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0014dbba7c
`AttachmentService.save_upload_file` joined the client-supplied multipart filename onto a fresh temp directory without sanitization. A filename with `../` segments escaped the temp dir, so the upload wrote attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary host path and the `finally` cleanup `unlink` then deleted that same traversed path — arbitrary file write and delete behind an endpoint that only requires an unauthenticated session id. Reduce the filename to its basename (normalising POSIX and Windows separators, falling back to `upload.bin` for empty/`.`/`..`) before building the temp path, so writes stay confined to the temp directory. Adds regression tests: a parametrized check of the basename normalisation and an end-to-end test proving a traversal filename can no longer overwrite or delete a victim file outside the temp/WareHouse area. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>