, + ) + config = AppConfig( + models=[ModelConfig(name="synthetic", model="synthetic", use="langchain_openai:ChatOpenAI", supports_vision=True)], + sandbox=SandboxConfig(use="deerflow.sandbox.local:LocalSandboxProvider"), + authorization=AuthorizationConfig(enabled=True, fail_closed=True, default_role="reviewer"), + ) + provider = RbacAuthorizationProvider(roles={"reviewer": {"tools": {"allow": ["view_image"]}, "sandbox": {"allow": sandbox_allowed}}}) + monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.config.get_app_config", lambda: config) + monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.authz.sandbox_authz.resolve_authorization_provider", lambda _: provider) + authorized_tools, _ = apply_tool_authorization([view_image_tool], context=context, app_config=config, authorization_provider=provider) + assert [tool.name for tool in authorized_tools] == ["view_image"] + tool_decision = GuardrailAuthorizationAdapter(provider, default_role="reviewer").evaluate( + GuardrailRequest(tool_name="view_image", tool_input={"image_path": IMAGE_PATH}, thread_id=context["thread_id"], user_id=context["user_id"], user_role=context["user_role"]) + ) + assert tool_decision.allow + return runtime, config, image_file + + +def _model_request(runtime, viewed_images: dict, tool_message: ToolMessage | None = None) -> ModelRequest: + messages = [ + HumanMessage(content="Describe this synthetic image"), + AIMessage(content="", tool_calls=[{"name": "view_image", "args": {"image_path": IMAGE_PATH}, "id": "image-call"}]), + tool_message or ToolMessage(content="Successfully read image", tool_call_id="image-call"), + ] + return ModelRequest( + model=FakeMessagesListChatModel(responses=[AIMessage(content="ok")]), + messages=messages, + system_message=None, + tool_choice=None, + tools=[], + response_format=None, + state={"messages": messages, "viewed_images": viewed_images}, + runtime=SimpleNamespace(context=runtime.context), + model_settings={}, + ) + + +def _image_payloads(request: ModelRequest) -> list[dict]: + return [block for message in request.messages for block in (message.content if isinstance(message.content, list) else []) if isinstance(block, dict) and block.get("type") == "image_url"] + + +def _image_metadata(image_file: Path) -> dict: + return {IMAGE_PATH: {"actual_path": str(image_file), "mime_type": "image/gif", "size": len(GIF_BYTES)}} + + +def test_allowed_sync_read_still_reaches_model(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, config, _ = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=True) + authorize_sandbox_execution(context=runtime.context, app_config=config) + result = view_image_tool.func(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + assert result.update["messages"][0].content == "Successfully read image" + request = ViewImageMiddleware()._inject(_model_request(runtime, result.update["viewed_images"], result.update["messages"][0])) + assert _image_payloads(request)[0]["image_url"]["url"] == f"data:image/gif;base64,{base64.b64encode(GIF_BYTES).decode()}" + + +def test_denied_sync_tool_stops_before_image_read(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, config, image_file = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=False) + with pytest.raises(SandboxAuthorizationError): + authorize_sandbox_execution(context=runtime.context, app_config=config) + original_open = open + reads = [] + + def record_open(file, *args, **kwargs): + if isinstance(file, (str, bytes, Path)) and Path(file).resolve() == image_file.resolve(): + reads.append(file) + return original_open(file, *args, **kwargs) + + with patch("builtins.open", side_effect=record_open): + with pytest.raises(SandboxAuthorizationError): + view_image_tool.func(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + assert reads == [] + + +def test_denied_restored_view_does_not_reenter_model(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, _, _ = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=True) + viewed = view_image_tool.func(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call").update["viewed_images"] + denied_provider = RbacAuthorizationProvider(roles={"reviewer": {"tools": {"allow": ["view_image"]}, "sandbox": {"allow": False}}}) + monkeypatch.setattr("deerflow.authz.sandbox_authz.resolve_authorization_provider", lambda _: denied_provider) + stranded = ViewImageMiddleware._create_image_context_message([{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}}]) + original_request = _model_request(runtime, viewed) + original_request = original_request.override(messages=[*original_request.messages, stranded]) + with patch("builtins.open", side_effect=AssertionError("denied image read")): + request = ViewImageMiddleware()._inject(original_request) + assert _image_payloads(request) == [] + assert stranded not in request.messages + + +def test_denied_tool_does_not_touch_live_sandbox(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, _, _ = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=False) + runtime.state["sandbox"] = {"sandbox_id": "synthetic-remote"} + with patch("deerflow.sandbox.sandbox_provider.get_sandbox_provider", side_effect=AssertionError("denied sandbox lookup")): + with pytest.raises(SandboxAuthorizationError): + view_image_tool.func(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_denied_async_tool_and_restored_view_do_not_read(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, _, image_file = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=False) + stale_context = ViewImageMiddleware._create_image_context_message([{"type": "image_url", "image_url": {"url": ""}}]) + user_message = HumanMessage(id="view-image-context:user-authored", content="Keep this message") + original_request = _model_request(runtime, _image_metadata(image_file)) + original_request = original_request.override(messages=[*original_request.messages, stale_context, user_message]) + with patch("builtins.open", side_effect=AssertionError("denied image read")): + with pytest.raises(SandboxAuthorizationError): + await view_image_tool.coroutine(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + + async def handler(request): + return request + + request = await ViewImageMiddleware().awrap_model_call(original_request, handler) + assert _image_payloads(request) == [] + assert stale_context not in request.messages + assert user_message in request.messages + + +@pytest.mark.asyncio +async def test_allowed_async_tool_and_model_injection(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + runtime, _, _ = _setup(tmp_path, monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=True) + result = await view_image_tool.coroutine(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + + async def handler(request): + return request + + request = await ViewImageMiddleware().awrap_model_call(_model_request(runtime, result.update["viewed_images"], result.update["messages"][0]), handler) + assert len(_image_payloads(request)) == 1 + + +def _run_probe() -> dict[str, object]: + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="deerflow-image-authz-") as temp_dir, pytest.MonkeyPatch.context() as monkeypatch: + runtime, config, image_file = _setup(Path(temp_dir), monkeypatch, sandbox_allowed=False) + with pytest.raises(SandboxAuthorizationError): + authorize_sandbox_execution(context=runtime.context, app_config=config) + original_open = open + image_reads = 0 + + def record_open(file, *args, **kwargs): + nonlocal image_reads + if isinstance(file, (str, bytes, Path)) and Path(file).resolve() == image_file.resolve(): + image_reads += 1 + return original_open(file, *args, **kwargs) + + with patch("builtins.open", side_effect=record_open): + try: + result = view_image_tool.func(runtime=runtime, image_path=IMAGE_PATH, tool_call_id="image-call") + except SandboxAuthorizationError: + tool_denied = True + viewed_images = {} + else: + tool_denied = False + viewed_images = result.update.get("viewed_images", {}) + request = ViewImageMiddleware()._inject(_model_request(runtime, viewed_images or _image_metadata(image_file))) + return {"tool_denied": tool_denied, "sandbox_denied": True, "image_reads": image_reads, "model_received_image": bool(_image_payloads(request))} + + +def _main() -> int: + parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description=__doc__, formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter) + parser.add_argument("--expect", choices=("vulnerable", "blocked"), required=True) + args = parser.parse_args() + observed = _run_probe() + vulnerable = not observed["tool_denied"] and observed["image_reads"] >= 2 and observed["model_received_image"] + blocked = observed["tool_denied"] and observed["image_reads"] == 0 and not observed["model_received_image"] + status = "vulnerable" if vulnerable else "blocked" if blocked else "inconclusive" + print(json.dumps({**observed, "observed": status, "expected": args.expect}, sort_keys=True)) + return 0 if status == args.expect else 2 + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + raise SystemExit(_main())